Will Scandal Upend Japan's Lower House Elections?

PM Takaichi Prepares for the Lower House Elections

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 26, 2026

Japan’s House of Representatives was dissolved on January 23. All the members of the House are up for election. The House is empty now. A general election to fill its 465 seats was officially announced on January 27, and voters will go to the polls on February 8. While the election itself requires voters to choose between Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and another person to be the leader of Japan, the election presents deeper choices between the right and the center and between pressure groups and populism. (The parties on the left are not a realistic option.) The voters will consider the Prime Minister’s economic and security policies, as well as her political ethics. 
 
It will be a highly unusual election. This is the first time a prime minister has dissolved the Diet at the beginning of its annual ordinary session since 1966 when former prime minister Eisaku Sato dissolved the House to bolster popular support for his administration. The 2026 general election also will have the shortest timeframe; election day is only 16 days after the dissolution. The previous record was 17 days when former prime minister Fumio Kishida dissolved the Diet in 2021.
 
Just before the election campaign begins, polls conducted by news organizations showed that the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating had fallen. The decline appears to reflect public doubts about holding a snap election before the Diet has passed the FY2026 budget bill. In the poll by Mainichi Shimbun, 41 percent disapproved of the snap election, while only 27 percent approved.
 
A Vote for the Right or the Center
Takaichi is asking the voters to validate the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). The LDP’s previous coalition partner, Komeito, had been working as a brake on the LDP’s rightward drift, but the JIP identifies itself as an “accel” or accelerant of the move to the right. The JIP is now quickening the pass by calling on the LDP to promote such conservative policies as eliminating Paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution of Japan, which prohibits maintaining armed forces and other “war potential”.
 
Takaichi has long been known as a hawkish figure among the LDP members; for example, she has advocated prime ministerial visits to the Shinto Yasukuni Shrine for Japan’s war dead. On several matters, the LDP-JIP government is taking positions further to the right than previous administrations led by Shigeru Ishiba or Fumio Kishida. Takaichi hopes voters will endorse her conservative agenda, similar to Shinzo Abe’s, including a review of the three principles for transferring defense equipment and of the three non-nuclear principles.
 
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito offer another choice for voters by establishing a new party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), in the Lower House. One of the two co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda, has explained that the new party will integrate centrist parties so that they can effectively challenge Takaichi’s right-wing administration.
 
Although the CDPJ on its own has been taking positions on the left and has in the past sought to cooperate with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) in elections, the new CRA is staking out positions on the center-right to attract moderate and conservative lawmakers. As former CDPJ lawmakers have left the party before joining the CRA, CDPJ’s leftist tradition was not succeeded to the CRA. Because the JCP, Reiwa Shinsengumi, and the Social Democratic Party are unable to build a coalition on the left, the voters will have to choose between the right with the LDP-JIP coalition and the center with the CRA.
 
Populism or Solid Supporters
Recent elections in Japan are testimony to the advance of populism. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Sanseito embody this movement. They can attract young voters with eccentric policy proposals and video messages through social networking services.
 
Following its successful campaign in the Upper House election last summer, the DPP has been repeating its slogan: “We will increase your take-home pay.” The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, reached a deal with Takaichi last month to raise the threshold for the imposition of income tax to an annual income of 1.78 million yen. Tamaki is asking for even more in the campaign.
 
Sanseito focuses on xenophobic policies. Some conservatives worry about the increasing number of foreigners seen in the streets, trains and popular tourist destinations. Sanseito promises to deport low-skilled workers to their home countries and to regulate more stringently foreign investment in Japanese real estate. The party targets independent voters who lean conservative.
 
By contrast, the CRA is trying to distance itself from populism. The alliance is basing its campaign on support from established organizations. Candidates from the CDPJ have solid support from labor unions in the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). Komeito lawmakers are backed by Soka Gakkai, which has about 20,000 votes in each single-seat district. Although the CRA is not popular with young and independent voters, the party nevertheless has a good chance to win single-seat districts around Japan.
 
The LDP has historically relied on several large organizations, including major corporations, local chambers of commerce, agricultural organizations, and associations of medical services to bring out the vote. But its leader, Takaichi, is now pursuing a populist agenda, including an increase in take-home pay and stricter regulation of the foreign presence in Japan. Takaichi’s strategy indicates that even the ruling party cannot depend entirely on its traditional supporters and must turn to the constituency of independent voters.
 
Campaign Policies
It is notable that Takaichi announced that she would consider a consumption tax cut. Although she had opposed it on the view that it would not have an immediate impact on the economy, she introduced a tax cut bill after pressure from opposition parties. Her policy change made the bond market skeptical of her economic and financial policies, resulting in a sudden increase in interest rate on long-term government bonds. The consumption tax cut has now become a critical issue in the election.
 
Consistent with the view of the LDP’s coalition partner, Takaichi is suggesting a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food. How the government will make up for the moratorium’s reduction in tax revenue is a discussion for later – after the election. The CRA has proposed a permanent consumption tax cut for food backed by a governmental fund. The DPP would cut the tax rate from ten percent to five percent.  The JCP, Sanseito, and Reiwa Shinsengumi have all called for a permanent abolition of the tax.
 
The CRA has prioritized every walk of life in the domestic economy, and not a nationalistic agenda such as a constitutional amendment, to present a clear contrast with the leading coalition. The LDP and the JIP also are emphasizing their efforts to combat inflation. To reduce contributions by the current working generation, the JIP is stressing the need for social security reform.
 
The Scandal Factor
The campaigns of three of the parties will likely suffer from negative public reaction to scandals or misdoings. First, the LDP has decided to give formal party backing to the lawmakers who were involved in the kickback fund scandal of some of the former factions in the party. Takaichi insists that those members who were re-elected in 2024 election have cleared the voters’ scrutiny. The LDP still rejects stricter regulation of political contributions, which the opposition parties highlight as evidence of the LDP’s unwillingness to engage in true political reform. 
 
Second, the Weekly Bunshun magazine reported in mid-January that the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU), formerly the Unification Church, has been working behind the scenes to establish Takaichi’s presidency of the LDP – and her prime ministership. Bunshun found that Takaichi’s name appeared 32 times in the FFWPU’s special reports to the “True Mother (Han Hak Ja)” between 2018 and 2022. The report also identified her as the best choice to be Japan’s prime minister. The opposition parties may demand that Takaichi explain her relationship with the FFWPU.
 
Third, the JIP allowed its local leaders to avoid paying their own health insurance premiums, an evasion scheme premised on the theory of an exception for board members of any incorporated association. The party has expelled these leaders, but the fallout will hurt the JIP’s effort to keep to its target of 38 seats in the Lower House. As seen in 2024 election, some scandals of the leading parties may slow down their campaigns.