Books Discussed In Washington this week

The following books will be discussed in public programs in 

Washington, DC in the following weeks. Click on each book to order.

Monday in Washington, July 11, 2016

A WINDOW INTO INDIA'S INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: ADISCUSSION WITH MINISTER NITIN GADKARI. 7/11, 10:00-11:00am. Sponsor: South Asia Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Barry Pavel, Vice President, Arnold Kanter Chair, Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council; Nitin Gadkari, Minister for Road Transport, Highways and Shipping, Government of India; Moderator: Dr. Bharath Gopalaswamy, Director, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council.

THE END OF WHITE CHRISTIAN AMERICA. 7/11, 10:00-11:30am. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Author Robert P. Jones, CEO, Public Religion Research Institute; E.J. Dionne, Jr., Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, W. Averell Harriman Chair, Brookings; William A. Galston, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, Brookings.

click to order

WORTH DEFERRING: A SINO-JAPANESE PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION RACE. 7/11, 11:30am-1:15pm. Sponsors: Foreign Policy Initiative; Arms Control Association. Speakers: Gordon Oehler, Former Director, Nonproliferation Center, CIA; Henry Sokolski, Executive Director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center; Mark Holt, Specialist in Energy Policy, Congressional Research Service; Moderator: Kingston Reif, Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy, Arms Control Association.

HOW TO DEFEAT TERRORISM IN IRAQ. 7/11, 1:00-2:30pm. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics (IWP). Speaker: Sheikh Jamal al-Dhari, President, Co-Founder, Peace Ambassadors for Iraq (PAFI).

CHINA’S ECONOMIC BUBBLE: GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES ANDGROWING RISKS. 7/11, 1:30-2:45pm. Sponsor: John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings. Speakers: Cheng Li, Director, Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings; Ning Zhu, Deputy Dean, Professor, Finance, Shanghai Jiaotong University; Moderator: David Dollar, Senior Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings.

ORLANDO, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE U.S. ELECTION. 7/11, 2:00-3:30pm. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Shibley Telhami, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Brookings; William A. Galston, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in Governance Studies, Brookings; Moderator: Tamara Cofman Wittes, Director, Center for Middle East Policy, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy.

SURVIVAL MIGRATION: NEW MODELS TO ADDRESS THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT. 7/11, 2:30-4:00pm. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CGD). Speakers: Michael Clemens, Senior Fellow, CGD, Research Fellow, IZA-Institute for the Study of Labor; Marta Foresti, Director, Governance, Security and Livelihoods, Overseas Development Institute; Sayre Nyce, Executive Director, Talent Beyond Boundaries; Ratna Omidvar, Honourable Senator, Senate of Canada (Ontario), Distinguished Visiting Professor, Global Diversity Exchange (GDX), Ted Rogers School of Management, Ryerson University.

NEXT STEPS IN PACIFIC ALLIANCE INTEGRATION. 7/11, 4:00-5:30pm. Sponsor: Latin American Program, Wilson Center (WWC). Speakers: Ambassador Juan Gabriel Valdés, Chilean Ambassador to the United States; Ambassador Luis Miguel Castilla, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States; Ambassador Juan Carlos Pinzón, Colombian Ambassador to the United States; Kenneth Smith-Ramos, Director, Trade and NAFTA Office, Embassy of Mexico in Washington DC; Antoni Estevadeordal, Manager, Integration and Trade Sector, Inter-American Development Bank; Meghan Greene, Research Assistant, Latin American Program, WWC; Moderator: Cynthia J. Arnson, Director, Latin American Program, WWC.

SHOULD THE U.S. BE FOR OR AGAINST NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION? THE CASE OF U.S. ALLIES IN ASIA. 7/11, 4:30pm. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics (IWP). Speakers: Doug Bandow, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute; Richard Weitz, Director, Center for Military Analysis, Hudson Institute; Moderator: Paul Coyer, Research Professor, IWP.

What are Shinzo Abe’s real three arrows?

looking old and worn and so 19th C

They are constitutional revision, security autonomy and Emperor worship. 

BY JEFF KINGSTON, director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan.

SPECIAL TO THE JAPAN TIMES, JUL 2, 2016

In his campaign for the upcoming Upper House elections, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pussyfooting around his plans to revise the Constitution. He is keeping his cards close to his chest because polls have shown that voters oppose constitutional change. Instead, Abe is calling on voters to keep the faith with Abenomics, despite widespread consensus that it has been a dismal flop and has failed to revive the Japanese economy or improve household welfare.

The cat is well and truly out of the bag regarding this failure — on June 27, NHK announced that only 6 percent of voters polled think Abenomics is working well while only 26 percent favor constitutional revisions, and only 11 percent think it a priority. Even two-thirds of newbie voters aged 18-19 know Abenomics is a no-hoper according to a Kyodo poll taken in June. It gets worse: 70 percent of women voters in this cohort don’t expect much from Abenomics, taking the shine off his “womenomics” grandstanding. The good news for Abe is that these young voters are only marginally more interested in the elections than other voters, with just 56 percent expressing an intention to vote. So much for an enthusiastic response from the newly enfranchised!

Apparently Abe’s campaign strategy is based on trying to keep the voter-participation rate low, and on that score he has a good track record, driving it down to just over 50 percent in the last election in 2014. The reason he doesn’t want to upset the applecart of apathy is that low turnout gives the Liberal Democratic Party an advantage: His core constituencies turn out to vote and will do so again in large numbers now that they smell blood, in the form of the prospects of a two-thirds majority in both houses and the possibility of constitutional revision. The fact that almost half of all eligible voters don’t vote means that Abe’s LDP has been winning elections with less than 25 percent of the potential vote.

So this explains why Abe is focusing on his discredited Abenomics program, the “three arrows” of radical monetary easing, fiscal stimulus and structural reforms. Who cares that representatives of leading industrial nations trashed it when they visited for the G-7 summit in May? They pointed out that the program really involves only one arrow: massive monetary easing. These leaders and virtually every sentient observer know that Abenomics is sputtering and is focused on monetary policy alone. A June Kyodo poll of all Upper House candidates running in the July 10 elections, including LDP candidates, reveals that 64.7 percent believe that Abenomics has not delivered, having failed to improve the economy. Business leaders are even more downbeat. If the LDP’s own candidates andmost voters are skeptical about Abenomics, why run a campaign on it?

The reason is that Abe needs to deflect attention away from the LDP’s plans to revise the Constitution. But those plans are hidden in plain sight and deserve more attention because the more the public knows about them, the more they might realize that thumbing their collective noses at the elections will hand Abe a historic opportunity to achieve his long-standing goal of overturning the postwar order. Voter disinterest is precisely what Abe is praying for so that he can rid the Constitution of pesky Western values such as civil liberties. He seeks to empower the state vis-a-vis citizens and eliminate the war-renouncing Article 9 that he and his supporters see as emasculating Japan, keeping the nation subordinate to the U.S.

Those who want to revise Article 9 are not all ultra-nationalist security hawks eager to make Japan the Great Britain of Asia. Many other pro-revision advocates point out the yawning gap between the apparent prohibitions on maintaining armed forces and the existence of Japan’s well-equipped armed forces — the country now has a larger navy than the U.K. Some argue that this breach discredits the Constitution and that Abe’s reinterpretation, which would allow for Japan to engage in collective self-defense, further subverts it. So, some argue, if Article 9 is essentially already being ignored and the threat of conflict in Asia has become more real, why do a majority of Japanese oppose revision?

Japanese pacifism draws on the trauma of World War II and the deep scars it left on the nation — memories that have been passed down through families, displayed at museums, taught at schools, shown in documentaries and commemorated at annual rites such as those in Okinawa, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Citizens worry that the “Abe Doctrine” will endanger the country, and that beefing up the alliance with the U.S. may lead Japan into a war at Washington’s behest, rather than safeguarding the country’s national security.

Japan is basically a one-party system, and there is little reason to believe that the Diet would act as resolutely as the British Parliament did a few years back in scuttling Prime Minister David Cameron’s plan to provide military support to the U.S. in Syria. Under Abe, the premiership has only grown in power, and his national security council and new secrecy and security legislation have strengthened his hand in a system where checks and balances are already weak. Japanese citizens are wary of entrusting Abe or any leader with too much discretionary power, but it is a fait accompli that they can do little about in elections, given the imbalance of power between the LDP and other parties.

Hence, Article 9 is seen by many to have residual symbolic power, manifesting pacifist sentiments as a collective norm. Across Japan, this idealism is also represented by the multitudes of demonstrators who gathered outside the Diet last summer to denounce Abe’s security legislation. Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs) organized popular protests against the secrecy and security legislation and has been involved in coordinating opposition parties for the Upper House elections. They decry the intensifying crisis in constitutional government and the LDP’s bait-and-switch campaign strategy aimed at bamboozling voters.

If the LDP wins big, Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi), the nation’s largest and most influential right-wing organization, will lobby Abe’s Cabinet to deliver on their shared vision. The consonance of interest between Abe and Japan Conference is clear in that a majority of his Cabinet ministers are members. It has clout in the Diet where 39 percent of all legislators — 281 in total — are members. This will enable it to press ahead with their real goals: constitutional revision, security autonomy and Emperor worship. These are the three arrows that Abe really cares about.

Why is Japan media not covering the July 10 elections?

Election coverage in Japan's media has been surprisingly light. NHK barely covers it. Is it citizen disinterest, boring candidates, a sense of despair, or encouraged by the LDP wanting voters to stay home? Below a Tokyo-based journalist tries to think through the problem and finds that most Japan believe voting will change nothing. And they just don't care.

How long can Japan’s old mens’ club last?
BY PHILIP BRASOR

SPECIAL TO THE JAPAN TIMES, JUL 9, 2016

Media coverage of the House of Councillors election campaign has been even more lacking in substance than usual. On July 2, Tokyo Shimbun noted how “low-key” the coverage has been on TV.

After the excitement of the money scandal surrounding former Tokyo Gov. Yoichi Masuzoe, ratings prospects for election-related news items were dim. The morning shows hardly mentioned it, and even legitimate news programs pushed reports to the end. A former NHK producer told Tokyo Shimbun that, given how the ruling Liberal Democratic Party is using the election to secure a two-thirds majority in the Diet to change the Constitution, it’s essential for the media to talk about it, but, in fact, TV seems to be “avoiding the subject” out of fear of angering the LDP. As a result, LDP president and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is, in effect, ruling the airwaves, said the producer.

This disinterest created a vaccuum that has been filled by analyses, in some media, of what the lack of concern reveals about the state of Japanese democracy. Some have made much of the fact that while the representation of women in the Diet has remained basically the same since they were given the vote right after World War II, the rest of the world has advanced in terms of greater gender parity. Japan is at the bottom of the international order when it comes to women in government, and though the ruling coalition has set a goal of ensuring women occupy 30 percent of “leadership positions” by 2020, there is little hope that today’s election will get the government any closer to that target.

NHK’s “Jiron Koron” editorial series provided a detailed explanation of how this situation came about, and why it is likely to persist. Other countries have increased political participation of women through mandatory quotas, while Japan’s goals have never been enforceable. In many cases, especially in Europe, mandatory quotas have also led to an increase in the number of women in private-sector executive positions, usually because corporations followed the lead of their governments.

Laws promoting more women in business have been passed in Japan, but none to promote women in politics, thus taking a tack opposite to what has become conventional wisdom. At present there is a bipartisan bill in the Diet that urges parties to set quotas for women candidates, who will then be given priority in proportional races. However, without making these quotas mandatory, it will be almost impossible to persuade male career politicians to risk their livelihoods for the sake of a political “ideal.”

The persistence of this obstacle was explained by University of Tokyo professor Masaki Taniguchi in the Asahi Shimbun. Taniguchi sent questionnaires to all the candidates in today’s election, and received replies from 357, who prioritized their top three policies from a list of 16. Seventy percent of female candidates placed policies regarding “education” and “child-rearing” in their top three. Only 50 percent of the male candidates did.

The survey also asked what could be done to solve the problem of Japan’s low birthrate. Candidates from almost all the parties said that a “balance” was needed between work and child-rearing through schemes such as building more day care facilities, as opposed to the other possible answer: “Support parents who raise children at home.” The exception was LDP candidates. While 90 percent of women LDP politicians said “balance,” only 50 percent of the men did, with the other half opting to not answer the question at all. The seriousness with which the ruling bloc addresses issues important to women is reflected in the number of candidates they fielded. Overall, 25 percent of the people running are women, but for the LDP and coalition partner Komeito, the portions are 16.4 percent and 12.5 percent, respectively.

As NHK’s presenter, Yumiko Samukawa, implied, the LDP’s cavalier treatment of half the population is not simply unfair, it is anti-democratic. Japan needs female lawmakers, she said, because the problems Japan faces are those that directly affect women with regard to the roles they are still expected to fill in Japanese society. Those who have a stake in a problem will be more intent to solve it.

The other development this election highlights is the political apathy of young people. For the first time, 18- and 19-year-olds can vote in a national election, though it doesn’t seem likely they will. The turnout of newly enfranchised teens for the recent mayoral contest in the city of Ukiha, Fukuoka Prefecture, was only 38 percent, well below the general turnout of 56 percent. One 19-year-old explained to the Tokyo Shimbun that he didn’t vote because he knew “it wouldn’t count for anything.”

In his Asahi Shimbun column, sociologist Eiji Oguma surveyed recent magazine articles pertaining to this topic and found that the traditional conservative-progressive axis means something different to people under 50. Whereas older generations may identify with a particular ideology, younger ones tend to think in terms of “organizational power.” “Conservative” to them doesn’t describe right-of-center viewpoints, but rather parties who have a dedicated following. Young people recognize that these parties’ organizational power is more important than their governing capabilities, and thus feel alienated because they don’t belong. Some of the writers Oguma cites draw a parallel between Japanese youth and the British voters who opted out of the European Union, not to mention the supporters of U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump. The difference is that young Japanese people aren’t expressing anger at the neoliberal elite who exploited their parents. They just don’t care.

In order to care, people have to believe that their interests have a possibility of being addressed, and that goes for women as well as young people. TV producers don’t see any point in covering the election because, ratings-wise, there’s nothing in it for them, which, in their minds, means there’s nothing in it for viewers.

Why China's Central Bank is not independent

Zhou Xiaochuan, the Governor of the People's Bank of China (PBoC) delivered the IMF's Michel Camdessus Central Banking Lecture on June 24, 2016. The annual lecture, initiated in 2014, is to highlight the Fund's commitment to collaboration with member countries' central banks and provides a forum to discuss topical issues in central banking.

Zhou spoke on Managing Multi-Objective Monetary Policy: From the Perspective of Transitioning Chinese Economy addressing the lack of independence of PBoC.

His main points were:

....if a central bank has multiple objectives, it may be harder to be immune from the political reality. The reason is that, on the one hand, multiple objectives require more coordination and joint efforts with other government agencies and regulators, and on the other hand, functions such as macro-prudential and financial regulation by themselves are sensitive mandates for central banks.

For central banks with a single objective, it is relatively easy to be independent. However, if a central bank has multiple objectives, it may be harder to be immune from the political reality.

...balance of payments largely affected the central bank’s monetary policy, money supply and price stability objective. Therefore, the PBoC must pay attention to balance of payments, and needs to assume accordingly roles such as managing the exchange rate, foreign exchange market, foreign exchange reserves, gold reserves, and balance of payments statistics. 

To put it in a nutshell, the PBoC has multiple objectives, which not only include such four annual objectives as ensuring price stability, boosting economic growth, promoting employment, and broadly maintaining balance of payments, but also cover two dynamic objectives, namely, financial reform and opening up, and financial market development. The choice of a multi-objective central bank has to do with China’s circumstances as a transition economy.

Japan's Upper House elections explained - Komeito loses

Tokyo on Fire:Japan News & Politics

Is the go-to discussion of Japanese politics. The weekly or more often videos give clear and informed analysis of Japanese politics without US-Japan Alliance "correctness" or wishfulness.



Japan faces realignment after upper house election

By Michael Cucek, who is featured above is an adjunct professor political science and history at Waseda University and Temple University Japan and an APP member, This essay first appeared in the East Asia Forum, 3 July 2016

On 10 July Japanese voters will go to the polls in the triennial upper house election. The candidates will be all-too-familiar faces; the party leaders wooden; and policy menus unpalatable. The contest is for only half the seats and voters are expected to either vote for the political status quo or not vote at all.

The outcome of the election will have little effect on the Abe government’s ability to pass the legislation. The ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito holds a two-thirds majority in the lower house, with the ability to override the upper house.

A great deal of attention has been paid both domestically and internationally to the chances of the ruling coalition securing 162 seats, and with that two-thirds majority in both houses the ability to amend the Constitution.

Abe and the LDP have been courting like-minded revisionist conservative parties, particularly the regionally popular ‘Initiatives from Osaka’ (Osaka Ishin No Kai) party. These parties could control anywhere from 12 to 20 seats post-election. When added to the seats held by the coalition, the seats of these revisionists could push the coalition beyond the 162 barrier.

Aware of the maths involved and the futility of trying to hold back the LDP and Komeito in the 96 seats filled by proportional voting, the opposition is trying a new and desperate tactic: joining forces to defeat the ruling coalition in the rural, underpopulated single-seat districts. Taking the fight to the supposedly impregnable core of the LDP’s power base, four opposition parties — the Democratic Party (DP), the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the micro-sized Democratic Socialist Party and People’s Life Party — are supporting joint candidates in the 32 single-seat districts up for election.

This is an unprecedented show of unity of purpose, particularly for the JCP. Previously the JCP has stubbornly played the role of spoiler in district elections, running its own hopeless candidates, bleeding around 10 per cent of the vote from more viable anti-LDP candidates.

But the 2016 electoral alliance between the DP and the JCP has caused considerable confusion. The DP insists that the relationship with the JCP is temporary and opportunistic. The four parties have developed a short list of common policy positions, agreeing, for example, to oppose the inclusion of nuclear power in the nation’s base load calculations, the move of the Futenma Air Station to Henoko, the Abe government’s security legislation institutionalising a reinterpretation of the Constitution permitting forms of collective self-defence, and the ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).

DP executives insist that these measures, including the party’s about face on the TPP, do not alter the party’s long-term orientation. But Abe and LDP leaders have taken the liberty to spice up their own campaign speeches with warnings of a Communist takeover of Japan’s main opposition party.

The hubbub around the DP–JCP alliance has diverted attention away from the challenge to the unity of the ruling LDP–Komeito coalition. It is this challenge that will likely have the greatest effect on policy.

Komeito is a status quo, conservative, anti-militarist party. Its members are unenthusiastic about constitutional revision, particularly revision of the Article 9 peace clause. Komeito’s leadership already expends a great deal of energy explaining to the party faithful the benefits of cooperating with the mildly revisionist LDP. Justifying a relationship with rightists and ultra-rightists would break Komeito’s connection with its supporters. For the Komeito leadership, the prospect of the coalition and its allies ending up with more than 162 seats is a nightmare.

The LDP relies on Komeito for its majorities in both houses. Komeito voters supply anywhere from 5 per cent to 20 per cent of the votes an LDP candidate receives in single-seat districts. In return, the Komeito earns significant influence over its much larger coalition partner. This influence makes it possible for the Komeito leadership to justify the coalition to its voters.

The results of the 2016 election seem destined to upset this balance. If Komeito voters do as they have done since the establishment of the coalition in 1999, they will vote Komeito in the proportional vote and multi-member districts, and they will vote for the LDP candidate in the single-member districts. With this help the LDP looks likely to win at least 56 seats giving it a total of 122 seats in the upper house necessary for a majority. In such a scenario, the LDP would be able to form government alone for the first time since 1989, and Komeito voters will thus have been complicit in their own disempowerment.

A possible solution to the dilemma — have the Komeito faithful betray the LDP in the single-seat districts, preventing the LDP from gaining its majority — is out of the question. Given Komeito voters’ hatred of the JCP, the chances of them voting for a candidate co-sponsored by the JCP are zero.

What happens if the LDP has majorities in both houses is anyone’s guess. It will certainly not kick Komeito out of government — many of the LDP’s lower house members are dependent on Komeito voters for easy victories. But Komeito will likely find it difficult to justify its continued participation in a coalition where it has lost most of its leverage. If so, the 2016 election may be seen to have been one of immense historical significance.

Is Japan's Rightwing vulnerable to foreign pressure? Unlikely

Can foreign media pressure force changes in Japan?

BY PHILIP BRASOR
SPECIAL TO THE JAPAN TIMES, JUN 25, 2016

Former Tokyo Gov. Shintaro Ishihara’s first-person “biography” of late Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, “Tensai” (“Genius”), remains atop best-seller lists. It is interesting to note that when Tanaka was alive Ishihara berated him as a crude opportunist. The years have obviously tempered his view, or perhaps Ishihara’s own political career helped him appreciate how an uneducated hick without connections could become the most powerful man in Japan.

The incident that caused Tanaka’s downfall, the 1970s Lockheed bribery scandal, received greater coverage overseas than it did in Japan, and one of Ishihara’s favorite themes as a public figure has been how Japan should resist foreign pressure and assert its position as a world power. Takashi Tachibana was the journalist most instrumental in exposing Tanaka’s money politics, but it was foreign press attention that made the former prime minister’s actions impossible to ignore — even in Japan.

A similar situation surrounds the rise of the right-wing lobbying group Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi), which has received close scrutiny by the likes of the U.K. newsweekly The Economist, Australia’s ABC News and other prominent foreign media over the past year. The Japanese press has shown less interest.

In April, freelance journalist Osamu Aoki talked about “grass roots conservative movements” on TBS radio, and mentioned the overseas fascination with Nippon Kaigi, which counts among its 38,000 members Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, half his Cabinet and a good portion of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Local reporters tend to think of Japan Conference as a cult, and thus some have characterized the foreign opinion that Abe and his government are “under the thumb of Japan Conference,” as Aoki put it, as being akin to conspiracy theory. Nevertheless, citing how the foreign press helped advance the prosecution of Tanaka, Aoki says Japan Conference could be another big story the Japanese press is missing “even though it’s right there under its nose,” and so he plans to publish a book on the organization next month.

If Aoki is hoping for a scoop, he’s too late. In April, a writer named Tamotsu Sugano published “Nippon Kaigi no Kenkyu” (“Nippon Kaigi Research”) which sold 126,000 copies in less than two months. The book purports to be the most detailed study of the group ever written, but its popularity is chiefly due to Japan Conference’s reaction. The organization’s founder, Yuzo Kabashima, wrote to Sugano’s publisher, Fusosha, asking it not to print the book. Fusosha ignored the request. Weekly magazine Shukan Post then called present and past members of Japan Conference asking why they hated the book so much. Most refused to comment. One professor who belongs to another nationalist organization told the magazine that Sugano’s report is “beyond the pale,” a “pile of lies” based on anonymous sources. “I don’t want to talk about it,” he is quoted as saying. “Whatever I say will benefit the book.” That seems to be exactly what happened.

Interviewed on the web news channel DemocraTV, Sugano admitted that he is ideologically right-of-center and did not write his book “to be critical” of Japan Conference. He just noticed that the mainstream press was not covering the group. The book is based mainly on a series of articles he wrote for the Japanese Harvard Business Review, which attracted no attention from Japan Conference when they were originally posted online. “Japan Conference members are old men and women who don’t use the internet,” he said. When the book was slated for print publication, Japan Conference finally took notice, but it thought Fusosha was a right-leaning imprint and could thus be easily persuaded. Sugano says Fusosha publishes anything “that can make money for them.” Their biggest-selling book in the same format is a study slamming the nuclear power industry, hardly a conservative position.

Sugano chronicles the group’s origins in the early ’70s. Several founding members belonged to the student wing of the religious group Seicho no Ie at the time, and its main purpose was to counterbalance the leftist student movement. After graduation, this group established its own right-wing organization, Nihon Seinen Kyogikai, which eventually merged with another like-minded group in 1977. This organization morphed into Nippon Kaigi in 1997.

Japan Conference’s formidable organizational skills have influenced government policy, especially with regard to the legality of the national anthem and flag, the definition of the “Japanese family,” the direction of education and the Constitution, which they want to change. But Japan Conference is not “conservative” in Sugano’s eyes. Its interests are purely reactionary in that they were formulated in response to left-wing interests.

So he interrogates its motives. Six lofty goals are listed on Japan Conference’s website. The first is to uphold Japan’s “beautiful traditions,” which he interprets as reestablishing a strict social hierarchy under the Emperor. Japan Conference says it wants to create an education system that “fosters a Japanese sensibility,” which Sugano says means getting rid of the teachers union, Nikkyoso, the Japanese right’s bete noire. Japan Conference aspires to contribute to world peace, which means elevating the Self-Defense Forces to the position of a national military and, according to Sugano, “bullying peace-loving liberals.”

The author believes none of these ideas merit deep thought. Except for the Self-Defense Forces’ change, most citizens would probably find them regressive. In fact, that’s the reason Seicho no Ie, which now boasts 520,000 followers, has come out against the LDP in next month’s election. Because of Sugano’s book, the religious group felt compelled to explain that it rejected politics in the ’80s, and told Shukan Post that it doesn’t support the present administration or Japan Conference, which is “stuck in the past.”

Sugano doesn’t think Japan Conference is as powerful as foreign media make them out to be, and he may be underestimating them. This lobbying group’s effectiveness lies in its ability to remain cloaked in anodyne sentiments. Sugano’s book reveals it still longs for a Japan that didn’t lose World War II — a country that doesn’t exist.

Abenomics and the Slowdown of Japan's Economy

Going into the July 10 Upper House elections, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has emphasized the success of his economic plan called "Abenomics." It consists of what he called “three arrows”: 1) bold monetary relaxation; 2) flexible application of fiscal stimulus; and 3) a growth strategy to spark private investment.  It is a clever public relations meme.

Launching the Upper House elections campaign on June 22, 2016, Abe spoke to a crowd in Kumamoto, a southern city struck by earthquakes and landslides in April.  He said, "This is an election to decide whether we will forge ahead strongly with economic policies, make Japan grow, the regions proper and everyone feel the benefits -- or return to a dark and stagnant era...Japan's economic is making steady progress and producing results.”  The Prime Minister cited Japan’s increasing tax revenue and tight labour market as evidence.

Public opinion, the media and major world economic institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and OECD all question Abe's positive cast on Abenomics. According to the two recent polls conducted by the Kyodo News, over 60 percent of the Japanese public and the youth have lost confidence in the government's economic reform. In a nationwide telephone survey conducted on June 12th and 13th, “62.2 percent expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the ‘Abenomics’ policy mix, while 28.0 percent said the measures would improve the economy.” In an Internet survey result published on June 19th by the Kyodo News of 1,535 respondents from age 18-19, “62.5 percent expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the ‘Abenomics’ policy mix,” while 37.5 percent expected the measures to help improve the economy.

In May and June, the IMF, OECD, and the World Bank published reports examining the three arrows of Abenomics. They all forecast slower economic growth. The World Bank projected GDP growth at 0.7 percent in 2016 and 0.4 percent in 2017.” The IMF said that Japan would be the world's only shrinking advanced economy, projecting GDP growth of "0.5 percent in 2016 and –0.1 percent in 2017.” They note that consumption in Japan fell in “fiscal 2015, logging its second straight annual fall for the first time since comparable data began in fiscal 1994.” Price-adjusted real wages dropped for the fourth consecutive year in 2015. The average proportion of consumption spending in disposable income fell to 72.8 percent in January-March this year.

The World Bank assesses two arrows in Abenomics: monetary easing and fiscal stimulus in Global Economic Prospects: Divergences and Risks (174 pgs, June 7, 2016). It notes that negative interest rates, in contrast, “induced low inflation expectations and currency appreciation, raising concerns about the effectiveness of monetary policy.” On the fiscal side, “a supplementary budget with additional stimulus measures is expected to provide some support in 2016…but the rise of consumption tax to 10 percent, a 2 percent increase will balance out some of the growth effects.”

The IMF also reaches the conclusion that increasing the consumption tax in 2017 will affect growth in Japan, in World Economic Outlook, Too Slow for Too Long (230 pgs, April 12,2016). Commenting on the “third Arrow” of structural reform, the IMF suggests “the Japanese government to implement strategies to raise productivity, which are vital for tackling medium-term risks and raising potential output.” Income policies are needed to “bolster wage-price dynamics and increase monetary policy effectiveness.” Structural reforms should focus on “boosting the supply of labour (including of women), reforming labour markets to remove duality, further deregulating product and services markets, and supporting investment through corporate governance reform.”

Besides giving similar remarks on Abenomics, the OECD also doubts the positive results that mentioned by Abe. In the OECD Economic Outlook (316 pgs, June 1, 2016). The contraction of the labour market has only “a limited impact on nominal wage growth.” At the same time, low inflation expectations signal “inefficiency of the fiscal stimulus.”

In a June 22 editorial, "Abenomics and the Upper House election," the Japan Times questioned the success of Abenomics. The recovery that marked the first year of his new administration was short-lived. The nation’s gross domestic product, “which grew 2 percent in real terms in fiscal 2013, shrank 0.9 percent in fiscal 2014 and grew a sluggish 0.8 percent in fiscal 2015.” The underlying weakness in consumer spending — “particularly since the April 2014 consumption tax hike to 8 percent — dragged down growth, as the cost of living mostly rose faster than wage hikes” — which Abe boasts have been the sharpest since the turn of the century. And the reversal of the yen’s downtrend in recent months — “with the currency hitting 103-to-the-dollar range last week for the first time since August 2014 — threatens to pare the earnings of export-led major firms that had been inflated by the weak currency.” But the writer concludes:

Neither trumpeting Abenomics as if it’s a cure-all or denouncing it as a failure will be constructive. The Upper House election should let voters hand down their judgment.

By Research Intern Ms. Nora Qiu

Monday in Washington, June 27, 2016

AFTER BREXIT: A NEW WORLD ORDER? TELECONFERENCE. 6/27, 11:00am-Noon. Sponsor: Wilson Center. The results of the June 23 UK referendum, in which British citizens voted to leave the European Union by a margin of 52% to 48%, shocked the markets and political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic. How long until economic and political stability returns? What kind of deal will Britain get as it forges new relationships with its European neighbors? Can the country retain its “special relationship” with the U.S.? Join BY PHONE as Wilson Center experts discuss the long-term global implications of this unprecedented vote.
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Speakers: James Hollifield, Public Policy Fellow;  Michael J. Geary, Global Fellow; Michelle Egan, Fellow; Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO, Wilson Center; Kent Hughes, Public Policy Fellow.

REFUGEES WORK: A HUMANITARIAN INVESTMENT THAT YIELDS ECONOMIC DIVIDENDS. 6/27, 12:30-2:00pm. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CGD). Speaker: Philippe Legrain, Founder, Open Political Economy Network (OPEN), Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics European Institute (LSEEI).

RESTORING NATO'S POWER AND PURPOSE. 6/27, 1:30-2:45pm. Sponsor: Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns (Ret.), Roy and Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Former US Ambassador to NATO; General James L. Jones, Jr., USMC (Ret.), Chairman and Board Director, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Founder and President, Jones Group International, Former National Security Advisor and Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Damon Wilson, Executive Vice President, Programs and Strategy, Atlantic Council, Former Senior Director, European Affairs, National Security Council; Moderator: Dr. Evelyn Farkas, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia/Ukraine/Eurasia, US Department of Defense.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT. 6/27, 3:30-5:00pm. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Tom Perriello, Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa; Victoria K. Holt, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Bruno Stagno Ugarte, Deputy Executive Director, Human Rights Watch; Lise Grande, Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

LEADERS SPEAK: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS. 6/27, 5:30-7:00pm. Sponsor: National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Speakers: Stephen J. Hadley, Principal, RiceHadleyGates LLC; Former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Robert “Bud” McFarlane, National Security Advisor to President Ronald Regan; Moderator: Steve Orlins, President, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations.

Prime Minister of Japan’s Schedule July 13- July 19, 2015

Monday, July 13, 2015 

AM
08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya (no morning visitors)
09:10 Depart private residence
09:25 Arrive at office
10:00 Meet with Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Cheng Yonghua and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka
10:30 End meeting with Mr. Cheng and Mr. Akitaka
11:08 Depart office
11:10 Arrive at Lower House 1st Diet Members’ Meeting Hall, receive dental treatment at dentist’s office
11:28 Depart Lower House
11:30 Arrive at office
11:39 Meet with President of Lions Club International Association, Yamada Mihiro and former Minister of Transport, Fujii Takao

PM
00:03 End meeting with Mr. Yamada and Mr. Fujii
00:48 Depart office
00:55 Arrive at Hotel Okura in Toranomon, Tokyo. Attend and deliver address at 30th National Meeting of the Japan Private Kindergarten PTA Association in banquet hall Heian
01:23 Depart hotel
01:26 Arrive at office
03:05 Meet with Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary, Takamizawa Nobushige
03:29 End meeting with Mr. Takamizawa
03:30 Meet with Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Eto Seiichi

04:11 End meeting with Mr. Eto
04:57 Depart office
04:58 Arrive at National Diet
05:00 Head towards LDP’s President’s Office
05:01 LDP’s Officers Meeting
05:14 Meeting ends
05:15 Meet with LDP members: Vice-President, Komura Masahiko, Secretary-General, Tanigaki Sadakazu and Executive Acting Secretary-General, Hosoda Hiroyuki and Chairman of LDP Election Strategy, Motegi Toshimitsu.
05:43 Depart room
05:45 Depart National Diet
05:46 Arrive at office
06:07 Depart office
07:21 Arrive at Federation of Economic Organizations in Otemachi, Tokyo. Attend, deliver address and take commemorative photos at The Sixth Asian Business Summit Reception  
07:44 Depart reception
07:57 Arrive at Japanese restaurant, ‘Kouetsu’ in Akasaka, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with former Lower House Speaker, Ibuki Bunmei. Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga Yoshihide and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kato Katsunobu also attend
08:40 Depart from restaurant
08:45 Arrive at LDP headquarters, appear on LDP internet program Café Sta
09:22 Depart headquarters
09:41 Arrive at private residence

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

AM
07:51 Depart from private residence
08:02 Arrive at office
08:13 The eighth meeting of the Headquarters for Promoting Decentralization Reform  

08:18 Meeting ends
08:23 Cabinet meeting starts
08:35 Cabinet meeting ends
08:36 Meet with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Aso Taro
09:20 End meeting with Mr. Aso
09:52 Meet Chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Suryo Bambang Sulisto and Indonesian Ambassador to Japan, Yusron Ihza Mahendra
10:24 End meeting with Mr. Suryo and Yusron
10:53 Meet with Secretary-General of Headquarters for Abduction Issue, Ishikawa Shoichiro
11:20 End meeting with Mr. Ishikawa
11:21 Meet with Director of National Security Council, Yachi Shotaro and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka
11:48 End meeting with Mr. Yachi and Mr. Saiki

PM
02:35 Director of National Security Council, Mr. Yachi, Director of Cabinet Intelligence, Mr. Kitamura, Head of LDP Yamanashi Chapter, Shimizu Takenori and Director of Cabinet Satellite Intelligence, Shimohira Koji enters
02:48 Mr. Yachi and Mr. Shimohira leave
03:09 Mr. Kimura leaves
03:19 Meet with Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka
03:48 End meeting with Mr. Saiki
04:20 Meet with Special Advisor to President of LDP, Hagiuda Koichi
04:46 End meeting with Mr. Hagiuda
05:00 Meet with Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, Amari Akira and Cabinet Office members: Vice-Minister, Matsuyama Kenji, Director-Generals for Policies on Cohesive Society, Maekawa Mamoru, Habuka Shigeki and Tawa Hiroshi
05:26 End meeting with Mr. Amari, Mr. Matsuyama, Mr. Maekawa, Mr. Habuka and Mr. Tawa
05:32 Courtesy Call from the Consortium for the Promotion of the Modern Industrial Heritage in Kyushu and Yamaguchi to Inscription on the World Heritage
05:44 Courtesy call ends
05:45 Meet with Chairperson of LDP Policy Research Council, Inada Tomomi
06:18 End meeting with Ms. Inada Tomomi
06:24 Depart office
06:47 Arrive at private residence

Wednesday, July 15, 2015
AM
07:30 Depart private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo
07:41 Arrive at office
07:45 Meet with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, Kato Katsunobu
08:11 End meeting with Mr. Kato
08:53 Depart office
08:54 Arrive at National Diet
08:56 Head towards Lower House Committee Room No. 1
09:00 Meeting of the Special Committee of the House of Representatives on the Legislation for Peace and Security of Japan and the International Community

PM
00:10 Leave seat during proceedings
00:12 Depart National Diet
00:13 Arrive at office
00:18 Meet with Chief Cabinet Secretary, Suga Yoshihide
00:26 End meeting with Mr. Suga
06:37 Interview to all media: when asked ‘Has the Security bills been approved by the Lower House Members of the Diet?’ Mr. Abe answers, ‘I would like to proceed in explaining this to our citizens including the discussion in the National Diet in an easy-to-understand manner.’
06:38 Depart office
06:44 Arrive at soba restaurant, ’Sampei’ in Akasaka, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with Yomiuri Newspaper group board member and Top Advisor, Oikawa Shouichi, and an artist of Western painting, Kinutani Kouji
08:36 Depart restaurant
08:56 Arrive at private residence

Thursday, July 16, 2015

AM
08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya ( no morning visitors)
09:28 Depart private residence
09:47 Arrive at office
10:40 Courtesy Call from the Deputy Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan
10:53 Courtesy call ends

10:57 Meet with Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Aso Taro, Ministry of Finance members, Vice-Minister, Tanaka Kazuho, Deputy Vice-Minister, Fukuda Junichi and Director-General of Tax Bureau, Sato Shinichi
11:34 Mr. Tanaka, Mr. Fukuda and Mr. Sato leave
11:41 Mr. Aso leaves
11:45 Filming video message for industrial group 

11:51 Finish filming

PM
00:47 Depart office
00:49 Arrive at National Diet
00:50 Head towards Lower House Waiting Room No. 14
00:51 Meeting of LDP Diet Members

00:57 Meeting ends

00:58 Depart room
00:59 Head towards Lower House Plenary Meeting Hall
01:02 Lower House Plenary Session opens
02:06 Meeting adjourns
02:07 Depart the hall
02:09 Depart National Diet
02:11 Arrive at office
02:12 Interview open to all media: when asked ‘the security bills that have been approved by the lower house of the Diet,’ Mr Abe answers, ‘for our national citizens to have a greater understanding, our whole party will be mobilized and will continue to work hard’.
02:14 Interview ends
02:30 Meeting with Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Eto Seiichi
03:41 End meeting with Mr. Eto
03:45 Meet with Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense, Mr. Nishi Masanori and Ministry of Defense, Director-General of Bureau of Local Cooperation, Nakajima Akihiko
03:56 End meeting with Mr. Nishi and Mr. Nakajima
04:19 Meeting of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy
05:13 Meeting ends

05:14 Meet with Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Takaichi Sanae
05:27 End meeting with Mr. Takaichi
06:46 Depart office
06:55 Arrive at Japanese restaurant, ‘Tsuyama’ in Akasaka, Tokyo. Dinner meeting with former Prime Minister, Mori Yoshiro, LDP’s Executive Acting Secretary-General, Hosoda Hiroyuki and Secretary-General for LDP in Upper House, Date Chuichi.
08:41 Depart restaurant
09:13 Arrive at private residence

Friday, July 17, 2015

AM

08:00 At private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo (no morning visitors)
08:42 Depart private residence
08:56 Arrive at office
09:03 Cabinet meeting starts
09:08 Cabinet meeting ends
09:14 The meeting of Global Warming Prevention Headquarters

09:22 Meeting ends
09:25 Speak with Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation, Mr. Ohta Akihiro
09:35 End speaking with Mr. Ohta
09:36 Meet with Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, Amari Akira, Cabinet members, Vice-Minister, Matsuyama Kenji and Director-Generals for Policies on Cohesive Society, Habuka Shigeki and Tawa Hiroshi
09:56 End meeting with Mr. Amari, Mr. Matsuyama and Mr. Tawa
10:02 Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka enters
10:52 MOFA’s Director-General of Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, Uemura Tsukasa, Director-General of International Legal Affairs Bureau, Akiba Takeo and Director-General of Intelligence and Analysis Service Oka Hiroshi join
11:18 Mr. Uemura and Mr. Oka leave
11:30 Mr. Saiki and Mr. Akiba leave

PM
00:01 Meet with LDP Secretary-General, Tanigaki Sadakazu
00:40 End meeting with Mr. Tanigaki
01:55 Formal Prime Minister, Mori Yoshiro enters
02:00 Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saiki Akitaka, Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Shimomura Hakubun and Minister in charge of Tokyo Olympic and Paralympics, Endo Toshiaki join
03:37 All members leave
03:38 Interview open to all media: when asked ‘What kind of decision has been reached for the new National Stadium plans?’ Mr. Abe answers, “I have decided that we will cancel the current plan for the New National Stadium that is to be the venue for the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, and create a new plan from scratch.”
03:42 Interview ends
04:08 Meet with Director of Cabinet Intelligence, Kitamura Shigeru
04:35 End meeting with Mr. Kitamura
05:00 Speak with MOFA’s Director-General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Ihara Junichi and Director-General of International Legal Affairs Bureau, Akiba Takeo
05:10 End speaking with Mr. Ihara and Mr. Akiba
05:30 Reception and commemorative photo with Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Xavier Bettel. Japan-Luxembourg Summit Meeting and Other Events
05.31Pay courtesy to honor guards

05:37 Honor guards ceremony ends
05:39 Summit conference with Prime Minister Bettel
06:23 Conference ends
06:28 Joint press release
06:40 Press release ends
06:41 Depart office
06:42 Arrive at official residence. Dinner meeting hosted by Prime Minister Abe
07:55 To see off Prime Minister Bettel 

07:56 See-off ends
08:17 Meet with Special Advisor to the Prime Minister, Eto Seiichi
10:01 End meeting with Mr. Eto

Saturday, July 18, 2015

AM
08:00 At official residence (no morning visitors)
Stay at private residence throughout the morning

PM
02:13 Depart official residence
02:33 Arrive at wedding venue ‘Shimomegurogajoen’ in Shimomeguro, Tokyo. Attend LDP’s Upper House member, Ejima Kiyoshi’s eldest daughter’s wedding reception banquet
05:23 Depart wedding ceremony
05:54 Arrive at private residence in Tomigaya, Tokyo

Sunday, July 19, 2015

AM
10:00 At private residence (no morning visitors)
Stay at private residence throughout the morning

PM
04:13 Depart private residence
04:22 Arrive at ‘Hair Guest’ hairdressers in Shibuya, Tokyo, receive haircut
05:57 Depart from hairdressers
06:12 Arrive at private residence

Provisional translation by Kelly Ing

A New Kind of Reconciliation in East Asia?

Obama's bow at Hiroshima

Harry & Helen Gray Senior Fellow, Director of the Society, Culture & Politics Program at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (AICGS) and APP member Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman discusses in this essay the current opportunities for reconciliation in East Asia in light of President Barack Obama's May visit to Hiroshima.


President Obama noted in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun before his visit to Hiroshima that his presence was an example of reconciliation: “I will point out that Prime Minister Abe and I coming to Hiroshima together shows the world the possibility of reconciliation—that even former adversaries can become the strongest of allies.” Six weeks earlier, in an interview with Asahi TV, Secretary of State John Kerry also referenced reconciliation to characterize Japanese-U.S. relations: “Well, no matter what people feel about [the dropping of the atomic bomb], we are now friends and allies. We have worked through a remarkable reconciliation.” The visits of Secretary of State Kerry and President Obama to Hiroshima in April and May 2016 came at the same time as Franco-German commemorations of the 100th anniversary of the battle of Verdun, providing an opportunity to reflect on reconciliation in Europe and in East Asia.

The current international salience of reconciliation has not been missed by foreign policy experts. For example, the former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs in the State Department, Ambassador Wendy Sherman, recently identified the global need for reconciliation—what she calls “political forgiveness”—as a political priority.

This essay looks at the nature of the reconciliation suggested by President Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, and how it compares to the iconic reconciliation pursued by Germany over more than seventy years. The path of Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation (with France, Israel, Poland, and Czechoslovakia/Czech Republic) can be described in terms of timing, motives, actors, mechanisms, opposition, and consequences. The argument here is that, while there are many similarities in the elements that make up reconciliation across the two cases, U.S.-Japanese reconciliation as exemplified at Hiroshima is more of a pragmatic kind, lacking the deep moral basis of the German and European experience.

Timing

Germany’s official policy of active reconciliation started early, in the 1950s with France and Israel, whereas Obama’s visit to Hiroshima took place a long 70 years after the dropping of the atomic bomb. Nonetheless, not all issues were settled speedily in the German case, as evidenced by the agreement on World War II slave and forced labor, which occurred only in 2000. And in the Japanese case, the framework for a new relationship was outlined soon after war, in the San Francisco Treaty of September 1951.

Motives

Germany was driven by both pragmatic motives (the return of considerable sovereignty in exchange for facing the past) and a moral imperative (compensation and contrition were the right thing to do). The dual motives were also present for Germany’s victims.

Obama’s motives for going to Hiroshima were pragmatic: to augment the U.S. relationship with Japan; to help stabilize East Asian security at a time of perceived growing threats from China, both economic and military. Obama also framed the visit in moral terms, but not like the morality in the European experience. By emphasizing the universal immorality of using nuclear weapons, Obama removed U.S. agency. He referred to a “shared responsibility to look directly into the eye of history and ask what we must do differently to curb such suffering again.” German officials from Adenauer to Merkel have accepted German responsibility for World War II and the Holocaust. In the Obama visit, there was no Japanese acceptance of responsibility, and no explicit American accusation.

History and memory, often the expressions of moral composure, were general but key terms for Obama: “[T]he memory of the morning of August 6, 1945 must never fade. That memory allows us to fight complacency. It fuels our moral imagination. It allows us to change.” Yet, specifics were lacking.

There is a danger in this treatment of history that it will become a footnote in Japanese-U.S. relations rather than a touchstone for constant dialogue. Obama’s view of history fits with Prime Minister Abe’s. Abe insisted, in the recent “comfort women” agreement with South Korea, that there be no more discussion of the issue. For Germany, commemoration has taken place repeatedly at the same sites for 70 years. It is unclear with Hiroshima whether this visit by a head of state will be the first and only such visit, or the beginning of symbolic gestures by heads of state and government and cabinet members at sites where the war in the Pacific can be remembered with regularity. In the European context, these visits often have been additionally powerful when the German representative has been accompanied by a representative of the other country. Joint visits (as with Obama and Abe in Hiroshima) both confirm and contribute to reconciliation.

Actors

In the German and European example, civil society actors were catalysts for reconciliation, beginning soon after the war and even before the Federal Republic was founded. U.S.-Japanese postwar relations similarly have been shaped by non-governmental relations in many societal arenas from economics to culture, from town twinning to educational and academic exchange. The European societal activities typically have been coordinated with official initiatives. At first, in the planning for the Hiroshima visit, American POWs were led to believe an American POW would accompany the President, but in the end this amplification of the visit did not materialize.

Another aspect of the nature of actors in these bilateral relations is the distinction, and common experience, of being both victims and perpetrators. While carefully avoiding the idea of an apology or reexamination of the decision to drop the bomb, Obama’s presence and words at Hiroshima importantly validated Japan as victim, albeit not singularly but as part of a universe of victims: “We come to mourn the dead, including over 100,000 Japanese men, women, and children, thousands of Koreans, a dozen Americans held prisoner.” Yet, Americans were Japan’s victims at Pearl Harbor and thereafter, which went unrecognized in the Hiroshima visit.

Germany recognized early on its role as perpetrator of World War II and the Holocaust, but Germany and its victims have underscored in the last 25 years that Germans—those expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia—were also victims, without suggesting a moral equivalence between Germans and other victims. Obama carefully avoided a victimhood vocabulary, but Abe said nothing to dispel the impression.

Mechanisms

In addition to symbolic gestures and civil society initiatives mentioned above, in a variety of policy arenas bilateral institutions have expressed policy preferences between the two sides in the European example. So, too, economics (constructing interdependence as an antidote to past conflict and as a bulwark against new conflicts) and defense (making war between the two impossible) have been prominent in the U.S.-Japanese case.

The key mechanism shaping European reconciliation has been the moral practice of acknowledgement of grievances, including but not limited to apologies, statements of regret, treaty language. The moral nature of acknowledgement is seen in its early and repeated use. Seventy years after World War II, Germans have no pragmatic need to acknowledge their conduct in the war and the Holocaust, but they continue to do so for reasons of moral compunction. Apology, or a variant thereof, has three basic requirements: a recognition of the suffering of the victims; the assumption of full responsibility by the perpetrator for his/her acts; an indication of the material or spiritual compensation for the loss. Only the first, a recognition of suffering, was present at Hiroshima, distinguishing morally the U.S.-Japan case as practiced at Hiroshima from Germany. Obama wanted to avoid the appearance of delivering an apology.

Opposition

European reconciliation teaches us that there is often opposition to the process, usually from domestic forces. Obama’s caution at Hiroshima was prompted by veterans’ rejection of the need for an apology. They felt it would call into question the decision to use the atomic bomb and would upend Truman’s reasoning that the bombing brought a speedy end to the war and avoided a massive loss of life. According to a 2015 Pew Research Center poll, 56 percent of Americans believed the use of the bombing was appropriate. Among those over 65, the figure for acceptance was 70 percent.

Despite Obama’s conviction that his visit to Hiroshima might advance his most profound commitment to a world without nuclear weapons, making victims but not contrition important, he inevitably has received the political criticism he anticipated. Supporters of the presumptive Republican presidential nominee called Obama “weak” and the visit unnecessary because Japan was the undisputed aggressor. For Obama’s nuclear agenda, and for his policy of making Japan the Asian leader against a rising China, this first act of reconciliation was essential. The test now is whether it will hold and be reciprocated.

Consequences

Bilateral reconciliation in Europe contributed in the postwar world to the stability of Western Europe as a whole. A new round of reconciliation after 1989 contributed to stability and solidarity in Eastern Europe, although Putin’s hyper-nationalism and nostalgia for the Soviet era have put both in question. Greater stability in East Asia could be a consequence of Obama’s trip if the President were to move vigorously on three fronts:

1. insist on a visit by Abe to Pearl Harbor (both sides need to acknowledge history). The Japanese defence minister visited in November 2015, but an equivalent to the President’s Hiroshima gesture is necessary;  
2. increase the number and intensity of civil society connections between Japan and the U.S. and include China and South Korea. There are many disparate non-governmental initiatives, but increasing, consolidating, and profiling them would provide a critical mass for a new push to reconciliation; 
3. be willing to mediate between Japan and China and between Japan and South Korea over history issues. 

Before the Hiroshima visit, the U.S. did not have the moral authority to push Japan toward regional reconciliation because of the use of the atomic bomb. Japan perceived and presented itself as victim. Now that its victimhood has been validated, both sides are liberated to look at reconciliation with fresh eyes. Such a willingness would assume that the Hiroshima visit was a demonstration of strength and courage, not the weakness the President’s critics are intent to claim.