Takaichi’s 2026

Foreign Affairs, Coalition Building, and a Snap Election Headline Takaichi’s 2026

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 5, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi entered the new year learning of the United States’ raid on Venezuela. Takaichi issued an anodyne comment, hoping for sustainable democracy in that country. Trump’s action may be a sign for Takaichi that 2026 will be diplomatically busy, even while her political focus should be on reinforcing the leading coalition and calling for a snap election.
 
It was in the evening of January 3, Tokyo time, when news broke of the U.S. attack on Caracas and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Having no opportunity to speak to the press on the day, Takaichi posted on X that the government of Japan was insisting on the importance of restoring democracy in Venezuela. The Japanese government “will promote diplomatic efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela and to stabilize the situation there, in close cooperation with neighboring countries and taking the utmost measures to secure the safety of Japanese citizens,” Takaichi said.
 
Although Takaichi had a telephone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump only the day before, she gave the reporters no hint about whether they had talked about Venezuela. “Having reconfirmed the close relationship between Japan and the U.S., we agreed on coordinating for my visit to the U.S. this spring,” Takaichi said in a press briefing after the call.
 
For Takaichi, who naively complicated bilateral relations with China by the observation that Japan could use force if the Taiwan contingency occurs, it would be the U.S. that she can rely on to reestablish diplomatic normality with China, without any apology or regret about her comment. As Trump agreed with Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Beijing in April, it is a diplomatic requirement for her to meet with Trump before his meeting with Xi.
 
Japan has opposed a unilateral change in the international status quo by force since criticizing China’s conduct toward Taiwan and its aggression in the South China Sea. No argument is heard in Japan that the U.S. raid on Venezuela was not a unilateral change of the status quo by force. “I am concerned that it would send a dangerous message that this American military operation could be regarded as a unilateral change in the status quo,” former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera said.
 
Professor Kazuhiro Maeshima of Sophia University indicated that Japan will need to balance its security against critical comments about U.S. action in Venezuela. “In case China invades Taiwan, it will not be easy to say ‘stop changing the status quo,’ ” after the U.S. action in Venezuela, Maeshima said. Indeed, North Korea launched ballistic missiles into the Japan Sea after the U.S. sent military forces into Venezuela. An event in South America can thus affect security in Northeast Asia.
 
Takaichi’s domestic agenda is no less crucial than the increasing complications in foreign affairs. Takaichi’s priority in 2026 is to stabilize her administration. In the first half of this year, Takaichi must survive the ordinary session of the Diet, which will convene on January 23. She has obtained support for the FY2026 main budget bill, which must pass the Diet by the end of March, from the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). On other legislation, though, the leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), must find votes from other opposition party members.
 
The LDP and JIP tabled action on a bill that would reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives in the ordinary session. The two parties did, however, agree to proceed in the ordinary session with a bill that would impose greater restrictions on real estate investments and sales by foreigners and that would establish the Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). To find a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, the LDP-JIP coalition must garner votes from the opposition parties.
 
The DPP is willing to support the LDP more broadly than in previous sessions, after the LDP agreed at the end of last year to the DPP’s policy to raise the threshold for imposing income tax to 1.78 million yen of annual income. But, the DPP has not decided to participate in the leading coalition. The DPP is worried that the LDP may field candidates against DPP candidates in single-seat districts of the Lower House in the next election. Further, by not joining the coalition, the DPP may exercise discretion in deciding whether to support bills sponsored by the LDP.
 
Because the LDP currently has no margin for error in passing bills in the House of Representatives, it is important to watch whether Takaichi will call a snap election of the House. The prime minister of Japan is regarded as having the power to dissolve the Lower House at any time of her choosing. Every prime minister hopes to call a snap election to reinforce the political basis of his or her administration.
 
To do so, Takaichi must resolve at least three practical issues. First, there are two conflicting factors. On the one hand, she will need the approval of the LDP’s coalition partner. The LDP and JIP so far have no agreement to cooperate in elections. JIP has overwhelming strength in single-seat districts in Osaka. If the parties do not agree to cooperate, they will compete in those districts. On the other hand, a decision against running candidates in districts with JIP lawmakers will frustrate the LDP’s local organizations. Takaichi will have to weigh the risks whether to cooperate or to compete.
 
Second, Takaichi must find a cause to run on. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Lower House in 2014, asking voters to approve his decision to postpone a consumption tax hike. Fumio Kishida in 2021 and Shigeru Ishiba in 2024 sought approval of their new premierships. To hold a snap election, Takaichi must clarify what she will ask voters in the election.
 
Third and most important, is whether a snap election will reinforce or erode Takaichi’s currently high approval rating. Public opinion for prime ministers tends to go down as time passes after inauguration. If Takaichi calls a snap election, she will want her administration to keep its fresh image.
 
Perhaps the earliest possible time to dissolve the Lower House is in April, right after it passes the FY2026 budget bill. The voters will evaluate Takaichi’s budget achievement and the success (or lack thereof) in her visit to the U.S. now planned for March. Another chance to dissolve the Lower House is at the end of the ordinary session in June after the Diet has passed conservative bills such as legalizing the use of maiden names for wives, rather than allowing for separate surnames.
 
If Takaichi feels she cannot call an election during the ordinary session of the Diet, she may still do so at the extraordinary session in the fall at which she will submit a supplementary budget bill. Notwithstanding her high approval rating in the polls, it is unclear if Takaichi can win a snap election. The state of the economy and international affairs cannot be foretold but will certainly affect the election and the Takaichi administration’s longevity.

Balancing History and Strategy: South Korea's Challenge

South Korea Walks a Narrow Bridge between China and Japan

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published January 9, 2026 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is spending the first weeks of the new year attempting a feat of diplomatic engineering that would challenge the most experienced leader. He began the year in Beijing, the first official visit by a South Korean president since 2019. Next week, he is scheduled to join Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in her hometown of Nara.

Both China and Japan are eager to draw South Korea to their side as President Lee walks across a narrowing bridge between them. His task is to foster closer ties while avoiding being drawn into conflict, even perhaps to help ease tensions.

This careful management of the complex triangular relations in the region takes place against a backdrop of growing global uncertainty, manifest in U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive intervention in Venezuela. In the capitals of Northeast Asia—as well as in Europe—the talk is of a world splintering into spheres of influence.

“Trump’s America seeks to position itself not as a global hegemon but as a great power whose sphere of influence is the American continent,” commented Jung E-gil, senior international affairs writer at Hankyoreh. “Looking at the situation surrounding Ukraine, Taiwan, and Venezuela, one wonders if the US, China, and Russia are now carving up separate spheres of influence.”

Xi Woos Lee to Join Hands Against Japan

Lee’s four-day visit to China was a continuation of a Chinese charm offensive toward the new government that began with Xi’s attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit late last year. As was the case then, the language and messaging of the summit were mainly focused on friendship and mutual benefit, founded in deepening economic and cultural cooperation. The South Korean leader was accompanied by some 200 corporate leaders, making the focus clear.

But Xi and his colleagues did not conceal their concerted effort to frame the relationship in the historical context of shared battles against the Japanese Empire, which China now contends is being revived under Takaichi. Chinese officials greeted the assumption of power by the conservative nationalist with skepticism, given her unapologetic views of Japan’s wartime past. They moved into outright hostility after Takaichi’s November 7 remarks suggesting Japan could get involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits. Chinese retaliation continues to grow, most recently threatening restrictions on exports of “dual-use” technology.

The official Chinese readout from the visit was explicit in promoting the idea that the two countries should join hands against Japan:

“Both countries, with broad common interests, should stand firmly on the right side of history and make correct strategic choices. Over 80 years ago, China and the ROK made great sacrifices in resisting Japanese militarism and achieved the victory. Today, it is all the more important for the two sides to join hands to defend the victorious outcomes of World War II, and safeguard peace and stability of Northeast Asia.”

Lee was ready to accommodate Xi in one key respect—the reaffirmation of South Korea’s standing policy on Taiwan, telling Xi he “respects” China’s position on “one China.” He made a nod toward their shared history of opposition to Japanese imperialism, symbolized by a visit to Shanghai to mark the anniversary of the birth of Kim Ku, who led the Korean government in exile there.

Otherwise, as foreign policy scholar Moon Chung-in anticipated in an interview with this writer, Lee was “much more prudent on Beijing’s push for collective action against Takaichi’s remarks on history” and tried to balance its strategic cooperative relationship with China, while “retaining its alliance with the US.”

Lee left more empty-handed in his effort to secure Xi’s support in pressing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to return to dialogue and engagement with South Korea. Despite vague words about dialogue, there was no mention of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, much less any reiteration of past statements supporting the “denuclearization” of the peninsula, a formula sought by Seoul.

Can Takaichi Match the Pragmatism of Lee?

The next stop in President Lee’s diplomatic obstacle course is Japan, where he is reportedly heading to what many hope will be a breakthrough meeting with Takaichi, hosted by the currently popular leader in her hometown of Nara, some thirty minutes east of Osaka.

The two leaders had a friendly forty-five-minute meeting on the sidelines of the APEC conference, where Lee went out of his way to defy a widely held view of him as “anti-Japanese.” He embraced a “forward-looking” relationship, building on progress made by the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration and his Japanese counterparts.

This has led to expectations that the two leaders can forge an unexpected partnership, based in part on shared apprehensions about China and an unspoken need to coordinate a response to the Trump administration.

“The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific makes it even more necessary for these leaders to collaborate,” wrote Japanese scholar Ayumi Teraoka in Foreign Affairs. “In particular, Washington’s renewed unpredictability and waning engagement in multilateral forums require Japan and South Korea to work together to sustain regional public goods and protect their interests.”

This optimism rests on several untested assumptions—that difficult issues of wartime and colonial history that have bedeviled the relationship can be put aside and Takaichi can bury her well-known conservative nationalist views and mirror the pragmatism of Lee. And it also assumes that the two leaders have a shared view of the regional security situation.

The two-day Nara visit could go smoothly if they steer clear of difficult questions. But there are already signs that this may be a challenge, especially for the Japanese prime minister. She did not hesitate to proclaim that the disputed islands of Dokdo (Takeshima for Japan) are being “illegally occupied.” Takaichi regularly and defiantly visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war dead and has left open the possibility that she would go as prime minister.

Lee is committed to establishing a working relationship with Takaichi. “His shuttle diplomacy with Takaichi in Nara on Jan. 13 will go well as long as she does not provoke him on Dokdo or other history issues,” predicts Yonsei University scholar Moon.

But it may not be enough to momentarily avoid sensitive subjects. Real progress remains to be made on resolving these issues, including compensation for forced labor victims and their families from decades ago—an issue that could lead to seizure of Japanese corporate assets. For Korean progressives, simply focusing on the strategic situation is not sufficient.

“They cannot simply avoid historical and territorial issues,” the progressive daily Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized. “Japan has remained completely indifferent to historical issues. This may be partly due to South Korea’s lack of strong opposition. I hope this summit will mark a turning point in resolving historical issues.”

There is no evidence, however, that Takaichi is interested in doing more than just keeping up the appearance of cooperation. Perhaps more challenging for Lee is that the Japanese leader is clearly locked into a confrontational approach toward China, which has become a key plank of the political coalition she is forming between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and other smaller parties.

Still, President Lee seems poised, for now, to manage the journey from China to Japan. What follows is less clear.

“Seoul’s choreography of summitry with Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing has been masterful,” says former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Kathleen Stephens. “But the real challenges will come when real choices have to be made.”

Japanese Politics 2025

 

2025: The Year of Conservative Resurgence

By Takuya Nishimura

Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point

You can find his blog, J Update here.

December 30, 2025

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has survived her first Diet session. She was able to enact her economic stimulus plan with the help of her party’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Despite her naïve and careless statement on a possible “Taiwan contingency,” her cabinet maintains a high approval rating. The current success of her big government and strong national security platform bolsters her conservative agenda. It is possible that 2025 will be remembered as the year when Japan’s conservative nationalists regained political power, driven by populism and global uncertainty.

The big political news of 2025 was Takaichi’s October inauguration. The July Upper House election signaled her forthcoming victory in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential race. In the July election, the ruling LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito, suffered a serious setback when the major opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), failed to win over voters who had left the LDP. Instead, two more radical groups, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and a new populist party, Sanseito, showed a remarkable surge in the election.

Former prime minister Taro Aso was one of the people who realized how serious the July election defeat was. Although he had reluctantly but openly supported then Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Aso led a behind-the-scenes movement in the LDP to replace Ishiba over the summer. Although Ishiba had no hope of staying in power, having lost both the Lower House election in 2024 and the Upper House election in 2025, LDP lawmakers speculated at the time that someone close to Ishiba, such as Shinjiro Koizumi or Yoshimasa Hayashi, would succeed him.

The LDP lawmakers in Tokyo did not appreciate that LDP local organizations had far more serious reservations about the situation. The local perception was that populist and conservative movements had eroded the political basis of the LDP. The DPP gained votes in the Upper House election on a platform of increasing voters’ take-home pay.  Sanseito campaigned on a different but equally popular policy: stricter measures against foreigners, which appealed to xenophobia among some Japanese. These policies attracted swing voters who were skeptical of the LDP’s leadership.

The July results set the stage for the LDP presidential election in October. Takaichi’s conservative nationalist and populist agenda proved attractive to the local LDP constituencies rocked by the loss of their traditional base. Aso also instructed his faction colleagues to vote for the candidate with the strongest support among the local branches of the party. This proved to be Takaichi.

Although Aso had wanted a more centralist prime minister beholding to him, he accepted her ascendancy. She had long positioned herself among the more extreme and vocal right wingers. Frankly, Aso’s views are not distant from hers, as he shares a belief that a stable administration leans on conservative groups, just like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did. As deputy prime minister in 2013, he suggested that the LDP in its discussions for constitutional change “should learn from the tactics of the Nazi regime that silently changed the Weimar Constitution” so to avoid protests. Although he retracted the statement, he maintains the need for decisive leadership and backroom decision making outside public scrutiny.

Takaichi’s victory is an epoch-making shift in LDP’s course from liberal centrist to conservative nationalist government. After the death of Abe, the LDP had gradually moved to the liberal side. Abe’s successor, Fumio Kishida, improved Japan’s relationship with the Republic of Korea and imposed heavy punishments on lawmakers with the now-former Abe faction in the kickback fund scandal. The faction was considered quite conversative nationalist.

Kishida’s successor, Shigeru Ishiba, long a political foe of Abe, tried to restore relations with China, which had deteriorated under Abe. Ishiba appealed to Beijing by repeatedly demonstrating his respect for his mentor, former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka who normalized the relations with China in 1972. Ishiba also took a major step toward restoring Japan’s historic war apology by including “remorse” in his address at the 80^th national memorial ceremony for the war dead on August 15, 2025.

Takaichi’s rise to LDP leadership has reversed much of the work of the Kishida and Ishiba administrations. She has unhesitatingly returned Japan to Abe’s political agenda. She supports a revisionist history of the War in the Pacific, believes that Japan has apologized enough for the War, and promotes a prime minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine to honor some of Japan’s war dead, including hanged war criminals.

This approach took its toll when the LDP lost Komeito as a coalition partner immediately after Takaichi took office as LDP president. Komeito’s leadership had been under pressure from its local branches, which were suffering from a conservative upsurge that included the LDP. Komeito had to choose between its values and Takaichi’s LDP.

Komeito’s departure pushed the LDP further to the right. Takaichi chose to form a coalition with JIP, after failing with the DPP. The LDP and JIP have memorialized a conservative agenda in their coalition agreement. This includes imperial succession in the male line only, amendment of the constitutional provision on the Self-Defense Forces, and the continued official use of maiden names rather than a selective separate surname system.  

Although it was her third bid for the prime ministership, it was obvious that Takaichi was not ready for leadership and too uncritical of Abe’s policies. Believing that Abe’s economic policy had had underwritten his conservative agenda, Takaichi undertook a major fiscal mobilization in the FY2025 supplemental budget and in the draft of the FY2026 main budget to create a “strong economy.” The budgets rely on the issuance of a large amount of government bonds, even though it is increasing tax revenue that drives expenditures in the budget.

Increasing government bonds may be a plan at odds with the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) monetary policy. The BOJ has been raising the interest rate steadily since July 2024, which reduces the price on government bonds. Increasing bond issuances to support Takaichi’s large-scale spendings would be an increasingly expensive undertaking. Put another way, while the BOJ is shrinking the money supply, Takaichi is expanding government spending. The market has responded to this prospect by hitting Takaichi with a triple low in stocks, bonds and the Japanese yen.

Relations with China have also suffered an unforced error on Takaichi’s part. Apparently disregarding how delicately Kishida and Ishiba had handled China policy, Takaichi decided to raise in public discussions in the Diet the prospect of a “Taiwan contingency” – the notion that Chinese aggression against Taiwan would trigger Japan’s self-defense authority. China reacted furiously, claiming that Takaichi’s comment was a Japanese intervention in a Chinese domestic issue.

It was later revealed that Takaichi had not sought any meaningful staff input. She has argued that her comment did not deviate from the stance of her predecessors. She has refused to retract her comment, leading to increasingly strident statements and actions by China. A recent comment by one of Takaichi’s special policy advisers, Oue Sadamasa, suggesting that Japan should possess nuclear weapons, acerbated the tension.

Nevertheless, the Japanee people still support Takaichi. A poll showed a 65 percent approval rating for the Takaichi Cabinet in November. Fifty percent of the respondents had no concerns about Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency, while only 25 percent thought it problematic.

The Takaichi administration has quickly gained a measure of stability. The LDP-JIP coalition secured a simple majority in the House of Representatives by adding three lawmakers to their coalition. Although there appears to be no room for error, the LDP has cleared a major hurdle with the JIP. 

Yet, the LDP failed to pass a bill to reduce seats in the Lower House. The JIP had made seat reduction an “absolute condition” for its participation in the coalition. But even with this failure, the JIP has shown no signs of leaving the coalition, apparently finding that continuing cooperation with the LDP is the best way to promote JIP policies.

The opposition parties are so fragmented that they cannot put effective pressure on the Takaichi administration. In fact, the DPP and Komeito voted for Takaichi’s supplemental budget bill because Takaichi included policies in her economic stimulus plan that the two parties supported.

Further, uninterested in cooperating with the CDPJ, the DPP looks willing to join the LDP-JIP coalition. Takaichi has promised to raise the income tax threshold to 1.78 million yen of annual income, an action that the DPP strongly supports. (Households with lower incomes would pay no income tax.) For its part, the CDPJ dropped the option of a no-confidence resolution against the Takaichi Cabinet. Such a proposal has always been the strongest weapon for the opposition parties to protest the government. The CDPJ’s withdrawal of the resolution, five days before the end of the Diet session, indicates the party’s weakness.

While the opposition parties  are trying to find an effective line of attack on the Takaichi administration,  the two-month-old seemingly populist and conservative nationalist government is  shaping up for a long rule

America Steps Back

A National Security Strategy of Retreat 

Leaves Asia to Manage the Consequences  

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published December 9, 2025 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

The Donald Trump administration’s much-awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) landed last week with an audible thud.

The somewhat truncated document is an odd combination of social media-style triumphalism and an effort to lay a strategic veneer on the administration’s often chaotic and contradictory policies. But the document clearly expresses an America-First view of the world, a combination of isolationism and U.S. primacy that places allies and partners near the bottom of the priority list.

Much of the strategy’s attention is on the assault against Europe and the dismissal of both the NATO alliance and European unity in favor of supporting right-wing ethno-nationalism. In homage to the nineteenth century, U.S. control of the Western Hemisphere—in the name of a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine—has regional priority.

But in Asia, the NSS offers a strange marriage of two historical moments, both still controversial.

One is the infamous Acheson Line, a reference to the speech delivered by then Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950, drawing a U.S. defense line along the island chain from Alaska through Japan to the Philippines, notably excluding the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. It was a declaration that many believe convinced Stalin to give the green light to Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea, igniting the Korean War.

Trump’s NSS describes a new Acheson Line, the so-called First Island Chain, presented as the first line of defense in the Pacific. Bizarrely, it contains no mention of either North Korea and its nuclear arsenal or even the Korean Peninsula.

This is combined with a revival of President Richard Nixon’s equally infamous Guam Doctrine. Amid the waning days of the Vietnam War, Nixon told reporters during a 1969 tour of Asia that while the region was important to the United States when it came to military defense, “the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.” One product of this doctrine was the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division from South Korea, a decision that shook confidence in the U.S. security commitment.

The message of this NSS echoes Nixon’s. It demands not only vastly increased defense spending from South Korea and Japan, as well as other partners such as Taiwan and Australia, but also that they assume the roles the United States currently plays in defending regional security, now defined as the First Island Chain. Their own defense gets no mention. As the NSS puts it: “Given President Trump’s insistence on increased burden-sharing from Japan and South Korea, we must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain.”

The NSS makes it clear that the United States will stand aside and ask its allies to take on the task of defending the Pacific and Europe. “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” the document pronounces. The United States will now ask “allies to assume primary responsibility for their regions,” while presumably still beholden to the United States’ whims and desires.

As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated last week, Trump prefers “countries that help themselves…rather than dependencies.” Those that spend more are “model allies”—for now, South Korea is on that list, but Japan is not—but “allies that do not, allies that still fail to do their part for collective defense, will face consequences.” It was not explicitly stated, but the withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees appears to be on the table.

The Retreat from Values and Strategic Competition
The two previous national security strategies, one issued during the first Trump administration and one by the Joe Biden administration, were shaped around the concept of strategic competition with China and Russia. The new document almost completely abandons this driving idea.

Instead, “it prioritizes threats from the Western Hemisphere, European civilizational decline and overregulation, and trade deficits but says nothing about the Russian threat to U.S. interests and views China almost entirely through the lens of economic security,” argued Thomas Wright, a former national security official under the Biden administration.

Evans Revere, a former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, offered this scathing summary of the NSS.

“This is not so much a national security strategy document as it is a screed telling America’s allies, partners, friends, and adversaries that the United States they once knew is gone. Gone are the priorities, principles, beliefs, and assumptions that underpinned U.S. strategy and diplomacy for most of the past 80 years during both Democratic and Republican administrations. Gone is the belief in a U.S.-centric international economic and security order based on American predominance, power, alliances, and defense commitments. And gone is the belief, once deeply shared across every previous U.S. administration, that America’s destiny was to promote a core set of values, including democracy, freedom, and equity, in cooperation with like-minded allies and partners.”

Media in South Korea and Japan echoed these concerns. “Trump administration formalizes strategy of isolationism based on US interests,” headlined a commentary in the progressive Hankyoreh. The editor of a major Japanese paper told this author that he took the NSS “as another statement of America in retreat” that “reconfirms that the entirety of US national core interest is defined as commercial benefit.”

The editor argued that the Trump administration appears to believe that “authoritarianism can be acceptable in the name of sovereignty, and effective foreign policy is conducted only by strong leadership” or “strongmen” like presidents Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin.

“America’s abandoning of its self-position as a leader of free world is obvious in this NSS,” the Japanese editor opined.

The China Question
Some have taken solace in the fact that while the NSS prioritizes the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, it does give some length to discussing China. There are elements of traditional approaches and policy continuity, particularly an embrace of military deterrence and a reaffirmation of support for the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

But the entire section on China is focused on economic and commercial relations, with the clear suggestion that the two countries can reach a more equitable division of the global economy and presumably the spoils of commerce.

“We will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence,” says the NSS. “Trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors.”

“The Trump admin believes in the possibility of a mutually advantageous economic relationship with China,” wrote Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at conservative Hudson Institute, on December 5.

Trump’s NSS makes no mention of the war against Ukraine or China’s support for Russian aggression, much less China’s military and nuclear buildup. Not only does North Korea drop out of the national security policy, but the entire goal of denuclearization is also gone, perhaps reflecting a growing acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state.

Even though Taiwan occupies a link on the First Island Chain, the focus is almost entirely on preserving its role in the electronics supply chain. “Asia is important because of its growing GDPs, and Taiwan must be defended for semiconductors and sea lanes,” wrote the veteran Japanese newspaper editor.

Two recent developments seem to manifest this view of Asia. One has been Trump’s apparent decision to effectively ignore China’s increasingly aggressive—including military confrontations in the skies—response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about the potential impact of a crisis over Taiwan on Japan’s security. Indeed, the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal both reported that Trump, after talking to Xi, may have urged Takaichi to back off.

Perhaps more importantly, Trump has cleared the way for a dramatic easing of export controls on the sale of high-powered Nvidia semiconductors to China, effectively putting commerce over security. Ironically, perhaps the NSS also calls for allies like South Korea and Japan to prioritize trade with the United States over China.

“In Europe, we are afraid that Donald Trump’s America may be selling us out to Russia,” wrote former Economist editor Bill Emmott. “In Japan, where I have just been, the fear is of Trump selling them out to China.”

Asia Policy Events, Monday December 15, 2025

CRITICAL MINERALS: 2025 YEAR IN REVIEW & LOOKING AHEAD TO 2026. 12/15, 9:00am-6:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Seth G. Jones, President, Defense and Security Department; Harold Brown Chair; Jarrod Agen, Executive Director of the White House’s National Energy Dominance Council; Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Ranking Member, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Subcommittee on Public Lands, Forests, and Mining; Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), Chairman, Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on National Security and International Trade and Finance; Representative Ami Bera (D-CA), Ranking Member, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific; Representative Young Kim (R-CA), Chair, House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific; Rahim Bapoo, Managing Director, Energy Transition, Metals, Mining & Critical Minerals, BMO Capital Markets; and more.

LOOKING TO 2026: ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE GCC. 12/15, 10:00-11:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Amine Mati, Assistant Director, Mission Chief for Saudi Arabia, Head of GCC Division, International Monetary Fund; Monica Malik, Chief Economist, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. Moderator: Tim Callen, Visiting Fellow, AGSI.

CRAFTING A NATIONAL POWER INDUSTRY STRATEGY IN RESPONSE TO CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL WAR. 12/15, 1:00-2:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF). Speakers: Michael Brown, Partner, Shield Capital; Lt. Gen. (Ret.) H.R. McMaster, Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Moderator: Robert D. Atkinson, President, ITIF.

ANNUAL CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF LECTURE BY AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR RICHARD KNIGHTON. 12/15, 6:30-9:00pm (GMT), 1:30–4:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Royal United Services Institute. Speaker: Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton KCB ADC FREng, Chief of the Defense Staff.

AI GOVERNANCE: A DISCUSSION WITH REPRESENTATIVE JAY OBERNOLTE, FEATURING REPRESENTATIVE KEVIN HERN. 12/15, 3:00-4:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Kevin Hern, Chairman, House Republican Policy Committee; Jay Obernolte, US House of Representatives (California); Jim Harper, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute (AEI).

Chinese Aircraft Illuminate Two JASDF Jets

 Chinese Aircraft Lock their Radar on Two JASDF Jets

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 8, 2025

Japan’s Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi announced on December 7 that one or two Chinese fighter jets, the previous day, had intermittently illuminated their radar onto two of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force fighter jets in separate incidents near the Okinawa prefecture. Tokyo immediately protested, although Beijing denied the action. While China’s motivations are unclear so far, it is believed that this provocation reflects China’s frustration with Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks last month that her government would view Chinese action on Taiwan – the “Taiwan contingency” – as a threat to Japan.
 
Koizumi’s report came in an unusual post-midnight Ministry of Defense press conference at 2 a.m. Sunday morning. Koizumi reported that two ASDF F-15 fighter jets were exposed to radar directed by J-15 Chinese warcraft twice on the afternoon of December 6. The Japanese jets were flying over international waters southeast of the Okinawa Main Island. Chinese jets were installed on an aircraft carrier, Liaoning, which was in an exercise nearby, also in international waters.
 
A fighter jet has two kinds of radar: fire-control radar and search radar. Fire-control radar is a radio wave to determine the precise location, flying speed, and direction of a target to guide weapons to the target. Search radar is used to find any aircraft, including commercial ones, within a wide area. The radar used by Chinese military aircraft was reportedly fire-control radar.
 
Locking fire-control radar on a target may be a sign that the aircraft can be shot down, metaphorically the same as putting a finger on trigger of gun. A radar lock is recognized as potentially leading into battle. “It was a dangerous activity which went beyond necessity for the safe aviation of an aircraft and extremely regrettable,” said Koizumi. “It was extremely regrettable. We will deal with this issue resolutely and calmly,” Prime Minister Takaichi said.
 
Beijing dismissed Japan’s argument as inconsistent with the facts. “We sternly urge the Japanese side to immediately cease its slanderous and defamatory acts against China and strictly discipline its front-line operations,” said a spokesperson for the PLA Navy, Wang Xuemeng. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that activating search radar during flight training is commonly done by carrier-based aircrafts of all countries, indicating that the radar illuminated onto JASDF aircraft was not fire-control radar, but search radar.
 
Japan has not determined whether this radar incident was related to Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency. The significance of her comment is that Chinese action on Taiwan would trigger Japan’s authority to exercise its right to collective self-defense, including necessary military action. While China has been escalating its response to her comment through economic and cultural activities, launching fire-control radar would mark the first major military event in this bilateral row.
 
When the Japanese government purchased the Senkaku Islands from a Japanese owner in 2012, China responded intensively with near-constant incursions into the territorial water around the Senkakus. In 2013, a Chinese frigate locked fire-control radar on a destroyer of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, the only disclosed example of China’s use of fire-control radar before last Saturday. 
 
China has been enlarging its territorial advances toward Japan in recent years. Chinese military aircraft for the first time invaded Japan’s territory offshore of Nagasaki in August 2024. A Chinese Coast Guard helicopter breached territorial waters close to the Senkaku Islands in May 2025. Thus, China may be taking advantage of Takaichi’s comment to step up its pre-existing military pressure on Japan.
 
China argues that its forces were in a naval exercise in neutral water, a not uncommon event for maritime nations. The radar incident occurred, according to the Chinese, because the Japanese fighter jets had scrambled to deter a Chinese fighter jet from a Chinese aircraft carrier. Yomiuri Shimbun reported the possibility that Chinese aircraft carriers are constantly present in the sea around Japan, including the Liaoning, the Shandong and the Fujian. China also is engaged more frequently in joint exercises with Russia around Japan.
 
Japan is strengthening its efforts to gain support from like-minded countries. The Defense ministers of Japan and Australia met in Tokyo on the day after the radar illumination. They announced the establishment of a Framework of Strategic Defense Coordination and welcomed the progress on Australia’s introduction of a Mogami-class frigate. “We are deeply concerned by the actions of China in the last 24 hours,” the Australian defense minister, Richard Marles, said at the press conference.
 
Although Japan and China have established a hotline between them to avoid an accidental conflict, the countries did not use the line during the radar illumination event – indeed, there is no evidence that it has ever been used. Japan thus has no viable channel to maintain a security dialogue with China. Japan likely expects the United States to communicate on its behalf with China, which at this writing does not appear to have happened. Takaichi was delighted with President Donald Trump when, during her November call with him, he invited her to call him anytime she wants. Tokyo is watching Trump’s actions on this matter but has seen nothing so far.

Asia Policy Events, Monday December 8, 2025

WITA’S TRADE & TECH SUMMIT. 12/8, 9:00am-1:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Washington International Trade Association (WITA). Speakers: Ambassador Rick Switzer, Deputy United States Trade Representative, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative; Moderator: Gary Shapiro, CEO and Vice Chair, Consumer Technology Association; Brandon Remington, Deputy Under Secretary for Policy, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce; Arrow Augerot, Head, International Policy, Americas, Amazon; Whitney Baird, President & CEO, United States Council for International Business; Jason Oxman, President & CEO, Information Technology Industry Council; Robert Porter, Chief Global Affairs Officer, Coupang; Jordan Heiber, Vice President of International Digital Economy Policy, U.S. Chamber of Commerce; Emily Benson, Head of Strategy, Minerva; Amy Morgan, Vice President, Trade Compliance, Altana; Matthew Schruers, President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association; John Corrigan, Senior Director, Trade and Industrial Strategy, Silverado Policy Accelerator; Rob Atkinson, President, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation; Geoffrey Gertz, Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security; Dr. Alina Polyakova, President and CEO, Center for European Policy Analysis; Hon. Nazak Nikakhtar, Partner, National Security Chair, Wiley Rein LLP; Representative Suzan DelBene (D-WA-1), U.S. House of Representatives; Representative Darin LaHood (R-IL-18), U.S. House of Representatives; Josh Kallmer, Chief Global Affairs Officer, Zoom Communications Inc.

IS NORTH KOREAN DENUCLEARIZATION DEAD? 12/8, 11:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Distinguished University Professor, Georgetown University; Cho Byung Jae, Former Chancellor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy; Jun Bong-geun, Professor Emeritus, Korea National Diplomatic Academy. 

ADDRESSING CONFLICT OF LAWS AND FACILITATING DIGITAL PRODUCT PASSPORTS FOR CRITICAL RAW MATERIALS VALUE CHAINS: FROM CENTRALISATION TO MUTUAL RECOGNITION. 12/8, Noon-1:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: U.S.-Asia Law Institute, NYU School of Law. Speaker: Dr. Luke Nottage, Professor, Comparative and Transnational Business Law, Sydney Law School.

OUT OF BALANCE: WHAT’S NEXT FOR GROWTH, WEALTH, AND DEBT? 12/8, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: McKinsey Global Institute. Speakers: Bill Dudley, Former President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Rebecca Patterson, Vice Chair, Bretton Woods Committee; Matt Peterson, Ideas Editor, Barron’s; Alan Taylor, Member, Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England; Jan Mischke, Partner, McKinsey Global Institute; Olivia White, Director and Senior Partner, McKinsey Global Institute.

TAIWAN ROUNDTABLE: NAVIGATING TAIWAN’S AI FUTURE: POLICY, INNOVATION, AND GOVERNANCE. 12/8, Noon-2:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: George Washington University. Speakers: Susan Aaronson, Research Professor, Director, Digital Trade and Data Governance Hub, GWU; Hsin-Chung Liao, Associate Professor, Chair of the Department of Public Administration, National Chengchi University; Cheng-Ming Wang, Director-General, Department of Digital Service, Ministry of Digital Affairs, Taiwan.

THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS: A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR CHRIS VAN HOLLEN. 12/8, 12:30-1:15pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Chris Van Hollen, U.S. Senator (D-MD); Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program.

Takaichi Pressured Outside, Protected Inside

Takaichi Pressured Outside, Protected Inside

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 1, 2025

The government of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is running into trouble in its international relations, but it is developing firm footing domestically. The diplomatic row between Japan and China, stemming from Takaichi’s reference to a Taiwan contingency, keeps on escalating. As China extends its anti-Japan campaign to Western countries, Japan continues to officially reject China’s demand that Takaichi retract her comment. At home though, Takaichi has maintained her domestic support and focus.
 
Takaichi spoke by telephone with U.S. President Donald Trump on November 25, when he called her just hours after his call with Chinese President Xi Jinping. She reported that Trump spoke with her warmly and that he encouraged her to call him anytime. But she did not reveal to the press the details of her conversation with Trump on Taiwan issue, nor did the White House.
 
Nor was the substance of the Japan-U.S. summit talk released by Japanese officials, but The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump asked Takaichi to “lower the volume on Taiwan.” This snippet of the call, different in tone from Trump’s usual calls, and the fact that he initiated it indicates that Trump is worried. Unusually for a close ally, Takaichi did not attempt to alert the U.S. about her comment ahead of time. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s visit to North Korea and meeting with its leader Kim Jong Il in 2002 was a similar change of policy unanticipated by the White House.
 
China’s furious response to Takaichi’s comment is based (among other things) on the fact that Imperial Japan once occupied Taiwan. In one reaction, a letter to the United Nations, China insisted on “its right of self-defense under the UN Charter.” This “right,” which appears in several places in the charter, would allow a country to take military action against an “enemy state.” Japan criticized China’s argument as baseless, labeling the clause obsolete. Notably, when Xi sought Trump’s support in dealing with Japan, he also asked the United Kingdom and France to support the one-China policy.
 
Although Takaichi has refused to retract her statement, she may be beginning to step back from it. In a meeting of the Committee on Fundamental National Policies in the Diet, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, asked whether Takaichi’s comment had been properly prepared as a Japanese government official statement and whether she had instead expressed a personal view. Takaichi explained that Japan’s actions in the event of a Taiwan contingency would be based on the actual situation -- functionally correcting her original statement.
 
Takaichi also attributed her controversial comment to the member, Katsuya Okada, who asked about the Taiwan contingency in a Lower House committee hearing on November 7. “While I did not want to say about a specific possibility, I sincerely answered the question, because I was asked with specific cases,” Takaichi told Noda. Supporters of Takaichi have accused Okada of setting a trap for Takaichi.
 
In a poll conducted by Mainichi Shimbun in late November, 50 percent of respondents believed that Takaichi’s comment on Taiwan was appropriate while 25 percent thought it would hurt Japan. As China escalates its diplomatic and economic actions against Japan, public sympathy for Takaichi grows, potentially inflaming rather than cooling sentiments about China.
 
Elsewhere on the prime minister’s agenda, Takaichi’s handling of domestic politics looks to be going well. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) added three independent lawmakers to its parliamentary group in the House of Representatives. These lawmakers had left the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) in September out of frustration with JIP leadership, but they voted for Takaichi as prime minister in October. LDP leaders invited them to join the LDP group.
 
With the additional three members, the LDP accounts for 199 seats in the Lower House. With the 34 seats held by JIP, the coalition has secured a simple majority of 233 seats out of 465 in the Lower House. As provided in Japan’s constitution, the Lower House has the power to reject Upper House decision on budget bill and non-confidence resolution against prime minister. The Upper House does not have the reciprocal power on those two issues. Thus, the coalition can pass its own budget bill simply with the Lower House majority. The coalition can also block a no-confidence resolution against Takaichi since it can disregard possible opposition from the Upper House.
 
The Takaichi Cabinet has approved a supplemental budget of 18.3 trillion yen, which includes an economic stimulus plan to help households suffering from price inflation. The supplemental budget also proposes 1.1 trillion yen in defense spending. This appropriation would enable the government to reach the target floor for defense spending of 2 percent of GDP two years earlier than scheduled. We expect the bill to be submitted to the Diet and passed with the votes of the LDP-JIP coalition by the end of current extraordinary session on December 17.
 
The LDP and JIP agreed on reductions in Diet seats, an issue that JIP considers its top legislative priority for the coalition. The two parties hope to submit a bill that, within a year, would eliminate 25 seats in single-seat districts and 20 seats in the proportional districts in the House of Representatives. Although JIP is stressing the importance of the seat reduction agreement, it is not at all clear that the agreement will find a broad consensus in the parties. In any case, JIP is showing no sign of leaving the coalition with the LDP.
 
Hirofumi Yoshimura, the leader of JIP as well as the Governor of Osaka has said that Takaichi need not retract her comment on Taiwan. He has also refused to attend any event held by the Chinese Consulate General in Osaka in response to the Consul General’s offensive comments about Takaichi over social media. JIP’s apparent unconditional support for the Takaichi effectively protects the administration. For now, her government is insulated from domestic opposition.

Alliance Burden Sharing in Asia

South Korea Redefines Alliance Burden Sharing 

After Trump’s Asia Visit

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published November 11, 2025 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

South Korea’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit showcased a tightening defense partnership with the United States. The U.S. push for allies to shoulder greater security burdens converged with South Korean efforts to deepen autonomy and prepare for long-term uncertainty about U.S. commitments, creating a mix of deeper operational integration and quiet hedging.

The Trump administration, under the umbrella of “alliance modernization,” is pushing for increased South Korean defense spending and a shift in U.S. focus from solely countering North Korea to “strategic flexibility,” which would allow U.S. forces in South Korea to assume regional missions aimed mainly at China. South Korea is expanding defense investment, accelerating transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), and pursuing nuclear fuel capabilities, all while reiterating that it will not be dragged into a broader confrontation with China.

The upshot is a more capable, forward-leaning alliance that is also more transactional, competitive, and sovereignty-driven. The question for policymakers is whether this becomes the new normal of the alliance or the first phase of a more fragmented Indo-Pacific.

Another Layer

A similar tightening of ties occurred in parallel between President Donald Trump and new Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as well as her surprisingly warm meeting with Korean President Lee Jae Myung on the sidelines of APEC. Beneath this official narrative of drawing closer, however, there is another layer to security developments.

“Both Korea and Japan are trying to keep the Americans locked in while they are preparing for the day when America doesn’t care enough to protect you,” says a Seoul-based observer familiar with the thinking of both Korean and Japanese senior officials, who preferred to comment on background. “The trade and investment deal components of this are ultimately protection money,” he added. “They wouldn’t be doing it if there wasn’t the risk of losing security guarantees from the U.S.”

The trade pressures may reinforce the need to tighten security ties, but they also undermine confidence in the alliance, some experts believe.

“U.S. expressions of support for allies are in the context of helping them to assist the U.S. coalition against China,” says Bruce Klingner, senior fellow at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and former CIA analyst. “Yet, that effort is undermined by Trump’s arbitrary, protectionist tariffs, which pummeled allies worse than opponents.

The United States, Klingner added, forced South Korea “into a disadvantageous trade deal” that violates the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement (KORUS FTA).

Nuclear Submarines?

The centerpiece of an apparent new level of U.S.-South Korea security cooperation is an agreement for joint production of nuclear-powered submarines at a South Korean-owned shipyard in Philadelphia.

“South Korea will be building its Nuclear Powered Submarine in the Philadelphia Shipyards, right here in the good ol’ U.S.A.,” Trump proclaimed in a October 29 post on Truth Social. “Shipbuilding in our Country will soon be making a BIG COMEBACK.”

Some experts claimed this was a breakthrough toward strategic interdependence.

“This move dismantles the old anmi-gyeongjung (security with the United States, economy with China) framework,” wrote Seong-Hyon Lee, a senior fellow at the George H.W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations, in The Interpreter. “South Korea is no longer merely buying American security; it is integrating its industrial base with that of the United States to form a single, strategic-economic bloc,” argued Lee.

But subsequent developments call this into question. Senior executives at Hanwha, the South Korean firm that has taken ownership of the Philly Shipyard, admitted that the facility is not capable of building a nuclear-powered submarine, not only technically but also because of insufficient security to conduct such secret work.

Senior South Korean officials have since told the National Assembly that the intention is, in fact, to build those submarines in South Korea, with the clear goal of enhancing the country’s defense capabilities, independently of the United States.

“Investing in a submarine facility at the Hanwha Philly Shipyard would not be realistic, and neither would it be realistic to contract with an American company like General Dynamics to build the submarines,” National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac told the National Assembly’s House Steering Committee. While paying due respect to the alliance, “we’re emphasizing defense autonomy as we seek to take on a bigger role and make greater contributions,” Wi said.

The Greater Prize

Behind the nuclear submarine agreement lies a deeper, and more significant, agenda for the Lee administration: a revision of the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, known as the 123 Agreement, to give South Korea the ability to enrich nuclear fuel and reprocess spent fuel, both of which are important to the expansion of the country’s nuclear power industry but also needed to operate submarine reactors. While the submarine agreement has gotten most of the media attention, the 123 Agreement’s revision is the greater prize.

South Korea has long sought this goal but has been blocked by the United States, which saw this as a doorway to potential nuclear weapons proliferation. By framing this as an issue of civilian nuclear power development, however, South Koreans in both conservative and progressive camps saw this as a means of acquiring near-threshold capability to go nuclear, without yet crossing the line—what some refer to as nuclear latency.

South Korean officials, in this view, understood that an appeal to build their nuclear power industry was not going to appeal to President Trump and his senior officials. But it could gain support if packaged as part of taking more responsibility for their own defense.

“Mr. Trump either did not understand the implications, or did not care,” wrote The Economist. “South Korea’s moves toward an insurance policy betray great unease about the future of its alliance with America.”

If the president did not understand what he signed off on in Seoul, national security officials in Washington with long experience on these issues are apparently aware of the Pandora’s box that was being opened. According to Korean media reports, the delay in publishing a written joint document detailing the agreements reached on tariffs and national security issues is due to an internal review in Washington.

A senior official in the South Korean government told the Hankyoreh newspaper that “the US Department of Energy is apparently upset with how many concessions Korea received in regard to the two countries’ nuclear energy agreement.”

OPCON transfer and the China question

The delay in issuing a joint statement following the Security Consultative Meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and South Korean Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-back, along with senior officials, may have partly been due to a lack of detailed agreement on key issues.

The two sides discussed the transfer of wartime OPCON, based on a previous plan that set out three phases to verify the operational capabilities of a future Combined Forces Command under a South Korean commander. The transfer has been stalled due to delays in U.S. verification and the lack of urgency by the previous conservative government.

In the joint meeting and in a direct meeting between Hegseth and Lee, the South Korean leader expressed his desire to complete the second phase by 2026 and move rapidly toward finalizing the transfer. Lee pitched this as a gesture toward the Trump administration’s expressed desire to shift its defense role.

“The early recovery of wartime operational control within my term will be an important opportunity to further deepen and develop the South Korea-U.S. alliance,” Lee reportedly told Hegseth. “If our military capabilities are significantly strengthened and we take the lead in defending the Korean Peninsula, the U.S. defense burden in the Indo-Pacific region will also be reduced.”

Hegseth made no specific commitments on concluding the verification process on South Korea’s desired timetable. There was similar ambiguity on the issue of “strategic flexibility,” an issue that has long been discussed between the two allies. The term refers to the idea that U.S. forces based in South Korea might be deployed out of the peninsula for missions other than the defense against North Korean aggression.

The two sides have sidestepped this issue by agreeing in general terms that U.S. forces can be moved wherever the U.S. commander-in-chief wants, while retaining the understanding that those forces are there to defend South Korea against a North Korean attack. South Korea has long insisted that the 28,500 U.S. forces based in South Korea are essential for the defense against a potential North Korean attack, but also as the trigger for deploying massive U.S. forces committed under joint operational plans.

Behind this issue lies South Korean concerns that the Trump administration might seek a peace deal with North Korea that could lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea. Hegseth and senior U.S. military officials have pledged to maintain the force commitment in South Korea. But he also alluded to their use in contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula, most likely around Taiwan.

“At the same time, we need to enhance flexibility to respond to other contingencies in the region,” Hegseth said following the security talks. He called for deeper coordination between the two countries to expand the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK).

South Korea, however, is not committed to a wider confrontation with China. Lee, while shoring up ties with the United States, has cultivated closer relations with China, particularly in the realm of economic cooperation. The APEC sideline meeting between Lee and Chinese leader Xi Jinping reportedly featured extensive discussions and personal warmth. It was notably different in tone from the brief thirty-minute meeting between Xi and Takaichi, which was clearly frosty.

“There will be disagreement between the U.S. and South Korea on China policy, but a greater similarity of views on North Korea because both Trump and Lee want to engage North Korea,” observes Klingner. “On China, Lee will still try to straddle the fence.” The meeting with Xi focused on the restoration of economic relations and a plea to Xi to encourage North Korea to resume engagement.

The goal of pairing security ties with the United States and economic ties with China has been a consistent feature of South Korean foreign policy, including under the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which was also careful about offering overt support for military contingencies around Taiwan.

“As the role of U.S. Forces Korea expands, it is crucial to establish safeguards through sufficient consultation to ensure that South Korea is not drawn into regional conflicts against its will,” Donga Ilbo commented.

Multilayered Policy

The effort by South Korean leaders to balance the competing demands of their ally, the United States, and the pursuit of national interests in Northeast Asia is not new. The goal of greater defense self-reliance has also been long-standing, particularly by progressive South Korean administrations. The difference now lies mostly in the volatile nature of the Trump administration and uncertainty about its policy direction. That drives South Korea and Japan, and other U.S. allies, to increasingly think about lessening dependency on the United States.

“Unpredictability makes everyone nervous, and it leads them to consider other alternatives,” says Klingner.