Friday, January 11, 2013

An encounter with a denier


Nautilus Institute, January 10, 2012
Let me tell you a story. It’s a bit long, and about a friend of mine and her family, but it might explain why I believe that the idea of Japan as the northern hinge of the United States’s pivot strategy against China is simply not viable in political terms, and may well prove dangerous.

In early March 2007 I found myself on the stage of CLSA’s annual Japan Forum in Tokyo, together with Koike Yuriko, at the time Prime Minister Abe’s National Security Advisor, and soon after, Minister of Defence. Koike, an Arabic speaking former journalist, gave a short anodyne talk to the 800 or so assembled suits about plans for a national security council. I followed on with some hopefully less anodyne comments, but then shifted from my prepared remarks to raise the issue of the Prime Minister’s comments in that morning’s newspaper in response to the testimony to a US Congressional sub-committee by three women, two Korean and one Australian, about their experiences as sexual slaves for the Japanese Army in WW2. Abe had said that while the events were regrettable, “in the legal definition”, this was not a matter of coercion.[1]

Addressing Ms Koike, and trying to keep a level tone, I said that as someone who had lived in Japan for a long time, with a deep affection for the country, I thought these remarks were disastrous for Japan in policy terms. Soft power – the capacity to generate a desire for imitation or admiration – is generally regarded as an important part of a country’s strategic posture, but for Japan this issue, and the inability of the country’s leaders to rise above it, was the repellent – and repelling – inverse of soft power. Moreover, I said, I had a small personal connection to the issue which would not permit me to let the matter pass without comment.

One of the three women who testified so courageously in Washington, was a woman named Jan Ruff O’Herne, who happened to be the mother of a close friend, the Australian painter Carol Ruff. Born and raised to Dutch parents in the Dutch East Indies, Jan had been a 17 year old girl planning a life as a nun when she and her mother were interned by the Imperial Army in 1942. Jan and other young girls were sent to the city of Semarang, to a brothel for army officers, where she was raped, repeatedly, daily, for many months. Eventually returned to the internment camp, Jan told only her mother, who just held her, and her priest, who told her any hopes she had of becoming a nun were over. At war’s end, the camp was liberated, and she fell in love with a young British soldier, Tom O’Herne, who she married, telling him, and no-one else for the next fifty years, what had happened to her. Despite all, it was a happy marriage, and Jan and Tom raised two daughters, Eileen and Carol, in Australia.[2]

In 1989, the first few extraordinary Korean women told the story of their abductions and systematic rape by the Imperial Army to their fellow Koreans, and then the wider world, bringing with them the strange and shocking phrase “comfort women”. Jan saw these women on television, and felt that she too had to break the silence of half a century, and sat down to write her story for her daughters in an old school notebook, which later became her remarkable book Fifty Years of Silence[3]. The Korean women had given her the courage to face the feelings of shame:

The truth is winning. Because, all of a sudden, after 50 years we had the courage to shed the shame.It was a risk I had to take, but I was afraid. Then to have the enormous relief when I had spoken out to be received back among my friends and my parish, and be welcomed and embraced and flowers put on my seat in the church, when I first went to Mass. It was a wonderful reception I had, you know? Mmm. It was good. [4]

For her daughters, suddenly many things made sense.

“My mother’s a very beautiful woman”, said Carol. “She’s really attractive and, as a young woman, she was stunning. And, in a sense, sometimes I think that her beauty has also been her disguise. We knew all along that she’d been in prison camp. I’ve never seen my mother as someone with a terrible past that she was hiding from me. Not a hint.”[5].

Carol and her then husband, the film maker Ned Lander, went on with Jan to make an award-winning film, also called Fifty Years of Silence[6], about Jan’s story, and most importantly, about her first, anxious visit to Japan after an invitation to speak about what had happened to her, and to so many other girls and young women.

Carol and I were friends from Alice Springs, that hard and special part of Australia where art and politics meet, where Carol painted the spirited landscape.[7] When the film came out, I was teaching politics in a Japanese university, and organising a fieldwork program for third year students to come to Australia for half a year. Carol was by now living in Sydney, and I asked her if she would consider showing the film to my students, and then talking with them. She had never shown it to a Japanese audience, and was not sure – about her own response or that of the students. 

Beforehand I prepared the students, talking about the historical background, working through the script of the film. On that first occasion, as in many later years, crowded into in Carol’s little Sydney house, the mainly female students watched intently, some in increasing dismay, and some, at least initially, in disbelief or denial, but all shattered by the end, wondering how they could possibly speak to the daughter of this extraordinary woman. And then the conversation, the many-stranded, halting, tearful, wondering conversations that were founded on the rock of authentic witness, began. In later years, Carol and I would start the film off, and then move to coffee in her tiny exquisite garden, catching up on the doings of our families, the quiet gossip about our friends, until it was time to go back in, to wait for the end of the film, and readying ourselves for the electric silence and the talking.   

On stage at the CLSA event, after explaining the Abe statement, I told a little of Jan’s story. I said to Ms Koike that I hoped that for both strategic policy reasons and because of the simple truth of what these women had been saying about their own lives in a committee room in Congress, the Abe administration would change course, and choose a path of historical reconciliation. After all, if a country so deeply imbued with racist attitudes as the Australia of my childhood could overcome most of its war-borne antipathy for Japan, then surely it was possible to at least start that process here. Ms Koike thanked me for my policy advice – with some asperity.

After the session, the atmosphere in the backstage waiting room was a tad awkward for the CLSA suits. I apologised to Ms Koike for ambushing her, but she was unflustered, and brushed any unpleasantness aside. That’s politics she said, smiling. I was about to say to her that Jan Ruff O’Herne was a deeply religious and decent person, outside the world of politics, and except for this issue, which marked her so deeply, she was an “ordinary” person who I felt sure Ms Koike would be able to talk with. 

“Sometimes God asks of us, late in life, to do an amazing task. And this has come to me late in life, you know. Without my faith I couldn’t have even survived the time that I was in the comfort stations. My faith has always been the backbone of my whole life.”[8]  

Before I was able to say any of these well-meaning, but, as it turned out, naive things, Ms. Koike leaned towards me and said,

“But you know, all this is the work of Korean leftists. There’s nothing to it.”

I was left with my mouth open as she wished me good bye, leaving the room with her minders. I realised that I had just heard the authentic voice of Japanese restorationist nationalism from a woman already spoken of at that time as a future prime minister. If a woman younger than me – and a journalist even! – was in such deep denial, it was clear that there really was nothing useful to be said. 

Just a few months earlier, at the ceremony to open the new Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister Abe declared it

“a landmark event that marks the end of the postwar regime and will lay the groundwork for building a new state.”[9]

There could not have been a clearer statement of the goal of the first Abe cabinet, which fizzled out ignominiously but typically a few months later. The most extreme nationalist amongst Japanese postwar leaders[10] (and grandson of war-criminal and later PM Kishi Nobusuke), Abe Shinzo is again the leader of America’s most important ally in the Pacific pivot, and once again, despite American hopes of a return to alliance stability, the issue of sexual slavery is on the Abe agenda. Most ominously, there has been a Cabinet-level suggestion of “revising” the 1993 “Kono statement” over sexual slavery[11], and Prime Minister Murayama’s 1995 apology.[12]

Militarily, of course, the process of Heisei militarisation Japan has undertaken over the past two decades has made it into a quiet military powerhouse, much more capable of close and effective operational coordination with the US than at the end of the Cold War.[13] But politically, Japan is the sick man of Asia, capable of neither building the successor to the late, great Japan Incorporated, nor abjuring the enduring toxins of its colonial and military domination of East and Southeast Asia three generations ago. The United States may well wonder whether the new state Abe has in mind is one that fulfills American hopes.

Go to next page for references

Abe Shinzo worries the US

At a January 10 conference on Asia at the Carnegie Endowment, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell confirmed that US government was concerned about the Abe Administration's statements on history. He will be part of a high level American delegation that will travel to Japan and South Korea the following week to ensure that both governments are committed to "rebuilding" their ties.

The Administration is fast concluding what many more liberal observers of Japan's conservative establishment know. Japan has too long been held to a double, if not lesser standard than Germany for its war crimes. The failure to acknowledge accountability has encouraged extreme views heightening security tensions in the region. Ignoring this has not produced productive results.

The article below in the liberal online Asia-Pacific Journal (Vol 11, Issue 1, No. 1, January 14, 2012) succinctly outlines Prime Minister ShinzoAbe's astonishing views on history and how they can potentially up end nearly 65 years of peace.

Abe Shinzo, a Far-Right Denier of History

By Narusawa Muneo
Translated and edited by Satoko Oka Norimatsu and David McNeill
In December 2012, not a few people in Japan remembered the 75th anniversary of Nanjing Massacre. Those people hoped that the lessons from war crimes committed by the Japanese Army from 1931-1945 would be learned so that Japan would never wage war against another country again, and peace would be achieved in East Asia. These Japanese, however, now face a major challenge.
In Japan’s general election of Dec. 16th the Liberal Democratic Party, which had been in opposition since August 2009, won an overwhelming majority putting it back in power. With Abe Shinzo, a right-wing historical revisionist back as prime minister, the change of government is no longer just a Japanese issue.
The LDP is a nexus for history deniers who regard calls for historical reconciliation from neighboring countries as unjustified, deem their historical accounts as inaccurate, and claim that listening to such appeals for Japan to remember the past would be "masochistic.” As LDP president, Abe most eloquently embodies this character of the party.
With the signing of the Treaty of Peace in San Francisco (September 1951), Japan was allowed to resume its place in the international community. Japan’s neighbors in Asia expected it, in return, to scrap its imperial past and apologize sincerely for perpetrating a string of wartime atrocities. But while the Federal Republic of Germany began its postwar period by breaking from Nazism and apologizing for the Holocaust, the LDP, which ruled Japan for most of the postwar period, has acted as a hub for history revisionists, and so it remains.
It is impossible to imagine that somebody who denies the Holocaust would be elected as Chancellor of Germany. What the world is witnessing right now in Japan, seventy-five years after the Nanjing Massacre, is the reappointment as prime minister of an extreme rightist who sides with the Nanjing-deniers.
The people of Asia, where millions were killed by Japanese wartime aggression, and where many witnesses and survivors are still alive, have the right to ask this prime minister if he really believes that the Nanjing Massacre was a myth, and if he recognizes that Japan invaded neighboring countries.
The people of both Koreas and Koreans around the world are entitled to challenge Abe on whether he recognizes the Japanese Army’s wartime enslavement of thousands of women (so-called “military ‘comfort women’”), one of the most ferocious and dishonorable crimes of Imperial Japan. This prime minister has been adamant about removing any description of these crimes from textbooks and classrooms.
Here is a fundamental question. Sixty-one years after the resumption of sovereignty, does Japan, led by such a prime minister, truly deserve to be a legitimate and credible member of the international community? It is the people of Japan who, first and foremost, are responsible for asking that question, and the people of Asia and beyond are entitled to pursue it, and to demand clear answers.
1. Who is Abe Shinzo?
Abe Shinzo’s father was Abe Shintaro, who held various key government positions including Foreign Minister and was at one point a candidate for an LDP presidential election. Abe Shinzo used his father’s coattails to get elected to the Diet for the first time in 1993. He is a peculiar existence within the LDP, having climbed the party by consistently advocating extreme right-wing policies. Here are some of his career highlights.
  • As soon as Abe was elected in 1993, he became a member of the LDP’s “History and Deliberation Committee.” This committee held about twenty meetings with right-wing scholars, and as a result, published a book called “Overview of the Greater East Asia War,” on August 15th, 1995, the fiftieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in the Asia-Pacific War. The book argues: 1) “The Greater East Asia War” (the Asia-Pacific War) was not an aggressive war, but a war for self-existence and self-defense, and for liberation of Asia from Western powers; 2) Events such as the Nanjing Massacre and the “comfort women,” are fabrications. Japan did not commit war crimes and was not a perpetrator; 3) Since “biased” school textbooks contain false information about Japan’s wartime activities, a “textbook struggle” (an attack on education) is necessary. Abe still holds these positions.
  • In December 1994, a right-wing group called “Diet Members’ League for the 50th Anniversary of the End of War” was formed to counter a parliamentary move to pass a resolution in August 1995, critically reflecting on Japan’s aggressive war. Abe was selected as deputy executive director. This group organized the “Steering Committee of Japanese People’s Movement for the 50th Anniversary of the End of War” in conjunction with far-rightist religious groups (mostly Shinto). It led twenty-six prefectural assemblies and ninety municipal assemblies across the nation to pass resolutions opposing the critical resolution and arguing that Japan did not invade its Asian neighbors.
  • The same right-wing members of LDP in June 1996 formed a new group to attack history textbooks, called “Bright Japan - League of Diet Members,” and Abe was appointed deputy executive director. In February 1997, he formed a group called “Group of Young Diet Members for Consideration of Japan’s Future and History Education,” and became its executive director (“Young” was dropped from the group’s name in 2004).
  • Abe has always been on the frontline of such groups and has worked hard to scour descriptions of Nanjing and the sex slaves, who he argues were “prostitutes,” from textbooks. He pressured not only education ministry officials responsible for textbook screening, but also presidents of textbook publishers and textbook authors, to remove references to such crimes, claiming that they were “distorted.”
  • While Abe was Chief Cabinet Secretary, he complained about the content of an NHK (Japan’s national public broadcaster) program on the sex slaves issue before it was broadcast, demanding that the head of the Broadcasting Bureau make the program “fair and objective,” or resign. As a result, significant changes were made to the program before it was screened on January 30, 2001. One of the changes was deletion of the part where the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, held in Tokyo in December 2000, deemed the rapes and the military sex slavery system by the Japanese military as “crimes against humanity,” and held Japan and Emperor Hirohito responsible for them.

Wednesday, January 9, 2013

Mixed views in Washington of Abe’s rebooted administration

By William L. Brooks, APP Senior Fellow, Adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University. He retired from the U.S. State Department in September 2009 after a 35-year career as a diplomat and research analyst. This article first appeared in the January 8, 2013 online Asahi Shimbun Asia & Japan Watch.


The return to power of the Liberal Democratic Party in the Dec. 16 Lower House election after three years of Democratic Party of Japan rule was more a voter repudiation of the DPJ's failed policies than an endorsement of the LDP's policy agenda.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, back in office for a second time, knows that if his party is to win the next election for the Upper House in July, he must regain the still-skeptical public's trust by quick and effective displays of policy energy.


Shinzo Abe at the Diet on Dec. 26 (Asahi Shimbun file photo)

To do so, he has scoped out an ambitious agenda covering both domestic and diplomatic policy fronts, including repairing strained relations with China and South Korea, and reclaiming a robust alliance with the United States.

Washington appreciates such momentum, and hopes that political stability has finally returned to Japan. But there is keen awareness that Abe's Achilles' heel remains his controversial revisionist views on Japan's war history, which could come back to haunt him if not kept in check.

Abe's top priority now will be to revive the ailing Japanese economy by overcoming the country's long-standing deflation. He has promised a bold monetary policy that includes setting an inflation target, implementing qualitative fiscal stimulation measures in the public sector, and devising a growth strategy that encourages private investment.

He also intends to accelerate the reconstruction of areas in northern Japan devastated by the 2011 earthquake and tsunami, many of which remain desolate wastelands.

Having promised in the election campaign to "restore a reliable Japan-U.S. alliance," Abe intends to visit Washington as soon as possible for a summit meeting with President Barack Obama. He will seek to build a "relationship of trust" with the president, while reconfirming his administration's deep commitment to the bilateral alliance as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy. In outlining his policy agenda, Abe will focus on such trouble spots as North Korea and China, and express his commitment to resolve a long-festering issue in Okinawa, the controversial relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to another part of the prefecture.

It is a tradition for a newly elected Japanese leader to make an obligatory journey early on to Washington, but this one has a particularly large significance to Abe.

The bilateral relationship was greatly strained during the three years of DPJ rule, particularly during Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama's nine months in office starting in September 2009, and the LDP now wants to reclaim what it believes is its rightful place as the long-standing manager of the alliance. During his first term in office, Obama witnessed growing political instability in Japan, with Cabinets falling, prime ministers changing every year, and policy gridlock in the Diet. There is likely to be skepticism in Washington that the LDP's election and Abe's return to power is not more of the same.

It would indeed help boost bilateral ties if Abe can bring with him progress on commitments that the DPJ before him could not keep, such as the long-delayed decision on whether Japan will join the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade pact. But at this juncture, Abe's initial encounter with Obama seems likely to be mainly statements of formal intentions rather than announcements of breakthroughs in pending issues.

Still, Abe's strategies for jump-starting the stalled economy, strengthening ties with the United States, and repairing deteriorating ties with China, South Korea and Russia will impress Washington. He also will please the Pentagon with his plans to enhance Japan's security posture in the region with an "integrated defense strategy" for the unified buildup of defense capabilities of the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces (SDF) based on long-range contingency scenarios.

Moreover, Abe has surrounded himself with a solid Cabinet filled with experienced policy experts, and he will tap the expertise of the bureaucracy and academia as needed. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in particular will assist Abe on the industrial policy front. His foreign and defense ministers both have experience in Okinawa policy and can be expected to lend their hands to resolving serious U.S. base issues with that prefecture.

Because the next election--this time for the Upper House--is to be held in July, Abe has little time to convince Japan's fickle electorate that his ambitious agenda, starting with bold fiscal and monetary measures to stimulate the economy, will be effective.


Saturday, January 5, 2013

Prime Minister of Japan's Schedule Dec 3-29, 2012


December 3, 2012 (MON)
AM
09:17 Office
10:02 Press Group Interview
11:00 Mr. Okada, Deputy Prime Minister
11:25 Mr. Gemba, Foreign Minister; and Mr. Sugiyama, Director General, Asia-Oceanian Affairs Bureau, MoFA
11:49 All leave

PM
12:35 Yurakucho Marion, Tokyo
12:59 Yurakucho Asahi Hall, Forum of Persons with Disabilities 2012
02:44 Tobu Asakadai Station, Saitama Prefecture, Street speech
04:01 JR Urawa Station, Saitama, Street speech
05:26 Tobu Shin Koshigaya Station, Saitama, Street Speech
06:44 JR Kawaguchi Station, Street speech
07:52 Nagatocho, Tokyo, The Capitol Hotel Tokyu; Haircut at Spa & Barber Carju Rajah Tiado
08:52 Residence

December 4, 2012 (TUE)
AM
06:49 JR Ueno Station
07:00 Leave Ueno Station on Super Hitach express train #3
09:19 Arrive at JR Iwaki Station, Street speech
10:58 JR Kooriyama Station, Fukushima Prefecture
11:09 Leave the station on Yamabiko bullet train #207
11:45 Arrive at JR Sendai Station, Miyagi Prefecture
11:52 Sendai City Aoba Ward, Shopping Mall Ichiban Heiwa Building, Street speech

PM
12:26 JR Sendai Station
12:38 Leave Sendai on Hayate bullet train #23
01:22 Arrive at JR Morioka Statin, Iwate Prefecture
01:40 In front of Iwate Prefectural Government Office, Street speech
02:01 JR Morioka Station
02:10 Leave the station on Yamabiko bullet train #60
02:47 Arrive at JR Ichinoseki Station, Iwate Prefecture, Street speech
03:29 Press interview
03:54 Leave Ichinoseki Station on Yamabiko bullet train #62
06:24 Arrive at JR Ueno Station, Street speech
07:26 DPJ Headquarters
08:20 Appear on a NHK program
08:54 Residence

December 5, 2012 (WED)
AM
08:12 Haneda Airport
08:48 Leave Haneda on JAL Flight 107
09:40 Arrive at Itami Ariport, Osaka Prefecture
Street Speeches
10:16 Suita City Osaka Prefecture, Asahi Shopping Street
11:57 Kiehan Hirakata Station, Hirakata City

PM
12:26 Lunch at a restaurant “Hirakata Sentei”
 Street speeches
01:20 Keihan Neyagawa Station, Neyagawa City, Osaka Prefecture
02:54 Nankai Sakai Higashi Station, Sakai City, Osaka
04:28 JR Wakayama Station, Wakayama Prefecture
 04:53 Press interviews
 Street speech
05:35 AEON Mall Rinku Sennan Store, Sennan City, Osaka
 06:18 Kansai Airport
06:51 Leave the airport on JAL Flight 186
07:38 Arrive at Haneda Airport
08:08 Residence
08:18 Mr. Yonemura, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management; and Mr. Ssakurai, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary
08:58 All leave

December 6, 2012 (THU)
AM
08:17 JR Tokyo Station
08:30 Leave Tokyo on Nozomi bullet train #17
10:11 Arrive at JR Nagoya Station, Aichi Prefecture
 Street Speeches
10:46 Meitetsu Kounomiya Station, Inasawa City, Aichi Prefecture
11:54 Nagoya City, Mizuho Ward, Aratama Bridge Intersection

PM
12:41 Nagoya City Nakamura Ward, Nagoya Marriot Associa Hotel
12:59 Press interviews
01:03 Lunch at Japanese Restaurant “Kaun” in the hotel
01:54 JR Nagoya Station
02:00 Leave the station on Kodama bullet train #658
 Street Speeches
03:01 JR Kakegawa Station, Shizuoka Prefecture
04:17 JR Fujieda Station, Shizuoka
05:57Shizuoka City Aoi Ward, Gofukumachi Intersection
 06:25 JR Shizuoka Station
06:37 Leave Shizuoka Station on Hikari bullet train #476
07:40 Arrive at JR Tokyo Station
07:57 DPJ Headquarters
08:23 Mr. Koshiishi, DPJ Secretary General; Mr. Hosono, DPJ Policy Research Council Chief; Mr. Hachiro, DPJ Election Affairs Council Chief
09:12 Residence

Friday, January 4, 2013

US-Japan Relations


Security, Alliance, and the
Japanese Political Landscape

Tuesday, January 8, 2013 – 10:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.

Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

Featuring Keynote Remarks by
The Honorable Motohiro Oono
Former Parliamentary Secretary of Defense and Parliamentary Secretary of Cabinet Office,
Member of the House of Councillors, Japanese Diet, and
Member of the Democratic Party of Japan

Introduction by
Randy Shriver
President, Project 2049

Followed by a Panel Discussion with
Major General Yoshihide Yoshida
Director, Public Affairs, Joint Staff, Ministry of Defense of Japan

Dr. Tomohiko Taniguchi
Professor, Graduate School of System Design and Management, Keio University

Yukio Tada
President and Chief Executive Officer, Sojitz Research Institute

Bruce Klingner
Senior Research Fellow, Northeast Asia, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

Hosted by
Walter Lohman
Director, Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation

The United States and Japan continue to share interests in regional security and stability.  The U.S.-Japan alliance is ever more important as North Korea continues to pose threats to the region and China increases its military strength and aggressively presses its own interests. Join us as our distinguished guests explore the impact of Japanese politics on the U.S.-Japan alliance and regional security.