Fukushima's Muddy Waters

Kishida Administration Provokes an International Dispute on Nuclear Contamination

By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
July 17, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently submitted to the government of Japan a report on the safety of discharging “treated water” from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS). The FDNPS is still in the process of decommissioning after the severe accident caused by Great East Japan Earthquake 12 years ago. The IAEA determined that Japan’s discharge plan is relatively safe, saying “the discharge of the ALPS (Advanced Liquid Processing System) treated water -- will have a negligible radiological impact on people and the environment.”

 However, there is considerable skepticism about the report both inside and outside Japan. By inviting an international organization to weigh in on the dispute over the uncontrollable by-product of cooling down the broken reactors, the Japanese government seems to have made the issue an international problem.

 The IAEA’s review followed Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga’s announcement in 2021 that the diluted contaminated water from the FDNPS would be released into the sea.  The FDNPS storage tanks are reaching their capacity limits. At the Japanese government’s request, the IAEA established a task force of international experts. The task force analyzed data provided by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), Nuclear Regulation Agency (NRA) of Japan and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The report is not an assessment of political impact of discharging, but simply a scientific analysis of data provided by Japan.

 The report has concluded that the approach to the discharge of treated water processed by the system named Advanced Liquid Processing System, or ALPS, and the associated activities by TEPCO, NRA and the government of Japan are consistent with relevant international safety standards. Even so, IAEA notes that once discharges begin, many of the technical topics reviewed and assessed by the task force will need to be revised by the IAEA. In his July visit to Fukushima, the IAEA Secretary General, Rafael Grossi, assured residents “We’ll be here until the last drop is safely discharged.”

The main concern in Japan about the treated water focuses on a substance called tritium, a radioactive hydrogen isotope, that remains even after the ALPS has processed water from the FDNPS. The IAEA report estimates that the annual amount of tritium, limited to 22 TBq in Japan’s plan, to be as low as the pre-accident level and much lower than the annual production on the planet due to natural processes. According to the report, the biological half-time of tritium in humans is 10 and 40 days, while its physical half-time is 12.3 years. The report concludes that the discharged tritium has limited impacts on people and the environment.

 It is not strange for the IAEA to support Japan’s plan for the discharge of treated water because the organization was established by U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower to promote the use of atomic energy. When Japan was not able to find a way to dispose of contaminated water in 2015, the IAEA, under the leadership of the Japanese Secretary General, recommended that Japan discharge the water into the sea. Not surprisingly, then, the IAEA report is on the side of the Japanese government.

 With the IAEA report in hand, the Kishida administration believes that it has cleared the last hurdle and has decided that the discharge may begin. A few days after the report was published, the NRA issued an approval to the facilities for discharging on its safety. METI has already announced that the discharge will be started this summer.

 The IAEA’s endorsement of the discharge met with an immediate and unfavorable international response. Korean protesters chanted not to approve Japan’s discharge plan as Grossi entered and exited the building in Tokyo where he held a press conference early July. The parliamentary members of an opposition party in South Korea argued in a Tokyo press conference that releasing “contaminated water” (never calling it treated water) would violate international laws such as the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and the London Convention and Protocol on prevention of marine pollution. The party members said that they would continue their protests until Japan stops discharging the water. Although the Yoon Suk-yeol administration has shown credibility in responding to Japan’s plan, the citizenry’s anxiety about contaminated water is causing a sharp political dispute in South Korea.

 China is firmly against the release of the water. Soon after the IAEA report was issued, the Chinese government announced that the review of IAEA “should not be the ‘shield’ or ‘green light’ for Japan’s discharge of nuclear-contaminated water into the ocean.” The government will consider more stringent inspection of imported seafood from Japan if Japan starts dumping the contaminated water into Pacific Ocean.

 When the buildings containing nuclear reactors exploded, TEPCO began to use water to cool down the reactors, instead of burying them. Ever since, the crippled plant has produced contaminated water. Although the FDNPS has taken various steps to reduce the risks, including the purifying process through ALPS system. Several measures, however, including blocking the water flow with underground frozen walls set around the site and lifting the water up before it reaches the site, the contaminated water, even though processed, is still increasing in the tanks built in FDNPS site. TEPCO and the government of Japan have yet to ensure that, in the words of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the contaminated water in Fukushima is “under control.”

 TEPCO has said that the water must be discharged into the sea because the tanks are going to be filled soon. But the company has been building new tanks when they have become full. If there is no more space in the FDNPS tanks, TEPCO can build new ones anywhere on their own property. That is the point that the neighbor countries have been making. TEPCO’s justification sounds as if Japan is risking the environment of the planet to save money. Kishida has shown no sign of refuting these criticisms.

###

Kyodo News opinion poll & results from Tokyo Shimbun, July 17, 2023  Tokyo Shimbun , p. 21, Questions & answers (%), provisional translation for education use

Q8: The government plans to take the treated water from the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, dilute it so that the concentrations of radioactive substances are below national standards, and release it into the ocean around this summer. Local fishermen as well as China and some of Japan’s other neighbors are opposed to this. Are you in favor of or opposed to releasing the treated water into the ocean?

In favor	31.3
Opposed	25.6
Unsure	43.1
D/K+N/A	—

Q9: The government says it will gain the understanding of the Japanese people and of the international community so that no economic damage arises through the spread of groundless rumors with the release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, local fishermen and others are expressing concern. If the government releases the treated water into the ocean, do you think economic damage will arise through the spread of groundless rumors?

Major economic damage will arise through the spread of groundless rumors	15.8
Some economic damage will arise	71.6
Little economic damage will arise	9.1
Absolutely no economic damage will arise	0.8
D/K+N/A	2.7

Q10: Do you think the government has given an adequate explanation of the release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi plant?

Yes	16.1
No	80.3
D/K+N/A	3.6

Japan's Ruling Coalition Cracks

Game of Chicken within Japan’s Ruling Coalition

By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun

July 7, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point.

 

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is suffering from unprecedented conflict with its long-time coalition partner, Komeito. Annoyed by LDP’s sober reaction over interparty cooperation for the next election of House of Representatives, Komeito announced that it would not support any LDP candidate in the Tokyo districts.  Without Komeito’s support, the LDP may suffer defeats in these districts.  While the struggle is not supposed to escalate to the point of dismantling the coalition, some LDP lawmakers have angrily criticized Komeito, urging them to leave. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that the LDP, led by Fumio Kishida, has not been taking good care of its ruling coalition partner.

 

The House of Representatives amended the Public Offices Election Act last November, increasing by ten the number of electoral districts in urban area and correspondingly decreases the number of electoral districts in rural regions. Realizing that these changes present a chance to raise as many candidates as possible, the LDP planned that to raise 11 candidates, including one in the Tokyo 29th district, in the next election. Meanwhile, the LDP, suffering from a decline in total votes in the current elections, planned to raises another candidate in Tokyo’s 28th district, one of the newly created districts.

 

Responding to complaints within the party, the LDP rejected Komeito’s idea. Traditional election cooperation between the LDP and Komeito mandated that LDP voters vote for Komeito candidates and vice versa. LDP lawmakers have now questioned why they have to support Komeito so much, since the LDP lost close to ten districts in the electoral reform. Komeito finally went without LDP support in the Tokyo 28th and decided that the party would not support LDP candidates in the Tokyo districts in next election. In an official agreement late last month, the LDP will recommend all the Komeito candidates in the Tokyo districts except for the Tokyo 29th. Komeito will recommend LDP candidates in the districts where the parties have reached a local deal except for the Tokyo districts.

 

In the 2021 election, Komeito only won nine districts in all of Japan. These districts included the Tokyo 12th, the only one that Komeito took in Tokyo. The winner, Mitsunari Okamoto, later decided to move to the Tokyo 29th in next election, a decision basically approved by the LDP. Komeito then tried to run a second candidate in the Tokyo 28th. The idea of two Komeito districts in Tokyo was too much for LDP to bear.

 

Comparing actual seats in the House of Representatives with the share of all the votes in 2021, the LDP’s advantage in the cooperation system is greater than Komeito’s. The LDP won 189 districts (65.4% of all 289), while Komeito won nine (3.1%). The LDP, however, earned only 34.6% of all the votes for proportional representation, while Komeito received 12.4%. It can be said that the LDP earned a great number of seats with relatively few votes, thanks to the inter party cooperation.

 

The decision not to support the LDP in Tokyo seems to have been led by a religious group, Soka Gakkai (SG), the political base of Komeito. Asahi Shimbun reported  that a vice president of SG has been involved aggressively in the negotiations with the LDP. Even after facing the reluctance of LDP local leaders to support Komeito candidates in the Aichi 16th and Saitama 14th districts, the vice president independently announced that he would raise candidates in both districts. If election strategy is actually controlled by SG board members, the leaders of Komeito are acting as puppets.

 

The current political surge of the Innovation Party, or Ishin-no-kai, is in the background of Komeito’s unusual anxiety. Ishin increased its seats in regional congresses in the local elections in April, when it won a historical victory over the LDP in a supplementary election of House of Representatives in Wakayama. Although it had been refraining from confrontation with Komeito in six districts in Osaka and Hyogo, Ishin announced that it would run its own candidates against Komeito’s incumbents in the next election.

 

Komeito’s irritation is caused not only by the uncooperative attitude of LDP. Kishida’s current support for military developments is at odds with Komeito’s traditional political principle as “party of peace.” Moreover, consecutive failures in the process of replacing health insurance cards with My Number Cards weakens the support of Soka Gakkai members, who are serious about welfare policies. Komeito can still not find a way to regain power.

 

Since joining the coalition with LDP (with the catalyst of the Liberal Party in 1999), Komeito has overcome many hardships of political differences with the conservative LDP. Maintenance of the leading coalition has actually worked for growth of the small party. The existence of Komeito has also helped soften the hawkish image of the LDP. Considering that Komeito possesses ten to twenty thousand votes in every district of the House of Representatives, there are a number of lawmakers who would not be reelected without Komeito’s support. Whether or not the next election in Tokyo is separated depends on which side will compromise. The 24-year-old coalition, however, looks exhausted with endless quibbles.

Monday Asia Events July 10 2023

A CONVERSATION WITH SAN FRANCISCO FED PRESIDENT MARY DALY. 7/10, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speaker: Mary C. Daly, President and Chief Executive Officer - Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. 

ASEAN: INEFFECTIVE OR INDISPENSABLE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA? 7/10, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Foundation. Speaker: Thomas Parks, Asia Foundation’s Country Representative in Thailand. 

BREAKING DOWN THE ADVANCED BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM. 7/10, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Air & Space Forces Association. Speaker: Brig. Gen. Luke C. G. Cropsey, the Department of the Air Force Integrating Program Executive Officer for Command, Control, Communications and Battle Management. 

HONEST PERSPECTIVES ON ESG AND LIBERTY. 7/10, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: R Street. Speakers: Jennifer Schulp, Director of Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute; Nick Loris, Vice President of Public Policy, C3 Solutions; Devin Hartman, Director of Energy and Environmental Policy, R Street Institute. 

DEFENDING THE GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM FROM AUTHORITARIAN ASSAULT: HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN RETAKE THE INITIATIVE. 7/10, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Endowment for Democracy. Speakers: Dr. Rana Siu Inboden, Senior Fellow, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin; Dr. Sophie Richardson, China Director, Human Rights Watch; Christopher Walker, Vice President for Studies and Analysis, National Endowment for Democracy. 

My Number, Not

Japanese Skeptical about National ID Number


By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
June 25, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point.

One of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s major domestic policy objectives has been the introduction and distribution of a national identification card called “My Number.” Although he seemed to have attained this objective when the Diet passed a bill to fold the national health insurance card into the My Number card, the rollout caused more problems than it solved.

The transition was inadequate and resulted in many errors. The public quickly began to distrust the program and blamed the government for incompetence. Kishida’s My Number campaign has the potential to be fatal to his administration.

My Number was originally introduced under the Shinzo Abe administration in 2013. It provided Japanese citizens with a 12-digit identification number to make administrative procedures such as taxation or social security efficient. Although the government distributed the number to every citizen, My Number card was not accepted as widely as the government expected.

The government hoped that My Number would be used for health insurance and drivers’ licenses. Instead, many felt these tie-ins would jeopardize their privacy. In 2020, Abe’s successor Yoshihide Suga, offered incentives to encourage acceptance. New card holders were offered 5,000 shopping points called “Maina Point” or the equivalent to ¥5,000.

Kishida began a second campaign of Maina Point last year, giving 5,000 points for obtaining the card, 7,500 points for integrating it with health insurance and 7,500 points for connection to a personal bank account. He also announced that the current health insurance card would be scrapped by the fall of 2024, integrating it with My Number card. Earlier this month, the Diet passed an amendment to the My Number Act, which expanded the utility of the card, confirmed the integration of the health insurance card with the My Number card, and established a new system to promote the linkage of the My Number with a holder’s personal bank account.

Although some operational flaws in My Number system had been reported before enactment of the amendment, several instances of the mishandling of personal data were reported after the the enactment. In the process of registering personal bank accounts in order to receive public benefits, there were many examples of incorrect linkages with family accounts. These mistakes occurred mainly when parents registered their accounts for their children, violating the rule of one account for one person. The rule makes no sense as long as young children, who are entitled to receive governmental benefits, cannot open their own bank accounts.

Despite the fact that the My Number system is a national policy, implementation was left to local governments. In some cases, personal data was registered to wrong person. Such data included medical history, the history of pension payment, and benefits for raising children or handicapped persons. As result of mishandling MyNumber accounts, some hospital patients were charged 100% for their medical bills even though such charges must normally be 30% or less by using health insurance. Unlike the ID systems in other countries, including social security numbers in the United States, according to the report of Mainichi Shimbun, Japan’s My Number system is not controlled in a unified manner. Since many ministries hope to utilize My Number in their programs, they dividedly hold the citizens’ personal data for protecting privacy.

The political impact of the system errors of My Number is not small. The Digital Minister, Taro Kono, apologized for the consecutive failures in My Number registration. Kishida established a special inspection team in an effort to cool down the public opposition. Nevertheless, the Kishida government fully intends to scrap the current health insurance card and integrate it into the My Number card in the fall of 2024. Polls conducted on June 17th and 18th showed a steep decline in support for Kishida. In the Kyodo poll, support dropped by 6.2 points to 40.8%. The Asahi poll that approval had dropped by 4 percentage points to 42%. Mainichi’s poll showed a drop of 12 points to 33%. Most people, as well as most newspapers’ editorials, are demanding the cancellation or postponement of the integration plan of the health insurance card with the My Number card.

Kishida promised that he would not scrap the current health insurance card until popular anxiety about integration has eased. However, an integrated personal identification number has been a long-cherished wish of the central government. When the government considered introduction of an integrated ID number in 1970s, it faced firm opposition from the public worried about growing governmental control and the loss of the security of confidential personal information. The Democratic Party of Japan renewed discussion of the common ID number in the integrated reform of taxation and social security in early 2010’s.

My Number originated as an attempt to protect low-income families from the negative impact of consumption tax hikes under the DPJ administration. One possible solution at that time was a “tax credit with benefits,” which would have been accompanied by a common ID number. My Number has also been discussed as a method for delivering government benefits. But the unchanged hidden intention appears to be stronger and easier governmental control over the people. The government’s haste in implementing My Number has resulted in confusion and error capped by weak, gimmicky incentives. As a result, Kishida’s government looks weak with no easy way for the Prime Minister to regain public credibility for the My Number system.

Monday Asia Events June 26, 2023

REFLECTIONS ON U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE IN THE HUMANITIES. 6/26, 8:30am-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Korean Library Association (KLA); Library of Congress. Speakers: Dr. Stella Xu, John Turbyfill Endowed Chair of History, Roanoke College; Owen Rogers, Liaison Specialist, Veterans History Project Megan Harris, Senior Reference Specialist, Veterans History Project; Dr. Jaechan Jeong, Professor of Korean Language Education, Hanyang University; Joseph Juhn, documentary filmmaker. 

MEKONG WATER DATA HOUR: DAM DEVELOPMENT & FISH BIODIVERSITY LOSS. 6/26, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL ONLY. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Dr. Ratha Sor, Director of Graduate School, National University of Cheasim Kamchaymear; Sarah Null, Associate Professor, Watershed Sciences Department at Utah State University. 

RIPPLE EFFECT: EXPLORING THE INTERSECTION OF WATER INSECURITY AND DISPLACEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. 6/26, 9:30-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS Middle East Program. Speakers: Natasha Hall, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program; Giorgi Gigauri, Chief of Mission, The International Organization for Migration in Iraq; Michael Talhami, Senior Program Manager, The International Committee of the Red Cross; Niku Jafarnia, Yemen and Bahrain Researcher, Human Rights Watch. 

MEI CLIMATE WEEK 2023: WATER MANAGEMENT & ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY. 6/26, 10:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speaker: Diana Francis, Assistant Professor & Head of ENGEOS Lab, Khalifa University. 

A CONVERSATION WITH DR. KURT CAMPBELL AND ADMIRAL MICHAEL GILDAY ON THE STRATEGIC AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF AUKUS. 6/26, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS Australia Chair. Speakers: Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, The White House; Charles Edel, Senior Adviser and Australia Chair; Michael Gilday, Admiral Michael Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Navy. 

TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN DEFENSE REPORT LAUNCH. 6/26, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. Speakers: Max Bergmann, Director of the Stuart Center and the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS; Marie Jourdain, visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center; Sean Monaghan, visiting fellow in the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS, where he focuses on NATO, European security, and defense. 

(CIVIL) WAR AND (NOW) PEACE? THE WAGNER GROUP REBELLION AND RUSSIA'S FUTURE. 6/26, 3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America. Speakers: Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO; Amb. Stephen Sestanovich, George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies; The Honorable Stephen Rademaker, Former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Member, JINSA's Iran Policy Project; Senior Advisor, JINSA Gemunder Center. 

BUILDING U.S. SPACE FORCE COUNTERSPACE CAPABILITIES: AN IMPERATIVE FOR AMERICA’S DEFENSE. 6/26, 3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speakers: Maj Gen David N. Miller Jr., Director of Operations, U.S. Space Force; Robert Atkin, Vice President, Special Space Systems, General Atomics. 

REVITALIZING NATIONAL SECURITY AMIDST SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS. 6/26, 5:00-6:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics. Speaker: Chris Garcia, former national deputy director of the U.S. Department of Commerce and acting national director of the Minority Business Development Agency. 

Kishida's population strategy

Introduced Without A Firm Basis

By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
June 19, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced his plan, the Children’s Future Strategy Policy, for dealing with Japan’s declining population on June 13. Recognizing the urgency of turning the current trend around, Kishida offered an “acceleration plan” to fix the problem of a declining birthrate by 2028. His policy package, which includes subsidies for families with children, met immediate skepticism as it did not include credible budgetary resources. Experts on Japan’s demography believe that policy is misguided, arguing that the measures wrongly focused on the existing children instead of encouraging childbirth.

Financial benefits for children currently are available only to those families beneath an income cap. The acceleration plan removes that cap. Benefits will also be expanded to include families with a high school student in addition to those with a middle-school student or younger. Every child between the ages of 0 and 2 will receive ¥15,000 monthly, and she or he between 3 and 18 will receive ¥10,000. The amount will be raised to ¥30,000 monthly for the third child or more. For the families with a student in higher education, the plan streamlines the application process for student loans and scholarships. The system of nursery schools will also be improved for the workers with small children.

Recommending that all fathers take time off from work to help raise new-born babies, the plan aims for a society in which male workers’ recess for a new baby is nothing strange. The policy sets a target of 85% of all male workers taking the new-baby leave by 2030 and offers public financial support to guarantee nearly 100% of the family’s income. Mid- or small businesses that provide their own additional measures for the new-baby leave will receive subsidies from the government.

Those policies require certain amounts of budgetary resources to be viable. One thing clear is that the plan requires ¥3.5 trillion annually for the concentration period between FY2024-26. While the plan assumes ¥1.5-1.6 trillion for financial supports for children, ¥700-800 billion for improving nursery services, ¥700-800 billion for the families with double income and ¥500 billion for poverty or abuse on child, there is no explanation of how the government will fund the budget. First, Kishida rejected any tax increase, including a consumption tax, and stressed the necessity of reforming the whole structure of current expenditures. One option on the table is the creation of a new budget for child support, supported by cuts in the social security budget or reforms to the social insurance system. Because the social insurance system supported by payments from both employers and employees, increasing those payments may contradict the current governmental policy of raising worker salaries. Although the plan mandates that the government find stable financial resources by the end of FY 2028 and offers a bridge bond until then, the anxiety about possible additional tax burdens on old agers cannot be removed.

Kishida’s seriousness about the decline of interest in parenthood, which the policy describes as “the biggest crisis we are facing,” is not baseless. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare released the annual population trend statistics of 2022, which indicate that Japan’s total birth rate – the average number of children a woman will bear in her lifetime – hit a record-tying low of 1.26. While a nation needs 2.07% to maintain its population, the statistics shows consecutive drops for in the past seven years. The number of new-born babies in 2022 was 770,747, falling below 800,000 for the first time.

One of the biggest questions on Kishida’s demographic policy is whether the measures for existing children are effective enough to change the negative trend on childbearing. According to the study by Kenji Kamata, Assistant Professor at Meiji University, non-marriages or late marriages account for 90% of the downward trend and the remaining 10% is the decline in the number of children each married couple has. A policy to support child-raising accordingly will not improve the birth rate. Rather, closing the gap between the regular and non-regular employment and remedying the disparity between male and female workers are more to change the course of demographic downturn.

Monday Asia Events June 19, 2023

BOOK TALK: COOPERATING FOR THE CLIMATE: LEARNING FROM INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS IN CHINA'S CLEAN ENERGY SECTOR. 6/20, 9:30-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Joanna Lewis, Provost Distinguished Associate Professor and Director, Science, Technology and International Affairs (STIA), Director, STIA Program, Georgetown University; Erica Thomas, Director of Policy, Environment, Sustainability, and Regulatory, Information Technology Industry Council; Shuang Liu, China Finance Director, World Resources Institute. PURCHASE BOOK


THE SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAIN. 6/19, 5:30-7:00pm (GMT +10), HYBRID. Sponsors: Australian Institute of International Affairs; Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia. Speaker: Terry Tsao, Global Chief Marketing Officer, SEMI.


REFORMING AMERICA'S AILING MONEY REGIME. 6/19, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Brendan Brown, Senior Fellow; Alex J. Pollock, Senior Fellow, Mises Institute; Harold Furchtgott-Roth, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for the Economics of the Internet. 

LGBTQ Rights in Japan Falter

Slow Progress in Japan’s LGBTQ Legislation

By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
June 5, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point.
 
For Japan’s ruling LDP and its government, G7 membership is considered precious for it gives Japan an advantage relative to other Asian nations. However, Japan is the only G7 member without any legislation prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation or self-recognition of gender identity, an embarrassment since Japan is the chair of the G7 this year. Although the LDP submitted a new non-discrimination bill to the Diet just before the opening of the G7 Hiroshima Summit, it remains unclear whether it will pass before the end of the current session on June 21. The rightwing powers in the Diet continue their efforts to derail the bill, regardless Japan’s status among developed countries.
 
The discussion over legislation for sexual minorities has been led mainly by Japan’s opposition parties. They submitted a bill to eliminate discrimination based on sexual orientation or self-recognition of gender identity to the Diet in 2016. The movement eventually included some of the LDP lawmakers. Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle reached an agreement on a multi-partisan draft of the new bill in 2021, but it was blocked by the conservative members of the LDP. Earlier this year, after a careless speech by Kishida that same sex marriage would entirely change Japanese society and much-criticized remarks by a staff member in the prime minister’s office on the legitimacy of discrimination against the LGBTQ community, the administration was pressured to do something to protect gender orientation and identification. Kishida further demanded that the LDP pass an LGBTQ law before the G7 summit.
 
Conservative lawmakers who had been blocking LGBTQ legislature have been annoyed by this pressure. In LDP internal meetings on the issue of sexual minorities, they worked hard to dilute expressions that promote understanding of sexual minorities in the multi-partisan agreement under consideration. The most controversial change was the mainline LDP’s willingness to replace the phrase “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or self-recognition of gender identity shall not be tolerated” with the more ambiguous “no unfair discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is allowed.” The opposition parties objected strongly, saying the insertion of “unfair” is needless to say, because there is no such thing as fair discrimination.
 
Other parts of the legislation were watered down as well. All the phrases of “self-recognition of gender identity” in the multi-partisan draft were replaced with “gender identity” on the theory that self-recognition might be interpreted as self-profession. The LDP conservatives’ apparent concern was that someone might be sneaking into the wrong side of public restrooms or baths. The LDP also dropped the words “effort of school administrators [gakkou setchisha]" in education. The argument in the LDP was that teachers were too immature and unskilled in sex education to lecture about LGBTQ.  
 
The LDP submitted a revised version of the bill to the Diet a few days before the Hiroshima Summit, receiving approval from its junior partner of the leading coalition, Komeito. Encouraged by the domestic legislative progress over gender recognition, Kishida, as the chairman of the G7 Summit, succeeded in organizing the leaders’ communiqué, including the section supporting a society where “all people can enjoy vibrant lives free from violence and discrimination independent of gender identity or expression or sexual orientation.”
 
After the summit, work on LGBTQ legislation bills became further complicated by the submission of several related bills. The Constitutional Democratic Party and the Japan Communist Party had already submitted a bill much the same as the multi-partisan draft, and the two parties did so on the same day that LDP submitted its own. The Japan Innovation Party (Ishin-no Kai) and the Democratic Party for the People submitted a third bill, which replaced the words of “gender identity” with “jendaa-aidentiti,” after the summit.

Not all the bills submitted to the Diet were discussed in either the Plenary or committees meetings. The Committee of Rules and Administration is chaired by an LDP lawmaker who selects the bills to be considered. Thus, a number of bills, mainly submitted by the opposition, are rejected even without discussion in every session. With the current Diet session ending June 21, time is running out to select and debate any bill selected.

While the political parties continue to struggle with LGBTQ legislation, the judicial branch is considering lawsuits brought in five Japanese cities by same-sex couples against the state. So far, three out of four courts have said that not allowing same-sex marriage is constitutionally problematic. At the end of May, the Nagoya Regional Court decided that provisions of Japan’s Civil Code or Family Register Act, which did not recognize same-sex marriage, were unconstitutional. The defect in the laws was that, the court said, “the same-sex couple of plaintiffs is excluded from the important personal benefit that is attached to a legal marriage.”

The court recognized the unconstitutionality of laws that do not recognize same-sex marriage, relying on Paragraph 2 of Article 24 of the constitution, which requires that all the laws be based on respect of individuals and the essential equality of both sexes in the choice of spouse. This is the first time for a court in Japan to recognize the unconstitutionality based on that clause. Although the Court did not comment on legislation under consideration in the Diet, the decision should be regarded as an expression of frustration with the slow progress in the legislative branch. This week, a court in Kyushu will issue a ruling on the fifth lawsuit.

UPDATE (6/16/23): After two years of discussion, the Diet passed a bill to promote understanding of sexual minorities. In the House of Councillors, the LDP, Komeito, Innovation Party, and the National Democratic Party (NDP) supported the bill. It was an amended version, actually a mixture of two bills, one submitted by the LDP and Komeito, and another by the Innovation and NDP. These four parties agreed on an amendment before the bill passed the House of Representatives on 13th. After an argument over the interpretation of “gender identity” in the Japanese language, the expression which would confusingly be recognized as allowing a man to enter a woman’s public bath, the four parties agreed on using the term of “jendaa aidentiti.” It also requires educational institutes to make efforts to achieve cooperation of families and local community before approving LGBTQ organizations. It is obvious that the law will be working as an obstruction to promote understanding of sexual minorities.

Fukuoka Regional Court ruled on June 8th that current laws related to marriage were in a “state of unconstitutionality,” because the plaintiffs, requiring the right for same-sex marriage, were suffering from the disadvantage of not being able to take advantage of the institution of marriage. Four out of five regional courts, including Fukuoka, Nagoya, Tokyo and Sapporo, decided that the laws were unconstitutional or in the state of unconstitutional on the lawsuits demanding recognition of the unconstitutionality of existing laws on same-sex marriage, urging the legislative branch to take further action. It is doubtful that the passed bill fulfills that requirement of the judicial branch.

According to a Pew Research survey this spring of 24 countries, Japanese people have a 74% acceptance rate of same-sex marriage. This is not reflected in the Diet legislation.

What did the G7 achieve?

 A World Still with Nuclear Weapons

By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
May 22, 2023
 
As the chair of the Group of Seven (G7) Hiroshima Summit, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida stated that he would use the summit to pave the way to “a world without nuclear weapons.” Although the Leaders’ Communiqué did include those specific words, the G7 leaders did not provide a way to implement of this goal. This leaves one wondering what Kishida did achieve with this high-profile international engagement.
 
The document for nuclear disarmament, called the Hiroshima Vision on Nuclear Disarmament, was issued a day before the Communiqué. It unequivocally declared the indispensability of nuclear weapons in the context of nuclear deterrence. The G7 thus continue to contemplate a world where nuclear weapons still exist. Those who suffered the nuclear bombs, or the Hibakusha, in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were deeply disappointed by how ineffective Kishida had been.
 
While underscoring the importance of the 77-year record of non-use of nuclear weapons, the Hiroshima Vision firmly accuses Russia of its “irresponsible nuclear rhetoric, undermining of arms control regimes, and stated intent to deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus.” With these and other strong words denouncing Russia’s rhetoric, the Vision statement follows: “Our security policies are based on the understanding that nuclear weapons, for as long as they exist, should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent wars and coercion.”
 
This document, made under the leadership of Kishida, conditionally recognized the role of nuclear weapons without showing any clear roadmap to the world without nuclear weapons. The G7 fundamentally reject the work of Hibakushas. Coming through hardships of losing loved ones, being threatened by the fear of cancer, or discrimination from the fellow citizens, Hibakushas define nuclear weapons as “absolute evil” that kill too many people immediately. Their use can never be justified.
 
The Hiroshima Vision ironically justifies nuclear weapons as a countermeasure to Russian aggression in Ukraine and nuclear saber-rattling. Thus, to 91-year-old atomic bomb survivor, Setsuko Thurlow, the G7 Summit was a “huge failure,” as stated in her press conference on Sunday, May 21. The International Campaign to Abolish NuclearWeapons (ICAN), the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize winner, stated that the G7 fell “far short of providing any meaningful outcomes for nuclear disarmament.”

Mostly ignoring the backlash from the Hibakushas, Kishida said at his post-summit press conference that he was satisfied with the outcome of the G7 Hiroshima Summit. “We shared an ideal for the future of the world without a nuclear weapon.” Recognizing appeals from nuclear-suffered cities, Kishida considers Hiroshima Vision the basis for future actions to attain a world without nuclear weapons. Kishida viewed the visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Hiroshima as a chance to deliver further a message against threats to use nuclear weapons.
 
Although the G7 Summit was a stage to show that the G7 leaders stand together with Zelenskyy and to condemn Russia for its aggression against international law and order, inviting the Ukrainian president at war nevertheless was questionable. Hiroshima’s significance is as a place once devastated by a nuclear weapon and of the Hiroshima people’s hope for unconditional peace, not war at any cost.
 
After laying flowers at the cenotaph to A-bomb victims, Zelenskyy reflected that “Photographs of ruins of Hiroshima absolutely remind me of Bakhmut and other similar settlements.” For the people in Hiroshima who believe in the principle of “war is not the answer,” the sympathetic comment of Zelenskyy might have brought a sense of discomfort to them.
 
Obviously, Zelenskyy’s purpose in visiting Hiroshima was to continue and win the war with as much support as possible from the G7. U.S. President Joe Biden told Zelenskyy that the US would start training Ukrainian pilots to fly F-16 fighter jets. In a bilateral meeting with Zelenskyy, Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who is regarded as a key for anti-Russia groups to reach the countries called “global south,” conveyed his clear support for dialogue and diplomacy to find a way forward. Hiroshima had become the place where world leaders were seen deeply engaged in Ukraine’s war strategy.
 
For Kishida who has been promoting his positive pro-active security policies, the appearance of the Ukrainian president must have been a good opportunity to trumpet the “success” of policies to domestic audiences. In the meeting with Zelenskyy, Kishida pledged Japanese assistance by sending trucks and provisions and accepting injured Ukrainian military personnel in the Self-Defense Forces Central Hospital in Tokyo. The Kishida administration is likely to insist that current budget request for security measures or positive involvement in maintaining world order has been necessary.
 
In terms of dealing with China’s advances in Asia-Pacific region, the G7 summit produced some positive outcomes. Zelenskyy’s attendance reinforced the ties of democratic nations. In the outreach meeting attended by the G7 leaders, eight guests and Zelenskyy, Kishida stressed that coercive and unilateral change of status quo would not be tolerated anywhere in the world. It is necessary, he said, to protect free and open world order based on the rule of law.
 
The G7 Leaders’ Communiqué, in contrast to its message to Russia, was toward China, calling on engagement with G7 and recommending “de-risking” for economic resilience instead of decoupling from China. Yet, the leaders of four major powers in the Asia-Pacific region, Japan, United States, India, and Australia (meeting as the quadrilateral security dialog or QUAD), also issued a statement that opposed “destabilizing or unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo by force or coercion,” a suggestion that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be unacceptable.
 
Inevitably, Japan will have to deal with further pressure from China. Kishida’s inability to make progress on nuclear disarmament among his peers at the G7 Summit does not engender much confidence on how well he can pursue this. To date, Kishida has yet to offer a concrete vision for a meaningful dialogue with China. By following along with the G7's support of Ukraine and deterrence, Kishida set aside Japan's priority to stabilize the situation in Northeast Asia. China reacted against the G7 Communique with "strong dissatisfaction." It is possible that Kishida has raised the tension in Northeast Asia by introducing the structure of hostility in the Eastern Europe.

Kishida's non-surprise

The Not Surprising Visit

But was it constitutional?

By Takuya Nishimura, Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
April 3, 2023

News organizations in Japan reported with sensational headlines the visit of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, as the chairman of Group 7, to the capital of Ukraine.  At the time the Russian invasion was showing signs of a quagmire, and Western support was indispensable. In the meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Kishida pledged multiple forms of assistance to support Ukraine its historic conflict to maintain democratic ties in the world. 

The real surprise of the visit was that most people in Japan, known as a nation whose constitution adopts strict pacifism, approved of his visit to the place where an actual war was being waged. The Japanese people appear to be accustomed to the real world that is confused by unilateral Russian aggression to Ukraine.

Prime Minister Kishida’s visit has at least one precedent. In 2003, the Koizumi Administration decided to support U.S. President George W. Bush’s “War on Terror” by sending Japanese Self-defense Forces to Samawah, Iraq. This decision led to a broad argument whether the forces’ activities would be made only within the non-combat zone. Sending the forces to a combat zone was recognized as a violation of the constitution of Japan, which renounces war as a measure of settling international conflicts. When the Ministry of Defense disclosed in 2018 the official records of SDF activities in Iraq, the opposition parties accused the government of breaching the constitution, because the description included the word “combat” around the camp.

A similar question arises here: is the PM's visit to the combat zone constitutional? As long as Kyiv was exposed to Russian missile or drone strikes, it could be said that Kishida's visit was made in the combat zone. The PM commands and controls the Self-defense Forces under Article 7 of the Self-defense Forces Act. Even though actual troops did not accompany him, Kishida’s visit means that Japan's supreme commander is not neutral in the conflict and is supporting one of the combatants that is engaged in a war (as is its enemy) as a measure of settling an international conflict. 

However, the legitimacy or implications of the PM’s visit was not discussed in Japan. It is likely that the unjust invasion by the Russians offset the uncertain constitutionality of Kishida’s visit to a country at war. And, maybe, accepting the responsibilities of being a G7 country.

During the visit, both leaders delivered a joint statement on “the special global partnership” between Japan and Ukraine. The statement denounced Russia for its baseless aggression against Ukraine, declared that Russia’s threat to use nuclear weapons was unacceptable, and increased the G7 commitment to $39 billion for fiscal and economic support of Ukraine. The leaders also shared serious concerns on the situation in the East and South China Seas. Zelenskyy pronounced Kishida a protector of Ukraine and international order and accepted Kishida’s invitation to G7 Hiroshima Summit in May (Zelenskyy will attend virtually.) Before the meeting, Kishida visited the city of Bucha where Russian troops had massacred Ukrainians, and displayed solidarity with the people of Ukraine.

Among the reasons why there were no active arguments on the constitutionality of the visit is that Kishida has maintained from the beginning a relatively firm position against the Russian invasion. The Japanese people could easily understand the visit as a diplomatic activity. Indeed, Kishida was the last leader among G7 nations to visit the capital of Ukraine after he had received an invitation from Zelenskyy in a telephone conversation in January. The surprise visit was therefore not surprising for Japanese people.

One possible negative aspect of the visit is the impact on Japan’s relationship with China. On the same day that Kishida met with Zelenskyy in Kyiv, Chinese President Xi Jinping was in Moscow in talks with Putin. Thus, two leaders of major powers in Asia were visibly standing on opposite sides of a war. A spokesperson for Foreign Ministry of China said that China hoped Japan would help settle the conflict in Ukraine rather than to do the opposite. It is obvious that Kishida has more diplomatic work to do in terms of managing Japan’s relationship with China, as the day of G7 Summit meeting in Hiroshima is approaching.

Rescinding Japan's War Apology

What Will Kishida Say on August 15 at Japan’s National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead?

Kishida has an opportunity to demonstrate his independence now that Abe is gone. Will he return to the legacy of the Murayama statement?

By Mindy Kotler, Asia Policy Point

The Diplomat, August 13, 2022

What Will Kishida Say on August 15 at Japan's National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead?

In the immediate aftermath of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s murder, Japan’s current leader Kishida Fumio promised to honor Abe’s legacy by building upon his accomplishments. The reportedly more liberal Kishida, however, came to power expected to do the opposite and dial back some of his predecessor’s more provocative stances. His room to maneuver was limited, however, by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s right wing and Abe’s own constant public hectoring on hewing to the course.

With Abe’s untimely death, Kishida has an opportunity to demonstrate his independence. The first indication of a new course may come with his August 15 address at the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead.

A crucial objective of Abe’s two terms was the freeing of Japan from “masochistic” history. This odd expression was a call to arms advocating both amending the U.S.-imposed “mind-control” constitution and ending Japan’s war apology diplomacy. Although constitutional amendment was not accomplished, the latter objective has been achieved.

Abe led an aggressive campaign to reconstruct history and monitor its telling at home and aboard. Diplomats asked the governments of the Philippines and Germany to remove statues memorializing the “comfort women” and other victims of sexual violence. Abe ordered the creation of commissions questioning the legitimacy of Japan’s 1995 official war apology, known as the Murayama statement, and the 1993 provisional apology to the comfort women, known as the Kono statement. (Here it should be noted that this particular statement is no longer prominently noted on the Foreign Ministry’s webpage explaining their position regarding the comfort women. Instead, it is buried in another document and only the knowledgeable and persistent can find it.)

Cabinet level officials squired applications for UNESCO World Heritage recognition of culturally dubious and politically fraught sites. One was an island shrine inaccessible to women. Another glorified Japan’s industrialization while disregarding the troubled use and abuse of convicts, the underclasses, children, Koreans, Chinese, and prisoners of war. Government promises to UNESCO to include this missing history have not been kept.

The Foreign Ministry was pressed into defending false history in an amicus brief to the U.S. Supreme Court, scrubbing its website of historical documents containing embarrassing details, and asking the public to report historical narratives contradicting the new official positions. The Abe government used budget allocations to hire public relations firms and amateur historians to cast doubt on widely respected historians. 

In talks with the Park Geun-hye administration in South Korea seeking to resolve the disagreements over the proper means of recognizing the dignity of the comfort women, the Abe government resorted to an unprecedented diplomatic diversion. Despite announcing an “agreement,” the 2015 comfort women talks resulted in two competing unsigned memoranda distributed at a “Joint Press Occasion.” The Japanese memorandum, in particular, contains an impossible demand that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly.” The “Press Occasion” document was furthermore not Cabinet approved, unlike every other diplomatic agreement the government of Japan has ever announced.

The crowning moment of Abe’s revisionism was his 2020 August 15th address at the National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead. His remarks were the culmination of a seven-year effort to completely revise, if not indeed rescind, the 1995 Murayama statement, the cabinet-approved apology for World War II released by Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi. Until Abe, the Murayama statement was the template for all Japanese apologies. The 2020 statement, however, had many of Murayama’s key phrases removed. The new statement was not an apology to Japan’s victims. Instead, it paid tribute to the Japanese people for their resilience.

As early as 2013, on August 15, Abe stopped expressing his “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology.” He replaced “colonial rule and aggression” in the Murayama statement with the milder “Japan took the wrong course and advanced along the road to war” causing “immeasurable damage and suffering.” The main focus shifted away from Japan’s victims to turning the war into a positive transformation where “the peace and prosperity that we now enjoy have been built upon the sacrifices of you who gave up your precious lives.” And the four mentions of unfortunate history in the Murayama statement were reduced to just one promising blandly to “face history with humility and engrave deeply into our hearts the lessons that we should learn.” 

Abe tried to codify these changes with a Cabinet-approved statement issued the day before the 2015 August 15th memorial. He explained that his Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the 21st Century had reevaluated Japan’s post-war period. The conclusion was that today’s Japanese are not “predestined to apologize.” Instead, “Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past” only because the peace enjoyed today “exists only upon such precious sacrifices” that are “the origin of postwar Japan.”

Abe’s last memorial statement was in 2020 for the 75th anniversary of Japan’s surrender ending World War II. It made no reference to history or remorse at all. The pledge to take “the lessons of history deeply into our hearts” vanished. In its place, Abe introduced a new, “forward-looking” phrase – that Japan was ready to make a “proactive contribution to peace.” 

In 2021, Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide substantially repeated Abe’s 2020 reconstruction of Japan’s war apology. History remained now only with the Japanese. Like his predecessor, Suga insisted that the lesson learned from WWII was “We will not forget, even for a moment, that the peace and prosperity we enjoy today was built atop the precious lives and the history of suffering of the war dead. I express my deepest respect and gratitude once more.” 

Come August 15, Kishida has a decision to make. He can choose to accept Abe’s unrepentant, nationalistic war remembrance. This would of course please the Abe faction and revisionist pressure organization Nippon Kaigi, whose legislative wing includes Kishida and most of the members of his new Cabinet. 

Or Kishida, a legislator from Hiroshima, can reassert the centrality of the Murayama statement and the honest, forthright contrition it represents. If he does so, he would send a powerful signal to South Korea and Imperial Japan’s other victims that Japan is willing to confront its dark history.

UPDATE: August 15, 2022

On August 15th, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida repeated Abe's unrepentant statement remembering, but not apologizing for WWII. With his statement, Kishida completed the undoing of the Murayama Statement of apology and remorse.

Kishida largely focused on the damage Japan suffered on its Home Islands — the U.S. atomic bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the massive fire-bombings across Japan, and the bloody ground battle on Okinawa. He said the peace and prosperity that the country enjoys today is built on the suffering and sacrifices of those who died in the war. The Japanese, he like Abe implied, were the victims. There was no mention of the harm Imperial Japan inflicted upon others. He repeated Abe's pledge for Japan to make "Proactive Contribution to Peace," which implies military involvement in upcoming world conflicts.

Kishida did, however, return to the August 15th statement a mention of history, however stopping short of actually learning from it: "Taking the lessons of history deeply into our hearts."