Japan's Prime Minister Announces a Snap Election

https://craj.jp/

With a New Competitor

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 19, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced on January 19 that she would dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) on January 23 and hold a general election of the House on February 8. In anticipation of Takaichi’s election decision, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito established a new party named Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) [中道改革連合] to cooperate in the coming election.
 
The Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), decided to hold gubernatorial and mayoral elections in Osaka on February 8 as well to promote the Osaka Capital Initiative, JIP’s unique policy. Although the prime minister and the major parties claim that the elections will promote the well-being of Japanese citizens, the politicians are takin these actions for their own survival.
 
Asking Public Endorsement for the Administration
In her press conference on the 19^th, Takaichi explained that she would ask voters for their fundamental support of her administration that was established only last October and of her decision to form a coalition with JIP. “This is a decision for the people to make on which direction Japan will go,” Takaichi said. The political vacuum created by a snap election, however, will delay the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill and measures to protect against price inflation. Takaichi dismisses this concern by claiming that they were included in the supplemental budget delivered last December.
 
Takaichi’s goal in the Lower House election is to achieve a simple majority -- 233 seats out of 465 -- for the LDP-JIP coalition. She indicated that she would resign if the coalition did not hit that target. But the leading coalition already has this majority. The premiership is always at stake in a Lower House election.
 
Takaichi thus will dissolve the Lower House for the limited purpose of maintaining the status quo. This fact raises the question of why she wants a snap election. Moreover, the election will not change the composition of the Upper House where the leading coalition is short of a majority.
 
Takaichi must believe that the election will boost her coalition’s voting power in the Lower House, aligning the composition of the Lower House with her popularity in the opinion polls. Takaichi has repeated slogans from her 2025 platform such as “responsible and proactive public finances” and “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”
 
These policies require the approval of both chambers of the Diet. Takaichi has attempted to accelerate these policies by taking advantage of her high approval ratings in national polls. Also at issue in the election is her proposal of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food – a key populist issue. Consumers are deeply worried about the future of price inflation as reflected in a survey by the Bank of Japan, in which over 80 percent anticipate higher prices a year from now.
 
Another purpose of the snap election is to increase supporters around Takaichi. The LDP reportedly favors restoring “double nominations” of those lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal of the now-former Abe factions in the LDP.  The double nomination is a system that enables a candidate who lost in a single-seat district to nevertheless win a seat through a proportional district. The option was denied to most members of the now-former Abe faction in 2024 election. Takaichi surely hopes to fortify her position by making it easier for former allies of Abe to gain seats.
 
Takaichi also wants to solidify her right-wing position by obtaining the endorsement of the coalition she assembled last year. She refused to admit that it was a mistake for her to have let Komeito leave the leading coalition last October. If the election goes her way, Takaichi will have popular approval for a new coalition, and she will be able to promote such conservative policies described in the agreement with JIP as amending the self-defense provisions in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, limiting imperial succession to a patrilinear line, and endorsing the official use of nicknames instead of introducing separate surnames of married couples.
 
All this agenda can be achieved without a snap election, if Takaichi can get support from some opposition parties. There is speculation that she decided for an election because she: 1) had failed to persuade the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) to join the leading coalition, 2) China’s pressure on Japan would seriously impact Japan’s economy, and 3) was caught in her own scandal exposing her relationship with the former Unification Church.
 
Takaichi heavily relies on her popularity to remove those negative elements sticking around her administration. She needs a reassurance for her administration. Her message to the voters of the snap election must be “Do you love me, or someone else?” But it causes an accusation among parties that her decision for a snap election is abuse of power given to the prime minister.
 
Integration of Opposition Parties
Takaichi’s decision on a snap election had two unexpected side effects. Their impact on the coming election is hard to assess. The first was the combination of the CDPJ and Komeito in the Lower House, establishing the CRA. They published their policy platform on January 19, which included sustainable economic policy, formulation of a new social security model, building an inclusive society, realistic diplomacy and security policies and continuing reform of political funds and elections. Note that the combination is only in the Lower House; the CDPJ and Komeito remain as independent parties in the Upper House.
 
The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, and the Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, are co-leaders of the CRA. Both parties expect their Lower House members to leave their parties and join the CRA. CDPJ currently holds 148 seats in the Lower House and Komeito has 24. If all their members join the CRA, it creates a substantial group of 172 lawmakers in the House, which, while still a minority, can contend in a meaningful way with the LDP-JIP coalition, which holds 233 seats.
 
Noda revealed that he has been approaching Komeito ever since Komeito left the leading coalition with the LDP last October. Even though it was the biggest opposition party, the CDPJ unable to lead the opposition parties against the ruling LDP over the years. For its part, Komeito needed another partner to survive the next election, having rejected the support of the LDP. Both parties have some common policy concerns on their agendas, such as the regulation of corporate political donations and the introduction of selective separate surnames.
 
Noda and Saito stressed that their intention is to form a group of centrists. Komeito left the leading coalition to protest the ascendancy of right-wing leadership in the LDP led by Takaichi. The LDP went further rightward by launching its coalition with the JIP.  On the left, the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi pursue such eccentric policy positions as the total abolishment of the consumption tax.
 
The CDPJ and Komeito plan to position themselves between the right and left to offer an alternative to the LDP-led government. Noda and Saito plan to approach the DPP and moderate lawmakers in the LDP to join them.
 
Distinguishing themselves from the rise of populism in Japanese politics as seen in advance of Sanseito, the CDPJ and Komeito have several firm supporters. These include the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) for CDPJ and the Buddhist organization, Soka Gakkai, for Komeito. Backed by these groups, Komeito will support former CDPJ candidates in single-seat constituencies in the coming election. Komeito will focus on proportional districts and not field any candidates in single-seat districts. This decision could be a major threat to LDP candidates whose principal advantage in past elections has been the support of Komeito.
 
For all that, the new party could prove a disappointment. In the most recent poll by Asahi Shimbun, only 20 percent expected CRA to be a serious contender against the Takaichi administration; 69 percent thought that it would not be.
 
Local Election for Osaka to Become a Second Capital
The second by-product of Takaichi’s decision was the JIP’s unilateral decision to hold local elections in Osaka on the same day as the Lower House elections. The JIP’s leader, Hirofumi Yoshimura, resigned as Governor of Osaka and announced that he would run in the gubernatorial election – a race that was brought about by his resignation. He is doing so with the intent of gaining the voters’ endorsement of JIP’s “Osaka Capital Initiative.” The JIP’s vice-leader and the mayor of Osaka city, Hideyuki Yokoyama, took the same course.
 
The “Osaka Capital Initiative” aims to integrate the governments of the Osaka prefecture and Osaka city to create a special autonomous government in Osaka. The initiative is modeled on the government of metropolitan Tokyo. JIP sought voter approval of the initiative through referenda in 2015 and 2020, but voters rejected it twice. Yoshimura once said that he would not seek a third chance as a politician after the loss in the 2020 referendum.
 
Yoshimura’s frequent and sudden policy changes are within his discretion as JIP leader. When he decided that JIP would form a coalition with the LDP, Yoshimura shifted his legislative priority from the regulation of political donations to the reduction of seats in the Diet. His stepping down is recognized as a request for public endorsement of this policy change.
 
The voters in Osaka city will vote for three elections for the Lower House, governor of Osaka and mayor of Osaka on February 8. Yoshimura and Yokoyama expect high voter turnout for the triple elections. Some observers including JIP members ask why the two leaders feel the need to step down and run again in the by-election if it is simply for the purpose of gaining voter support for their unilateral policy change. Other major parties, including the LDP, will not field any candidates in the two elections.
 
Takaichi’s sudden decision to call a snap election for her survival induced unusual responses by other parties. Neither the election nor the responses will appeal to citizens who are frustrated with how the national government has managed economic and security policies. Rather, these events are for the politicians and parties themselves. A Lower House election costs 80 billion yen.
 
Abrupt moves in the new year reflect the situation in today’s politics in Japan, which is filled with populism, jingoism, and political maneuvering. The politicians’ actions distance the government and the parties from the Japanese who, the majority who suffer from the unstable economy.