Asia Policy Events, Monday December 8, 2025

WITA’S TRADE & TECH SUMMIT. 12/8, 9:00am-1:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Washington International Trade Association (WITA). Speakers: Ambassador Rick Switzer, Deputy United States Trade Representative, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; Moderator: Gary Shapiro, CEO and Vice Chair, Consumer Technology Association; Brandon Remington, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Arrow Augerot, Head, International Policy, Americas, Amazon; Whitney Baird, President & CEO, United States Council for International Business; Jason Oxman, President & CEO, Information Technology Industry Council; Robert Porter, Chief Global Affairs Officer, Coupang; Jordan Heiber, Vice President of International Digital Economy Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Emily Benson, Head of Strategy, Minerva; Amy Morgan, Vice President, Trade Compliance, Altana; Matthew Schruers, President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association; John Corrigan, Senior Director, Trade and Industrial Strategy, Silverado Policy Accelerator; Rob Atkinson, President, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation; Geoffrey Gertz, Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security; Dr. Alina Polyakova, President and CEO, Center for European Policy Analysis; Hon. Nazak Nikakhtar, Partner, National Security Chair, Wiley Rein LLP; Representative Suzan DelBene (D-WA-1), U.S. House of Representatives; Representative Darin LaHood (R-IL-18), U.S. House of Representatives; Josh Kallmer, Chief Global Affairs Officer, Zoom Communications Inc.

IS NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION DEAD? 12/8, 11:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Distinguished University Professor, Georgetown University; Cho Byung Jae, Former Chancellor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy; Jun Bong-geun, Professor Emeritus, Korea National Diplomatic Academy. 

ADDRESSING CONFLICT OF LAWS AND FACILITATING DIGITAL PRODUCT PASSPORTS FOR CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS VALUE CHAINS: FROM CENTRALISATION TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION. 12/8, Noon-1:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: U.S.-Asia Law Institute, NYU School of Law. Speaker: Dr. Luke Nottage, Professor, Comparative and Transnational Business Law, Sydney Law School.

OUT OF BALANCE: WHAT’S NEXT FOR GROWTH, WEALTH, AND DEBT? 12/8, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: McKinsey Global Institute. Speakers: Bill Dudley, Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Rebecca Patterson, Vice Chair, Bretton Woods Committee; Matt Peterson, Ideas Editor, Barron’s; Alan Taylor, Member, Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England; Jan Mischke, Partner, McKinsey Global Institute; Olivia White, Director and Senior Partner, McKinsey Global Institute.

TAIWAN ROUNDTABLE: NAVIGATING TAIWAN’S AI FUTURE: POLICY, INNOVATION, AND GOVERNANCE. 12/8, Noon-2:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: George Washington University. Speakers: Susan Aaronson, Research Professor, Director, Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub, GWU; Hsin-Chung Liao, Associate Professor, Chair of the Department of Public Administration, National Chengchi University; Cheng-Ming Wang, Director-General, Department of Digital Service, Ministry of Digital Affairs, Taiwan.

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS: A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR CHRIS VAN HOLLEN. 12/8, 12:30-1:15pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Chris Van Hollen, U.S. Senator (D-MD); Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program.

Takaichi Pressured Outside, Protected Inside

Takaichi Pressured Outside, Protected Inside

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 1, 2025

The government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is running into trouble in its international relations, but it is developing firm footing domestically. The diplomatic row between Japan and China, stemming from Takaichi’s reference to a Taiwan contingency, keeps on escalating. As China extends its anti-Japan campaign to Western countries, Japan continues to officially reject China’s demand that Takaichi retract her comment. At home though, Takaichi has maintained her domestic support and focus.
 
Takaichi spoke by telephone with U.S. President Donald Trump on November 25, when he called her just hours after his call with Chinese President Xi Jinping. She reported that Trump spoke with her warmly and that he encouraged her to call him anytime. But she did not reveal to the press the details of her conversation with Trump on Taiwan issue, nor did the White House.
 
Nor was the substance of the Japan-U.S. summit talk released by Japanese officials, but The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump asked Takaichi to “lower the volume on Taiwan.” This snippet of the call, different in tone from Trump’s usual calls, and the fact that he initiated it indicates that Trump is worried. Unusually for a close ally, Takaichi did not attempt to alert the U.S. about her comment ahead of time. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to North Korea and meeting with its leader Kim Jong Il in 2002 was a similar change of policy unanticipated by the White House.
 
China’s furious response to Takaichi’s comment is based (among other things) on the fact that Imperial Japan once occupied Taiwan. In one reaction, a letter to the United Nations, China insisted on “its right of self-defense under the UN Charter.” This “right,” which appears in several places in the charter, would allow a country to take military action against an “enemy state.” Japan criticized China’s argument as baseless, labeling the clause obsolete. Notably, when Xi sought Trump’s support in dealing with Japan, he also asked the United Kingdom and France to support the one-China policy.
 
Although Takaichi has refused to retract her statement, she may be beginning to step back from it. In a meeting of the Committee on Fundamental National Policies in the Diet, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, asked whether Takaichi’s comment had been properly prepared as a Japanese government official statement and whether she had instead expressed a personal view. Takaichi explained that Japan’s actions in the event of a Taiwan contingency would be based on the actual situation -- functionally correcting her original statement.
 
Takaichi also attributed her controversial comment to the member, Katsuya Okada, who asked about the Taiwan contingency in a Lower House committee hearing on November 7. “While I did not want to say about a specific possibility, I sincerely answered the question, because I was asked with specific cases,” Takaichi told Noda. Supporters of Takaichi have accused Okada of setting a trap for Takaichi.
 
In a poll conducted by Mainichi Shimbun in late November, 50 percent of respondents believed that Takaichi’s comment on Taiwan was appropriate while 25 percent thought it would hurt Japan. As China escalates its diplomatic and economic actions against Japan, public sympathy for Takaichi grows, potentially inflaming rather than cooling sentiments about China.
 
Elsewhere on the prime minister’s agenda, Takaichi’s handling of domestic politics looks to be going well. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) added three independent lawmakers to its parliamentary group in the House of Representatives. These lawmakers had left the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) in September out of frustration with JIP leadership, but they voted for Takaichi as prime minister in October. LDP leaders invited them to join the LDP group.
 
With the additional three members, the LDP accounts for 199 seats in the Lower House. With the 34 seats held by JIP, the coalition has secured a simple majority of 233 seats out of 465 in the Lower House. As provided in Japan’s constitution, the Lower House has the power to reject Upper House decision on budget bill and non-confidence resolution against prime minister. The Upper House does not have the reciprocal power on those two issues. Thus, the coalition can pass its own budget bill simply with the Lower House majority. The coalition can also block a no-confidence resolution against Takaichi since it can disregard possible opposition from the Upper House.
 
The Takaichi Cabinet has approved a supplemental budget of 18.3 trillion yen, which includes an economic stimulus plan to help households suffering from price inflation. The supplemental budget also proposes 1.1 trillion yen in defense spending. This appropriation would enable the government to reach the target floor for defense spending of 2 percent of GDP two years earlier than scheduled. We expect the bill to be submitted to the Diet and passed with the votes of the LDP-JIP coalition by the end of current extraordinary session on December 17.
 
The LDP and JIP agreed on reductions in Diet seats, an issue that JIP considers its top legislative priority for the coalition. The two parties hope to submit a bill that, within a year, would eliminate 25 seats in single-seat districts and 20 seats in the proportional districts in the House of Representatives. Although JIP is stressing the importance of the seat reduction agreement, it is not at all clear that the agreement will find a broad consensus in the parties. In any case, JIP is showing no sign of leaving the coalition with the LDP.
 
Hirofumi Yoshimura, the leader of JIP as well as the Governor of Osaka has said that Takaichi need not retract her comment on Taiwan. He has also refused to attend any event held by the Chinese Consulate General in Osaka in response to the Consul General’s offensive comments about Takaichi over social media. JIP’s apparent unconditional support for the Takaichi effectively protects the administration. For now, her government is insulated from domestic opposition.

Alliance Burden Sharing in Asia

South Korea Redefines Alliance Burden Sharing 

After Trump’s Asia Visit

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published November 11, 2025 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

South Korea’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit showcased a tightening defense partnership with the United States. The U.S. push for allies to shoulder greater security burdens converged with South Korean efforts to deepen autonomy and prepare for long-term uncertainty about U.S. commitments, creating a mix of deeper operational integration and quiet hedging.

The Trump administration, under the umbrella of “alliance modernization,” is pushing for increased South Korean defense spending and a shift in U.S. focus from solely countering North Korea to “strategic flexibility,” which would allow U.S. forces in South Korea to assume regional missions aimed mainly at China. South Korea is expanding defense investment, accelerating transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), and pursuing nuclear fuel capabilities, all while reiterating that it will not be dragged into a broader confrontation with China.

The upshot is a more capable, forward-leaning alliance that is also more transactional, competitive, and sovereignty-driven. The question for policymakers is whether this becomes the new normal of the alliance or the first phase of a more fragmented Indo-Pacific.

Another Layer

A similar tightening of ties occurred in parallel between President Donald Trump and new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as well as her surprisingly warm meeting with Korean President Lee Jae Myung on the sidelines of APEC. Beneath this official narrative of drawing closer, however, there is another layer to security developments.

“Both Korea and Japan are trying to keep the Americans locked in while they are preparing for the day when America doesn’t care enough to protect you,” says a Seoul-based observer familiar with the thinking of both Korean and Japanese senior officials, who preferred to comment on background. “The trade and investment deal components of this are ultimately protection money,” he added. “They wouldn’t be doing it if there wasn’t the risk of losing security guarantees from the U.S.”

The trade pressures may reinforce the need to tighten security ties, but they also undermine confidence in the alliance, some experts believe.

“U.S. expressions of support for allies are in the context of helping them to assist the U.S. coalition against China,” says Bruce Klingner, senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and former CIA analyst. “Yet, that effort is undermined by Trump’s arbitrary, protectionist tariffs, which pummeled allies worse than opponents.

The United States, Klingner added, forced South Korea “into a disadvantageous trade deal” that violates the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS FTA).

Nuclear Submarines?

The centerpiece of an apparent new level of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation is an agreement for joint production of nuclear-powered submarines at a South Korean-owned shipyard in Philadelphia.

“South Korea will be building its Nuclear Powered Submarine in the Philadelphia Shipyards, right here in the good ol’ U.S.A.,” Trump proclaimed in a October 29 post on Truth Social. “Shipbuilding in our Country will soon be making a BIG COMEBACK.”

Some experts claimed this was a breakthrough toward strategic interdependence.

“This move dismantles the old anmi-gyeongjung (security with the United States, economy with China) framework,” wrote Seong-Hyon Lee, a senior fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations, in The Interpreter. “South Korea is no longer merely buying American security; it is integrating its industrial base with that of the United States to form a single, strategic-economic bloc,” argued Lee.

But subsequent developments call this into question. Senior executives at Hanwha, the South Korean firm that has taken ownership of the Philly Shipyard, admitted that the facility is not capable of building a nuclear-powered submarine, not only technically but also because of insufficient security to conduct such secret work.

Senior South Korean officials have since told the National Assembly that the intention is, in fact, to build those submarines in South Korea, with the clear goal of enhancing the country’s defense capabilities, independently of the United States.

“Investing in a submarine facility at the Hanwha Philly Shipyard would not be realistic, and neither would it be realistic to contract with an American company like General Dynamics to build the submarines,” National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac told the National Assembly’s House Steering Committee. While paying due respect to the alliance, “we’re emphasizing defense autonomy as we seek to take on a bigger role and make greater contributions,” Wi said.

The Greater Prize

Behind the nuclear submarine agreement lies a deeper, and more significant, agenda for the Lee administration: a revision of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, known as the 123 Agreement, to give South Korea the ability to enrich nuclear fuel and reprocess spent fuel, both of which are important to the expansion of the country’s nuclear power industry but also needed to operate submarine reactors. While the submarine agreement has gotten most of the media attention, the 123 Agreement’s revision is the greater prize.

South Korea has long sought this goal but has been blocked by the United States, which saw this as a doorway to potential nuclear weapons proliferation. By framing this as an issue of civilian nuclear power development, however, South Koreans in both conservative and progressive camps saw this as a means of acquiring near-threshold capability to go nuclear, without yet crossing the line—what some refer to as nuclear latency.

South Korean officials, in this view, understood that an appeal to build their nuclear power industry was not going to appeal to President Trump and his senior officials. But it could gain support if packaged as part of taking more responsibility for their own defense.

“Mr. Trump either did not understand the implications, or did not care,” wrote The Economist. “South Korea’s moves toward an insurance policy betray great unease about the future of its alliance with America.”

If the president did not understand what he signed off on in Seoul, national security officials in Washington with long experience on these issues are apparently aware of the Pandora’s box that was being opened. According to Korean media reports, the delay in publishing a written joint document detailing the agreements reached on tariffs and national security issues is due to an internal review in Washington.

A senior official in the South Korean government told the Hankyoreh newspaper that “the US Department of Energy is apparently upset with how many concessions Korea received in regard to the two countries’ nuclear energy agreement.”

OPCON transfer and the China question

The delay in issuing a joint statement following the Security Consultative Meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and South Korean Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-back, along with senior officials, may have partly been due to a lack of detailed agreement on key issues.

The two sides discussed the transfer of wartime OPCON, based on a previous plan that set out three phases to verify the operational capabilities of a future Combined Forces Command under a South Korean commander. The transfer has been stalled due to delays in U.S. verification and the lack of urgency by the previous conservative government.

In the joint meeting and in a direct meeting between Hegseth and Lee, the South Korean leader expressed his desire to complete the second phase by 2026 and move rapidly toward finalizing the transfer. Lee pitched this as a gesture toward the Trump administration’s expressed desire to shift its defense role.

“The early recovery of wartime operational control within my term will be an important opportunity to further deepen and develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance,” Lee reportedly told Hegseth. “If our military capabilities are significantly strengthened and we take the lead in defending the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. defense burden in the Indo-Pacific region will also be reduced.”

Hegseth made no specific commitments on concluding the verification process on South Korea’s desired timetable. There was similar ambiguity on the issue of “strategic flexibility,” an issue that has long been discussed between the two allies. The term refers to the idea that U.S. forces based in South Korea might be deployed out of the peninsula for missions other than the defense against North Korean aggression.

The two sides have sidestepped this issue by agreeing in general terms that U.S. forces can be moved wherever the U.S. commander-in-chief wants, while retaining the understanding that those forces are there to defend South Korea against a North Korean attack. South Korea has long insisted that the 28,500 U.S. forces based in South Korea are essential for the defense against a potential North Korean attack, but also as the trigger for deploying massive U.S. forces committed under joint operational plans.

Behind this issue lies South Korean concerns that the Trump administration might seek a peace deal with North Korea that could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Hegseth and senior U.S. military officials have pledged to maintain the force commitment in South Korea. But he also alluded to their use in contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula, most likely around Taiwan.

“At the same time, we need to enhance flexibility to respond to other contingencies in the region,” Hegseth said following the security talks. He called for deeper coordination between the two countries to expand the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

South Korea, however, is not committed to a wider confrontation with China. Lee, while shoring up ties with the United States, has cultivated closer relations with China, particularly in the realm of economic cooperation. The APEC sideline meeting between Lee and Chinese leader Xi Jinping reportedly featured extensive discussions and personal warmth. It was notably different in tone from the brief thirty-minute meeting between Xi and Takaichi, which was clearly frosty.

“There will be disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea on China policy, but a greater similarity of views on North Korea because both Trump and Lee want to engage North Korea,” observes Klingner. “On China, Lee will still try to straddle the fence.” The meeting with Xi focused on the restoration of economic relations and a plea to Xi to encourage North Korea to resume engagement.

The goal of pairing security ties with the United States and economic ties with China has been a consistent feature of South Korean foreign policy, including under the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which was also careful about offering overt support for military contingencies around Taiwan.

“As the role of U.S. Forces Korea expands, it is crucial to establish safeguards through sufficient consultation to ensure that South Korea is not drawn into regional conflicts against its will,” Donga Ilbo commented.

Multilayered Policy

The effort by South Korean leaders to balance the competing demands of their ally, the United States, and the pursuit of national interests in Northeast Asia is not new. The goal of greater defense self-reliance has also been long-standing, particularly by progressive South Korean administrations. The difference now lies mostly in the volatile nature of the Trump administration and uncertainty about its policy direction. That drives South Korea and Japan, and other U.S. allies, to increasingly think about lessening dependency on the United States.

“Unpredictability makes everyone nervous, and it leads them to consider other alternatives,” says Klingner.

Takaichi's China Test

Above is Sanae Takaichi when she was running for LDP president in 2021, holding forth at a rally of Tibetan, Uighur, Hong Kong and Taiwan independence activists inside LDP headquarters. Credit to Michael Cucek, Temple University, Japan

Japan Faces China’s Wolf Warriors

By Takuya Nishimura

Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point

Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun

You can find his blog, J Update here

November 25, 2025

A careless reference to a “Taiwan contingency” by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi drew a vocal official retort from China. As Beijing plays its “wolf warrior diplomacy” gambit against Japan, Tokyo has not responded with any effective countermeasures. Japanese foreign policy officials predict that the bilateral disputes will not be settled any time soon and that the negative consequences to Japan of such a failure are growing. It may also be true that China is using Takaichi’s comment as an excuse to broadcast its longstanding views on the place of Taiwan in China’s sphere of influence.

On November 7 at the Diet discussion, Takaichi said that a Chinese blockade around Taiwan deploying warships with the use of force would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. In such a condition, Japan could invoke its right to collective self-defense to justify activating its self-defense forces with a country with a close relationship with Japan. The “country” in this context is presumably the United States – although U.S. President Donald Trump has yet to demonstrate the closeness of this relationship.

 Before delivering her comment, Takaichi had had a middle-of-the-night (or early morning) meeting at 3 a.m. to discuss a possible “Taiwan contingency” with her staff. Although Takaichi told her staff after the Diet discussion that she might have gone too far, it is likely that her comment on Taiwan was what she meant as she had consulted with her diplomatic advisers. She has refused to retract her words.

China sees Taiwan as one of its core interests. As a result, Beijing would and did respond aggressively to Takaichi. Whether her remark was merely careless or whether it was an affirmative line in the sand mattered not to China. The Chinese Consul General to Osaka, Xue Jian, posted on social media a comment suggesting the beheading of the “filthy heard” of the Japanese leader. Beijing also issued recommendations to its citizens, including college students, not to travel to Japan. China demanded that the Takaichi administration retract the statement.

Moreover, China decided to treat Takaichi’s comment as a form of military intimidation. The People’s Liberation Army Daily regarded Takaichi’s observation as interference in China’s internal affairs and an infringement on China’s sovereignty. “Any external interference forces will be crushed to ashes,” the paper announced. Four China Coast Guard vessels entered territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands on November 16.

China continues to apply diplomatic pressure on Japan. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, sent a letter to UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, on November 21, stating that Japan had issued a threat of force against China for the first time. China froze again its imports of Japanese seafood by imposing stricter inspections of Japanese cargo. Until this decision, Japan had since May been able to export goods to China with few restrictions.

Other ostensibly private sector actions followed. Some Chinese airlines stopped flights to Japan. Chinese travel agencies cancelled reservations to hotels in Japan. These measures have begun to have an impact on the Japanese economy. The worst decision for Japan was China’s embargo of exports of rare earth minerals an action that Japan had experienced in 2010. Rare earth minerals are crucial for the production of cars and smart phones.

These measures represent China’s confrontational policy in foreign relations, which is called “wolf warrior diplomacy,” named after a 2015 Chinese film. Changing from traditional diplomacy avoiding controversy, China actively seeks its utmost interest by aggressively taking advantage of any diplomatic resources including economic sanctions or military pressure.

Japan’s position has been that Takaichi’s comment did not cross the line that her predecessors had drawn. The Prime Minister tried to explain this view by sending the Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masaaki Kanai, to Beijing on November 18. China had none of it.

After Kanai’s meeting, Chinese media broadcast a scene with the the Foreign Ministry’s Director General Liu Jinsong looking down contemptuously on Kanai. Liu had his hands in his trousers’ pockets while Kanai looked to be bowing to Liu. Kanai was obviously not ready for the press.

Although hawkish groups in Japan have called on the government to declare the Consul General to Osaka a persona non grata and send him home, the previous four examples of Japan’s expulsion of foreign diplomats are based on crimes or a highly serious deterioration in bilateral relations. It is questionable whether the expulsion can be applied to the posting on SNS of a Chinese diplomat who is critical of the Japanese government.

The Takaichi administration has miscalculated in its diplomatic relations with China. She mostly had no idea that her comment would cause China to respond so stridently. “I’m not going to discuss a specific issue in this venue anymore,” Takaichi said before the budget committee of the Lower House. But a prime minister cannot be responsible for Japan’s sovereign people without discussing specific issues in the Diet.

Takaichi made her comment on Taiwan just a week after her meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea. She and her staff did not recognize the significance of China’s decision to meet with the new hawkish leader of Japan despite concerns of the Chinese (as well as other nations) about her visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and comments supporting revisionist history. Tokyo was not considerate and Takaichi’s surprise statement caused Xi to lose face with the Chinese public.

The first response of Trump to the contretemps was not to Takaichi’s advantage. When asked about it in an interview with Fox News on November 11, Trump observed that “a lot of our allies are not friends either.” Adding, he said “Our allies took advantage of our trade more than China did.” Japan had little advance knowledge of this change of U.S. policy from the Biden administration toward its allies or China. Trump takes a softer approach to China while eschewing close relationships with traditional allies.

A second and possibly more troubling event was Xi’s call to Trump in the morning of Monday, November 24. Xi’s purpose was to discuss Taiwan, specifically that Taiwan’s return to China is central to the post-World War II international order. At least one U.S. press report has linked Xi’s call to Takaichi’s statement, but there appear to be no reports that Xi mentioned Japan or Takaichi by name. It may be fair to say that China’s disproportionate response to Takaichi reflects a felt need that existed well before she came on the scene to promote its influence over Taiwan.

Trump called Takaichi that evening. Although she did not reveal the substances of their conversation about the Japan-China row over Taiwan, Takaichi told the press that she was briefed on the Trump-Xi call and Trump said she should call him whenever she wanted. The time lag between Trumps calls with China and Japan, however, appears to undermine her efforts to shape a “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”

Takaichi, as the first female premier of Japan, hopes to be the Margaret Thatcher of Japan. The conservative “Iron Lady” was a hardliner against the Soviet Union. But Japanese observers expect that Takaichi will more likely follow one of two recent and different models: Liz Truss of the UK or Giorgia Meloni of Italy. Truss’s tenure was brief: she stepped down shortly after her installation when the markets looked unfavorably on her tax cut policy that lacked reliable, alternative fiscal resources. Meloni has been more successful. She has adjusted her conservative agenda to account for the realities of domestic and international politics.

Thus far, Takaichi has been able to keep her relationship with U.S. President Trump on an even keel. Maintaining a dialogue with China is more difficult. Her active spending for an economic stimulus has met with skepticism from the market, which now shows a triple low of stocks, bonds, and the Japanese yen a reminder for Japan about the U.K.’s Truss Shock in 2022.

It is true that Takaichi has high approval rate in current polls, despite concerns on relations with China stemming from her own speech. However, the honeymoon period for theTakaichi administration is getting close to an end. If China’s measures start impacting Japan’s economy or security, the one-month-old Takaichi administration may similarly find itself in a Truss situation with questions about its survival.

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 24, 2025

BEHIND THE BUILD: DRIVING FACTORS OF CAPACITY AND EFFECTS OF GEOPOLITICAL RISKS ON THE SHIPBUILDING MARKET. 11/24, 9:30am-5:30pm (CET), 3:30-11:30am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: OECD. Speakers: Ines Nastali, Senior Supply Chain Analyst, S&P Global Intelligence & Analytics; Jayendu Krishna, Director and Head of Maritime Advisors, Drewry; Tim Walters, First Marine International; Jacob Gunter, Head of Program, Economy and Industry, Merics; Capt. Rahul Khanna, Global Head Marine Risk Consulting, Allianz; Brooke Weddle, Senior Partner, McKinsey; Ryan Brukardt, Senior Partner, McKinsey; and more.

TESTING THE WATERS: UNREGULATED MINING IN THE MEKONG REGION. 11/24, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Regan Kwan, Research Analyst, Southeast Asia Program and the Energy, Water, and Sustainability Program, Stimson Center; Pai Deetes, Regional Campaigns Director, Southeast Asia Program, International Rivers; Saeng Lee, Vice President, Romphothi Foundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand; Wan Wiriya, Assistant Head, Environmental Science Research Center, Faculty of Science, Chiang Mai University; Moderator: Brian Eyler, Senior Fellow and Director, Southeast Asia Program, Stimson Center.

SUSTAINABLE TRADE INDEX 2025. 11/24, 10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States (AFPC-USA), in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. Speaker: Dr. Christos Cabolis, Chief Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center.

THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE LIVE PODCAST: WHAT DOES CHINA WANT? 11/24, 11:00-11:40am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair; Henrietta Levin, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies; Zenobia Chan, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University.

BOOK TALK: MIDDLE EAST CRISES. 11/24, 11:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speaker: Author James F. Jeffrey, Former U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement; John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS, and Langone Chair in American Leadership; Seth G. Jones, President, Defense and Security Department, CSIS; Eliot A. Cohen, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS; Mona Yacoubian, Director and Senior Adviser, Middle East Program, CSIS. PURCHASE BOOK

PROMISES, POWER, AND PROTECTION: THE WEST'S DEBATE OVER SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR UKRAINE. 11/24, 11:00am-Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: American German Institute (AGI). Speaker: Iulian Romanyshyn, DAAD/AGI Research Fellow; Moderator: Jeff Rathke, President and Director of the Foreign & Security Policy Program, AGI.

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF IRAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS. 11/24, Noon-2:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for International Studies, MIT. Speaker: Peter Krause, Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston College.

Japan’s PM Takaichi Searches for Policies

Launch of Five LDP/JIP Working Groups 

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 17, 2025

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) launched five working groups to implement agreements they reached when forming their coalition. The groups will address five issues: reductions in the number of Diet seats, regulation of political contributions from companies and organizations, amendment of Article 9 of the constitution, reform of the governmental system, and social security reform. Although these issues are a top priority for JIP, the LDP views them as secondary but necessary to discuss in order to keep JIP in the leading coalition. Thus, even at the beginning of this exercise, the two parties are not necessarily headed in the same direction.
 
The working groups met between November 11 and 13. Several lawmakers leading the working groups attended and discussed how to proceed. Neither party has a clear idea of what the groups are likely to accomplish.   
 
Here are the remits for each of the five working groups:
 
1. Reduction of Diet Seats
Headed by Katsunobu Kato (LDP) and Yasuto Urano (JIP)
JIP believes that Diet seat reduction will boost the party’s popularity based on what they think was the success of seat reductions in the Osaka Prefectural Assembly and Osaka City Assembly. JIP also believes that the reductions appealed to voters who were frustrated with too many assembly members who enjoyed privileges as representatives of the people. JIP sold their policy as a self-sacrificing reform.
This issue was an “absolute condition” for the JIP to enter the coalition. The coalition agreement states that the two parties will “seek” to submit and enact a bill in the 2025 extraordinary session that would eliminate 10 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives. The current extraordinary session will close on December 17.

The LDP Secretary General, Shun-ichi Suzuki, has said that it would be difficult for the two parties to pass the bill by the end of the session. The JIP’s co-leader, Fumitake Fujita, has admitted that the coalition cannot bring all of the election reform matters to a close by the end of the year. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has said that she will seek a broad consensus for reform, including the buy-in of the opposition parties. At its first meeting on this issue, the working group merely reconfirmed the October agreement.

Some LDP lawmakers have argued that this Diet seat reduction should be discussed in the broader context of Diet’s election system. Such discussions would include new multiple-seat districts in the House of Representatives to replace single-seat districts. Other LDP members would support only a bill limited to a scheduling of the seat reduction.

Despite an obvious lack of consensus even within the coalition, the JIP does not show any sign of leaving the coalition if the seat reduction does not take place. The JIP’s “absolute condition” for joining the coalition is not non-negotiable; JIP will stay with the LDP provided that the LDP continues to discuss this issue with the JIP.
 
2. Political Contributions from Companies and Organizations
Headed by Sadahisa Furukawa (LDP) and Yasuto Urano (JIP)
Just like the opposition parties, the JIP has advocated for the prohibition of political donations from companies and organizations. The LDP, by contrast, heavily relies on these contributions. After Komeito left the coalition with the LDP, frustrated by the LDP’s laziness on this reform, JIP tried to include this issue in the coalition agreement. However, by its terms, the agreement provides only that the coalition will resolve the issue by the end of Takaichi’s term as LDP president, which will be September 2027. The agreement thus was an obvious setback for JIP.

JIP wants to eliminate donations from companies and organizations since it identifies itself as a reform party. The LDP, however, calls for “more transparency than prohibition,” arguing that a ban on contributions infringes the freedom of political activity that is guaranteed to each business entity. In the working group’s first meeting,, the parties could not even set a schedule for their next meeting.
 
3. Constitutional Amendment
Headed by Yoshitaka Shindo (LDP) and Nobuyuki Baba (JIP)
JIP is more radical on amending Article 9 than is the LDP. JIP argues that Sentence 2 of Article 9, which currently prohibits the use of military force, should be replaced by language that creates a national defense force. The LDP takes a more nuanced and less sweeping view: the party would add an emergency clause to deal with disaster or invasion by a foreign country and a description of a self-defense force in Article 9.  The LDP would not, however, repeal Sentence 2.

Although the coalition agreement calls for the parties to agree by the end of FY2026 on language for a proposed constitutional amendment, neither party is really focused on this issue. At its first meeting, the working group simply confirmed that the parties will accelerate their discussions. We may assume that the parties have not yet assembled the necessary two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the Diet.
 
4. Reform of Governmental System
Headed by Ichiro Miyashita (LDP) and Alex Saito (JIP)
For JIP, reform of the governmental system is all about a “backup capital initiative” —the designation of Osaka as the backup capital in the event of a disaster in Tokyo. With its main office not in Tokyo but in Osaka, JIP primarily represents Osaka’s interests. Although it failed to win two referendums in Osaka on the “Osaka Capital Initiative,” JIP still hopes to move the political functions of Japan’s capital from Tokyo to Osaka. The backup capital initiative will come into play if a disaster occurs. This can be a revised version of the Osaka Capital Initiative.

Most LDP lawmakers have little interest in this matter since it originates in the JIP.  Undeniably, the issue is less urgent than the issues, such as political reform and management of price inflation, taken up by the other working groups. In the first working group meeting, both parties agreed to prepare talking points for the next meeting.
 
5. Social Security Reform
Headed by Norihisa Tamura (LDP) and Satoshi Umemura (JIP)
Social security reform is another crucial issue for JIP. The party included it in their campaign platform for the Upper House elections in July. JIP promised an annual 60-thousand-yen reduction in social insurance premiums.

A specific issue that JIP has raised is the reduction of the costs of “over the counter (OTC)” medicines whose formularies are close to those of commercial drugs in drug stores. The cost of OTC medicines is funded by health insurance. Both parties shared at the first meeting of this working group an end-of-the-year target of the end of 2025 to reach an agreement. 
 
The Takaichi administration recognizes that these five working groups are necessary to maintain its coalition government. However, the LDP has its own history on each of the issues. It is unlikely that formation of a coalition will suddenly bridge the wide gap between the two parties. In the past, the LDP used working groups in the coalition with Komeito and in the trilateral coalition with the Japan Socialist Party and New Party Sakigake.
 
It is far more important for Takaichi to implement her own agenda. She established some working groups in her government to promote economic and security policies, including the Panel on Economic Growth Strategy, as soon as she formed her Cabinet.
 
In her discussion at Plenary Sittings of the House of Representatives, Takaichi said that the Shinzo Abe administration’s economic growth strategy, which was one of the three pillars of Abenomics, had been insufficient to boost the Japanese economy. Takaichi intends that this new panel will discuss economic strategy regardless of budgetary requirements, while the traditional Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy will manage the balance between revenue and spending.
 
Takaichi also convened a Cabinet meeting on Foreigners to address problems with foreign visitors in Japan. Some conservative parties such as Sanseito call for stricter regulation. Takaichi wants to take on this issue to bring the voters who voted for those conservative parties back to the LDP. She has also directed the council on the establishment of National Intelligence Bureau to discuss enhancement of the intelligence community.
 
However, there already are bodies in the government to discuss these issues, which Takaichi hopes will produce specific policies. Establishing an array of working groups to pursue various policies was a common practice for previous prime ministers. Launching working groups does not mean that policies a prime minister has promised to the voters will become a reality.

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 17, 2025

JAPAN’S ROLE IN NAVIGATING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL UNCERTAINTY. 11/17, 2:00-6:00pm (JST), Midnight-4:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Speakers: Kenichiro Sasae, President, JIIA; Naoko Eto, Senior Fellow, Institute of Geoeconomics; Jacob Happymon, Director, Council on Strategic and Defense Studies, India; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Nguyen Minh Vu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam; Naoko Shimazu, Professor, University of Tokyo, and more.

5TH INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY FORUM. 11/17-18, IN PERSON ONLY, Ottawa, Canada. Sponsor: Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD). Speakers: RSVP for speaker list.

TRUMP AND MBS: WHAT’S IN STORE FOR U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS? 11/17, 10:00-10:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program, Carnegie; Michael Ratney, Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern History of the Gulf Cooperation Countries, Princeton University.

THE GOOD NEWS ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS GLOBALLY. 11/17, Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Live. Speakers: Lyric Thompson, Founder and CEO, Feminist Foreign Policy Collaborative; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy.

SUPPORTING SURVIVORS OF CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE. 11/17, Noon-1:15pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics, Columbia University. Speakers: Grace Achan, Board Member, Global Survivors Fund, Co-founder, Women’s Advocacy Network; Esther Dingemans, Executive Director, Global Survivors Fund; Ajna Jusić, President, Forgotten Children of War; Khrystyna Kit, Head of JurFem Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association. Moderator: Rachel Vogelstein, Associate Professor of Professional Practice, Director, IGP Women’s Initiative, Director of Human Rights, Gender, and Equity Concentration, Columbia SIPA.

THE US AND CHINA: COMPETITION, COEXISTENCE, OR COLLISION? 11/17, 5:30-6:30pm (CST), 6:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; Rana Mitter, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Leslie Vinjamuri, President & CEO, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

SHIFTING SECURITY LANDSCAPE: U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS. 11/17, 6:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Japan Society, New York. Speakers: Ken Jimbo, Professor, International Relations, Keio University, Managing Director of Programs, International House of Japan; Sheila A. Smith, John E. Merow Senior Fellow, Asia-Pacific Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

FORMER PRIME MINISTERS IN JAPANESE POLITICS: POWER, INFLUENCE AND THE ROLE OF INFORMAL POLITICS. 11/17, 6:45pm (GMT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society, London. Speakers: Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations, School of Languages, Arts and Societies, University of Sheffield; Karin Narita, Research Associate in Japanese Politics and International Relations, School of Languages, Arts and Societies, University of Sheffield; Caroline Rose, Emeritus Professor of Sino-Japanese Relations, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds.

Takaichi’s First Debates in the Diet: Strong Words, Shakey Ground

Takaichi’s First Debates in the Diet: Strong Words, Shakey Ground

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 10, 2025

Last week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi participated in a series of debates in the Diet, both in the Plenary Sittings and in budget committee appearances. Although she refrained from asserting an ambitious agenda in the Plenary Sittings, given her minority government in both Houses, Takaichi revealed her intention to take bold steps on issues of security and the economy in the Committee on the Budget. Regardless she does not have a sufficiently firm political base to implement those policies, she is proceeding as if she does.
 
The Diet typically holds Plenary Sittings for debate after a prime minister’s policy speech. In the current extraordinary session, Takaichi delivered her policy speech on October 24. The parties in both chambers submitted written questions to her, and she prepared written responses before her appearance at the sittings between November 4 and 6. On the following day, November 7, unscripted debate started in the Committee on Budget of the Lower House. A similar debate will in the budget committee of the Upper House will begin on November 12.
 
In the Plenary Sittings, the opposition leaders asked Takaichi how she would promote political reform, which would affect every party. (Since the LDP’s current coalition is only with the Japan Innovation Party, all other parties are in opposition.) Specific reform proposals now include reductions in the number of seats in the Diet and the regulation of political donations from companies and organizations.
 
On the former point, Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed, when they established their coalition in October, to cut Lower House seats by 10 percent. They have focused on reductions in the proportional districts. The small opposition parties depend heavily on the proportional districts and oppose the approach of the LDP and JIP. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, argued that the seat reduction should be balanced between single-seat districts and proportional districts.
 
“It is important to have a broad consensus,” Takaichi told Noda. Opposition parties and even some LDP lawmakers have protested the LDP-JIP proposal. Although the LDP and JIP originally agreed to introduce and enact a seat reduction bill in the current Diet session, the strong push back suggests that this timeline may be too aggressive. This result may increase the JIP’s frustration with its coalition with the LDP.
 
On the second point, the regulation of political fundraising, it was the LDP’s failure to deal with this issue that caused its serious defeats in the national elections last fall and spring and led Komeito to leave the leading coalition with the LDP. This history does not disturb Takaichi. She repeated the LDP’s longstanding position – which lacks public support – that the issue of political fundraising is not about the prohibition, but the transparency of these contributions. Indeed, she believes that that the regulation of fundraising may violate business entities’ freedom of political activities. That is, the LDP still wants to maintain a system for siphoning money from business sectors.
 
Unlike the Plenary Sittings, the discussions in the budget committees of both Houses do not include written Q&As and have an improvisational and ad hoc air. Lawmakers can be agitated and aggressive in the budget committee discussions.
 
Exciting may be an understatement for what may have been an offhand (and in any case careless) remarks about a “Taiwan contingency” by Takaichi in the Lower House budget committee meeting. The “Taiwan contingency” is the question whether and how Japan should respond to military hostilities between China and the U.S. over Taiwan. Her remarks, careless though they may have been, have created a diplomatic incident – just weeks into taking office.
 
Katsuya Okada, a veteran CDPJ lawmaker and a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked Takaichi about the Taiwan contingency. She said that a contingency in Taiwan could create a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan “if it is a situation with use of warships or use of armed force,” Takaichi said – the first time a Japanese prime minister has so characterized possible events surrounding Taiwan. 
 
One of the problems with Takaichi’s remark is that “survival-threatening situation” is a specific term that appears in 2015 security legislation backed by the Shinzo Abe administration. One of those packaged laws defines a “survival-threatening situation” as “a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that has a close relationship with Japan occurs, and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” The purpose of this definition is to enable Japan to exercise a right of collective self-defense that the constitution might otherwise prohibit.
 
Prime ministers since then have assiduously avoided any discussion of what might constitute a “survival-threatening situation.” Takaichi’s description of a Taiwan contingency as a survival-threatening situation broke with that tradition and implied that Japan would send troops to support United States forces, if attacked by China.
 
This unprecedented statement about a Taiwan contingency immediately struck a nerve in China, although Takaichi tried to walk her comment back. The Chinese consul-general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted on social media that an “intruding dirty neck must be cut off without a moment’s hesitation.” The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minoru Kihara, responded that Xue’s posting was “extremely inappropriate.”
 
Takaichi’s statement, however, has gone further up the ranks in the Chinese government. “The remarks are seriously inconsistent with the political commitments the Japanese government has made so far, and their nature and impact are extremely egregious,” Chinese foreign policy spokesperson, Lin Jian, said in a press conference.
 
It seems unlikely that Takaichi, with no experience in foreign affairs or defense, wanted to spark a diplomatic incident, but, in her carelessness, she has done so. “I realized the danger of her going it alone without consulting others,” Noda said about Takaichi’s comments. But backed by a high approval rating in the polls, Takaichi looks to be pushing her agenda full speed ahead almost regardless of the consequences.

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 10, 2025

TRANS-PACIFIC SUSTAINABILITY DIALOGUE 2025: SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES. 11/10-11/11, 9:00am-6:00pm (PHST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University; Ban Ki-moon Foundation for a Better Future. Speakers: Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and APARC’s Japan Program, Stanford University; Arsenio M. Balisacan, Secretary, Department of Economy, Planning, and Development, Republic of the Philippines; Ban Ki-moon, 8th Secretary-General, United Nations; Chairman, Ban Ki-moon Foundation for a Better Future, and more.

THE 21ST KOREA-MIDDLE EAST COOPERATION FORUM: A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. 11/10, 10:00am-5:30pm (AST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council); Korea Arab Society (KAS); Jeju Peace Institute (JPI). Speakers: Dr. Maryam bint Ali bin Nasser Al-Misnad, Minister of State for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar; Dr. Cho Hyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Dr. Khalid Al-Jaber, Director, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Young Hoon Kang, President, Jeju Peace Institute; Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar; Dr. Waleed Siam, Ambassador, Permanent General Mission of Palestine to South Korea and Japan; Woong-Yeob Song, Former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan; and more.

THE STATE OF TAIWAN: WHAT'S NEXT AFTER THE TRUMP-XI MEETING? 11/10, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Bonny Lin, Director, China Power Project, Senior Fellow, Asian Security, CSIS; Dan Blumenthal, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director, Indo-Pacific Program, German Marshall Fund; I-Chung Lai, President, Prospect Foundation; Ryo Sahashi, Professor, University of Tokyo.

STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT ON CHINA: EU APPROACHES AND TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. 11/10, 10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Global China Hub; Europe Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Jörn Fleck, Senior Director, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; The Hon. John Moolenaar, United States Representative (R-MI-02); Zoltán Fehér, Nonresident Fellow, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council; Michael Laha, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology, DGAP; Jacqueline Ramos, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Melanie Hart, Senior Director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council.

LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KĘSTUTIS BUDRYS ON NATO, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EUROPE-CHINA RELATIONS. 11/10, 2:30-3:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Kęstutis Budrys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania; Marshall Billingslea, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.