Japan: Caught Between Israel and Gaza
By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 15, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
Japan proved itself a slow starter in the wake of the brutal military exchanges in the Middle East. During the first week, from Saturday October 7th, when militant group Hamas attacked Israel, to Friday 13th, Japan was hesitant to deliver a clear message to the world. Japanese leaders hope to raise Japan’s profile in international security issues. Yet, because Japan is a pacifist nation, its opportunities to do so are limited. It is thus unlikely that Japan can play a large role in attaining peace in Middle East
The first comment of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was not through a press conference or a ministers’ meeting of the Cabinet, but through the social networking service, X (formerly Twitter). “Hamas and other Palestinian militants attacked Israel from Gaza yesterday. Japan strongly condemns the attacks which severely harmed innocent civilians. I express my condolences to the bereaved families and heartfelt sympathies to the injured,” Kishida posted on Sunday.
Kishida also deplored the kidnapping, demanded the release of the hostages, and urged all parties to exercise their utmost self-restraint in consideration with a number of victims in Gaza. Kishida first spoke to reporters on Friday the 13th. He said that the government would send aircraft to Djibouti to evacuate Japanese citizens in Gaza.
The spokesman of Kishida Cabinet, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno, repeated Japan’s stance in his daily press conferences. “We closely watch the situation there with serious concern. Attacks on the innocent ordinary people cannot be justified with any reason and we strongly condemn that,” Matsuno said on Monday.
It took six days for Matsuno to call the attack by Hamas terrorism. “After the attacks of Palestin armed power including Hamas against Israel, we recognize that a number of people were dead or injured. We firmly condemn the terrorist attacks this time,” Matsuno told on Thursday. His expression in Japanese, likely prepared by his chief foreign affairs aide, was too fuzzy to determine whether he condemned only Hamas or included the retaliatory attacks by Israel.
During her trip to visit four countries in Southeast Asia, Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa spoke by telephone with the Deputy Prime Minister of Jordan on Sunday and with the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Emirates on Monday. “I conveyed that I am deeply saddened by the attacks by Hamas and other militants, which have claimed the lives of so many innocent civilians,” Kamikawa commented to the reporters in Vietnam on Tuesday. Kamikawa explained Japan’s view to her counterparts that Japan strongly condemns “such” attacks.
The leaders of five countries of G7, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and United States, issued a joint statement on Monday that expressed their steadfast support of the State of Israel, and condemned Hamas and its acts of terrorism. Japan did not join the statement. “In the international society, the opinions have been delivered from various frameworks. The statement (of five leaders) was issued as one of those,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno said in his press conference on Tuesday.
It is hard for Japan, taking a neutral position on the issue, to side now with Israel on the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza. Japan has, for instance, taken the initiative on “Corridor for Peace and Prosperity” with Gaza, Israel, and Jordan, which promotes social and economic development in Jericho and Jordan Valley. Japan has contributed approximately $22 million in FY 2022 to the Gaza Strip for emergency and food aid through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). While former Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi announced in July that Japan would host a G7 foreign ministers meeting in Japan this November, it is unclear whether Japan can lead the discussion over the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.
Japan has maintained a friendly relationship with Israel. Kamikawa told Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs Eli Cohen in a telephone call on Thursday that Japan would unequivocally condemn the recent terror attack by Hamas and that Israel had a right to defend itself and its people in accordance with international law.
Japan continues to favor the “two-state solution” to end conflicts in Israel and Gaza. However, Japan does not have a diplomatic channel with a non-state actor as Hamas. It will not be easy for Japan to mediate between the parties in the conflict.
The ambassadors of Israel and Palestine argued their respective cases on Friday, October 13 at press conferences at Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. Israeli Ambassador to Japan Gilad Cohen denounced the attack and the kidnappings by Hamas as crimes against humanity. He insisted that Israel would uproot and demilitarize Hamas in Gaza, declaring war against them.
To a question about Japan’s decision not to join the G5 statement on Israel, Cohen understood the pressures that Japan faces. “Of course, I would be more satisfied, if Japan would join the statement. But now there is a statement of Japan, which goes alone, with basic fundamental principles. We hope Japan to stand by us in the future,” Cohen said.
Ambassador Waleed Siam, the Permanent General Mission of Palestine held his press conference three hours later. “Japan has been a real good friend for the Palestinian people through the years. Actually, before Japan was accepted at United Nations as a member, Japan started helping UNRWA, which is for Palestinian refugees, since 1953 until today. I do believe Japan is neutral and can continue to play neutral role between the Palestinians and Israelis,” said Siam.
Siam also expressed his deep skepticism about Israeli aims. “Only thing to stabilize Palestine is to end Israel’s military occupation,” he said. Asked whether Japan is an ally of Israel, he said “Read the news, you can know who the allies are. You can hear the voices that calls for destruction of Gaza. Those are allies. Japan has not called for destruction of Gaza. Japan has always called for human rights, for international laws and for respecting United Nations resolutions.”
Both sides of the conflict want Japan to be their friend. To maintain a traditional relationship with each, Japan has to keep its position neutral. But it is difficult for Japan to exercise its leadership in the Western countries, which tend to favor the Israeli side. For Kishida who has been selling himself as a diplomatic leader, this year’s G7 chairmanship will be fraught.
G7 chair Japan opts not to sign statement by 5 leaders supporting Israel, Arab News, 10/10/21. Japan and Canada abstain from joint statement in support of Israel after deadly attacks by Hamas from Gaza; Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno: Japan’s absence from the statement may be attributed to its desire to maintain flexibility in its approach.
Sunday, October 22, 2023
Japan Plays Catch-up
Monday Asia Events October 23, 2023
US LAUNCH OF THE 2023 OECD GOING FOR GROWTH REPORT. 10/23, 9:00am-12:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Adam S. Posen, PIIE president; Luiz de Mello, director of the Policy Studies Branch at the Economics Department of the OECD.
BEYOND CLIMATE: HOW NATURE LOSS UNDERMINES PEACE AND SECURITY. 10/23, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Center for American Progress (CAP); The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD); World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Speakers: Monica Medina, President and CEO, Wildlife Conservation Society; Andrew Zolli, Chief Impact Officer, Planet; Dr Winnie Kiiru, Executive Director, Mpala Research Centre; Dr Erin McFee, Professor of Practice, Climate Security, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY’S (CISA) EVOLVING .GOV MISSION: REPORT ROLLOUT EVENT. 10/23, 10:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS, International Security Program. Speakers: Emily Harding, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, International Security Program; Malcolm Harkins, Former Chief Security & Privacy Officer, Intel; Benjamin Jensen, Senior Fellow, Future War, Gaming, and Strategy, and International Security Program; Dr. Phyllis Schneck, Vice President and Chief Information Security Officer, Northrop Grumman; David Simon, Global Co-Head of Cybersecurity & Data Privacy, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom; Suzanne Spaulding, Senior Adviser for Homeland Security, CSIS.
HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS TO SANCTIONS IN NORTH KOREA. 10/23, 12:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea. Speakers: Hazel Smith, Professorial Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Professor Emerita in International Security at Cranfield University, UK, Advisory fellow at the North Korea Economic Studies section of the Korea Development Institute (KDI) Seoul, Fellow, the Royal Society of Arts since 1996; Troy Stangarone, Senior Director, Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute (KEI).
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ENERGY: AI & ENERGY TECHNOLOGY DISCOVERY. 10/23, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Speaker: Rick L. Stevens, Associate Laboratory Director for Computing, Environment, and Life Sciences, Argonne National Laboratory.
THE OUTLOOK FOR ISRAEL’S MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST HAMAS. 10/23, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Jon B. Alterman, senior vice president, Middle East Program Director, CSIS; Emily Harding, Deputy Director, International Security Program, CSIS; Norman T. Roule, Senior Adviser, Transnational Threats Project, CSIS.
FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ISRAEL ALLIANCE AT 75. 10/23, 1:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: Victoria Coates, Ph.D., Vice President, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation; Robert Greenway, Director, Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation; Eyal Hulata, Ph.D., Senior International Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Ellie Cohanim, Senior Fellow, Independent Women's Forum; Ludovic Hood, Senior Advisor, Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, U.S. Department of State; Kenneth L. Marcus, Founder and Chairman, Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law; Charles Asher Small, DPhil., Founding Director and President, Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy; Amb. Ronald S. Lauder, President, World Jewish Congress.
PUTIN’S “TURN TO THE EAST” IN THE XI JINPING ERA. 10/23, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: co- editor Gilbert Rozman, Emeritus Musgrave Professor of Sociology, Princeton University; Editor-in-Chief, The Asan Forum; Gaye Christoffersen Co-Editor, Putin’s “Turn to the East” in the Xi Jinping Era. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/46wdM3C
THE FIRST 25 YEARS: UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (USCIRF) ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEXT STEPS. 10/23, 3:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). Speakers: Abraham Cooper, Chair, USCIRF; Frederick A. Davie, Vice Chair, USCIRF; Frank Wolf, Commissioner, USCIRF; Don Nickles, Former Senator; Joe Lieberman, Former Senator; Tom Lantos, Former Co-Chair, Human Rights Commission (TLHRC).
CONGRESS AND BIDEN'S INITIAL SUCCESS IN COUNTERING CHINA'S CHALLENGES. 10/23, 3:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: GW Elliott School Research Program. Speaker: Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, Elliott School, George Washington University, Author Congress and China Policy: Past Episodic, Recent Enduring Influence. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Fkqjep
DREAMS FOR A DECADE: INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ABOLITIONISM AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR. 10/23, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Author Stephanie L. Freeman, Historian, US Department of State, Susan Colbourn, Associate Director of the Program in American Grand Strategy, Duke University; Svetlana Savranskaya, Member, History and Public Policy Program Advisory Board; Luc-André Brunet, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary International History, The Open University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/45yuQVh
THE WAR OVER CHINESE TALENT IN THE U.S.' WITH DAVID ZWEIG. 10/23, 4:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: China and the World Program, Columbia-Harvard. Speaker: David Zweig (Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 1983), Professor Emeritus, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsinghua University, Taiwan.
VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RUSSIA: AND THE USES OF WAR. 10/23, 4:30-5:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: author Leon Aron, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3PReily/
NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES AND THE ENERGY TRANSITION: LOOKING TO COP28 AND BEYOND. 10/23, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA. Speakers: Erica Downs, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA; Tatiana Mitrova, Research Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA; Luisa Palacios, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA; Karen E. Young, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA.
Sunday, October 15, 2023
Monday Asia Events, October 16, 2023
PEACE IN THE PACIFIC: A CONVERSATION WITH FORMER INDO-PACIFIC COMMANDERS. 10/16, 11:00-11:50am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Philip S. Davidson, Former Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command; Harry B. Harris Jr., Former Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command; Eric Sayers, Nonresident Fellow, AEI.
A CONVERSATION WITH U.S. NAVY COMPTROLLER HON. RUSSELL RUMBAUGH. 10/16, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Hon. Russell Rumbaugh, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & Comptroller); Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program; Rachel Stohl, Vice President of Research Programs.
US-JAPAN DEFENSE UPDATE: A LOOK AHEAD. 10/16, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute for Contemporary Asian Studies. Speaker: Lieutenant Colonel John Wright, US Air Force Foreign Area Officer.
WHY WILL INDONESIA BECOME MORE IMPORTANT AND WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR JAPAN AND THE US? 10/16, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Speakers: Masafumi Ishii, Former Ambassador of Japan to Indonesia; Ann Marie Murphy, Adjunct Research Scholar, WEAI; Gerald L. Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus of Political Science.
Wednesday, October 11, 2023
The Kishida Administration’s Second Anniversary:
Few Accomplishments Lots of Politics
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, retired Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 9, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
Two years have passed since Fumio Kishida became Prime Minister on October 4, 2021. During this time, no outstanding achievements can be seen except for adherence to the political agenda set by former administrations: namely, expanding the security budget and discharging radioactive Fukushima processed water into the sea. Unsurprisingly, public support for the Kishida Cabinet is low and declining. As seen in the recent reshuffling of his Cabinet and the appointment of new leaders of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Kishida is still struggling to maintain his administration.
Kishida faced two historical challenges last year: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, Kishida boldly and directly accused Russia of “aggression.” This response might have been milder and more diplomatic if Abe were still in office.
Kishida’s hardline policy toward Russia hurt future negotiations with Russia. But it may have been worth the price. Kishida’s leadership at the Group of Seven (G7) summit meeting in Hiroshima this past May, in which the world leaders stood together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy against Russia, increased his popularity in the polls.
Kishida was tested as a national leader when Abe was shot to death last summer. Kishida was unable to generate a broad discussion in the Diet about whether the administration would decide to have a national funeral for Abe. As a result, Kishida only considered the emotions of conservative groups in the LDP. Once it became clear that the shooter’s motivation was a grievance against the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Kishida was slow in disclosing the relationship between the religious organization and LDP.
Polls show that the support for the Kishida administration, which rose gradually at the beginning, declined steeply after the assassination of Abe. This volatility has continued. Public support lifted again in the first half of this year when Kishida was the chairman of the G7, but it fell again with public frustration with the implementation of the My Number identification card and with money scandals of LDP lawmakers.
A litmus test for a political leader is how it handles controversial issues. Kishida renewed the three major documents for defense last December, enabling the Self-Defense Force to have a capability of attacking enemy bases. While it has a possibility of violating the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy the constitution requires, Kishida avoided discussing the constitutionality of the capability in the Diet. Kishida administration decided to expand defense budget to ¥43 trillion in next five years. But he has not explained how to accumulate the budget to that level. Taxpayers are worried about additional tax increase, dubbing Kishida “the tax raiser wearing glasses.” Anyway, those defense policies are in the agenda that Kishida inherited from Abe administration.
The list of administration scandals has swollen. Some Ministers of Kishida Cabinet stepped down last year because of complex relationships with FFWPU, gaffes, or money scandals. The most recent revelation was of an inappropriate relationship between a LDP lawmaker and a businessman involved in wind power generation. Kishida did not exercise leadership to improve ethical aspect of political activities of his colleagues.
Because the Kishida administration lacks clear policy goals, public support has remained low. At the beginning of his administration, Kishida insisted on reviving his faction of the LDP, the Kochi-kai. His predecessor, Abe, led a different faction, the Seiwa-kai, which stood for strong leadership and invited controversy on its hawkish stance. By contrast, Kishida’s Kochi-kai faction focuses more on the economy than security. Kishida has proposed some policies, such as doubling people’s income or “the garden city concept,” which traced the projects of former Kochi-kai leaders such as Hayato Ikeda and Masayoshi Ohira. These policies have not, however, worked out well in Kishida administration.
Such modest policies were not the high-profile goals of the second Abe administration that began in December 2012. Soon after he took the office, Abe announced the “three arrows” of Abenomics: bold monetary policy, mobilization of fiscal policy and growth strategy. He appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as Governor of Bank of Japan, who continuously issued surprising monetary easing policies. Abe also did not hide his intention to amend the constitution, particularly to allow amendments on the basis of a simple majority rather than the two-thirds supermajority required in Article 96.
Kishida is more interested in the ordinary life of the people rather than in state management. Wage hikes or increases in the birth rate are less economic policy and more moderate conservative social policy. But those policies do not hold strong appeal because they take a long time to show results. For example, the government’s increased support for young couples will not raise the birth rate anytime soon.
In an administration with low popularity, political manipulations take center stage. Removing Yoshimasa Hayashi as Foreign Minister in the recent Cabinet reshuffle was a tactic by Kishida to help his reelection next year as LDP president. Hayashi’s main job now is to enhance solidarity within the Kochi-kai and establish firm support within the LDP for Kishida’s reelection.
The good news for Kishida is the unpopularity of the opposition parties. No party other than the LDP has more than ten percent support in the opinion polls. Even though Kishida is unpopular, the opposition parties will not be able to achieve victory in next general election. The upcoming by-elections on October 22 in the Tokushima-Kochi District for the House of Councillors and in the Nagasaki 4th for the House of Representatives will be a good gauge of the public’s approval of Kishida’s policies. The results promise to influence the prime minister’s decision on whether to hold a much-discussed snap election.
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, retired Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 9, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
Two years have passed since Fumio Kishida became Prime Minister on October 4, 2021. During this time, no outstanding achievements can be seen except for adherence to the political agenda set by former administrations: namely, expanding the security budget and discharging radioactive Fukushima processed water into the sea. Unsurprisingly, public support for the Kishida Cabinet is low and declining. As seen in the recent reshuffling of his Cabinet and the appointment of new leaders of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Kishida is still struggling to maintain his administration.
Kishida faced two historical challenges last year: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, Kishida boldly and directly accused Russia of “aggression.” This response might have been milder and more diplomatic if Abe were still in office.
Kishida’s hardline policy toward Russia hurt future negotiations with Russia. But it may have been worth the price. Kishida’s leadership at the Group of Seven (G7) summit meeting in Hiroshima this past May, in which the world leaders stood together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy against Russia, increased his popularity in the polls.
Kishida was tested as a national leader when Abe was shot to death last summer. Kishida was unable to generate a broad discussion in the Diet about whether the administration would decide to have a national funeral for Abe. As a result, Kishida only considered the emotions of conservative groups in the LDP. Once it became clear that the shooter’s motivation was a grievance against the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Kishida was slow in disclosing the relationship between the religious organization and LDP.
Polls show that the support for the Kishida administration, which rose gradually at the beginning, declined steeply after the assassination of Abe. This volatility has continued. Public support lifted again in the first half of this year when Kishida was the chairman of the G7, but it fell again with public frustration with the implementation of the My Number identification card and with money scandals of LDP lawmakers.
A litmus test for a political leader is how it handles controversial issues. Kishida renewed the three major documents for defense last December, enabling the Self-Defense Force to have a capability of attacking enemy bases. While it has a possibility of violating the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy the constitution requires, Kishida avoided discussing the constitutionality of the capability in the Diet. Kishida administration decided to expand defense budget to ¥43 trillion in next five years. But he has not explained how to accumulate the budget to that level. Taxpayers are worried about additional tax increase, dubbing Kishida “the tax raiser wearing glasses.” Anyway, those defense policies are in the agenda that Kishida inherited from Abe administration.
The list of administration scandals has swollen. Some Ministers of Kishida Cabinet stepped down last year because of complex relationships with FFWPU, gaffes, or money scandals. The most recent revelation was of an inappropriate relationship between a LDP lawmaker and a businessman involved in wind power generation. Kishida did not exercise leadership to improve ethical aspect of political activities of his colleagues.
Because the Kishida administration lacks clear policy goals, public support has remained low. At the beginning of his administration, Kishida insisted on reviving his faction of the LDP, the Kochi-kai. His predecessor, Abe, led a different faction, the Seiwa-kai, which stood for strong leadership and invited controversy on its hawkish stance. By contrast, Kishida’s Kochi-kai faction focuses more on the economy than security. Kishida has proposed some policies, such as doubling people’s income or “the garden city concept,” which traced the projects of former Kochi-kai leaders such as Hayato Ikeda and Masayoshi Ohira. These policies have not, however, worked out well in Kishida administration.
Such modest policies were not the high-profile goals of the second Abe administration that began in December 2012. Soon after he took the office, Abe announced the “three arrows” of Abenomics: bold monetary policy, mobilization of fiscal policy and growth strategy. He appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as Governor of Bank of Japan, who continuously issued surprising monetary easing policies. Abe also did not hide his intention to amend the constitution, particularly to allow amendments on the basis of a simple majority rather than the two-thirds supermajority required in Article 96.
Kishida is more interested in the ordinary life of the people rather than in state management. Wage hikes or increases in the birth rate are less economic policy and more moderate conservative social policy. But those policies do not hold strong appeal because they take a long time to show results. For example, the government’s increased support for young couples will not raise the birth rate anytime soon.
In an administration with low popularity, political manipulations take center stage. Removing Yoshimasa Hayashi as Foreign Minister in the recent Cabinet reshuffle was a tactic by Kishida to help his reelection next year as LDP president. Hayashi’s main job now is to enhance solidarity within the Kochi-kai and establish firm support within the LDP for Kishida’s reelection.
The good news for Kishida is the unpopularity of the opposition parties. No party other than the LDP has more than ten percent support in the opinion polls. Even though Kishida is unpopular, the opposition parties will not be able to achieve victory in next general election. The upcoming by-elections on October 22 in the Tokushima-Kochi District for the House of Councillors and in the Nagasaki 4th for the House of Representatives will be a good gauge of the public’s approval of Kishida’s policies. The results promise to influence the prime minister’s decision on whether to hold a much-discussed snap election.
Sunday, October 8, 2023
Monday October 9, 2023 Asia Events
GLOBAL MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX 2023. 10/9, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office (HDRO), and George Washington University’s Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP). Speaker: Sabina Alkire, Professor of Poverty and Human Development and director of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) at the University of Oxford.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR. 10/9, Noon–1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East; Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; Jonathan Schachter, Senior Fellow, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East.
Thursday, October 5, 2023
Kishida's Political Calculations
Kishida’s Economic Measures Have Political Motivations
By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 1, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
Suffering from consistently low public support for his administration, Prime Minister Kishida ordered September 25th the preparation of a package of economic measures to relieve inflation and wage growth. Kishida will submit a supplemental budget bill to an extraordinary session of the Diet later this month. He has even referred to a possibility of tax reduction. This announcement has invited speculation about a snap election by the end of this year.
The planned economic measures consist of five pillars: protection from inflation, sustainable wage growth, promotion of domestic investment, overcoming demographic decline, and infrastructure to enhance safety and security. Sustainable wage growth typically receives the most paid attention.
Kishida may also attempt to reform the pension and health insurance system. Embedded in the system is the so-called “wall of ¥1.3 million.” That is, a worker who earns ¥1.3 million or more annually is no longer included with another worker’s – i.e., the spouse’s -- “dependent family.” The worker who has breached the wall must pay for pension and health insurance of his/her own.
In a family, the wall affects the lower-earning spouse. If a woman--and women typically earn less than men in Japan--is part of the dependent family of her husband, her pension and health insurance is covered by her husband. If her yearly income is less than ¥1.3 million, the payment for her pension and health insurance is paid by the company she works for. Her husband also can accept ¥380 thousands of reduction from his income tax for supporting his dependent family. But once the wife’s income exceeds ¥1.3 million, she and her husband no longer enjoy these benefits. In some cases, then, the wife is better off being her husband’s dependent family without any job than being an independent worker who has to pay for her own pension and health insurance.
Kishida supports only a temporary fix, either ¥500 thousand subsidy for each worker or a two-year moratorium on enforcement of the ¥1.3 million wall. The current system was established in 1986, when women were only beginning to gain financial and independence, and the government sought to support women unable to take that step. In the thirty-seven years since then, job prospects for women have improved. Fundamental system reform is needed, rather than one-time stop-gap measures.
Temporary relief is also the plan for other pillars. To address inflation, the subsidy for gasoline, electricity or gas, set expire at the end of this year may continue into next year. To raise workers’ wage, the government plans a tax cut for employers who have increased wages. To increase business investment the government may provide some support for semi-conductor industries.
Where does the money come from? Article 29 of Public Finance Act allows supplemental appropriations only when an urgent need arises after the yearly budget has been wrapped up. Inflation relief and wage growth may be urgent, demographic decline and infrastructure safety are not.
Furthermore, there is a fundamental question about the necessity of economic measures now, when Japan’s economy is not in a serious slump. According to the estimate of Cabinet Office, GDP gap in the second quarter of this year marked +0.4%, which meant total demand surpassed total supply for the first time in these fifteen quarters. Bank of Japan sees that “Japan’s economy is likely to continue recovering moderately.”
Nevertheless, Kishida insists on delivering stimulus measures, including tax reduction. “Now, we have to properly return the increased tax revenue, which is our achievement of growth, to the people,” Kishida said in his press conference. This statement caused speculation about a snap election within this year, because tax cuts typically garner higher popularity for incumbents.
The supplementary budget will be submitted to the next Diet session starting on October 20th. “I’m focusing on economic issues that cannot be delayed,” said Kishida, when asked about the possibility of snap election. As long as a snap election is a possibility, the opposition parties are unlikely to debate the supplementary measures aggressively. For Kishida, economic measures are merely tools to control politics.
By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 1, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
Suffering from consistently low public support for his administration, Prime Minister Kishida ordered September 25th the preparation of a package of economic measures to relieve inflation and wage growth. Kishida will submit a supplemental budget bill to an extraordinary session of the Diet later this month. He has even referred to a possibility of tax reduction. This announcement has invited speculation about a snap election by the end of this year.
The planned economic measures consist of five pillars: protection from inflation, sustainable wage growth, promotion of domestic investment, overcoming demographic decline, and infrastructure to enhance safety and security. Sustainable wage growth typically receives the most paid attention.
Kishida may also attempt to reform the pension and health insurance system. Embedded in the system is the so-called “wall of ¥1.3 million.” That is, a worker who earns ¥1.3 million or more annually is no longer included with another worker’s – i.e., the spouse’s -- “dependent family.” The worker who has breached the wall must pay for pension and health insurance of his/her own.
In a family, the wall affects the lower-earning spouse. If a woman--and women typically earn less than men in Japan--is part of the dependent family of her husband, her pension and health insurance is covered by her husband. If her yearly income is less than ¥1.3 million, the payment for her pension and health insurance is paid by the company she works for. Her husband also can accept ¥380 thousands of reduction from his income tax for supporting his dependent family. But once the wife’s income exceeds ¥1.3 million, she and her husband no longer enjoy these benefits. In some cases, then, the wife is better off being her husband’s dependent family without any job than being an independent worker who has to pay for her own pension and health insurance.
Kishida supports only a temporary fix, either ¥500 thousand subsidy for each worker or a two-year moratorium on enforcement of the ¥1.3 million wall. The current system was established in 1986, when women were only beginning to gain financial and independence, and the government sought to support women unable to take that step. In the thirty-seven years since then, job prospects for women have improved. Fundamental system reform is needed, rather than one-time stop-gap measures.
Temporary relief is also the plan for other pillars. To address inflation, the subsidy for gasoline, electricity or gas, set expire at the end of this year may continue into next year. To raise workers’ wage, the government plans a tax cut for employers who have increased wages. To increase business investment the government may provide some support for semi-conductor industries.
Where does the money come from? Article 29 of Public Finance Act allows supplemental appropriations only when an urgent need arises after the yearly budget has been wrapped up. Inflation relief and wage growth may be urgent, demographic decline and infrastructure safety are not.
Furthermore, there is a fundamental question about the necessity of economic measures now, when Japan’s economy is not in a serious slump. According to the estimate of Cabinet Office, GDP gap in the second quarter of this year marked +0.4%, which meant total demand surpassed total supply for the first time in these fifteen quarters. Bank of Japan sees that “Japan’s economy is likely to continue recovering moderately.”
Nevertheless, Kishida insists on delivering stimulus measures, including tax reduction. “Now, we have to properly return the increased tax revenue, which is our achievement of growth, to the people,” Kishida said in his press conference. This statement caused speculation about a snap election within this year, because tax cuts typically garner higher popularity for incumbents.
The supplementary budget will be submitted to the next Diet session starting on October 20th. “I’m focusing on economic issues that cannot be delayed,” said Kishida, when asked about the possibility of snap election. As long as a snap election is a possibility, the opposition parties are unlikely to debate the supplementary measures aggressively. For Kishida, economic measures are merely tools to control politics.
Tuesday, October 3, 2023
What did the Okinawa Governor say in Geneva?
Tamaki was the first Okinawa governor in eight years to deliver a speech on the problem of military bases on the island at a UN Human Rights Council meeting. In 2015, then-Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga spoke out against the creation of the Henoko airfield as a replacement for the one at Futenma. Onaga stated "the Okinawan people are being deprived of their right to self-determination and their human rights." Tamaki declared the same.
In Geneva, the current governor held talks with officials with a number of officials with HRC. He was to speak again at the Council, at a meeting on toxic substances, but there was not enough time. Some speakers reportedly had gone over their time. Funny how that happens.
His plea to respect of the human rights of Okinawan people and to lessen the burden of military bases on the islands was countered and condemned by the Japanese government and the rightwing press.
POSTED DOCUMENT. FULL TEXT BELOW
FOR AN AUDIO RECORDING CLICK HERE, click the > at the right and click play
For context see: Commentary by Takya Nishmura.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Okinawa covers only 0.6% of Japan’s total land area, but 70% of all the U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated on our small island.
Furthermore, the Japanese government is imposing the construction of a new American base in Okinawa by reclaiming the precious sea areas, which I believe will further increase the burden on my people. The reclamation proceeds despite the fact that it was clearly opposed by Okinawan voters in a democratically-held referendum.
We are afraid that the build-up of military capabilities will increase tensions in the areas around Japan, and lead to unexpected situations. This is totally incompatible with Okinawan people’s aspiration for peace.
We call for the stronger diplomatic efforts by the relevant governments to embody in our region the “right to peace,” which was adopted at the 2016 United Nations General Assembly.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today.
ID with IE on international order
Oral Statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council by the governor of Okinawa Item 3: interactive dialogue with the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order - Interactive Dialogue
(193 words, 2:28:11 minutes)
I am Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa, Japan.
I am here today to ask the world to witness the situation in Okinawa, where the concentration of the American bases threatens the peace, and prevents equal participation in decision-making.
Okinawa covers only 0.6% of Japan’s total land area, but 70% of all the U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated on our small island.
Furthermore, the Japanese government is imposing the construction of a new American base in Okinawa by reclaiming the precious sea areas, which I believe will further increase the burden on my people. The reclamation proceeds despite the fact that it was clearly opposed by Okinawan voters in a democratically-held referendum.
We are afraid that the build-up of military capabilities will increase tensions in the areas around Japan, and lead to unexpected situations. This is totally incompatible with Okinawan people’s aspiration for peace.
We call for the stronger diplomatic efforts by the relevant governments to embody in our region the “right to peace,” which was adopted at the 2016 United Nations General Assembly.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today.
Monday October 3, 2023 Events on Asia
ALLIED PERSPECTIVES ON SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORT CONTROLS. 10/2, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Gregory C. Allen, Editor of the report and CSIS director; Emily Benson, Director, Project on Trade and Technology and Senior Fellow, CSIS; Chau-Chyun Chang, Senior Strategy Executive Director, Industry, Science and Technology International Strategy Center; Francesca Ghiretti, Analyst, Mercator Institute for China Studies; Jan-Peter Kleinhans, Director, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung; Rem Korteweg, Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute; Wonho Yeon, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.
NEW TOOLS FOR ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN ENDING TUBERCULOSIS: THE LANCET COMMISSION ON TUBERCULOSIS REPORT, 2023. 10/2, 2:00-3:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Katherine E. Bliss, Senior Fellow and Director, Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience, Global Health Policy Center; Nidhi Bouri, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Global Health, U.S. Agency for International Development; Anthony Fauci, Distinguished University Professor of Medicine at Georgetown University; Eric Goosby, Professor of Medicine at the University of California at San Francisco.
INTERNAL SECURITY IN INDIA: VIOLENCE, ORDER, AND THE STATE. 10/2, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Amit Ahuja, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center; Devesh Kapur, Starr Foundation Professor, South Asian Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Rachel Kleinfeld, Senior Fellow, Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program; Ashley J. Tellis, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
BREAKING THE DOLLAR'S MONOPOLY: HOW CHINA'S REGIONAL DE-DOLLARIZATION INITIATIVE IS RESHAPING INTERNATIONAL FINANCE WITH ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU. 10/2, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Harvard China and the World Program; Columbia Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Speaker: Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
THE COST OF CLIMATE: HOW CAN COUNTRIES PAY FOR CLIMATE ACTION? 10/2, 11:00-12:00 (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development. Speakers: Raphael Lam, Deputy Division Chief, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund (IMF); Christine Richmond, Deputy Division Chief, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF; Min Zhu, Vice Chairman of China Centre for International Economic Exchanges, and Envoy of Sino-UK Professional and Financial Service for the Belt and Road Initiative; Ruud de Mooij, Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF; Carolyn Fischer, Research Manager, Development Research Group, World Bank.
Wednesday, September 27, 2023
Japan at the UN General Assembly
PM Kishida Defends Human Dignity at the UN
By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 25, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
To exercise Japan’s leadership in the international community, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida focused on “human dignity” in his speech at the General Debate of United Nations General Assembly on September 19th. Citing Japan’s non-permanent membership in UN Security Council and presidency in Group of Seven, Kishida proposed A World Caring for Human Dignity to “respond to the desperate desire for Peace and the pleas of vulnerable people seeking help.” So, what would Japan do for that?
Kishida insisted that Japan had led human-centered international cooperation, based on the concept of human security. In the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori declared that Japan would put “human security” on the center of its diplomacy. Considering the tradition of Japan’s UN diplomacy, Kishida requested further efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goals, which is highly popular in the business sector in Japan. “The key is to ‘invest in people,’ which is my pollical credo,” said Kishida.
However, does Kishida administration invest in its own people enough? Although he told that “Japan aims to reduce inequalities and overcome social divisions by promoting women’s participation,” his choice of no female State Minister or Parliamentary Vice-Minister earlier this month was criticized as the consequence of woman lawmakers’ shortage in Liberal Democratic Party. He is responsible for achieving more accesses of women to politics by increasing female lawmakers in LDP.
What Kishida emphasized the most in his speech was the nuclear issue. Calling nuclear disarmament his lifelong mission, Kishida touched on the significance of promoting Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and pledged ¥3 billion of contribution to newly establishment of “Japan Chair” at overseas research institutes and think tanks. In the backdrop of General Assembly, Kishida co-sponsored with the leaders of Australia and Philippines a commemorative high-level event on FMCT. “The concept of an FMCT was proposed 30 years ago. Hence, experts have engaged in numerous dialogues over its technical elements. Unfortunately, negotiations on an FMCT have still not begun, but we are in need of an FMCT than ever before,” told Kishida in his opening statement.
In spite of his eagerness to nuclear disarmament, Japan is well known as turning its back to Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has already been signed by over 90 UN member countries. Considering his diligent effort for promoting FMCT this time, it is obvious that Kishida focuses more on FMCT than TPNW. What we need to see is the number of member countries. If Japan wants to outreach the countries called Global South, the easier way should be joining the treaty at least as an observer at first.
Denouncing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Kishida required reinforced UN. “Initiatives to limit the use of the veto, which exacerbates division and confrontation in the UN, will strengthen and restore confidence in the Security Council,” he said. While the appeal can be paralleled with what Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demanded to the member countries in General Debate, the intention of Japan is always regarded as connected to its ambition to join the permanent members, whenever it refers to Security Council reform. It would be notable that Russia also hopes to expand the member counties to erode the Western power in the council.
“Facing severe situation of the world today, we need a common language for human beings to achieve an international community for cooperation,” Kishida said, gingerly reading a prepared statement at his press conference after his UN speech. Being the top leader of a nation with over twenty thousand of yearly suicides or pervasive discrimination against ethnical or sexual minorities, was he successful in resonating his words to the people in the world?
Or Does He?
By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 25, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
To exercise Japan’s leadership in the international community, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida focused on “human dignity” in his speech at the General Debate of United Nations General Assembly on September 19th. Citing Japan’s non-permanent membership in UN Security Council and presidency in Group of Seven, Kishida proposed A World Caring for Human Dignity to “respond to the desperate desire for Peace and the pleas of vulnerable people seeking help.” So, what would Japan do for that?
Kishida insisted that Japan had led human-centered international cooperation, based on the concept of human security. In the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori declared that Japan would put “human security” on the center of its diplomacy. Considering the tradition of Japan’s UN diplomacy, Kishida requested further efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goals, which is highly popular in the business sector in Japan. “The key is to ‘invest in people,’ which is my pollical credo,” said Kishida.
However, does Kishida administration invest in its own people enough? Although he told that “Japan aims to reduce inequalities and overcome social divisions by promoting women’s participation,” his choice of no female State Minister or Parliamentary Vice-Minister earlier this month was criticized as the consequence of woman lawmakers’ shortage in Liberal Democratic Party. He is responsible for achieving more accesses of women to politics by increasing female lawmakers in LDP.
What Kishida emphasized the most in his speech was the nuclear issue. Calling nuclear disarmament his lifelong mission, Kishida touched on the significance of promoting Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and pledged ¥3 billion of contribution to newly establishment of “Japan Chair” at overseas research institutes and think tanks. In the backdrop of General Assembly, Kishida co-sponsored with the leaders of Australia and Philippines a commemorative high-level event on FMCT. “The concept of an FMCT was proposed 30 years ago. Hence, experts have engaged in numerous dialogues over its technical elements. Unfortunately, negotiations on an FMCT have still not begun, but we are in need of an FMCT than ever before,” told Kishida in his opening statement.
In spite of his eagerness to nuclear disarmament, Japan is well known as turning its back to Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has already been signed by over 90 UN member countries. Considering his diligent effort for promoting FMCT this time, it is obvious that Kishida focuses more on FMCT than TPNW. What we need to see is the number of member countries. If Japan wants to outreach the countries called Global South, the easier way should be joining the treaty at least as an observer at first.
Denouncing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Kishida required reinforced UN. “Initiatives to limit the use of the veto, which exacerbates division and confrontation in the UN, will strengthen and restore confidence in the Security Council,” he said. While the appeal can be paralleled with what Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demanded to the member countries in General Debate, the intention of Japan is always regarded as connected to its ambition to join the permanent members, whenever it refers to Security Council reform. It would be notable that Russia also hopes to expand the member counties to erode the Western power in the council.
“Facing severe situation of the world today, we need a common language for human beings to achieve an international community for cooperation,” Kishida said, gingerly reading a prepared statement at his press conference after his UN speech. Being the top leader of a nation with over twenty thousand of yearly suicides or pervasive discrimination against ethnical or sexual minorities, was he successful in resonating his words to the people in the world?
Tuesday, September 26, 2023
Nothing New
Kishida Preserves His Administration
While Kishida stresses salary increases for workers, inflation increasingly damages the household economy. The Kishida administration will submit a supplementary budget in the middle of next month. But budgetary resources for his key policies such as raising the birth rate or expanding defense capability have yet to be identified.
With her money scandal unexplained, Obuchi may cause further damage to the LDP. No end is in sight for the War in Ukraine or for disputes with China on the discharge of processed radioactive water in Fukushima. It is doubtful that a vulnerable administration that stands on a delicate balance of power in the leading party can handle all the critical issues inside and outside of Japan.
As long as support for the Kishida administration remains low, Kishida may not declare a snap election of House of Representatives. But there still is a speculation that passing the supplemental budget in this fall session of the Diet will trigger a snap election, because victory in the general election will support Kishida’s reelection in the LDP presidential election. All the calculations are made for preserving the life of this administration.
By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
September 18, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
September 18, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point
You can find his blog, J Update here.
On September 13th, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reshuffled his Cabinet for the second time since coming to power in October 2021. Although personnel changes are ordinarily made to tackle difficult issues, Kishida focused on the balance of power in his administration. He reappointed most key Cabinet ministers and leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kishida must have thought that he had to preserve the LDP’s positions in the administration in order to garner their support in the presidential election next year.
The main point of the reshuffle was not about the Cabinet, but the LDP Board. The key structure of the board was maintained. Vice-President Taro Aso, Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi and Chairman of Policy Research Council Koichi Hagiuda from the Abe group were retained remained in the same positions. The new Chairman of the General Council Hiroshi Moriyama leads the smallest faction.
According to the news reports, Kishida once wanted to replace Motegi, who did not conceal his ambition to succeed him. But considering that his faction is only the fourth largest in the LDP, Kishida was afraid that the Motegi group could further distance itself from his administration, if Motegi left the board. Kishida finally decided to let Motegi stay in his current position.
To deter Motegi’s plan to run in the next presidential election, Kishida picked Yuko Obuchi, a daughter of late, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, for one of the four pillars on the LDP Board, the Chair of Election Strategy Committee. It gives her a chance to sell herself as another possible candidate for president in the Motegi group. Obuchi has strong support from her father’s close colleagues: Keizo’s successor Yoshiro Mori, who still has a considerable influence in the Abe group, and Mikio Aoki, who had not been a supporter of Motegi in the Motegi group.
The Yomiuri Shimbun and other newspapers reported that Kishida considered bringing Hagiuda into the cabinet as Chief Cabinet Secretary, hoping for a closer relationship with the largest Abe group. Hagiuda has been criticized, however, for his close relationship with Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (formerly the Unification Church, FFWPU). The relationship of FFWPU with a number of LDP lawmakers has caused low popularity of Kishida administration. Kishida and his staff finally gave up on the idea.
These decisions show that the main reason for the reshuffling and renewing LDP board members was to establish a firm basis of the administration to ensure victory in the presidential election next year. Kishida naming five women to ministerial positions, equaling the record of largest number of women in a cabinet, also reflects Kishida’s desire to increase public support for his reelection.
Some points in the reshuffling are hard to understand. Japan is the chair country of Group of Seven meeting later this fall, but Kishida chose to replace Yoshimasa Hayashi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs with Yoko Kamikawa. Kamikawa is known as the former Minister of Justice who signed death penalty orders for thirteen prisoners of Aum Shinrikyo in 2018. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa are affiliated with the Kishida group.
Since Kamikawa has little experience as a diplomat, Kishida said that he would lead diplomacy himself. Hayashi’s recent denouncement of Russian aggression in Ukraine and his remarks on the reconstruction of Ukraine might have presented a challenge to the prime minister.
If Kishida wants to raise his support, why didn’t he replace the ministers who faced public unpopularity? Minister in Charge of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi accused the Ministry of Internal Affair of fabricating her remarks in documents over impartiality in the Broadcasting Law. But no evidence supported the attack. It is obvious that she will be targeted by the opposition parties in the Diet discussion.
Elsewhere, the Minister for Digital Transformation, Taro Kono, has apologized publicly for several critical mistakes in registering people to the new healthcare system connected to My Number Card. Cabinet reshuffling was a good opportunity for a fresh restart for healthcare reform led by a new Minister for Digital Transformation, but Kishida missed it.
Blunt political considerations may explain why Takaichi and Kono survived the recent reshuffling. Both were contenders against Kishida in the 2021 LDP presidential election. Takaichi is one of the possible leaders in the conservative group, and Kono can be a candidate for the future prime minister in Aso group. Kishida possibly took the influence of the conservative and Aso groups into consideration.
Given the deference accorded two problematic ministers, it is ironic that Kishida replaced the Minister for Children Affairs and the Minister of Defense, both of whom are in charge of issues Kishida focuses on, in order to bring some element of newness to the cabinet.
Two meanings can be seen in picking Yoshitaka Shindo, an ultraconservative lawmaker whose grandfather was the supreme commander of Japan Imperial Army in the Battle of Iwo Jima and the head of a conservative group called 'League of Lawmakers Taking Action for Protecting Japan’s Territory.' One is a message to the conservative group in LDP that Kishida is taking good care of the conservative issues, including promoting constitutional amendment. But if Kishida is so serious about amending the Constitution, Shindo should stay in the LDP and manage the issue in the Diet. Another approach should be to separate Shindo from Motegi. Shindo has been a firm supporter of Motegi in his group. People will see how Motegi’s leadership in his group will be affected by the latest reshuffling.
In spite of all the above elements on the revived administration, Kishida claimed that his goal was not solely to preserve the political life of his administration. His focus was policy. Kishida said in his press conference on the 13th that he would focus on three issues: economy, society, and diplomacy and security.
On September 13th, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reshuffled his Cabinet for the second time since coming to power in October 2021. Although personnel changes are ordinarily made to tackle difficult issues, Kishida focused on the balance of power in his administration. He reappointed most key Cabinet ministers and leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kishida must have thought that he had to preserve the LDP’s positions in the administration in order to garner their support in the presidential election next year.
The main point of the reshuffle was not about the Cabinet, but the LDP Board. The key structure of the board was maintained. Vice-President Taro Aso, Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi and Chairman of Policy Research Council Koichi Hagiuda from the Abe group were retained remained in the same positions. The new Chairman of the General Council Hiroshi Moriyama leads the smallest faction.
According to the news reports, Kishida once wanted to replace Motegi, who did not conceal his ambition to succeed him. But considering that his faction is only the fourth largest in the LDP, Kishida was afraid that the Motegi group could further distance itself from his administration, if Motegi left the board. Kishida finally decided to let Motegi stay in his current position.
To deter Motegi’s plan to run in the next presidential election, Kishida picked Yuko Obuchi, a daughter of late, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, for one of the four pillars on the LDP Board, the Chair of Election Strategy Committee. It gives her a chance to sell herself as another possible candidate for president in the Motegi group. Obuchi has strong support from her father’s close colleagues: Keizo’s successor Yoshiro Mori, who still has a considerable influence in the Abe group, and Mikio Aoki, who had not been a supporter of Motegi in the Motegi group.
The Yomiuri Shimbun and other newspapers reported that Kishida considered bringing Hagiuda into the cabinet as Chief Cabinet Secretary, hoping for a closer relationship with the largest Abe group. Hagiuda has been criticized, however, for his close relationship with Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (formerly the Unification Church, FFWPU). The relationship of FFWPU with a number of LDP lawmakers has caused low popularity of Kishida administration. Kishida and his staff finally gave up on the idea.
These decisions show that the main reason for the reshuffling and renewing LDP board members was to establish a firm basis of the administration to ensure victory in the presidential election next year. Kishida naming five women to ministerial positions, equaling the record of largest number of women in a cabinet, also reflects Kishida’s desire to increase public support for his reelection.
Some points in the reshuffling are hard to understand. Japan is the chair country of Group of Seven meeting later this fall, but Kishida chose to replace Yoshimasa Hayashi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs with Yoko Kamikawa. Kamikawa is known as the former Minister of Justice who signed death penalty orders for thirteen prisoners of Aum Shinrikyo in 2018. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa are affiliated with the Kishida group.
Since Kamikawa has little experience as a diplomat, Kishida said that he would lead diplomacy himself. Hayashi’s recent denouncement of Russian aggression in Ukraine and his remarks on the reconstruction of Ukraine might have presented a challenge to the prime minister.
If Kishida wants to raise his support, why didn’t he replace the ministers who faced public unpopularity? Minister in Charge of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi accused the Ministry of Internal Affair of fabricating her remarks in documents over impartiality in the Broadcasting Law. But no evidence supported the attack. It is obvious that she will be targeted by the opposition parties in the Diet discussion.
Elsewhere, the Minister for Digital Transformation, Taro Kono, has apologized publicly for several critical mistakes in registering people to the new healthcare system connected to My Number Card. Cabinet reshuffling was a good opportunity for a fresh restart for healthcare reform led by a new Minister for Digital Transformation, but Kishida missed it.
Blunt political considerations may explain why Takaichi and Kono survived the recent reshuffling. Both were contenders against Kishida in the 2021 LDP presidential election. Takaichi is one of the possible leaders in the conservative group, and Kono can be a candidate for the future prime minister in Aso group. Kishida possibly took the influence of the conservative and Aso groups into consideration.
Given the deference accorded two problematic ministers, it is ironic that Kishida replaced the Minister for Children Affairs and the Minister of Defense, both of whom are in charge of issues Kishida focuses on, in order to bring some element of newness to the cabinet.
Two meanings can be seen in picking Yoshitaka Shindo, an ultraconservative lawmaker whose grandfather was the supreme commander of Japan Imperial Army in the Battle of Iwo Jima and the head of a conservative group called 'League of Lawmakers Taking Action for Protecting Japan’s Territory.' One is a message to the conservative group in LDP that Kishida is taking good care of the conservative issues, including promoting constitutional amendment. But if Kishida is so serious about amending the Constitution, Shindo should stay in the LDP and manage the issue in the Diet. Another approach should be to separate Shindo from Motegi. Shindo has been a firm supporter of Motegi in his group. People will see how Motegi’s leadership in his group will be affected by the latest reshuffling.
In spite of all the above elements on the revived administration, Kishida claimed that his goal was not solely to preserve the political life of his administration. His focus was policy. Kishida said in his press conference on the 13th that he would focus on three issues: economy, society, and diplomacy and security.
While Kishida stresses salary increases for workers, inflation increasingly damages the household economy. The Kishida administration will submit a supplementary budget in the middle of next month. But budgetary resources for his key policies such as raising the birth rate or expanding defense capability have yet to be identified.
With her money scandal unexplained, Obuchi may cause further damage to the LDP. No end is in sight for the War in Ukraine or for disputes with China on the discharge of processed radioactive water in Fukushima. It is doubtful that a vulnerable administration that stands on a delicate balance of power in the leading party can handle all the critical issues inside and outside of Japan.
As long as support for the Kishida administration remains low, Kishida may not declare a snap election of House of Representatives. But there still is a speculation that passing the supplemental budget in this fall session of the Diet will trigger a snap election, because victory in the general election will support Kishida’s reelection in the LDP presidential election. All the calculations are made for preserving the life of this administration.
Thursday, August 17, 2023
The Lessons of August 15, 1945
On August 15, 78 years ago, Japan's Emperor Hirohito broadcast to his subjects "that our empire accepts the provisions of their [the Allies] Joint Declaration [of the Powers, Potsdam Declaration]." The fighting was to stop. Whether he believed this was a surrender or not, is still subject to debate. What the Japanese people heard that day was a recording of his statement made the night before. The Emperor's voice maintained its divine distance from his subjects as he explained "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest." He concluded by asking the nation "to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable."
Memories have faded and most Americans are surprised to learn that Japan was an enemy during WWII. One result of this fugue is that governments East and West find little opposition to their rewriting of WWII history and its aftermath. Generally, this has not been for the better and always for personal political gain. Worse, Washington counts many of these countries as allies and remains silent.
These revisionist histories have undermined the values that have shaped the postwar "liberal democratic order." Authoritarian regimes now erode individual freedoms, human rights, and humanitarian cooperation. Glorifying strongmen, dismissing war atrocities, identifying perpetrators now as victims, and co-opting the victor's history as one's own is upending the legacy and lessons of WWII. A new "glorious history" is being promulgated in Poland, Hungary, China, Japan and other places. Unashamedly, the Polish government claims that Poles were uninvolved with the persecution of Jews and a Japanese diplomat praises the "Bushido Spirit" of the famed Japanese American 442nd Regimental Combat Team to their sons.
Thus, it is welcome that this fall there are a number of seminars and conferences examining the immediate postwar period.
Prime Minister Kishida's address at the Seventy-Eighth National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead yesterday repeated his predecessor Abe's 2015 statement that makes no mention of apology or remorse to Japan's victims. He, like Abe and Suga before him, promises only: "We will not forget, even for a moment, that the peace and prosperity that Japan enjoys today was built atop the precious lives and the history of suffering of the war dead." Ceremony photos and documents. Kishida marks 78th anniversary of World War II end without mentioning Japan's wartime aggression, Associated Press, Aug. 15, 2023.
As a new book by a Brookings scholar supports this celebratory view of contemporary Japan, The author sees the Japanese government as having reinvented itself to encourage more political engagement with the world and a greater military presence in the region. This is a new self-confidence that will award Tokyo with credibility and global leadership. To be sure, I have not read the book (then again neither have the folks who recommend it on the dust jacket). I have, however, heard this argument repeatedly over the decades that Japan has changed and it is in our image. Someone once observed that Western efforts to "fix" Japan always result in the tutor being broken-hearted.
See: Japan’s Quiet Leadership Reshaping the Indo-Pacific by Mireya Solis, (release August 24, 2023).
See: Japan’s Quiet Leadership Reshaping the Indo-Pacific by Mireya Solis, (release August 24, 2023).
Or watch the book talk: Japan's Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Pacific, Wednesday, September 6, 89:30-10:30am EDT, Washington, DC, Hybrid. Sponsor: Brookings Institution. Speakers: Mireya Solís, Director - Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies; Kurt W. Tong, Managing Partner - The Asia Group (grandson of Philippine internee Rev Walter Curtis Tong); Yuichi Hosoya, Director of Research, API & Professor, Keio University; Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S.-China Correspondent, Financial Times.
But not everyone forgets: Memorial service for POWs in Yokohama passed down to next generation, August 12, 2023, Mainichi Shimbun
Here are a number of talks and conferences this fall that examine Japan's Pacific War and its aftermath. I hope you can attend in person or virtually.
A. Friday September 8
MJHA Distinguished Annual Lecture
Tessa Morris-Suzuki on Writing War: History in Occupied Japan and its Echoes for Today
Hosted by The Modern Japan History Association
Hosted by The Modern Japan History Association
Speaker: Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Professor Emerita of Japanese History, Australian National University https://researchprofiles.anu.
Date/time and registration information:
Date/time and registration information:
Online, free.
Saturday, September 9, 2023 | 9:00-10:30 AM Australian Eastern Standard Time
Friday, September 8, 2023 | 7:00-8:30 PM (EST)
https://mjha.org/
As the world edges into a new Cold War, rising political tensions in East Asia are reflected in growing conflict over memories of history, and particularly of the history of the Asia-Pacific War. Increasing nationalism in all the countries of the region finds expression in rewritings of that history. In Japan, a central feature of recent waves of historical revisionism has been a focus on the shaping of historiography in the post war occupation period. The period from August 1945 to May 1952 was the era when historians first struggled to give meaning to the disastrous events of the war which had ravaged East Asia during the previous decade or more. The diverse ways in which they did this has had an enduring effect on the way in which the war is remembered to the present day. In the context of contemporary controversies over history, it is important to return to that occupation era and to reassess the possibilities and limitations of the way in which the history of the war was written by those who had just experienced it in their own lives.
Saturday, September 9, 2023 | 9:00-10:30 AM Australian Eastern Standard Time
Friday, September 8, 2023 | 7:00-8:30 PM (EST)
https://mjha.org/
As the world edges into a new Cold War, rising political tensions in East Asia are reflected in growing conflict over memories of history, and particularly of the history of the Asia-Pacific War. Increasing nationalism in all the countries of the region finds expression in rewritings of that history. In Japan, a central feature of recent waves of historical revisionism has been a focus on the shaping of historiography in the post war occupation period. The period from August 1945 to May 1952 was the era when historians first struggled to give meaning to the disastrous events of the war which had ravaged East Asia during the previous decade or more. The diverse ways in which they did this has had an enduring effect on the way in which the war is remembered to the present day. In the context of contemporary controversies over history, it is important to return to that occupation era and to reassess the possibilities and limitations of the way in which the history of the war was written by those who had just experienced it in their own lives.
Annual Symposium
Occupation: The Legacy of the Asiatic Pacific War
Hosted by The Admiral Nimitz Foundation.
Speakers: Richard B. Frank, internationally recognized leading authority on the Asia-Pacific War; Dr. Xiaobing Li, professor of the Department of History and Geography and the Don Betz Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma (UCO); Ricardo Trota Jose, professor of history at the University of the Philippines, Diliman; Mindy L. Kotler is founder and director of Asia Policy Point. Special guest, Marie Vallejo, author of Dauntless, a book about the First and Second Filipino Regiments.
In person and online. Fee.
Saturday, September 16, 2023, 9:00am-5:00pm (CDT)
https://www.pacificwarmuseum.
https://www.pacificwarmuseum.
The Admiral Nimitz Foundation is excited to welcome you back to this year’s Annual Symposium. The focus this year will be on Japan's occupation of Asia. Titled, “Occupation: The Legacy of the Asiatic Pacific War,” the symposium will explore the nuanced ramifications of the Japanese occupation.
C. Saturday September 23
6th Annual Conference on WWII in the PhilippinesWar Crimes - From WWII Until Today
Hosted by: Bataan Legacy Historical Society in partnership with the University of San Francisco's Philippine Studies Program, Memorare Manila 1945 and USF Kasamahan
Saturday, September 23, 2023 | 10:00am - 4:00pm (PDT)
Hosted by: Bataan Legacy Historical Society in partnership with the University of San Francisco's Philippine Studies Program, Memorare Manila 1945 and USF Kasamahan
Speakers: James Zarsadiaz, Director, Philippine Studies Program, University of San Francisco; Prof. Mark Hull, Professor of War Crimes, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth; Philippine Consul General in San Francisco Neil F. Ferrer; Father Paul Fitzgerald, S.J., President, University of San Francisco; Benjamin Hall, Fox News State Department Correspondent, Eyewitness to War Crimes Today (Via Zoom); Jose Custodio, Fellow, Consortium of Indo Pacific Researchers; Christopher Capozzola, Professor of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Richard Frank, Pacific War historian, author, Tower of Skulls; Marie Vallejo, author of Dauntless, a book about the First and Second Filipino Regiments; Kate LaFerriere, daughter of Frank Innis, former civilian POW in Los Banos; Cynthia Bonta, survivor of the Los Baños massacre, mother of California Attorney General Rob Bonta; and Richard Foye, author of Foye And The Filipinos Bailout, Escape, And Rescue Of A Navy Fighter Pilot In World War Two Luzon, is the son of Ensign William Foye, an F6F Hellcat Pilot and a member of the Air Group Twenty assigned to the USS Enterprise (CV6).
Date/time and registration information:
In person, Facebook Live, Taped, feeSaturday, September 23, 2023 | 10:00am - 4:00pm (PDT)
https://www.eventbrite.com/e/
The conference aims to present the war crimes the invading Japanese perpetrated upon soldiers and civilians in the Philippines. A compelling discussion on war crimes in the Philippines and its effects on subsequent generations as well as similarities in today's world.
The conference aims to present the war crimes the invading Japanese perpetrated upon soldiers and civilians in the Philippines. A compelling discussion on war crimes in the Philippines and its effects on subsequent generations as well as similarities in today's world.
D. Thursday December 7 to Saturday December 9
16th International Conference on World War II
Finding Hope In A World Destroyed: WWII Liberations & Legacies
16th International Conference on World War II
Finding Hope In A World Destroyed: WWII Liberations & Legacies
Hosted by National WWII Museum, New Orleans.
Speakers: [there are no affiliations listed on the website and your editor simply did not have the energy to track everyone down]: Jason Dawsey ; Francine Hirsch ; Robert Hutchinson ; Günter Bischof ; John Curatola, Military Historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy; Rana Mitter, University of Oxford; Yuma Totani, University of Hawaii; Yoshikuni Igarashi, Vanderbilt University; William Hitchcock ;Blanche Wiesen Cook ;Jeremi Suri ;Lizabeth Cohen ; Krewasky Salter, Pritzker Military Museum & Library; Marcus Cox : Kara Dixon Vuic ; David Davis ;Jeremy Black ; Robert Citino, National WWII Museum; Richard B. Frank, Pacific War historian, author, Tower of Skulls; Craig Symonds, Distinguished Visiting Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History for the academic years 2017–2020 at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island; Trent Hone, a Vice President with ICF and an award-winning naval historian, author of Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945; Allan R. Millett ;Keith Lowe ;Ronald Spector, professor emeritus, George Washington University; John McManus : Conrad Crane ; Steph Hinnershitz ; Catherine Musemeche ;Dave Gutierrez ; Jim McNaughton ; Gordon H. “Nick” Mueller, PhD, ;William Hitchcock ;Jeremi Suri ;Major General Peter Gravett ;Cameron McCoy ;Robert Edsel ;Alexandra Richie ;Wendy Lower ; Paul Hilliard ; Kirk Saduski ;Donald L. Miller ; John Orloff
Aftermath in Asia
Chair: John Curatola, Military Historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy
“The War That Never Really Ended: WWII’s Long Legacy”: Rana Mitter, University of Oxford
“Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945-1952: Allied War Crimes Prosecutions”: Yuma Totani, University of Hawaii
“Japan’s Decade After Defeat: Occupation and Democratization”: Yoshikuni Igarashi, Vanderbilt University
Date/time and registration information:
In person only in New Orleans, LA, feehttps://www.nationalww2museum.
The International Conference on World War II is the premier adult educational event bringing together the best and brightest scholars, authors, historians, and witnesses to history from around the globe to discuss key battles, personalities, strategies, issues, and controversies of the war that changed the world. The agenda, speakers, and times are not yet set.
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