Sunday, June 21, 2026

Takaichi's Mercantilism

Japan's PM Takaichi Heads to Europe


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 15, 2026


Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi participates in her first Group of Seven (G7) summit in Evian, France from June 15 to 17. The meeting is the last stop for her; in the past few days, she has visited the United Kingdom and Italy. Her top diplomatic priority is securing Japan’s supply chain amid a volatile world order. Although Takaichi says she stands for a “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage,” her diplomacy is in fact heavily dominated by her own interests.
 
The first stop on her trip to Europe was London from June 13-14. In a meeting with United Kingdom Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Takaichi shared her concern over export restrictions on critical minerals and urged bilateral cooperation on economic security, including strengthening supply chains.
 
Securing supply chains has been a core tenet of Takaichi’s diplomacy. In her individual meetings with the leaders of Vietnam, Australia, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines in May, Takaichi drew attention to the maintenance of supply chains while criticizing China for its export controls over critical minerals. Aspiring to strengthen her position on international economic security, Takaichi hoped to make up for her irregular comment on the Taiwan contingency last November, which deeply undermined Japan’s relations with China.
 
Takaichi and Starmer also confirmed acceleration of the development of next-generation fighter aircraft under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with the UK and Italy. This is supposedly the main reason that Takaichi chose to visit London and Rome before the G7 summit.
 
Takaichi has sought to expand Japan’s international trade in defense equipment, expecting it to contribute to her economic growth strategy. She promoted trade in or joint development of destroyers with the Philippines and Australia. GCAP is in the same context. She once said that “Strategic investments that enhance resilience against potential crises are the core focus of the Takaichi Cabinet’s growth strategy.”
 
This approach reverses Japan’s longstanding reluctance to trade in military equipment.  “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons,” former prime minister Kiichi Miyazawa said when he was foreign minister in 1976. Takaichi now argues that times have changed and that trade with other countries in defense equipment would contribute to the growth of the Japanese economy.
 
While Takaichi was travelling in Europe, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. and Iran had reached a deal for ending the war. Takaichi posted on X that she would welcome the agreement as a key step toward a settlement and hoped for free and safe traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi must be wishing for the normalization of international trade. “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world,” Takaichi said to Trump in her visit to the White House in March.
 
The Takaichi administration introduced a subsidy for gasoline as soon as the war in Iran started. To maintain public support for her cabinet, she formulated a supplemental budget to continue this subsidy earlier this month. A subsidy does not cure all ills, however. Opposition lawmakers have questioned Takaichi about oil import shortages that limit production of various goods that are indispensable for manufacturing and that cause prolonged price inflation.
 
That is why she is focusing her diplomatic efforts on securing the supply chain. It is expected that she would propose a joint stockpiling plan for critical minerals at the G7 summit meeting. Takaichi hopes to take the initiative to build a system in which like-minded countries can collaborate to strengthen supply chains. Her proposal would be a countermeasure to China’s coercive trade policy on critical minerals.
 
It is still unclear whether Takaichi’s initiative to secure the supply chain accelerates Plan B of Japan’s diplomacy, which is to move Japan away from excessive dependence upon the United States. It is true that Japan has been seeking alternatives in trade opportunities after Trump imposed additional tariffs in June 2025. The Iran war has proven that Japan cannot secure oil from the Middle East by relying on U.S. dominance in international security. Yet Japan’s national security is still fundamentally based its alliance with the U.S., as seen in efforts to grow the defense budget by current and former administrations.
 
Takaichi has yet to find an exit from Japan’s current diplomatic difficulties: the uncertainty of the Trump administration and the persistent diplomatic pressure from China. Although Takaichi stands by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), which was invented by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to expand Japan’s role in the region, it no longer holds much sway. In the current war-based world order, the creation of a democratic bloc of countries may not guarantee stability or prosperity. The FOIP policy may appeal to Japan’s conservative base, but Takaichi does not have a viable grand strategy to give Japan a greater role on the international stage.
 
Turning our eyes to domestic politics, Takaichi faces scandals of her own. Her secretary is thought to be involved in a defamatory social media campaign strategy in the presidential election of the Liberal Democratic Party last October. Although she has denied any misdeeds in her campaign, the opposition parties have demanded that the secretary testify before a Diet committee. Although it may not violate any law, a defamatory strategy could damage Takaichi politically because she depends on support from SNS users.
 

Her approval rating has suffered a gradual decline according to polls of news organizations because of the defamation scandal or the shortage of naphtha. As former prime ministers have done, Takaichi hopes to achieve diplomatic gains that will change the direction of domestic headwinds. However, it is unlikely that she can attain success in her visit to Europe to a degree that would lead to a resurgence in public support. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 22, 2026

SHADOW OF CATASTROPHE AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. 6/22, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Speakers: Colin Kahl, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford; Janice Stein, Founding Director, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Chief, Norwegian Intelligence School. Moderator: Ulrich Kuehn, Head of Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, University of Hamburg.

PHILIPPINES ASEAN CHAIRSHIP 2026: ADVANCING REGIONAL RESILIENCE AND U.S.-ASEAN COLLABORATION. 6/22, 3:00-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: US-ASEAN Center; Embassy of the Philippines; US-Philippines Society. Speakers include: Jose Manuel G. Romualdez, Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States; Hunt VanderToll, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Hans Siriban, Economic Minister and Consul, Philippine Embassy to the U.S.; Heather Variava, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

STABILITY MULTIPLIERS: FOOD AND CLIMATE SECURITY IN A FRACTURED WORLD. 6/22, 6:00-8:30pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks; Strategic Climate Risks Initiative; Ditchley Foundation; Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University. Speakers: TBA; Moderator: Erin Sikorsky, Director, Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks.

WOMEN ARTISTS IN ACTION: VISUALIZING THE 1970S WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. 6/22, 6:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Workshop. Speaker: Kanako Tajima, PhD Candidate, Columbia University. 

TAIWAN’S STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND THE FUTURE OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS. 6/22, 6:30-8:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Speakers: Tom Chih-Chiang Lee, Director-General, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office; Shihoko Goto, Vice President of Programs and Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Chris Estep is a Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI; Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US-Taiwan Business Council; Aaron Stein, President, FPRI; Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI.


Monday, June 15, 2026

Expanding Japan's Imperial Family


The Diet’s Unanimous Opinion on Maintaining the Imperial Family


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog,
 J Update here.
June 8, 2026 Updated June 15, 2026


The Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both chambers of the Diet 
agreed to a draft of a “unanimous opinion” [立法府の総意] of the legislative branch to secure members of the Imperial Family. The draft proposes expansion of the family in two ways, adopting expert recommendations from 2021. First, female members of the family would be allowed to remain in the family after marriage. Second, male members of branches of the Imperial Family that were excised in 1947 could be adopted and thus re-enter the family.
 
The acting chair on this issue, Speaker of the Lower House Eisuke Mori, hopes to make these changes through amendments to the Imperial House Law by the end of the current session of the Diet 
on July 17. 
 
The Imperial House currently has 16 members, only three of whom are male and eligible to succeed to the throne. Members of the public, members of the Diet, and the imperial family itself are concerned that the family may dwindle. There is a near-term issue about lightening the responsibilities of each family member. The duties of the imperial family to participate in the life of the nation – such as participating in ceremonies of national events or official visits of foreign heads of state – are in fact extensive and occasionally burdensome. Spreading out these responsibilities by expanding the imperial family would be helpful to all.
 
Allowing married female members to remain in the family has the overwhelming support of all the parties. Article 12 of 
the Imperial House Law provides that a female loses her status as a family member when she marries. If female members could remain in the family, they could share the roles of the Imperial Family. The draft accordingly would allow all female members to stay after marriage. The draft also includes transitional measures to respect the will of female members who have been living their lives based on current law – i.e., not all female members may wish to stay in the family.
 
Whether the husband and children of a female member remaining in the family should also have the status of members of the Imperial Family has been a controversial point. While some lawmakers with Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) support such inclusion, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) oppose it. If the husband and children do not have the imperial status, possible questions are “Do they have the right of freedom of religion or political activities?” or “Can they spend the governmental funds for the Imperial Families?
 
The draft does not take a position on the status of husband and children and merely recommends adding a supplementary provision to the revised Imperial House Law that hopes to resolve the issue sometime in the future.
 
More divisive in the draft is a process for the Imperial Family to adopt a male from a branch of the former Imperial Family that had been excised in 1947. That former Imperial Family share the same ancestor of over 600 years ago with current Imperial Family. Article 9 of the Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits Imperial House members from adopting children to prevent members from disrupting the imperial lineage.
 
While the LDP and JIP approve of the adoption proposal, as do some conservative opposition parties, some CRA members have protested it. For them, an adoption without consent may violate the constitutional provision that prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Even some conservative scholars are 
skeptical about the idea of adoption.
 
Considering the CRA’s objections, the draft includes conditions on adoption. There would be a minimum age for adoption, which is supposed to be fifteen. The draft also demands a decision on who in the Imperial Family can adopt a child. Most importantly, an adopted child would not be eligible to succeed to the throne. With these conditions, the CRA accepted adoption. The draft also recommends the Diet to resolve that this rule for adoption should be subjected to ongoing reviews.
 
Complicating things, the Speaker Mori 
announced his own view in his press conference that male offspring of adopted children should have eligibility to succeed to the throne. That represented a conservative standpoint which insists on making paternal succession certain rather than the legitimacy of lineage concerning adoption. Some opposition parties firmly oppose Mori’s idea. Mori later explained that he was referring to an interpretation of the current law, and not binding future discussions.
 
The draft would not affect other Imperial Family rules. The draft unequivocally reconfirms the current order of succession to the throne. The first successor of Emperor Naruhito is Crown Prince Akishino, followed by his son, Prince Hisahito. Maintenance of the current order was a requirement of the experts’ report in 2021. That report separated discussion about provisions to enlarge the Imperial House from the line of succession.
 
The speakers distributed the draft to the parties on June 8 and concluded the draft as “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” with approval of seven parties out of all thirteen on June 10. The 
Emperor Abdication Special Law of 2017 demands such unanimity. The opinion was submitted to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Takaichi Cabinet is expected to submit a bill of revised Imperial House Law to current session of the Diet.

It is noteworthy that the Emperor Naruhito commented on securing Imperial Family members right after the Speakers wrapped up the unanimous opinion. “I hope it to be understood by the people,” he said in his press conference before leaving Japan to visit Europe on June 11. Although reserving judgement on the opinion, he clearly wants the process to be democratic and reflecting the views of the Japanese people. The emperor began his remarks by noting that the fundamental principle of the imperial family is "to share the joys and sorrows of the people."

 It is still unclear, however, whether the unanimous opinion will receive the full support of the people. Polls by news organizations find that the concept of the adoption of male members of former Imperial Family branches faces a certain amount of opposition. A substantial percentage of those polled support the right of female members to remain the in family after marriage.
 
There is a popular expectation that Aiko, the daughter of Naruhito, will succeed to the throne. The “unanimous opinion” would rule out this possibility. Takaichi revealed her opposition to a female emperor during a discussion in the Diet last March. “The time has not come for discussing it. It may destabilize imperial succession,” 
said Takaichi, Japan’s first female prime minister. This is a view more representative of Japan’s conservatives who believe that succession should be only along the male line than of its citizens.


Sunday, June 14, 2026

Cruciatus in cruce

 

U.S. Senator Bob Packwood, 93, died on June 6 in California. A relatively liberal Republican senator representing Oregon, he was forced to resign the Senate in 1995 because he accepted a bribe from Mitsubishi Electric Corp (MEC). Although the Justice Department declined to prosecute him, the details of the case combined with multiple accusations of sexual misconduct with female staff to have his fellow Senators to demand his resignation. It is possible that the harassment claims were cover for the more serious charges of bribery. However, his obituaries only mention the "sex scandal."


The lobbyist who worked on Senator Packwood for MEC and many other Japanese companies was Steven Saunders (Saunders & Co. one of the more notorious lobbyists for Japan) . He died last year at 78 in Alexandria, VA. MEC was the focus of congressional inquiry and a Harvard Business School case study on its aggressive and eventually successful effort to co-opt the patent and put out of business Fusion Systems that was then-owned by the rowing legend Don Spero (who is still alive,1964 Olympian and 1966 world champion).

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 15, 2026



Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology launch of a new report, Strengthening the Front Line: Transforming the Japan Self-Defense Force for 

AFTER THE WAR: REORIENTING GULF ECONOMIC STRATEGY. 6/15, 4:00-5:15pm (GMT+3), 8:00-9:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Frédéric Schneider, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Mohammed Al-Hashemi, Economic Expert; Sultan Barakat, Professor at the College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Moderator: Logan John Robert Cochrane, Associate Professor, College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University.

NAVIGATING LOCAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN EUROPE. 6/15, 3:00-4:00pm (CEST), 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Speakers: Tomasz Kamiński, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Paul Costello, Senior Program Manager, GMF Cities; Mareike Ohlberg, Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, GMF.
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Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

D
espite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.

Sunday, June 7, 2026

A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 8, 2026

JAPAN'S CRACKDOWN ON FOREIGN BUSINESS OWNERS. 6/8, 1:30-2:30pm (JST), 12:30-1:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Sakura Uchikoshi, Member of the House of Councillors; Kazuki Yuda, Touch Immigration Law Firm.

2026 JAPAN–PHILIPPINES FRIENDSHIP YEAR COMMEMORATIVE SYMPOSIUM. 6/8, 2:30-6:00pm (JST), 1:30-5:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tokyo. Speakers Include: H.E. Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the Philippines; H.E. Shinjiro Koizumi, Minister of Defense, Member of the House of Representatives; Sen. Juan Miguel Fernández Zubiri, Senator, the Republic of the Philippines; Yoshiaki Wada, Member of the House of Representatives, Japan; Maryjun Takahashi; Shun Ohno, Affiliated Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University; Ines Yamanouchi Mallari, School President, Philippine Nikkei Jin Kai International School, School President, Mindanao Kokusai Daigaku.

PETRO DIPLOMACY 2026: ENERGY IN CRISIS. 6/8, 9:00am-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Phillip Cornell, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council; Mason Hamilton, Vice President of Economics and Research, American Petroleum Institute; Ben Cahill, Nonresident Fellow, AGSI; Ambassador William Roebuck, Executive Vice President, AGSI; Sarah Ladislaw, Founding Director, New Energy Industrial Strategy Center, Former Senior Director for Climate and Energy, U.S. National Security Council.

GAZA UPDATE: REALITIES, RISKS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD. 6/8, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jaser Abu Mousa, Senior Fellow, MEI; Natan Sachs, Senior Fellow, MEI; Moderator: Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Senior Fellow, MEI.

THE END OF TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY?: ERDOĞAN'S ATTEMPTS TO NEUTER THE LAST OPPOSITION PARTY. 6/8, 3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Amb. Eric Edelman, Distinguished Scholar, JINSA, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; Svante E. Cornell, Scholar, Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, JINSA; Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy, JINSA. Exclusively for JINSA National Leaders in good standing, program participants, congressional and administration staff, U.S. military, press, and select members of the policy community.

FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND THE FUTURE OF AID IN TURBULENT TIMES. 6/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Development Department, CSIS. Speakers: David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue Committee (IRC); Rabih El Chammay, Head, National Mental Health Programme, Ministry of Health, Lebanon; Roya Rahmani, Director of Global Engagement, World Bank Group; Moderator: Enoh T. Ebong, President, Global Development Department, CSIS.

FROM YORKTOWN TO PHILADELPHIA: GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. 6/8, 6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Hillsdale College [MAGA]. Speaker: Paul A. Rahe, Professor of History, Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair, Western Heritage, Hillsdale College.

KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES AND US NATIONAL SECURITY. 6/8, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: Xavier Brunson, General Commander UNC/CFC/USFKs, United States Army.

FISCAL POLICY FORUM: THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISES. 6/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University, School of Public Policy and Management at Korea Development Institute. Speakers: Tom Ramage, Fellow/Economic Policy Analyst, Korea Economic Institute of America; Tami Overby, Partner, DGA Group Government Relations; Taesuk Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Public Finance and Social Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI); Younghyun Kim, Director, Budget Communication Cooperation Division, Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Planning and Budget; Moderator: Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.