Japan's Energy Security Threatened

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant

Concerns on Energy Scarcity

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 8, 2026

It is possible that Japan will go back to the stone age before Iran does. Concern about an energy shortage is growing in Japan ever since the United States began to attack Iran and Iran effectively blocked most oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, including those headed to Japan. Sanae Takaichi’s administration has been taking interim measures to remedy the resulting shortage and to limit oil price hikes. However, the government of Japan does not have a clear path to get through its current energy scarcity.

In 2025, Japan depended on the Middle East for 94 percent of its crude oil. The ratio had increased from 72 percent in 1990 as Indonesia and China reduced their exports to Japan and later as Russian oil became unreliable after it started the war with Ukraine. Now that Iran has created a de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, Japan has not found any alternative route to transport oil from the Middle East.

Gasoline prices immediately responded to the attacks on Iran by the U.S. and Israel. The retail price of regular gasoline rose from 153 yen per liter in late February to 183 yen in the second week of March. Gasoline retailers always raise the gasoline price more swiftly than reducing it. Long lines of cars waiting to get gas were common at service stations by early March.

Prime Minister Takaichi decided to subsidize gasoline retailers to bring the gasoline price down to 170 yen per liter. She found resources for the subsidy in a governmental fund established during the COVID-19 pandemic to stabilize living standards. Although the regular gas price is controlled at 170 yen for now, the subsidy is not very sustainable because it will upset the government’s financial balance if it is prolonged.

Japan had an oil reserve for 254 days when the war in Iran began. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced that it would eventually release that reserve as needed to maintain the supply to industries and families. Following the release of a fifteen-day supply from a private reserve on March 16, the government released a month’s supply from the national reserve on March 26. It was the first release from the oil reserve since 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.

It is undeniable that the release of oil reserves is an interim measure. Concern about an oil shortage is spreading throughout the business sectors. One key product is naphtha, which is refined from oil and which serves as a raw material for chemical products. It is used, for example, in making a thinner that removes grease from industrial machines. In his press conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara dismissed social media rumors that the Japan’s supply of naphtha would run out in June.

A major oil retailer, Idemitsu, decided to reduce production of another oil-based product, ethylene used for plastic bags. Price hikes in oil will also reduce the supply of polyester for clothes and acetone for cosmetics.

Elsewhere, the negative impact on power generation is immeasurable. Japan depends on thermal power generation for 70 percent of its electricity. The fuel for this 70 percent breaks down to a little more than 30 percent in natural gas, a little less than 30 percent of in coal, and 10 percent in oil. An oil shortage thus puts 10 percent of Japan’s total power generation at risk.

It is urgent that the government of Japan find alternative fuel for power generation before the beginning of summer, the season when the Japanese need copious amounts of electricity to cool every room in the house. Deaths from heat stroke is so prevalent that they no longer make a news. The Takaichi administration did decide to increase the share of coal as a fuel for thermal power generation for a year to cover for the potential shortage of oil. Takaichi did not rule out a request for citizens to conserve power this year, while she insisted that it would not be necessary, with the perspective of enough oil for next year at least.

A shortage of oil from the Middle East also may make it harder than ever for Japan to meet its of carbon emission target. Japan has set targets of a 46 percent cut in the 2013 level of emissions by FY2030 and a 73 percent cut by FY2040. Japan has promised net zero carbon emissions by 2050. Oddly enough, there has been no immediate discussion in the Japanese government on how to increase renewable energy to cover an oil shortage.

One theoretical alternative is nuclear power. Japan cannot, however, look to this source of energy, having imposed strict regulations after a catastrophic accident in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011. Although the government restarted a reactor in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in January, the reactor suffered repeated, unexpected malfunctions in its control system.

Nuclear power generation also presents another problem: there is nowhere for the nuclear waste produced from a nuclear reactor to go. A law on nuclear waste directs that used nuclear fuel be buried underground, but Japan has yet to find a suitable location.  While the government hopes that Minamitorishima Island in the middle of Pacific Ocean will be a candidate site, it will take decades to finish geological research.

There is an interim facility to store used nuclear fuel in Aomori prefecture. Some used fuel has already been transferred to the facility. But the governor of Aomori, Soichiro Miyashita, has refused to permit further transfers to the facility without a designated final disposal site to which the used nuclear fuel in the prefecture will be transferred. All things considered, then, nuclear power cannot replace oil as an energy resource for present-day Japan.

The U.S. President Donald Trump announced two-week ceasefire in Iran, based on conditions including opening the Strait of Hormuz. However, the deal does not guarantee Iran’s safety from future attacks by the U.S. or Israel, which means the ceasefire may not work for to lower the price of oil price. 

In the absence of an immediate replacement for oil, the government of Japan is looking for alternative routes to transport oil from the Middle East. But it has not found viable waterways so far. The war in Iran thus has revealed Japan’s energy vulnerability – a condition like the one that put them on the road to World War II.

Asian Art Corner

ARTS JAPONICA

GLOBAL SAMURAI CONFERENCE. 4/10-11, HYBRID. Sponsors: British Museum and SOAS. Speakers: Filippo Cervelli (SOAS); Rosina Buckland (British Museum); Oleg Benesch (University of York); Joe Nickols (British Museum); Edward Boyle (Nichibunken); Rebekah Clements (Autonomous University of Barcelona and ICREA); Helen Macnaughtan (SOAS); Birgit Tremml-Werner (Stockholm University); Satona Suzuki (SOAS); Nam-lin Hur (University of British Columbia); Chika Tonooka (Cambridge University); Luke Gartlan (University of St Andrews); Sarah Thal (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Mark Ravina (University of Texas Austin); Sven Saaler (Sophia University); Michele Monserrati (Smith College); Maria Framke (University of Erfurt); Tatiana Linkhoeva (New York University); Ignacio López-Calvo (University of California Merced); Hiromu Nagahara (MIT); Natasha Bennett (Royal Armouries); Julie Reynolds and Emile de Bruijn (National Trust); Sarah Panzer (Missouri State University); Clemens Büttner (University of Heidelberg); Ethan Mark (Leiden University); Thomas D. Conlan and Christina Lee (Princeton University). This event is part of the public programme supporting the exhibition Samurai (open until 4 May). PURCHASE EXHIBITION CATALOG: https://amzn.to/4mqEJ1h

SAMURAI: THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL ICON. 4/23, 5:30–6:30pm (DST), 12:30-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: British Museum. Speakers: Satona Suzuki, Senior Lecturer in Japanese and Modern Japanese History at SOAS; Oleg Benesch, Professor and Head of the Department of History at the University of York and co-author of the exhibition book, Samurai; Matt Alt, co-founder AltJapan, a Tokyo-based company that specialises in localisation and author of Pure Invention: How Japan Made the Modern World (2021). This event is part of the public programme supporting the exhibition Samurai (open until 4 May).

FORTHCOMING art two special issues of the Japan Review focused on the samurai.

BOOK TALK: SIMPLY DONABE! (JAPANESE CLAY POT COOKING). 4/ 19, Noon-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Kinokuniya New York. Speaker: author Ms. Naoko Takei Moore, owner of TOIRO, an online and brick-and-mortar shop in West Hollywood that specializes in Japanese kitchen goods. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4dPUYTd

TOIRO kitchen supply (donabe), https://toirokitchen.com/

BOOK TALK: IMPERIAL ANIMATIONS IN TRANSPACIFIC CONTEMPORARY ART. 5/4, 9:00-10:30pm (EDT), 9:00-10:30am (HKT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Centre for Cultural Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Speaker: author Namiko Kunimoto, Director of the Center for Ethnic Studies, Associate Professor, Department of History of Art, Ohio State University; Moderator: Prof. SaeHim Park (CUHK). PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4bImyzf

THESE EVENTS ARE PAST BUT MAY HAVE RECORDINGS

*EXHIBITING JAPAN IN MID-CENTURY NEW YORK. 3/30, 6:00-8:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Digital Museum of the History of Japanese in NY. Speaker: Dr. Angus Lockyer, author of Exhibitionist Japan: The Spectacle of Modern Development (Cambridge, 2025) and Japan: A History in Objects (Thames and Hudson, 2026). He currently teaches at the Rhode Island School of Design. 

*REMAKING THE ACADEMIC MUSEUM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. 4/2, 8:00-9:15am (JST), 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society. Speakers: James Steward, Director, Princeton University Art Museum; Kit Brooks, Curator of Asian Art, Princeton University Art Museum. 

*FROM KIRIN TO CASA BRUTUS: HISTORY OF JAPANESE DESIGN. 4/2, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), 5:30-7:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS), Temple University, Japan. Speakers: Ian Lynam | Associate Professor of Graphic Design, Temple University Japan; Moderator: Benoit Hardy-Chartrand | Senior Lecturer Temple University Japan & ICAS Faculty Fellow. 

What happens when Japan curates its aesthetic for the world?

By Erik Augustin Palm, Japan Times, Mar 28, 2026
     Scathing review of the Japanese government's exhibition of the Japan Sui Collection in Kyoto and Paris that is meant to showcase Japanese regional crafts and cuisine framed around the concept of sui (an Edo Period [1603-1867] concept of aesthetic refinement).

Official Japan's penchant for dealing with the West by leaning into Orientalism can be startling. It is so ingrained that Japanese embassies and consulates still display sensoga, the carely controlled statist art of 1930s wartime Japan. Japan has a vibrant modern art community. It is a shame that it is not promoted more.

Isamu Noguchi

In full swing

from the Monocole Minute on Design, March 18, 2025.

Isamu Noguchi is a household name thanks to his abstract totem-like sculptures, Vitra’s bestselling glass Coffee Table and the ubiquitous Akari paper lamps. Still, the Japanese-American designer maintained that his best projects never saw the light of day. He harboured ambitions to be an urban planner, particularly to make playgrounds, but city officials wouldn’t hear of it. Those torpedoed ideas, such as this swing set, are the subject of Noguchi’s New York, an exhibition at The Noguchi Museum in Queens, which runs until 13 September.

This three-piece swing was originally conceived in 1940 for a playground in Hawaii, which would also have included a curved slide and a jungle gym. That plan was derailed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a year later, with Noguchi spending seven months in an internment camp in Arizona. Later, he pitched the scheme in New York but was unsuccessful; a version of the design finally went up in Atlanta in 1975. With hindsight, everyone can agree that Noguchi should not have had to work so hard to bring play to public spaces. 

Defending Asia Has Gotten Harder

Why Nuclear Deterrence in Asia Is Collapsing

By Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute, Scholar in Residence at Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Strategy and Technology (CMIST), and APP Member.

First Published March 31, 2026 on The National Interest. 

As the 2027 “Davidson window” approaches, Washington appears less concerned about deterrence failure in Asia than at any point in recent years. The phrase, drawn from former US Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Philip Davidson’s warning about China’s timeline for achieving combat readiness for a Taiwan contingency, once became shorthand for fears of imminent conflict, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Yet “deterrence” is scarcely mentioned in the US Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, the intelligence community’s capstone document. While it notes that Beijing’s ambitions over Taiwan remain undiminished, it asserts that “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.” The intelligence community appears to have embraced a view of Xi Jinping’s strategy as gradual, positional, and political, aimed at tightening control over what Beijing calls a rogue province, even though the People’s Republic of China has never governed Taiwan.

Admiral Davidson’s warning was never a prediction of impending war. It was a caution about the convergence of two trends: China’s military modernization milestone in 2027 and a potentially declining US force posture, which could create a gap in deterrence. Ironically, on the eve of the People’s Liberation Army’s centenary in 2027, Washington risks becoming overly sanguine about the durability of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Although the Annual Threat Assessment reflects reasonable analytical caution, it risks strategic complacency.

Across both South and East Asia, structural trends are eroding deterrence. A fracturing international order, the expansion of conflict below the nuclear threshold, and the accelerating impact of emerging technologies are together undermining stability. This is no time to slacken efforts to shore up deterrence.

The Failure of Nuclear Deterrence

Recent conflicts suggest the stark lesson that while nuclear weapons may still deter large-scale war, they do not prevent conflict. Indeed, nuclear-armed states appear increasingly willing to incur risk by operating below the nuclear threshold. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the most obvious case. Had Kyiv retained its nuclear arsenal, it is difficult to imagine Russia prosecuting a prolonged war of aggression on its territory.

Iran provides a more recent example of deterrence failure. Tehran exposed its capabilities through premature use, delegated credibility to unreliable proxies, and lingered at a nuclear threshold sufficient to provoke an attack but insufficient to prevent it. What should have imposed caution instead created opportunity for its adversaries. Deterrence did not fail quietly; it collapsed visibly.

More broadly, deterrence is no longer reliably governing the space below major war. This was evident in South Asia in spring 2025.

After a terrorist attack in Pahalgam killed 26 civilians, India launched Operation Sindoor, striking deep inside Pakistan, including near sensitive military infrastructure. The episode demonstrated a higher tolerance for risk on both sides. It reinforced the parlous conclusion that even nuclear-armed rivals believe there is still room to engage in conflict without triggering nuclear escalation. Tensions continue to simmer on the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and last year was not the last time terrorism will prompt military reprisal. India’s subsequent shift toward compellence, outlined in Defence Forces Vision 2047, underscores this trend.

Across recent conflicts, from Ukraine to Iran, states are testing the limits of escalation, probing how far they can go without crossing nuclear red lines. Indeed, a Carnegie Endowment study of nuclear threats in recent years suggests that nuclear-armed governments have grown more adept at manipulating fears of nuclear exchange to pursue conventional aims. Some may think that even a tactical nuclear use might not elicit more than conventional retaliation.

That assumption is profoundly misplaced. As the line between coercion and conflict blurs, and as conventional and nuclear domains become increasingly entangled, ambiguity is rising. And with ambiguity comes a heightened risk of miscalculation. These pressures are global, but nowhere are they more dangerous than in Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia’s Nuclear Paradox

North Korea has moved beyond deterrence by retaliation toward a doctrine that emphasizes early, limited use to control escalation. Its focus on tactical nuclear weapons, preemption, and potential pre-delegation lowers the threshold for nuclear employment. As Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un made clear in a speech amid the Iran conflict, North Korea’s “nuclear shield…drives the development of all sectors of the country” and guarantees “the dignity of the state, national interests, and ultimate victory.”

Russia acts as an accelerant. Its deepening alignment and“invincible alliance” with North Korea, its reliance on nuclear coercion, and its reported support for Pyongyang’s missile programs are contributing to a more interconnected and volatile deterrence environment. North Korean systems tested in Ukraine are already demonstrating improved survivability and maneuverability, as the KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles are increasingly able to evade interception.

China, meanwhile, is undertaking a rapid and opaque nuclear expansion. Whether Beijing seeks parity or something more ambitious, its trajectory, combined with possible movement toward a launch-on-warning posture, introduces new instability into crisis dynamics.

These trends are not isolated. They reinforce one another, creating an interlinked nuclear system that is more complex, less predictable, and harder to stabilize.

At the strategic level, deterrence still holds. The catastrophic costs of nuclear war continue to constrain major powers. But at the operational level, where crises unfold and decisions are made, deterrence is fragmenting. The central paradox of the current moment is that, as destructive capabilities grow, predictability declines.

The US’ Nuclear Credibility Gap

Credibility, the currency of deterrence, is also steadily fading. Allies increasingly question the reliability of US commitments, even as technological advances fail to deliver greater security. US force posture adjustments have compounded these concerns.

Taiwanese officials have warned that the expenditure of long-range strike systems such as Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) and Tomahawks erodes deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. South Korean officials have voiced similar unease over the redeployment of missile defense assets, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems, especially given the domestic political and economic costs Seoul previously incurred to host them.

At the same time, the credibility of US extended deterrence, the foundation of security for Japan and South Korea, is under growing strain. The longstanding question of whether the United States would risk Los Angeles to defend Seoul or Tokyo is no longer theoretical, but increasingly being asked in allied capitals.

South Korea is hedging by investing in nuclear-powered submarines, expanding its latent nuclear capability while remaining faithful to the nonproliferation regime. Tokyo, constrained by domestic politics, is strengthening its conventional strike capabilities while reassessing old assumptions, including the role of US nuclear weapons on its territory.

Deterrence rests not only on capability but also on trust and belief. And trust and belief are becoming harder to sustain.

Along with a decline in credibility is the questionable assumption that conflicts in Asia can be geographically contained. The Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea are increasingly interconnected. A Taiwan contingency, for example, would draw US and allied assets away from Korea, weakening deterrence on the peninsula and potentially inviting opportunistic action. In a multi-front scenario, even strong alliances can be stretched thin.

Emerging technologies are exacerbating these risks. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems are compressing decision-making timelines, reducing the space for human judgment. What once unfolded over days may now occur in minutes. Advances in surveillance are making military movements more visible, increasing incentives for preemption. The logic of “use it or lose it” is becoming more salient. Even the undersea domain, long the foundation of secure second-strike capability, may become more transparent, undermining a key pillar of strategic stability.

Crises are moving faster than the institutions designed to manage them.

How to Strengthen US Nuclear Deterrence Without Breaking It

What, then, is to be done? There is broad agreement on the need to strengthen deterrence, but less consensus on how to do so. Some advocate deeper allied integration. For instance, tighter trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, enhanced missile defense cooperation, and a more unified defense of the First Island Chain are all prevailing lines of effort for bolstering deterrence in East Asia.

Others emphasize preparing for limited nuclear use, ensuring that alliances can absorb and respond without uncontrolled escalation. But there is also a growing recognition that overreliance on preemption and rapid escalation could sow crisis instability. Efforts to strengthen deterrence may inadvertently accelerate the very dynamics that make it fragile. The policy challenge is fortifying deterrence without breaking it.

Defense modernization programs that envision a “spine” of AI-enabled technologies across all domains, with a focus on resilience of the system, could also invite foes to paralyze the spine, or at least lead them to believe that they might be capable of doing so. Deterrence is no longer a slow-moving, bilateral system. It is a fast, interconnected, multi-actor environment shaped by nuclear modernization, technological disruption, and shifting political commitments.

The greatest danger is not that deterrence collapses outright, but that it fails in ways we do not anticipate. A misinterpreted signal. A limited strike. A decision made too quickly.

The Davidson window may never have been a countdown to war. But it was a warning about vulnerability, and that vulnerability has deepened rather than disappeared. The danger is not that deterrence collapses. It is that it fails in ways we fail to anticipate.

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 6, 2026

FORGING JUST FUTURES: SOLUTIONS-BASED SCIENCE TO ADDRESS THE CLIMATE GAP. 4/6, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. Speakers: Rachel Morello-Frosch, Professor, School of Public Health and Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management, UC Berkeley; Moderator: Joseph E. Aldy, Faculty, Belfer Center. 

PRESSURE POINTS: THE IRAN WAR’S GROWING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY IMPACT. 4/6, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Lieutenant General Sam Mundy, USMC (Ret.), President of Once a Marine LLC; Karen E. Young, Senior Fellow, MEI; Moderator: Kenneth M. Pollack, Vice President for Policy, MEI. 

BOOK TALK: JAPAN REBORN: RACE AND EUGENICS FROM EMPIRE TO COLD WAR. 4/6, 5:30-7:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author Kristin Roebuck, Assistant Professor, Cornell University; Takashi Fujitani, Dr. David Chu Professor in Asia-Pacific Studies, University of Toronto; Moderator: Seiji Shirane, Associate Professor of Japanese History, City College of New York. PURCHASE BOOK

THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT AT 47: TAIWAN'S EVOLVING HEDGING STRATEGY AMIDST INTENSIFYING GLOBAL COMPETITION. 4/6, 4:00-5:30pm (PDT), 7:00-8:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hoover. Speakers: David Ta-wei Lee, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan); Admiral O. James Ellis Jr, Annenberg Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover; Larry Diamond, William L. Clayton Senior Fellow, Hoover.

Takaichi Diet Lesson

Takaichi Realizes the Power of the Upper House

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 29, 2026
 
A power play over Japan’s FY2026 budget bill resulted in a defeat for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi by the opposition parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced on March 30 that it has given up its attempt to pass the budget bill before the end of March. The Cabinet was forced to submit to the Diet an interim budget bill to authorize spending for the beginning of FY2026. Despite this setback, Takaichi continues to be highly popular in recent polls.
 
Looking back at the past few months, Takaichi exercised her constitutional power and dissolved the Lower House on January 23. The House held a general election on February 8. Her decision was fundamentally surprising because the timing of the snap election put at risk passage of the annual budget bill, which must occur before the beginning of the next fiscal year on April 1. Takaichi nevertheless initiated the snap election to reinforce her political support before her approval rating fell.
 
The LDP’s sweeping victory in the election went beyond her expectation. Takaichi and her staff in Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei) came to believe that they were invincible, able to make impossible possible. Takaichi called on the Diet to pass the budget bill before the fiscal year began. The LDP in the Lower House obliged; it passed the budget bill with only 59 hours of discussion, ignoring the established but unspoken agreement between the parties to discuss a budget bill for at least 80 hours.
 
This hard push by the leading party stirred anger in the opposition parties in the Upper House which still outnumber the LDP. The opposition held captive a few bills relating to the FY2026 budget. Two of them were the high school tuition bill and the free school lunch bill which were to take effect in April. These bills also needed to pass the Diet by the end of March.
 
The Committee on Education, Culture and Science in the Upper House was to discuss the bills. The chair of this committee is a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the biggest opposition party. The chairman delayed discussion of the bills at the request of the opposition parties who first wanted to thoroughly examine the qualifications of the Minister of Education, Yohei Matsumoto [松本 洋平], who had a history of extramarital affairs. The opposition parties threatened the LDP that they would scrap the two bills if the parties did not have enough time to discuss the budget bill in the Upper House.
 
The leading parties and opposition parties struck a deal in late March. The leading parties would give up on meeting the March 31 deadline for the FY2026 budget bill, allowing time in the Upper House for discussion for the bill in early April. In the meantime, there would be an interim budget bill for 11 days, by which time the Diet is expected to pass the budget. The opposition parties agreed to pass the related bills, including the high school tuition and school lunch bills by the end of March. Although media reports did not go into detail, the LDP leaders told Takaichi about the deal on March 23. But Takaishi still insisted on passage of the budget bill by the end of March.
 
Takaichi must have known of the LDP’s weakness in the Upper House and of the deal between the parties to pass the bills. In fact, the FY2026 budget bill includes an economic stimulus package. Any delay in the budget bill will frustrate voters who expected assistance in this time of price inflation. Takaichi and her staff mistakenly thought that the opposition parties, afraid of public annoyance, would not be so persistent in opposing the budget bill.
 
She and her staff miscalculated the anger of the opposition parties in the Upper House. An extraordinarily abbreviated discussion on the budget bill brought to the fore a fundamental concern about the existence of the chamber, which has been dubbed “a carbon copy of the Lower House.” Regardless of their positions as either leading or in opposition, the parties in the Upper House felt challenged about their raison d’etre.
 
As a matter of fact, the Upper House sometimes has played a crucial role in the history of the Japanese government. The Ryutaro Hashimoto administration fell to a minority government in the Upper House after a defeat in the 1998 election. On the advice of his mentor, former premier Noboru Takeshita, Hashimoto stepped down as prime minister even though he maintained a majority in the Lower House.
 
In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believed that the LDP’s majority in the Lower House could overcome its minority position in the Upper House. The result was terrible. A cabinet reshuffling caught some ministers in scandals related to the mismanagement of political funds. When the Upper House blocked an anti-terrorism bill, Abe’s chronic disease returned, he could not attend a plenary sitting in the Diet, and he decided to resign.
 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan left office in 2011 because a bill to authorize government bonds to fund reconstruction after the East Japan Great Earthquake earlier that year could not pass the Upper House. He asked the LDP, which had a majority in the house, to pass the bill in return for his resignation. These episodes illustrate that the Upper House has the power to destroy an administration.
 
Despite her mismanagement of the budget bill, Takaichi remains highly popular in two polls. Nikkei Shimbun reported a 72 percent approval rating of Takaichi’s Cabinet. She also maintained a high rating in the Mainichi Shimbun poll with 58 percent approval. Although there is skepticism about her attitude to the Diet, a substantial share of respondents preferred her performance in her summit meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Her style of relying on popular opinion is still working and may continue for some time.