Monday Asia Events October 23, 2023

CHINA’S STANDING IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH – TAKEAWAYS FROM THE BELT AND ROAD FORUM. 10/23, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Victoria Chonn-Ching, Nonresident Fellow, Atlantic Council; Michael Schuman, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Atlantic Council; Oscar Meywa Otele, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Nairobi; Sanusha Naidu, Senior Research Associate, Institute for Global Dialogue. 

US LAUNCH OF THE 2023 OECD GOING FOR GROWTH REPORT. 10/23, 9:00am-12:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Adam S. Posen, PIIE president; Luiz de Mello, director of the Policy Studies Branch at the Economics Department of the OECD. 

BEYOND CLIMATE: HOW NATURE LOSS UNDERMINES PEACE AND SECURITY. 10/23, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Center for American Progress (CAP); The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD); World Wildlife Fund (WWF). Speakers: Monica Medina, President and CEO, Wildlife Conservation Society; Andrew Zolli, Chief Impact Officer, Planet; Dr Winnie Kiiru, Executive Director, Mpala Research Centre; Dr Erin McFee, Professor of Practice, Climate Security, William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies.

 CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY’S (CISA) EVOLVING .GOV MISSION: REPORT ROLLOUT EVENT. 10/23, 10:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS, International Security Program. Speakers: Emily Harding, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, International Security Program; Malcolm Harkins, Former Chief Security & Privacy Officer, Intel; Benjamin Jensen, Senior Fellow, Future War, Gaming, and Strategy, and International Security Program; Dr. Phyllis Schneck, Vice President and Chief Information Security Officer, Northrop Grumman; David Simon, Global Co-Head of Cybersecurity & Data Privacy, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom; Suzanne Spaulding, Senior Adviser for Homeland Security, CSIS. 

HUMANITARIAN EXEMPTIONS TO SANCTIONS IN NORTH KOREA. 10/23, 12:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea. Speakers: Hazel Smith, Professorial Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Professor Emerita in International Security at Cranfield University, UK, Advisory fellow at the North Korea Economic Studies section of the Korea Development Institute (KDI) Seoul, Fellow, the Royal Society of Arts since 1996; Troy Stangarone, Senior Director, Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute (KEI). 

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR ENERGY: AI & ENERGY TECHNOLOGY DISCOVERY. 10/23, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs. Speaker: Rick L. Stevens, Associate Laboratory Director for Computing, Environment, and Life Sciences, Argonne National Laboratory. 

THE OUTLOOK FOR ISRAEL’S MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST HAMAS. 10/23, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Jon B. Alterman, senior vice president, Middle East Program Director, CSIS; Emily Harding, Deputy Director, International Security Program, CSIS; Norman T. Roule, Senior Adviser, Transnational Threats Project, CSIS. 

FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ISRAEL ALLIANCE AT 75. 10/23, 1:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: Victoria Coates, Ph.D., Vice President, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation; Robert Greenway, Director, Center for National Defense, The Heritage Foundation; Eyal Hulata, Ph.D., Senior International Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Ellie Cohanim, Senior Fellow, Independent Women's Forum; Ludovic Hood, Senior Advisor, Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, U.S. Department of State; Kenneth L. Marcus, Founder and Chairman, Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under Law; Charles Asher Small, DPhil., Founding Director and President, Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy; Amb. Ronald S. Lauder, President, World Jewish Congress. 

PUTIN’S “TURN TO THE EAST” IN THE XI JINPING ERA. 10/23, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: co- editor Gilbert Rozman, Emeritus Musgrave Professor of Sociology, Princeton University; Editor-in-Chief, The Asan Forum; Gaye Christoffersen Co-Editor, Putin’s “Turn to the East” in the Xi Jinping Era. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/46wdM3C

THE FIRST 25 YEARS: UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (USCIRF) ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND NEXT STEPS. 10/23, 3:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). Speakers: Abraham Cooper, Chair, USCIRF; Frederick A. Davie, Vice Chair, USCIRF; Frank Wolf, Commissioner, USCIRF; Don Nickles, Former Senator; Joe Lieberman, Former Senator; Tom Lantos, Former Co-Chair, Human Rights Commission (TLHRC). 

CONGRESS AND BIDEN'S INITIAL SUCCESS IN COUNTERING CHINA'S CHALLENGES. 10/23, 3:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: GW Elliott School Research Program. Speaker: Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, Elliott School, George Washington University, Author Congress and China Policy: Past Episodic, Recent Enduring Influence. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Fkqjep

DREAMS FOR A DECADE: INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR ABOLITIONISM AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR. 10/23, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Author Stephanie L. Freeman, Historian, US Department of State, Susan Colbourn, Associate Director of the Program in American Grand Strategy, Duke University; Svetlana Savranskaya, Member, History and Public Policy Program Advisory Board; Luc-André Brunet, Senior Lecturer in Contemporary International History, The Open University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/45yuQVh

THE WAR OVER CHINESE TALENT IN THE U.S.' WITH DAVID ZWEIG. 10/23, 4:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: China and the World Program, Columbia-Harvard. Speaker: David Zweig (Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 1983), Professor Emeritus, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Taipei School of Economics and Political Science, National Tsinghua University, Taiwan. 

VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RUSSIA: AND THE USES OF WAR. 10/23, 4:30-5:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: author Leon Aron, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kori Schake, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3PReily/

NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES AND THE ENERGY TRANSITION: LOOKING TO COP28 AND BEYOND. 10/23, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA. Speakers: Erica Downs, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA; Tatiana Mitrova, Research Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA; Luisa Palacios, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA; Karen E. Young, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia SIPA. 

Monday Asia Events, October 16, 2023

JAPAN’S MIDDLE POWER DIPLOMACY IN AN ERA OF U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY. 10/16, 8:00-9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: Mike Mochizuki, Japan-US Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur, George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, Non-Resident Fellow, Quincy Institute; Yoshihide Soeya, Professor Emeritus, Keio University; Hitoshi Tanaka, Special Advisor, Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute, Ltd; Kuniko Ashizawa teaches international relations at the School of International Service, American University, and at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. 

PEACE IN THE PACIFIC: A CONVERSATION WITH FORMER INDO-PACIFIC COMMANDERS. 10/16, 11:00-11:50am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Philip S. Davidson, Former Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command; Harry B. Harris Jr., Former Commander, US Indo-Pacific Command; Eric Sayers, Nonresident Fellow, AEI. 

A CONVERSATION WITH U.S. NAVY COMPTROLLER HON. RUSSELL RUMBAUGH. 10/16, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Hon. Russell Rumbaugh, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management & Comptroller); Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director of the Reimagining US Grand Strategy Program; Rachel Stohl, Vice President of Research Programs. 

US-JAPAN DEFENSE UPDATE: A LOOK AHEAD. 10/16, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute for Contemporary Asian Studies. Speaker: Lieutenant Colonel John Wright, US Air Force Foreign Area Officer. 

WHY WILL INDONESIA BECOME MORE IMPORTANT AND WHAT DOES THAT MEAN FOR JAPAN AND THE US? 10/16, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Speakers: Masafumi Ishii, Former Ambassador of Japan to Indonesia; Ann Marie Murphy, Adjunct Research Scholar, WEAI; Gerald L. Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus of Political Science. 

The Kishida Administration’s Second Anniversary:

Few Accomplishments Lots of Politics

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, retired Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 9, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

Two years have passed since Fumio Kishida became Prime Minister on October 4, 2021. During this time, no outstanding achievements can be seen except for adherence to the political agenda set by former administrations: namely, expanding the security budget and discharging radioactive Fukushima processed water into the sea. Unsurprisingly, public support for the Kishida Cabinet is low and declining. As seen in the recent reshuffling of his Cabinet and the appointment of new leaders of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Kishida is still struggling to maintain his administration.

Kishida faced two historical challenges last year: Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the assassination of former prime minister Shinzo Abe. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, Kishida boldly and directly accused Russia of “aggression.” This response might have been milder and more diplomatic if Abe were still in office.

Kishida’s hardline policy toward Russia hurt future negotiations with Russia. But it may have been worth the price. Kishida’s leadership at the Group of Seven (G7) summit meeting in Hiroshima this past May, in which the world leaders stood together with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy against Russia, increased his popularity in the polls.

Kishida was tested as a national leader when Abe was shot to death last summer. Kishida was unable to generate a broad discussion in the Diet about whether the administration would decide to have a national funeral for Abe. As a result, Kishida only considered the emotions of conservative groups in the LDP. Once it became clear that the shooter’s motivation was a grievance against the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification, Kishida was slow in disclosing the relationship between the religious organization and LDP.

Polls show that the support for the Kishida administration, which rose gradually at the beginning, declined steeply after the assassination of Abe. This volatility has continued. Public support lifted again in the first half of this year when Kishida was the chairman of the G7, but it fell again with public frustration with the implementation of the My Number identification card and with money scandals of LDP lawmakers.

A litmus test for a political leader is how it handles controversial issues. Kishida renewed the three major documents for defense last December, enabling the Self-Defense Force to have a capability of attacking enemy bases. While it has a possibility of violating the principle of exclusively defense-oriented policy the constitution requires, Kishida avoided discussing the constitutionality of the capability in the Diet. Kishida administration decided to expand defense budget to ¥43 trillion in next five years. But he has not explained how to accumulate the budget to that level. Taxpayers are worried about additional tax increase, dubbing Kishida “the tax raiser wearing glasses.” Anyway, those defense policies are in the agenda that Kishida inherited from Abe administration.

The list of administration scandals has swollen. Some Ministers of Kishida Cabinet stepped down last year because of complex relationships with FFWPU, gaffes, or money scandals. The most recent revelation was of an inappropriate relationship between a LDP lawmaker and a businessman involved in wind power generation. Kishida did not exercise leadership to improve ethical aspect of political activities of his colleagues.

Because the Kishida administration lacks clear policy goals, public support has remained low. At the beginning of his administration, Kishida insisted on reviving his faction of the LDP, the Kochi-kai. His predecessor, Abe, led a different faction, the Seiwa-kai, which stood for strong leadership and invited controversy on its hawkish stance. By contrast, Kishida’s Kochi-kai faction focuses more on the economy than security. Kishida has proposed some policies, such as doubling people’s income or “the garden city concept,” which traced the projects of former Kochi-kai leaders such as Hayato Ikeda and Masayoshi Ohira. These policies have not, however, worked out well in Kishida administration.

Such modest policies were not the high-profile goals of the second Abe administration that began in December 2012. Soon after he took the office, Abe announced the “three arrows” of Abenomics: bold monetary policy, mobilization of fiscal policy and growth strategy. He appointed Haruhiko Kuroda as Governor of Bank of Japan, who continuously issued surprising monetary easing policies. Abe also did not hide his intention to amend the constitution, particularly to allow amendments on the basis of a simple majority rather than the two-thirds supermajority required in Article 96.

Kishida is more interested in the ordinary life of the people rather than in state management. Wage hikes or increases in the birth rate are less economic policy and more moderate conservative social policy. But those policies do not hold strong appeal because they take a long time to show results. For example, the government’s increased support for young couples will not raise the birth rate anytime soon.

In an administration with low popularity, political manipulations take center stage. Removing Yoshimasa Hayashi as Foreign Minister in the recent Cabinet reshuffle was a tactic by Kishida to help his reelection next year as LDP president. Hayashi’s main job now is to enhance solidarity within the Kochi-kai and establish firm support within the LDP for Kishida’s reelection.

The good news for Kishida is the unpopularity of the opposition parties. No party other than the LDP has more than ten percent support in the opinion polls. Even though Kishida is unpopular, the opposition parties will not be able to achieve victory in next general election. The upcoming by-elections on October 22 in the Tokushima-Kochi District for the House of Councillors and in the Nagasaki 4th for the House of Representatives will be a good gauge of the public’s approval of Kishida’s policies. The results promise to influence the prime minister’s decision on whether to hold a much-discussed snap election.

Monday October 9, 2023 Asia Events

Monday October 9 is a national holiday in the United States. It is Columbus Day/Indigenous People's Day. All businesses and government are closed. 

GLOBAL MULTIDIMENSIONAL POVERTY INDEX 2023. 10/9, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI), UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report Office (HDRO), and George Washington University’s Institute for International Economic Policy (IIEP). Speaker: Sabina Alkire, Professor of Poverty and Human Development and director of the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (OPHI) at the University of Oxford. 

ANALYSIS OF THE ISRAEL-HAMAS WAR. 10/9, Noon–1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Michael Doran, Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East; Can Kasapoğlu, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute; Jonathan Schachter, Senior Fellow, Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East. 

Kishida's Political Calculations

Kishida’s Economic Measures Have Political Motivations

By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 1, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

Suffering from consistently low public support for his administration, Prime Minister Kishida ordered September 25th the preparation of a package of economic measures to relieve inflation and wage growth. Kishida will submit a supplemental budget bill to an extraordinary session of the Diet later this month. He has even referred to a possibility of tax reduction. This announcement has invited speculation about a snap election by the end of this year.

The planned economic measures consist of five pillars: protection from inflation, sustainable wage growth, promotion of domestic investment, overcoming demographic decline, and infrastructure to enhance safety and security. Sustainable wage growth typically receives the most paid attention.

Kishida may also attempt to reform the pension and health insurance system. Embedded in the system is the so-called “wall of ¥1.3 million.” That is, a worker who earns ¥1.3 million or more annually is no longer included with another worker’s – i.e., the spouse’s -- “dependent family.” The worker who has breached the wall must pay for pension and health insurance of his/her own.

In a family, the wall affects the lower-earning spouse. If a woman--and women typically earn less than men in Japan--is part of the dependent family of her husband, her pension and health insurance is covered by her husband. If her yearly income is less than ¥1.3 million, the payment for her pension and health insurance is paid by the company she works for. Her husband also can accept ¥380 thousands of reduction from his income tax for supporting his dependent family. But once the wife’s income exceeds ¥1.3 million, she and her husband no longer enjoy these benefits. In some cases, then, the wife is better off being her husband’s dependent family without any job than being an independent worker who has to pay for her own pension and health insurance.

Kishida supports only a temporary fix, either ¥500 thousand subsidy for each worker or a two-year moratorium on enforcement of the ¥1.3 million wall. The current system was established in 1986, when women were only beginning to gain financial and independence, and the government sought to support women unable to take that step. In the thirty-seven years since then, job prospects for women have improved. Fundamental system reform is needed, rather than one-time stop-gap measures.

Temporary relief is also the plan for other pillars. To address inflation, the subsidy for gasoline, electricity or gas, set expire at the end of this year may continue into next year. To raise workers’ wage, the government plans a tax cut for employers who have increased wages. To increase business investment the government may provide some support for semi-conductor industries.

Where does the money come from? Article 29 of Public Finance Act allows supplemental appropriations only when an urgent need arises after the yearly budget has been wrapped up. Inflation relief and wage growth may be urgent, demographic decline and infrastructure safety are not.

Furthermore, there is a fundamental question about the necessity of economic measures now, when Japan’s economy is not in a serious slump. According to the estimate of Cabinet Office, GDP gap in the second quarter of this year marked +0.4%, which meant total demand surpassed total supply for the first time in these fifteen quarters. Bank of Japan sees that “Japan’s economy is likely to continue recovering moderately.”

Nevertheless, Kishida insists on delivering stimulus measures, including tax reduction. “Now, we have to properly return the increased tax revenue, which is our achievement of growth, to the people,” Kishida said in his press conference. This statement caused speculation about a snap election within this year, because tax cuts typically garner higher popularity for incumbents.

The supplementary budget will be submitted to the next Diet session starting on October 20th. “I’m focusing on economic issues that cannot be delayed,” said Kishida, when asked about the possibility of snap election. As long as a snap election is a possibility, the opposition parties are unlikely to debate the supplementary measures aggressively. For Kishida, economic measures are merely tools to control politics.

What did the Okinawa Governor say in Geneva?

On September 18, 2023, Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa, Japan under the auspices of Shimin Gaikou Centre (Citizens' Diplomatic Centre for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples) testified to the session for the Interactive Dialogue with the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order at the 54th session of the Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland.

Tamaki was the first Okinawa governor in eight years to deliver a speech on the problem of military bases on the island at a UN Human Rights Council meeting. In 2015, then-Okinawa governor Takeshi Onaga spoke out against the creation of the Henoko airfield as a replacement for the one at Futenma. Onaga stated "the Okinawan people are being deprived of their right to self-determination and their human rights." Tamaki declared the same.

In Geneva, the current governor held talks with officials with a number of officials with HRC. He was to speak again at the Council, at a meeting on toxic substances, but there was not enough time. Some speakers reportedly had gone over their time. Funny how that happens.

His plea to respect of the human rights of Okinawan people and to lessen the burden of military bases on the islands was countered and condemned by the Japanese government and the rightwing press.

POSTED DOCUMENT. FULL TEXT BELOW  

FOR AN AUDIO RECORDING CLICK HERE, click the > at the right and click play

For context see: Commentary by Takya Nishmura.

ID with IE on international order

Oral Statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council by the governor of Okinawa Item 3: interactive dialogue with the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and equitable international order - Interactive Dialogue

(193 words, 2:28:11 minutes)

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I am Denny Tamaki, Governor of Okinawa, Japan.

I am here today to ask the world to witness the situation in Okinawa, where the concentration of the American bases threatens the peace, and prevents equal participation in decision-making.

Okinawa covers only 0.6% of Japan’s total land area, but 70% of all the U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated on our small island.

Furthermore, the Japanese government is imposing the construction of a new American base in Okinawa by reclaiming the precious sea areas, which I believe will further increase the burden on my people. The reclamation proceeds despite the fact that it was clearly opposed by Okinawan voters in a democratically-held referendum.

We are afraid that the build-up of military capabilities will increase tensions in the areas around Japan, and lead to unexpected situations. This is totally incompatible with Okinawan people’s aspiration for peace.

We call for the stronger diplomatic efforts by the relevant governments to embody in our region the “right to peace,” which was adopted at the 2016 United Nations General Assembly.

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak here today.

Monday October 3, 2023 Events on Asia

ALLIED PERSPECTIVES ON SEMICONDUCTOR EXPORT CONTROLS. 10/2, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Gregory C. Allen, Editor of the report and CSIS director; Emily Benson, Director, Project on Trade and Technology and Senior Fellow, CSIS; Chau-Chyun Chang, Senior Strategy Executive Director, Industry, Science and Technology International Strategy Center; Francesca Ghiretti, Analyst, Mercator Institute for China Studies; Jan-Peter Kleinhans, Director, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung; Rem Korteweg, Senior Research Fellow, Clingendael Institute; Wonho Yeon, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy. 

NEW TOOLS FOR ACCELERATING PROGRESS IN ENDING TUBERCULOSIS: THE LANCET COMMISSION ON TUBERCULOSIS REPORT, 2023. 10/2, 2:00-3:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Katherine E. Bliss, Senior Fellow and Director, Immunizations and Health Systems Resilience, Global Health Policy Center; Nidhi Bouri, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Global Health, U.S. Agency for International Development; Anthony Fauci, Distinguished University Professor of Medicine at Georgetown University; Eric Goosby, Professor of Medicine at the University of California at San Francisco. 

INTERNAL SECURITY IN INDIA: VIOLENCE, ORDER, AND THE STATE. 10/2, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Amit Ahuja, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Fellow, Woodrow Wilson International Center; Devesh Kapur, Starr Foundation Professor, South Asian Studies at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Rachel Kleinfeld, Senior Fellow, Carnegie’s Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program; Ashley J. Tellis, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs, Senior Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

BREAKING THE DOLLAR'S MONOPOLY: HOW CHINA'S REGIONAL DE-DOLLARIZATION INITIATIVE IS RESHAPING INTERNATIONAL FINANCE WITH ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU. 10/2, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Harvard China and the World Program; Columbia Weatherhead East Asian Institute. Speaker: Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE COST OF CLIMATE: HOW CAN COUNTRIES PAY FOR CLIMATE ACTION? 10/2, 11:00-12:00 (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development. Speakers: Raphael Lam, Deputy Division Chief, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund (IMF); Christine Richmond, Deputy Division Chief, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF; Min Zhu, Vice Chairman of China Centre for International Economic Exchanges, and Envoy of Sino-UK Professional and Financial Service for the Belt and Road Initiative; Ruud de Mooij, Deputy Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, IMF; Carolyn Fischer, Research Manager, Development Research Group, World Bank.

Japan at the UN General Assembly

PM Kishida Defends Human Dignity at the UN

Or Does He?

By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 25, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

To exercise Japan’s leadership in the international community, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida focused on “human dignity” in his speech at the General Debate of United Nations General Assembly on September 19th. Citing Japan’s non-permanent membership in UN Security Council and presidency in Group of Seven, Kishida proposed A World Caring for Human Dignity to “respond to the desperate desire for Peace and the pleas of vulnerable people seeking help.” So, what would Japan do for that?

Kishida insisted that Japan had led human-centered international cooperation, based on the concept of human security. In the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, then Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori declared that Japan would put “human security” on the center of its diplomacy. Considering the tradition of Japan’s UN diplomacy, Kishida requested further efforts to achieve Sustainable Development Goals, which is highly popular in the business sector in Japan. “The key is to ‘invest in people,’ which is my pollical credo,” said Kishida.

However, does Kishida administration invest in its own people enough? Although he told that “Japan aims to reduce inequalities and overcome social divisions by promoting women’s participation,” his choice of no female State Minister or Parliamentary Vice-Minister earlier this month was criticized as the consequence of woman lawmakers’ shortage in Liberal Democratic Party. He is responsible for achieving more accesses of women to politics by increasing female lawmakers in LDP.

What Kishida emphasized the most in his speech was the nuclear issue. Calling nuclear disarmament his lifelong mission, Kishida touched on the significance of promoting Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and pledged ¥3 billion of contribution to newly establishment of “Japan Chair” at overseas research institutes and think tanks. In the backdrop of General Assembly, Kishida co-sponsored with the leaders of Australia and Philippines a commemorative high-level event on FMCT. “The concept of an FMCT was proposed 30 years ago. Hence, experts have engaged in numerous dialogues over its technical elements. Unfortunately, negotiations on an FMCT have still not begun, but we are in need of an FMCT than ever before,” told Kishida in his opening statement.

In spite of his eagerness to nuclear disarmament, Japan is well known as turning its back to Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which has already been signed by over 90 UN member countries. Considering his diligent effort for promoting FMCT this time, it is obvious that Kishida focuses more on FMCT than TPNW. What we need to see is the number of member countries. If Japan wants to outreach the countries called Global South, the easier way should be joining the treaty at least as an observer at first.

Denouncing Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Kishida required reinforced UN. “Initiatives to limit the use of the veto, which exacerbates division and confrontation in the UN, will strengthen and restore confidence in the Security Council,” he said. While the appeal can be paralleled with what Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy demanded to the member countries in General Debate, the intention of Japan is always regarded as connected to its ambition to join the permanent members, whenever it refers to Security Council reform. It would be notable that Russia also hopes to expand the member counties to erode the Western power in the council.

“Facing severe situation of the world today, we need a common language for human beings to achieve an international community for cooperation,” Kishida said, gingerly reading a prepared statement at his press conference after his UN speech. Being the top leader of a nation with over twenty thousand of yearly suicides or pervasive discrimination against ethnical or sexual minorities, was he successful in resonating his words to the people in the world?

Nothing New

Kishida Preserves His Administration

By Takuya Nishimura, Former Editorial Writer, The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
September 18, 2023. Special to Asia Policy Point

You can find his blog, J Update here.

On September 13th, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida reshuffled his Cabinet for the second time since coming to power in October 2021. Although personnel changes are ordinarily made to tackle difficult issues, Kishida focused on the balance of power in his administration. He reappointed most key Cabinet ministers and leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Kishida must have thought that he had to preserve the LDP’s positions in the administration in order to garner their support in the presidential election next year.

The main point of the reshuffle was not about the Cabinet, but the LDP Board. The key structure of the board was maintained. Vice-President Taro Aso, Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi and Chairman of Policy Research Council Koichi Hagiuda from the Abe group were retained remained in the same positions. The new Chairman of the General Council Hiroshi Moriyama leads the smallest faction.

According to the news reports, Kishida once wanted to replace Motegi, who did not conceal his ambition to succeed him. But considering that his faction is only the fourth largest in the LDP, Kishida was afraid that the Motegi group could further distance itself from his administration, if Motegi left the board. Kishida finally decided to let Motegi stay in his current position.

To deter Motegi’s plan to run in the next presidential election, Kishida picked Yuko Obuchi, a daughter of late, former Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, for one of the four pillars on the LDP Board, the Chair of Election Strategy Committee. It gives her a chance to sell herself as another possible candidate for president in the Motegi group. Obuchi has strong support from her father’s close colleagues: Keizo’s successor Yoshiro Mori, who still has a considerable influence in the Abe group, and Mikio Aoki, who had not been a supporter of Motegi in the Motegi group.

The Yomiuri Shimbun and other newspapers reported that Kishida considered bringing Hagiuda into the cabinet as Chief Cabinet Secretary, hoping for a closer relationship with the largest Abe group. Hagiuda has been criticized, however, for his close relationship with Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (formerly the Unification Church, FFWPU). The relationship of FFWPU with a number of LDP lawmakers has caused low popularity of Kishida administration. Kishida and his staff finally gave up on the idea.

These decisions show that the main reason for the reshuffling and renewing LDP board members was to establish a firm basis of the administration to ensure victory in the presidential election next year. Kishida naming five women to ministerial positions, equaling the record of largest number of women in a cabinet, also reflects Kishida’s desire to increase public support for his reelection.

Some points in the reshuffling are hard to understand. Japan is the chair country of Group of Seven meeting later this fall, but Kishida chose to replace Yoshimasa Hayashi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs with Yoko Kamikawa. Kamikawa is known as the former Minister of Justice who signed death penalty orders for thirteen prisoners of Aum Shinrikyo in 2018. Both Hayashi and Kamikawa are affiliated with the Kishida group.

Since Kamikawa has little experience as a diplomat, Kishida said that he would lead diplomacy himself. Hayashi’s recent denouncement of Russian aggression in Ukraine and his remarks on the reconstruction of Ukraine might have presented a challenge to the prime minister.

If Kishida wants to raise his support, why didn’t he replace the ministers who faced public unpopularity? Minister in Charge of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi accused the Ministry of Internal Affair of fabricating her remarks in documents over impartiality in the Broadcasting Law. But no evidence supported the attack. It is obvious that she will be targeted by the opposition parties in the Diet discussion.

Elsewhere, the Minister for Digital Transformation, Taro Kono, has apologized publicly for several critical mistakes in registering people to the new healthcare system connected to My Number Card. Cabinet reshuffling was a good opportunity for a fresh restart for healthcare reform led by a new Minister for Digital Transformation, but Kishida missed it.

Blunt political considerations may explain why Takaichi and Kono survived the recent reshuffling. Both were contenders against Kishida in the 2021 LDP presidential election. Takaichi is one of the possible leaders in the conservative group, and Kono can be a candidate for the future prime minister in Aso group. Kishida possibly took the influence of the conservative and Aso groups into consideration.

Given the deference accorded two problematic ministers, it is ironic that Kishida replaced the Minister for Children Affairs and the Minister of Defense, both of whom are in charge of issues Kishida focuses on, in order to bring some element of newness to the cabinet.

Two meanings can be seen in picking Yoshitaka Shindo, an ultraconservative lawmaker whose grandfather was the supreme commander of Japan Imperial Army in the Battle of Iwo Jima and the head of a conservative group called 'League of Lawmakers Taking Action for Protecting Japan’s Territory.' One is a message to the conservative group in LDP that Kishida is taking good care of the conservative issues, including promoting constitutional amendment. But if Kishida is so serious about amending the Constitution, Shindo should stay in the LDP and manage the issue in the Diet. Another approach should be to separate Shindo from Motegi. Shindo has been a firm supporter of Motegi in his group. People will see how Motegi’s leadership in his group will be affected by the latest reshuffling.

In spite of all the above elements on the revived administration, Kishida claimed that his goal was not solely to preserve the political life of his administration. His focus was policy. Kishida said in his press conference on the 13th that he would focus on three issues: economy, society, and diplomacy and security.

While Kishida stresses salary increases for workers, inflation increasingly damages the household economy. The Kishida administration will submit a supplementary budget in the middle of next month. But budgetary resources for his key policies such as raising the birth rate or expanding defense capability have yet to be identified.

With her money scandal unexplained, Obuchi may cause further damage to the LDP. No end is in sight for the War in Ukraine or for disputes with China on the discharge of processed radioactive water in Fukushima. It is doubtful that a vulnerable administration that stands on a delicate balance of power in the leading party can handle all the critical issues inside and outside of Japan.

As long as support for the Kishida administration remains low, Kishida may not declare a snap election of House of Representatives. But there still is a speculation that passing the supplemental budget in this fall session of the Diet will trigger a snap election, because victory in the general election will support Kishida’s reelection in the LDP presidential election. All the calculations are made for preserving the life of this administration.

The Lessons of August 15, 1945

On August 15, 78 years ago, Japan's Emperor Hirohito broadcast to his subjects "that our empire accepts the provisions of their [the Allies] Joint Declaration [of the Powers, Potsdam Declaration]." The fighting was to stop. Whether he believed this was a surrender or not, is still subject to debate. What the Japanese people heard that day was a recording of his statement made the night before. The Emperor's voice maintained its divine distance from his subjects as he explained "the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest." He concluded by asking the nation "to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is insufferable."

Memories have faded and most Americans are surprised to learn that Japan was an enemy during WWII. One result of this fugue is that governments East and West find little opposition to their rewriting of WWII history and its aftermath. Generally, this has not been for the better and always for personal political gain. Worse, Washington counts many of these countries as allies and remains silent.

These revisionist histories have undermined the values that have shaped the postwar "liberal democratic order."  Authoritarian regimes now erode individual freedoms, human rights, and humanitarian cooperation. Glorifying strongmen, dismissing war atrocities, identifying perpetrators now as victims, and co-opting the victor's history as one's own is upending the legacy and lessons of WWII. A new "glorious history" is being promulgated in Poland, Hungary, China, Japan and other places. Unashamedly, the Polish government claims that Poles were uninvolved with the persecution of Jews and a Japanese diplomat praises the "Bushido Spirit" of the famed Japanese American 442nd Regimental Combat Team to their sons.

Thus, it is welcome that this fall there are a number of seminars and conferences examining the immediate postwar period. 

In Japan, the revisionist, denialist history has become normalized by two decades of conservative nationalist governments. Western Alliance Managers consequently do not recognize that nationalist populism has consumed the body politic and they have concluded incorrectly that Japan is "stable" and "unscathed from the populist wave" around the world. Little attention is given to how Japan's official war apology has been diminished, voting districts are unconstitutional, or to Japan's well-funded history disinformation campaign. 

Prime Minister Kishida's address at the Seventy-Eighth National Memorial Ceremony for the War Dead yesterday repeated his predecessor Abe's 2015 statement that makes no mention of apology or remorse to Japan's victims. He, like Abe and Suga before him, promises only: "We will not forget, even for a moment, that the peace and prosperity that Japan enjoys today was built atop the precious lives and the history of suffering of the war dead." Ceremony photos and documents. Kishida marks 78th anniversary of World War II end without mentioning Japan's wartime aggression, Associated Press, Aug. 15, 2023.

As a new book by a Brookings scholar supports this celebratory view of contemporary Japan, The author sees the Japanese government as having reinvented itself to encourage more political engagement with the world and a greater military presence in the region. This is a new self-confidence that will award Tokyo with credibility and global leadership. To be sure, I have not read the book (then again neither have the folks who recommend it on the dust jacket). I have, however, heard this argument repeatedly over the decades that Japan has changed and it is in our image. Someone once observed that Western efforts to "fix" Japan always result in the tutor being broken-hearted.
See: Japan’s Quiet Leadership Reshaping the Indo-Pacific by Mireya Solis, (release August 24, 2023).

Or watch the book talk: Japan's Quiet Leadership: Reshaping the Pacific, Wednesday, September 6, 89:30-10:30am EDT, Washington, DC, Hybrid. Sponsor: Brookings Institution. Speakers: Mireya Solís, Director - Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies; Kurt W. Tong, Managing Partner - The Asia Group (grandson of Philippine internee Rev Walter Curtis Tong); Yuichi Hosoya, Director of Research, API & Professor, Keio University; Demetri Sevastopulo, U.S.-China Correspondent, Financial Times.

But not everyone forgets: Memorial service for POWs in Yokohama passed down to next generation, August 12, 2023, Mainichi Shimbun

Here are a number of talks and conferences this fall that examine Japan's Pacific War and its aftermath. I hope you can attend in person or virtually. 

A. Friday September 8

MJHA Distinguished Annual Lecture

Tessa Morris-Suzuki on Writing War: History in Occupied Japan and its Echoes for Today

Hosted by The Modern Japan History Association

Speaker: Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Professor Emerita of Japanese History, Australian National University https://researchprofiles.anu.edu.au/en/persons/tessa-morris-suzuki . 

Date/time and registration information:

Online, free.
Saturday, September 9, 2023 | 9:00-10:30 AM Australian Eastern Standard Time
Friday, September 8, 2023 | 7:00-8:30 PM (EST)
https://mjha.org/Distinguished-Annual-Lecture 

As the world edges into a new Cold War, rising political tensions in East Asia are reflected in growing conflict over memories of history, and particularly of the history of the Asia-Pacific War. Increasing nationalism in all the countries of the region finds expression in rewritings of that history. In Japan, a central feature of recent waves of historical revisionism has been a focus on the shaping of historiography in the post war occupation period. The period from August 1945 to May 1952 was the era when historians first struggled to give meaning to the disastrous events of the war which had ravaged East Asia during the previous decade or more. The diverse ways in which they did this has had an enduring effect on the way in which the war is remembered to the present day. In the context of contemporary controversies over history, it is important to return to that occupation era and to reassess the possibilities and limitations of the way in which the history of the war was written by those who had just experienced it in their own lives.

B. Saturday September 16
Annual Symposium
Occupation: The Legacy of the Asiatic Pacific War 

Hosted by The Admiral Nimitz Foundation.  
Speakers: Richard B. Frank, internationally recognized leading authority on the Asia-Pacific War; Dr. Xiaobing Li, professor of the Department of History and Geography and the Don Betz Endowed Chair in International Studies at the University of Central Oklahoma (UCO); Ricardo Trota Jose, professor of history at the University of the Philippines, Diliman; Mindy L. Kotler is founder and director of Asia Policy Point. Special guest, Marie Vallejo, author of Dauntless, a book about the First and Second Filipino Regiments.

Date/time and registration information:
In person and online. Fee.

Saturday, September 16, 2023, 9:00am-5:00pm (CDT)
https://www.pacificwarmuseum.org/event/2023-admiral-nimitz-symposium

The Admiral Nimitz Foundation is excited to welcome you back to this year’s Annual Symposium. The focus this year will be on Japan's occupation of Asia. Titled, “Occupation: The Legacy of the Asiatic Pacific War,” the symposium will explore the nuanced ramifications of the Japanese occupation.

C. Saturday September 23

6th Annual Conference on WWII in the Philippines

War Crimes - From WWII Until Today

Hosted by: Bataan Legacy Historical Society in partnership with the University of San Francisco's Philippine Studies Program, Memorare Manila 1945 and USF Kasamahan

Speakers: James Zarsadiaz, Director, Philippine Studies Program, University of San Francisco; Prof. Mark Hull, Professor of War Crimes, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth; Philippine Consul General in San Francisco Neil F. Ferrer; Father Paul Fitzgerald, S.J., President, University of San Francisco; Benjamin Hall, Fox News State Department Correspondent, Eyewitness to War Crimes Today (Via Zoom); Jose Custodio, Fellow, Consortium of Indo Pacific Researchers; Christopher Capozzola, Professor of History, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Richard Frank, Pacific War historian, author, Tower of Skulls; Marie Vallejo, author of Dauntless, a book about the First and Second Filipino Regiments; Kate LaFerriere, daughter of Frank Innis, former civilian POW in Los Banos; Cynthia Bonta, survivor of the Los Baños massacre, mother of California Attorney General Rob Bonta; and Richard Foye, author of Foye And The Filipinos Bailout, Escape, And Rescue Of A Navy Fighter Pilot In World War Two Luzon, is the son of Ensign William Foye, an F6F Hellcat Pilot and a member of the Air Group Twenty assigned to the USS Enterprise (CV6).

Date/time and registration information:

In person, Facebook Live, Taped, fee
Saturday, September 23, 2023 | 10:00am - 4:00pm (PDT)

https://www.eventbrite.com/e/war-crimes-from-wwii-until-today-tickets-636013321967

The conference aims to present the war crimes the invading Japanese perpetrated upon soldiers and civilians in the Philippines. A compelling discussion on war crimes in the Philippines and its effects on subsequent generations as well as similarities in today's world.

D. Thursday December 7 to Saturday December 9
16th International Conference on World War II
Finding Hope In A World Destroyed: WWII Liberations & Legacies

Hosted by National WWII Museum, New Orleans.

Speakers: [there are no affiliations listed on the website and your editor simply did not have the energy to track everyone down]: Jason Dawsey  ; Francine Hirsch  ; Robert Hutchinson  ; Günter Bischof  ; John Curatola, Military Historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy; Rana Mitter, University of Oxford; Yuma Totani, University of Hawaii; Yoshikuni Igarashi, Vanderbilt University; William Hitchcock  ;Blanche Wiesen Cook  ;Jeremi Suri  ;Lizabeth Cohen   ; Krewasky Salter, Pritzker Military Museum & Library; Marcus Cox  : Kara Dixon Vuic  ; David Davis  ;Jeremy Black   ; Robert Citino, National WWII Museum; Richard B. Frank, Pacific War historian, author, Tower of Skulls;  Craig Symonds, Distinguished Visiting Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History for the academic years 2017–2020 at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island; Trent Hone, a Vice President with ICF and an award-winning naval historian, author of Learning War: The Evolution of Fighting Doctrine in the U.S. Navy, 1898–1945; Allan R. Millett   ;Keith Lowe   ;Ronald Spector, professor emeritus, George Washington University; John McManus  : Conrad Crane  ; Steph Hinnershitz  ; Catherine Musemeche  ;Dave Gutierrez  ; Jim McNaughton  ; Gordon H. “Nick” Mueller, PhD,   ;William Hitchcock  ;Jeremi Suri  ;Major General Peter Gravett  ;Cameron McCoy  ;Robert Edsel  ;Alexandra Richie  ;Wendy Lower  ; Paul Hilliard  ; Kirk Saduski   ;Donald L. Miller  ; John Orloff

Panel of particular interest (December 7):
Aftermath in Asia
Chair: John Curatola, Military Historian at the Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy
“The War That Never Really Ended: WWII’s Long Legacy”: Rana Mitter, University of Oxford
“Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945-1952: Allied War Crimes Prosecutions”: Yuma Totani, University of Hawaii
“Japan’s Decade After Defeat: Occupation and Democratization”: Yoshikuni Igarashi, Vanderbilt University

Date/time and registration information:

In person only in New Orleans, LA, fee
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/programs/16th-international-conference-world-war-ii

The International Conference on World War II is the premier adult educational event bringing together the best and brightest scholars, authors, historians, and witnesses to history from around the globe to discuss key battles, personalities, strategies, issues, and controversies of the war that changed the world. The agenda, speakers, and times are not yet set.

Contested History's Shadow

US Moves To Lock In Gains At Camp David Trilateral Summit

By Daniel Sneider, Lecturer, International Policy at Stanford University and APP member

First published in The Oriental Economist, August 14, 2023

When the leaders of Japan and South Korea join President Joe Biden at Camp David on August 18, it will cap a year of remarkable progress in bringing relations in the region back from the depths of dysfunction.

The summit will showcase the attempts by the Biden administration to institutionalize trilateral security cooperation – tying the three countries into a pseudo-alliance built on intelligence sharing, missile defense, cybersecurity and strengthened nuclear deterrence.

For American security officials, these steps have gained fresh urgency from the tightening of another alliance – between North Korea, China and Russia. In an eerie echo of the Korean War, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu made a highly symbolic visit to Pyongyang in late July, along with a senior Chinese Communist Party official.

The irony is that Moscow is now seeking arms from North Korea, rather than providing them. But in any case, the Kim Jong Un regime now feels emboldened, marrying new missile tests with bombastic threats.

The Pyongyang axis was perhaps also energized by the efforts of the U.S. to shore up its pledge of nuclear deterrence – so-called “extended deterrence” – to both Seoul and Tokyo.

Before the Shoigu visit, the U.S. and South Korea convened the first official meeting of a new Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in Seoul, attended by senior U.S. national security official Kurt Campbell, designed to reassure Koreans of the American pledge to come to their defense and deter a North Korean nuclear attack. The meeting was dramatized by the visit of an American nuclear missile-armed submarine to South Korea, the first since 1981.

The Camp David summit will offer some new icing on the trilateral cake that has been baking for the past year. That will take the form of a joint declaration, still under negotiation, that will set out a shared security perception and interests, with some reference to North Korea and China, as well as the war in Ukraine. An agreement on mutual consultation in case of crisis and the convening of annual trilateral summits is also on the agenda. Economic security issues like cooperation on semiconductors and technology ties to China will also be part of the summit.

But this is short of what the Americans originally had on the agenda.

The Americans want to create a trilateral extended deterrence dialogue – broadening in effect the NCG created with South Korea. But senior American and Korean officials in Washington told this writer that these plans were opposed by both the Japanese and Korean governments.

Japanese officials are wary of any multilateral nuclear discussions, which are considered beyond the political limits in Tokyo. And the Koreans do not want to dilute the importance of their bilateral Washington Declaration, adopted earlier this year in the Biden-Yoon summit.

The Camp David summit is actually a rescheduling of a meeting that was planned for the sidelines of the G7 meeting in Hiroshima but did not take place due to Biden’s need to rush home to deal with the U.S. debt limit negotiations.

U.S. security officials had hoped to follow up on earlier agreements to share missile defense information in real-time, formalized at the trilateral defense ministers meeting in June in Singapore, and the establishment of trilateral joint exercises for anti-submarine and missile defense.

Locking in the gains

The symbolism of a stand-alone summit at Camp David, site of many famous meetings, will still capture the headlines. But behind this lie serious concerns about the fragility of this progress, no matter how much it will be celebrated in all three capitals.

The Biden administration is trying to lock in the gains of the past year to create structures of cooperation that can endure beyond the current administrations in power in Seoul and Tokyo. Lurking behind that there is a fear, strongly felt in Japan and South Korea, that the U.S. elections could return to power an American president who has no real commitment to these alliances.

There are considerable forces in both Japan and South Korea that seek to undermine, if not reverse, what has taken place in the past year. Both South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio suffer from low popularity and ongoing challenges to their leadership.

Serious unresolved issues in the realm of wartime historical justice could re-emerge at any moment. And there are gaps in strategic perception among all three countries that remain largely unaddressed, especially in Washington.

The failure to forge an effective regional trade strategy on the part of the Biden administration undermines whatever progress has been made on trilateral security. The most obvious and effective vehicle for cooperation remains the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).

There is a clear benefit if South Korea joined the CPTPP, particularly if China seeks to join the grouping. But the Biden administration, for domestic political reasons, can offer no public push for that move.

While South Korea and Japan are bound by their alliance with the U.S., they do not share the same priorities.

For Korea, the central issue has been and always will be the division of the Korean peninsula and the ongoing threat of the North Korean regime to seek reunification by military means. While Seoul worries about the Sino-Russian partnership that has emboldened Pyongyang, Korean policymakers are reluctant to be drawn into an overt balancing strategy against the PRC.

For Japan, while North Korea is a shared threat, the main security focus is on China and on the tightening alliance between China and Russia, propelled by the Ukraine war. The possibility of Chinese use of force in resolving the Taiwan question has become a much more urgent issue as a result.

But the Japanese also reflect the same views as Koreans about the need to avoid a path toward full-scale economic war with China and to continue to seek ways to engage Beijing.

“Amid the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, Japan finds itself in an increasingly delicate situation, caught between its security guarantor and its leading economic partner,” former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Tanaka Hitoshi wrote recently.

“As a staunch ally of the United States, Japan is committed to reinforcing the alliance framework to deter unilateral changes to the status quo and uphold regional stability. At the same time, despite significant debate and diverse views on its China policy, Japan’s geographic proximity, extensive people-to-people connections, and strong economic ties with China mean that it must carefully navigate tensions and avert unnecessary instability or chaos.”

Ironically, that is true as well for the U.S. although its current political climate does not allow a frank discussion of this reality, though that is changing slightly.

The politics of normalization in Korea and Japan

The greatest source of potential challenges to this progress toward a trilateral security pact is the attempt to push ahead in Korea-Japan relations without really resolving the issues of colonial and wartime history.

The normalization of relations is largely the consequence of the change in administrations in Seoul, though even during the previous progressive administration there was a growing conviction that the severe downturn in relations needed to be reversed.

Yoon has very clearly repudiated the use of anti-Japanese tropes in Korean domestic politics and taken steps to unilaterally resolve the forced labor issue, the Fukushima nuclear wastewater discharge controversy, the export control problem and lingering barriers to security cooperation such as the fire control incident of 2018.

Still, Yoon’s personal popularity remains relatively low, though support for his administration has stabilized somewhat. That said, the polarization of Korean politics remains unchanged. The opposition Democratic Party is gearing up for what promises to be a highly contested and crucial election next spring for the National Assembly, where the Democrats still hold a majority.

The key issues pushed by the progressives are aimed squarely at Yoon’s foreign and security policy agenda, as well as at issues of domestic economic reform. These include the Fukushima discharge, the confrontation with trade unions over labor policy reforms, the unilateral and unreciprocated settlement of the forced labor compensation suits, and the charge that Yoon is undermining Korean independence by subordinating policy to the U.S. and Japan.

The Korean left argues that Yoon’s tilt against China is dictated by the US and Japan and endangers the Korean economy, which is suffering from slowing growth driven in part by a steep decline in exports of Korean semiconductors, batteries and other technology goods to China.

Even among conservatives in Korea, there is a growing concern that while Korea has embraced a confrontation with China, it may find itself alone as the U.S. pursues the resumption of engagement with Beijing. If the economy continues to suffer, with Korean businesses seeming to be put at risk due to the anti-China policy, this may shape the coming election as a potential turning point for Yoon’s foreign and security policy shift.

The politics of normalization in Japan are not nearly as perilous as those of Korea. Prime Minister Kishida’s efforts to improve the optics of relations – the visit of Yoon to Japan, the reciprocal visit to Korea, and the joint appearance at the memorial for Korean victims of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima – are generally viewed positively in Japan.

Within elite policy circles in Japan, based on this writer’s conversations in Tokyo this year, there is recognition that President Yoon has taken serious and even politically risky steps to improve relations and that it is the Japanese interest to support those efforts. Skepticism about Korean commitment to normal relations and the easing of anti-Japanese feelings in Korea has eased considerably.

The history problem will not go away

However, Kishida has been unwilling – and perhaps politically unable – to offer significant concessions on the historical justice issues, most specifically to encourage Japanese corporations to offer contributions to the fund used by Korea to compensate forced labor victims and their descendants.

Nor was Kishida willing to directly address the issues of Japan’s wartime conduct or its colonial rule. All of that was widely noted by Koreans and influenced the view held by Koreans that Yoon made all the concessions on this issue and the Japanese did essentially nothing.

Kishida remains effectively constrained by the strength of the more conservative and historically revisionist elements of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), mainly organized by the former Abe faction but not confined to its members alone.

He may not feel able to take the steps needed on history issues until he holds another general election under his leadership and, if successful, ends the constant discussion of his succession within the LDP. Kishida, however, also shows no personal interest or conviction to confront the history issues more directly.

There is a belief in Tokyo, echoed in Washington, and to some degree in the Presidential administration in Seoul, that the history issues have been effectively contained and even resolved. That will probably be reflected in the outcome of the Camp David summit. But that is an illusion, and a dangerous one.