Kan's dangerous lesson for Noda

As Japanese Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda prepares to become his nation’s sixth new Prime Minister since the popular and comparatively long-lived Junichiro Koizumi stepped down just five years ago, he and his top advisers face the challenge of figuring out how to avoid the common fate of his five short-lived predecessors.

The pattern is clear: each new Prime Minister starts out with relatively high approval ratings, normally in the 55-65% range (although in Monday’s intra-party race former Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara was the overwhelming public favorite, drawing over 40% in an Asahi Shimbun poll, while Noda drew less than 5% support, so he might start out with less than the standard level of support for a new Prime Minister).

Then, inevitably, the new Prime Minister’s support level starts its slow but steady decline. After about a year, approval dips and stays below 20%, the Prime Minister resigns, and the cycle repeats.

Graph 1: This comparison of the support levels of Prime Ministers Abe, Fukuda, Aso, Hatoyama, and Kan was posted on a right-wing blog in the summer of 2010, making the point that after six weeks Kan’s approval rating (in black) was falling even faster than his predecessors. Source: “正しい歴史意識、国益重視の外交、核兵器の実現 [Proper Historical Consciousness, Diplomacy Emphasizing the National Interest, and the Realization of Nuclear Weapons], July 19, 2010. 

But as the following chart of approval ratings for the Kan cabinet makes clear, in September 2010 this pattern was broken.

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Graph 2: Asahi Shimbun polling showing the approval (red) and disapproval (blue) ratings of the Kan cabinet from its inauguration in June 2010 through July 2011. Source: “首相辞任「８月末までに」７割 [Poll: 70% call for Prime Minister’s resignation “by the end of August]," Asahi Shimbun, July 11, 2011.

By the time that a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a pair of Japanese Coast Guard vessels in waters near the disputed Senkaku Islands on September 7, 2010, the Kan cabinet’s approval rating had already dropped from 60% to below 40%. The collision was initially reported as a minor incident in the Japanese press, but media attention grew as an outraged China demanded a full apology and the return of the arrested captain and crew.

To the surprise of the Japanese press, the Kan administration refused.

The ensuing diplomatic standoff lasted for weeks, and drew global attention. The Kan administration released the crew, but moved to press charges against the captain. China responded by ratcheting up the diplomatic pressure to a level that astounded most observers in Japan and the US, even hyping a planned reduction of rare earth metal exports to Japan as an embargo  – a key component of almost all high-tech modern electronics that is currently produced almost exclusively in China.

And public approval ratings for the Kan administration soared.

This point was lost in most Western media coverage of the standoff, but all major Japanese media reported the same trend: support for the Kan administration continued to climb with each day that it stood up to China. The cabinet regained its inaugural level of support, and appeared headed for even higher levels.

Then, on September 25, the Kan administration folded. The Chinese trawler captain was released and sent back to China without a trial.

U.S. officials applauded what they described as an “adult” gesture by the Kan administration to diffuse the situation, but the Japanese media was unanimous in condemning the move as a show of diplomatic weakness. Public opinion quickly followed suit: the Kan cabinet’s approval rating plunged, and never again regained even its pre-collision level.

Unfortunately, with its show of support for Prime Minister Kan in the weeks before he backed down, the Japanese public unwittingly raised the security risk in northeast Asia.

Incoming Prime Minister Noda has already shown that he is not overly concerned about Chinese or Korean sensibilities. It is difficult to imagine any Japanese prime minister deliberately picking a fight with a rising China, but it is not at all hard to imagine another seemingly minor incident sparking another diplomatic conflict between Japan and China.

If Noda or any future Japanese prime minister studies the Senkaku collision incident and concludes that the way to win domestic public support is to stand up to China, the stage will be set for a significant confrontation between northeast Asia’s two biggest military and economic powers. Handling such a confrontation would be a major challenge not just for leaders in Tokyo and Beijing, but also in Washington, DC.

Conrad Chaffee

APP Nonresident Fellow

August programs

August in Washington is hot and quiet. Anyone with any sense leaves. Unfortunately, a few folks have not gotten the memo that this is the time NOT to hold any events. Unfortunately, the Korea Economic Institute is hiding all the new analytical talent on Korea in two late August programs!

US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: STRATEGIC OR TRANSACTIONAL? 8/16, 5:30-7:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: South Asia Studies Program, SAIS. Speaker: Riaz Khan, Former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan.

IS CHINA THE NEW NORTH? ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CHINESE TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA. 8/17, 9:30-11:00am, 2011. Sponsor: John L. Thornton China Center and the Latin America Initiative at Brookings, with the Council of the Americas. Speakers: Mauricio Cárdenas, Director, Latin America Initiative; Erica S. Downs, Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center; Mauricio Mesquita Moreira, Principal Economist, Trade and Investment Sector, Inter-American Development Bank.

HAS AMERICA’S POLITICAL DYSFUNCTION UNDERMINED ITS POSITION AS THE WORLD’S REMAINING SUPERPOWER? 8/16, 1:00-2:30pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Foreign Policy, Brookings. Speakers: Martin S. Indyk, Vice President and Director, Foreign Policy (moderator); Mauricio Cárdenas, Director, Latin America Initiative; Fiona Hill, Director, Center on the United States and Europe; Robert Kagan, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe; Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Director, John L. Thornton China Center; Thomas E. Mann, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies.

KOREA’S DOMESTIC POLICIES INFLUENCE ON ASIA (EMERGING VOICES). 8/17, Noon–2:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Andrew Kim, Princeton University; Jiun Bang, University of Southern California; Yukyong Choe, University of California, Berkeley School of Law; Gloria Koo, University of Southern California.

DEFICIT REDUCTION AND THE NEW CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE: A PRIMER. 8/17, 1:30-3:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Budgeting for National Priorities Project, Brookings. Speakers: Ron Haskins, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies; Henry J. Aaron, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies; Sarah A. Binder, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies; Bill Frenzel, Guest Scholar, Economic Studies; William G. Gale, Senior Fellow, Economic Studies.

NUCLEAR SAFETY IN IRAN, POST-FUKUSHIMA. 8/23, 12:30-2:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: National Defense University Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Speaker: Mr. Nima Gerami, Research Analyst, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University.

THE KOREA CLUB HOSTS DR. ANDREI LANKOV. 8/23, 6:30-9:00pm, Vienna, Virginia. Sponsor: Korea Club, Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Andrei Lankov, Lecturer, China and Korea Center, Faculty of Asian Studies, Kookmin University; Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director, U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

KOREA: ENERGY AND ECONOMY (EMERGING VOICES). 8/24, Noon–2:00pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Eunjung Lim, Johns Hopkins University SAIS; Lisa He, Georgetown University; June Park, Boston University.

TERRORISM BY THE NUMBERS: UNDERSTANDING U.S AND GLOBAL TRENDS. 8/25, 11:00-Noon, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: David B. Muhlhausen, Research Fellow in Empirical Policy Analysis, Center for Data Analysis, The Heritage Foundation and Jessica Zuckerman, Research Assistant, Homeland Security and Latin America, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, The Heritage Foundation.

Reporting from South Sudan

On July 9, the Republic of South Sudan became the world's newest country. Independence follows a referendum vote in January in which 98.83% of South Sudanese voters decided to separate from Northern Sudan and its government in Khartoum. The referendum was a provision of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which ended the second North-South civil war since Sudan's independence in. The overwhelming vote for independence surprised no one, and most Southern Sudanese view this Saturday as the culmination of their struggle against more than a century of Ottoman, British/Egyptian, and Northern Sudanese oppression.

Juba, the capital city, was a Northern-held garrison town during the war, but has been growing every day since the peace in 2005. The Government of South Sudan has been preparing the city to receive thirty-five African heads of state and innumerable other dignitaries and visitors for the Independence celebrations. A nice, wide JICA-funded bridge over the creek near my office opened on Monday, and the new mayor has been energetically leading a much-needed campaign against litter.

Japan has successfully courted leaders in both Khartoum and Juba, but diplomacy with South Sudan will be more challenging for China. The majority of Sudan's oil is underneath Southern ground. However, all the pipelines, refineries and handling facilities are in the north, which has been sending 65% of its exports to China. The People's Republic gained some points this year in the South with the construction of a hospital in Unity State, Vice President Riek Machar's birthplace. But some of that goodwill was no doubt lost at the end of June, when Beijing hosted Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in the midst of his military aggression in the border areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and even parts of Unity State. The Government of Southern Sudan plans to build a pipeline south through Kenya, but it will be a long time until oil flows anywhere but north.

Oil diplomacy and relations with Khartoum will challenge the new country but the larger issue will be internal tribalism. Cross-ethnic cattle raiding, agriculturalist-pastoralist conflict, factionalism from wartime divisions within the South, and a perception of tribal favoritism in the government combine to create a lot of internal instability.

It is to foster reconciliation that the Church is focusing its work as independence comes. South Sudan has seen very high rates of conversion to Christianity within the last hundred—and even the last twenty—years. Most people at least partially identify with a church, which is often the only form of non-tribal civil society. The five main denominations are Roman Catholic, Episcopal, Presbyterian, Pentecostal, and Africa Inland Church. These and smaller churches are typically very united in message, though their demographics still often reflect earlier missionaries’ territorial division of labor. (Most Nuer Christians, for instance, are Presbyterian.)

The Church’s anti-tribalism strategy has been three-fold. It regularly preaches communal reconciliation, based on similar preaching for Jewish and Greek members of New Testament-era congregations. Together with the government, denominations also promote education, aiding development and occupying young would-be cattle keepers and cattle raiders. And thirdly, especially here in Juba, it preaches against corruption and nepotism, since those vices not only waste meager resources, but breed hostility toward the state.

Church, state, citizens, allies and friends will all have a lot of work to do starting July 10. But no matter how landlocked or unstable, on July 9th, the newly minted citizens of the Republic of South Sudan will be on top of the world.

Reporting by John Marienau Turpin who lives in Juba, South Sudan. He teaches Church History at Bishop Gwynne Episcopal Theological College and works with African Leadership and Reconciliation Ministries (ALARM). He worked for APP from 2004-05.

In Sympathy

On July 27th, APP staff and interns visited the Norwegian Embassy to express their sympathy with the country's national sorrow and to sign the condolence book.

Anders Behring Breivik was not the first right-wing Norwegian to betray his country. The most famous was Vidkun Quisling who gave Hilter Norway's defense plans allowing the German Reich to successfully invade the country. Quisling was made Minister-President during the war and executed by firing squad shortly after. His last name has forever become the ultimate description of a national traitor.

Power issues

On 16 July 2011, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) posted on its Englishwebsite a video clip taken by Japanese robot Quince showing inside of the No.2 reactor building of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Very Kool.

Switching to thermal power generation can cost ¥400,000,000,000 (Approximately$50.5billion)[Karyoku Daitai de Syotoku Ryusyutu 4-Chyo-Yen mo], 火力代替で所得流出4兆円も) by Tatsuo Kobayasi (小林辰男), Japan Center for Economic Research, July 15, 2011.

                    Japan would face a serious electricity shortage if all its 54 nuclear reactors stopped operating, since the country would be unable to bridge the gap with just fossil fuel power generation. If all the power plant shuts down, GDP would decrease 1.4% in 2011 and 2.2% by 2012, as Kobayashi forecasted. By 2020, the capacity of Nuclear Power generation will be half of what it is in 2011.

Reuters PressReport

Lessons learned

LESSONS LEARNED BY THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY IN THE AFTERMATH OF JAPAN'S MARCH 11 FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER. 7/18, 12:30pm, Washington DC. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speaker: Gregory Jaczko, chairman of Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Japan Nuclear Accident-NRC Actions.

BRIEFING ON THE TASK FORCE REVIEW OF NRC PROCESSES AND REGULATIONS FOLLOWING THE EVENTS IN JAPAN To provide the Commission a summary of the task force’s review and recommendations, if any, for changes to NRC processes and regulations. Rockville, MD. 7/19, 9:30am. Search link for video of meeting.

HARNESSING NATURAL RESOURCE FOR PEACE BUILDING: LESSONS FROM U.S. AND JAPANESE ASSISTANCE. 7/20, 8:30am-5:00pm, lunch, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Wilson Center (WWC). Speakers: Geoff Dabelko, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; John Cruden, Environmental Law Institute; Norio Yamamoto, Global Infrastructure Fund Research Foundation Japan; Carl Bruch, Environmental Law Institute; David Catarious, and Alison Lawlor Russell, Center for Naval Analyses; Mami Sato, University of Tokyo; Jon Unruh, McGill University; Ilona Coyle, Environmental Law Institute; Lisa Goldman & Sandra Nichols, Environmental Law Institute; Mikio Ishiwatari, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); Vladislav Michalcik, American University Washington College of Law; Cynthia Brady, and Oliver Agoncillo, U.S. Agency for International Development; Mikiyasu Nakayama, University of Tokyo; Mikiko Sugiura, Columbia University; Haruka Satoh, University of Tokyo; Jennifer Wallace, University of Maryland; Ken Conca, American University; Alex Fischer, Columbia University; Nao Shimoyachi-Yuzawa, Japan Institute of International Affairs.

THE GREAT EAST JAPAN EARTHQUAKE: LESSONS FOR JAPAN’S ENERGY POLICY, INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT, AND MEDIA COVERAGE. 7/21, 10:00am-Noon, Washington, DC. Sponsor: U.S.-Japan Research Institute. Speakers: Yoshiaki Abe, USJI Operating Adviser/University Professor, Waseda University; Mikiyasu Nakayama, Professor, Division of Environmental Studies, Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, University of Tokyo; Mikio Ishiwatari, Senior Advisor in disaster management and water resources management, JICA; Jennifer Sklarew, U.S.-Japan energy policy specialist; Mikiko Sugiura, Visiting Scholar of the Department of Civil Engineering Mechanics, Columbia University; Norio Yamamoto, Executive Vice President, Global Infrastructure Fund (GIF) Research Foundation Japan.

OPERATION TOMODACHI: SUPPORT, COMPASSION, COMMITMENT. 7/22, 1:30-2:30pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Japan-America Society of Washington DC. Speaker: Admiral Patrick M. Walsh, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

No guarantees for Japan after 2012: Will the Republicans bring anything new?

HUMZA AHMAD a former APP Research Assistant and current nonresident fellow and C.D. ALEXANDER EVANS, wrote an op-ed for The Japan Times, Friday, July 8, 2011 on what the Republicans presidential hopefuls might say about Japan. The result is a witty, amusing, and sometimes sad account of how little Japan will be noted in Republican foreign policy.

 NEW YORK — In recent years both the United States and Japan have seen leadership changes at the highest levels of government. In 2008, Democrat Barack Obama was elected U.S. president, followed in 2009 by the ascendance of the Democrat Party of Japan, ending the nearly unbroken postwar dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party.

 

After both changes of power, relationship managers on both sides of the Pacific scrambled to find out as much as they could about these new ruling parties and their new national leaders.

While a change of power is by no means assured, the 2012 U.S. presidential election holds the potential to bring a Republican back to the White House.

Although it is an open secret that the Japanese political elite have always been more comfortable with the pro-military, pro-free trade Republicans, a look at the current field of candidates leaves no guarantee that a Republican administration would strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationship.

Three of the candidates seem particularly negative. Michele Bachmann, a House member from Minnesota, called the Japanese health care system an example of "gangster government" in 2009 when she claimed that the threat of not receiving health care silenced open criticism of the system.

Ron Paul, a House member from Texas, is strongly in favor of free trade but he is strongly opposed to overseas U.S. military bases.

Rick Santorum, a former senator from Pennsylvania, voted for a bill in the Senate in 1995 that tried to limit sales of Japanese automobiles in the U.S. on purely protectionist grounds.

For Jon Huntsman, the former governor of Utah and former Ambassador to China, China seems to be a more important focus for America's attention.

According to sources close to the campaign, Huntsman's pro-China stance and cultural affinity for China (he was a Mormon missionary there and speaks fluent Mandarin) might translate to a negative perception of Japan, in general, and the U.S. military's presence there in particular.

Three of the candidates do seem quite positive. Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House of Representatives, has been in favor of a strong Japan-U.S. alliance, and traveled to Japan on a speaking tour in 2009.

Hanging on by a slender thread

President Barack Obama most likely will meet a fourth Japanese prime minister this September on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. He originally was supposed to have hosted Prime Minister Naoto Kan for a state visit in Washington. I, however, expect that PM Naoto Kan will be out of office in August, if not earlier, and his party, the DPJ, will just have time enough to elect a new party president and thus prime minister before the September UNGA.

Faulted for alleged ineptness in handling the earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disaster this spring, Kan, early this summer, promised to step down in order to avoid what could have been a fatal vote of no-confidence in the Lower House. Yet, he never said exactly when that would be. He has since sounded as if he is no rush to leave, angering the opposition camp and the many in his own party who want new leadership. The latest speculation is that he will step down sometimes in August after key legislation clears the extended session of the Diet.

Most Japanese have long ago given up on the Kan administration. Nothing that Kan has touched with his policy finger since coming into office a year ago has turned to gold. Instead, most of his agenda has ended up in the dustbin. With little to show in terms of domestic and foreign policy accomplishments, Kan’s once heady popularity has suffered accordingly.

Only weeks ago, his support rate in the polls was hovering in the low to mid-twenty percent range, but in the latest NHK poll, it plunged to 16 percent, a record low. Asahi’s poll was even worse, 15 percent, down from last month’s 22 percent. Kan’s predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, had a 17 percent support rate in the Asahi poll when he resigned. The vast majority of Japanese, the polls show, want Kan out by August. The Asahi’s poll registered this view as being held by 80 percent.

Kan’s recent reshuffling of his cabinet was rather meaningless – one new appointee, Reconstruction Minister Ryu Matsumoto, was forced to quit after a week when he bad-mouthed earthquake victims (he was hospitalized recently). One disgruntled Cabinet member, METI Minister Banri Kaieda, has hinted at quitting over energy policy differences with Kan. The Prime Minister’s unilateral, uncoordinated decisions have left his cabinet and party frustrated. No one seems to know what he will do next, and many suspect he is just stalling in order to prolong his political life. Despite the chorus in the DPJ calling for his resignation, Kan still keeps chugging along as if he single-handedly can get things done. Kan has increasingly isolated himself.

The China threat

CHINA IN 2020: A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER. 6/15, 2:00-3:45pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings. Speakers: Hu Angang, Director, Center for China Studies, Tsinghua University; Nicholas R. Lardy, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Cheng Li, Director of Research, John L. Thornton China Center.

CHINA’S FIVE-YEAR PLAN, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS, AND OUTSOURCING. 6/15, 9:00am-3:15pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Speakers: Rep. Tim Murphy (R-PA); Dr. Willy C. Shih, Professor of Management Practice, Harvard Business School; Dr. Eswar Prasad, Nandlal P. Tolani Professor of Trade Policy, Cornell University and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; Dr. Adam Segal, Ira A. Lipman Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and National Security Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Mr. John Neuffer, Vice President for Global Policy, Information Technology Industry Council; Dr. Dieter Ernst, Senior Fellow, East-West Center; Dr. Ralph E. Gomory, Research Professor, NYU Stern School of Business and President Emeritus, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; Mr. Leo Hindery, Jr., Chairman, U.S. Economy/Smart Globalization Initiative, New America Foundation; Dr. Philip I. Levy, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute.

DEATH BY CHINA. 6/16, Noon-1:30pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: American Iron and Steel Institute. Speakers: Peter Navarro, Business Professor, Paul Merage School of Business, University of California-Irvine; Greg Autry, Economics Professor, Paulo Merage School of Business, University of California-Irvine; Richard Fisher, senior fellow of Asian military affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center; Richard McCormack, editor and publisher of Manufacturing and Technology News; Peter Morici, professor of international business at the University of Maryland; and Alan Tonelson, research fellow of the U.S. Business and Industrial Council Educational Foundation.

FRIEND, FOE, OR FALLACY: HOW TO THINK ABOUT CHINA’S RISE. 6/16, 12:45-1:45pm, Washington, DC. Sponsor: New American Foundation (NAF). Speakers: Ely Ratner, Associate Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Steven Weber, Professor of Political Science and the School of Information, University of California-Berkley.

CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: IS IT A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, DOMESTICALLY OR GLOBALLY? 6/21, 10:00am–Noon, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Wilson Center and Asia Society Washington Center. Speakers: Daniel H. Rosen, Rhodium Group; Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation; J.Stapleton Roy, Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.

Shangri-La Previewed

The above talk given by Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell at CSIS on May 31, previews many of the points the US government hopes to make at this weekend's Shangri-La Dialogue where anyone who is anybody goes to discuss Asia. APP member, The Cable Guy Josh Rogin, has a good summary of the presentation HERE. Essentially, Campbell made it very firm that the US has strategic interests in the region and is not going away anytime soon.

Note that the talk was very focused on Southeast Asia with little reference to China, Japan or Korea except as elements of cooperation.

Can Kan Survive?

Getty Images

By tomorrow we will know if the Kan government has survived. On Thursday, June 2 the opposition LDP and New Komeito coalition promises to bring a no-confidence motion to a vote. How many rebels within Kan’s own party, the DPJ, will join is the question. Note, it is not “whether” but “how many.” No matter the outcome, Prime Minister Kan’s leadership is shaken and the DPJ is shredded.

The G8 Summit and the bilateral with President Obama was important for Prime Minister Naoto Kan. They bolstered Japan’s international presence as well as the beleaguered leader’s image. At home, Japan’s triple disasters have created profound physical and psychological damage. Japanese remain panicked about the continued radiation from Fukushima.

Kan is under heavy criticism for his allegedly bungling responses, particularly to the nuclear accident. Kan and his cabinet have been pummeled daily in the Diet and the press. The U.S.-Japan summit meeting thus turned into an anchor of calm for Japan in a sea of political chaos at home.

Japan needed the personal assurances of its good friend and ally, the U.S., that the bilateral relationship remains high on the President’s agenda, including assistance to help its long-term recovery. That being said, the bilateral meeting did not address pending problems, nor was it supposed to. It simply gave Kan more time to work on domestic issues such as the future course of the Futenma relocation issue and Japan’s preparations for possibly joining TPP – hopefully by the Prime Minister’s official U.S. visit, now delayed to September.

That is, if Kan can survive politically beyond tomorrow.

Kan’s visible presence among the G8 leaders, his speeches that showed Japan’s resolve, and promises on the energy front were impressive. It was also good for the Japanese people to see their leader no longer in a crisis-management mode, but actively engaged in fulfilling the international responsibilities of his position. Press reaction initially to his summit diplomacy was positive. The media have been far less friendly, though, on the highly volatile issue of managing the nuclear crisis set off by the Fukushima disaster.

Kan may have bought some time with the U.S., but the political opposition in the Diet has not given him any slack. He returned from France not only with heavy Summit homework to address, but also a Diet in turmoil, key bills in limbo, and a reinvigorated opposition camp ready to submit a no-confidence motion against him. The irony of the U.S. President praising Kan’s leadership, when it is under severe attack at home, was not lost on the Japanese media.

It is likely that some of the anti-Kan forces in the DPJ, mostly loyal followers of former Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa, will bolt from the party to support the motion. DPJ leaders have warned that they would throw any rebels out of the party. Nevertheless, former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has also indicated that he will support the no-confidence motion. Further, on Wednesday evening three Vice Ministers and two Parliamentary Secretaries turned in their resignations to the government. The five men, all close to Ozawa, said that they had to resign in order to vote for the no confidence motion.*

As of today (June 1, U.S. time), it still seems unlikely that there will be enough rebels (85 or so needed) to allow the motion to pass. Conventional wisdom, however, has the number at around 50. Kan told the Diet he was not about to resign with his job of reconstructing Japan undone, and the DPJ has warned that the Prime Minister might dissolve the Diet as punishment to the rebels and the LDP.

But an election could be political suicide for the DPJ. At least four political pundits have predicted that if there were a snap election, the DPJ would lose badly, with the LDP winning big enough to put it back into power with the Komeito. Recently, however, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled the previous Diet elections unconstitutional. They can prohibit another election until the Diet fixes the apportionment inequalities in the voting system. It is anybody's guess how this political drama will play out, but the mood of the public is very negative that at a time of national calamity the politicians are playing a game of chicken.

Assuming he survives this ordeal, Kan must then start to work on delivering on his G8 Summit homework. His still-to-fleshed out energy plan, announced at the OECD, is bold and ambitious, but the target, for example, of doubling reliance on renewable energy by 2020 is seen as admirable as it is unattainable. And whether the Japanese economy – and society – can take another 10 years of austere restrictions on energy – another target – remains to be seen. There is fear in industry that power restrictions and rising costs could drive even more production offshore.

On the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Kan would like Japan to join, but the domestic obstacles to including agriculture among Japan’s concessions remain even more formidable now after the earthquake that destroyed precious farmland in the north. The delay in TPP preparations also has given anti-TPP forces the advantage in their campaign to convince the public that joining would “destroy” Japanese agriculture. The new arrival sections of bookstores are already filling with such propaganda.

It is the herculean task of finally resolving the Futenma base relocation issue that may ultimately make or break Mr. Kan. Committed firmly to implementing the current relocation plan, the central government must now do the kind of heavy lifting in Okinawa that it previously was loathe to do – namely, convince the governor and local officials to allow the base to agree to let the base be moved to another part of Okinawa and not out of the prefecture.

Defense Minister Kitazawa’s meeting last week with Okinawa’s Governor Nakaima went predictably nowhere. Whether the exhausted Kan Cabinet, assuming is survives the June crisis, has the will and the energy to devote to convincing Okinawa to swallow a very bitter pill that is likely to include offers of significant economic measures to affected areas to win them over remains unclear. And frankly, neither the DPJ rebels nor the too long ruling and opposition LDP have proposed better solutions.

Spiteful politics is no way to run a country.

William Brooks

APP Senior Fellow

Mindy Kotler

APP Director

*The five, all Lower House lawmakers, are Shozo Azuma, senior vice minister at the Cabinet Office, Wakio Mitsui, senior vice minister of land, infrastructure, transport and tourism, Katsumasa Suzuki, senior vice minister of internal affairs and communications, Akira Uchiyama, parliamentary secretary of internal affairs and communications, and Takeshi Hidaka, parliament secretary of environment.