Takaichi Diet Lesson

Takaichi Realizes the Power of the Upper House

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
March 29, 2026
 
A power play over Japan’s FY2026 budget bill resulted in a defeat for Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi by the opposition parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced on March 30 that it has given up its attempt to pass the budget bill before the end of March. The Cabinet was forced to submit to the Diet an interim budget bill to authorize spending for the beginning of FY2026. Despite this setback, Takaichi continues to be highly popular in recent polls.
 
Looking back at the past few months, Takaichi exercised her constitutional power and dissolved the Lower House on January 23. The House held a general election on February 8. Her decision was fundamentally surprising because the timing of the snap election put at risk passage of the annual budget bill, which must occur before the beginning of the next fiscal year on April 1. Takaichi nevertheless initiated the snap election to reinforce her political support before her approval rating fell.
 
The LDP’s sweeping victory in the election went beyond her expectation. Takaichi and her staff in Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei) came to believe that they were invincible, able to make impossible possible. Takaichi called on the Diet to pass the budget bill before the fiscal year began. The LDP in the Lower House obliged; it passed the budget bill with only 59 hours of discussion, ignoring the established but unspoken agreement between the parties to discuss a budget bill for at least 80 hours.
 
This hard push by the leading party stirred anger in the opposition parties in the Upper House which still outnumber the LDP. The opposition held captive a few bills relating to the FY2026 budget. Two of them were the high school tuition bill and the free school lunch bill which were to take effect in April. These bills also needed to pass the Diet by the end of March.
 
The Committee on Education, Culture and Science in the Upper House was to discuss the bills. The chair of this committee is a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the biggest opposition party. The chairman delayed discussion of the bills at the request of the opposition parties who first wanted to thoroughly examine the qualifications of the Minister of Education, Yohei Matsumoto [松本 洋平], who had a history of extramarital affairs. The opposition parties threatened the LDP that they would scrap the two bills if the parties did not have enough time to discuss the budget bill in the Upper House.
 
The leading parties and opposition parties struck a deal in late March. The leading parties would give up on meeting the March 31 deadline for the FY2026 budget bill, allowing time in the Upper House for discussion for the bill in early April. In the meantime, there would be an interim budget bill for 11 days, by which time the Diet is expected to pass the budget. The opposition parties agreed to pass the related bills, including the high school tuition and school lunch bills by the end of March. Although media reports did not go into detail, the LDP leaders told Takaichi about the deal on March 23. But Takaishi still insisted on passage of the budget bill by the end of March.
 
Takaichi must have known of the LDP’s weakness in the Upper House and of the deal between the parties to pass the bills. In fact, the FY2026 budget bill includes an economic stimulus package. Any delay in the budget bill will frustrate voters who expected assistance in this time of price inflation. Takaichi and her staff mistakenly thought that the opposition parties, afraid of public annoyance, would not be so persistent in opposing the budget bill.
 
She and her staff miscalculated the anger of the opposition parties in the Upper House. An extraordinarily abbreviated discussion on the budget bill brought to the fore a fundamental concern about the existence of the chamber, which has been dubbed “a carbon copy of the Lower House.” Regardless of their positions as either leading or in opposition, the parties in the Upper House felt challenged about their raison d’etre.
 
As a matter of fact, the Upper House sometimes has played a crucial role in the history of the Japanese government. The Ryutaro Hashimoto administration fell to a minority government in the Upper House after a defeat in the 1998 election. On the advice of his mentor, former premier Noboru Takeshita, Hashimoto stepped down as prime minister even though he maintained a majority in the Lower House.
 
In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believed that the LDP’s majority in the Lower House could overcome its minority position in the Upper House. The result was terrible. A cabinet reshuffling caught some ministers in scandals related to the mismanagement of political funds. When the Upper House blocked an anti-terrorism bill, Abe’s chronic disease returned, he could not attend a plenary sitting in the Diet, and he decided to resign.
 
Prime Minister Naoto Kan left office in 2011 because a bill to authorize government bonds to fund reconstruction after the East Japan Great Earthquake earlier that year could not pass the Upper House. He asked the LDP, which had a majority in the house, to pass the bill in return for his resignation. These episodes illustrate that the Upper House has the power to destroy an administration.
 
Despite her mismanagement of the budget bill, Takaichi remains highly popular in two polls. Nikkei Shimbun reported a 72 percent approval rating of Takaichi’s Cabinet. She also maintained a high rating in the Mainichi Shimbun poll with 58 percent approval. Although there is skepticism about her attitude to the Diet, a substantial share of respondents preferred her performance in her summit meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. Her style of relying on popular opinion is still working and may continue for some time.

Embracing Trump

If surviving Trump meeting was goal: Takaichi leaves DC a winner

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published March 20, 2026 on Responsible Statecraft.

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s high-stakes meeting with President Donald Trump began with a warm embrace and opening remarks that established a favorable mood.

Takaichi declared that “Donald” is the only person who can achieve peace and prosperity throughout the world, and that she intends to reach out to other countries to support his efforts. Trump congratulated Takaichi for her historic electoral victory, called her a “powerful woman,” and thanked her for all she has done.

But despite the positive atmosphere, this summit revealed the risks of Japan’s policy of clinging to the United States while allowing its relations with China to deteriorate.
Because of Japan’s assessment of the Chinese security threat, Takaichi seeks to lock-in Japan’s alliance with the United States by flattering Trump and appeasing as much as possible his demands on defense and economic issues.

When Takaichi originally requested a summit with Trump, her aim was to get reassurance from Trump before his scheduled trip to China (which has now been postponed). Last November, Takaichi’s imprudent remarks about how a Taiwan crisis could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” that might warrant a Japanese military response, triggered a sharp downturn in Sino-Japanese relations. Her statements wiped away the improvement in ties with China that had been achieved under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi’s immediate predecessor.

Rather than defending Takaichi as Japan-China tensions escalated, Trump reportedly told her in a phone call that she should tone things down because he wanted to avoid a conflict with China over the Taiwan issue. Trump’s cool response prompted Takaichi to seek assurances from Trump that he would not make deals with Xi Jinping that might undermine Japan’s interests. She also wanted to deepen bilateral cooperation to strengthen economic resilience in response to Chinese coercion.

The U.S. and Israeli war against Iran, however, complicated Takaichi’s original game plan and entrapped Japan in a severe dilemma.

On the one hand, Trump wants Japan “to step up” to help reopen the Strait of Hormuz by deploying naval vessels. From Trump’s perspective, Japan should take on this mission because Japan is more dependent on energy supplies passing through the strait than any other country. Given her landslide electoral victory in February, Takaichi ironically does not have the excuse of domestic political constraints to deny Trump’s request. Furthermore, Japan’s acute fear of China makes it hard for Takaichi to say “no” to Trump.

On the other hand, Takaichi faces strong domestic pressures not to comply with Trump. 82 percent of the Japanese public oppose the U.S. attack against Iran, and most Japanese strategic experts — including those who have stressed the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance — believe that Trump’s war against Iran is an illegal and illegitimate strategic blunder. Japan’s legal and constitutional obstacles for deploying naval ships to a war zone are extremely high.

Furthermore, Iran has indicated that states that send naval ships to the area would be considered to have joined the American and Israeli side in this war and would be seen as hostile. Iran has, however, shown a willingness to allow oil tankers headed for countries that are not involved in the conflict and friendly toward Iran to pass through the strait. It is therefore in Japan’s energy security interests not to deploy naval ships into the area.

Although a joint press conference is usually held after U.S.-Japan summits, for some reason no Takaichi-Trump press briefing took place after their meeting. Instead, Takaichi held a solo press conference with the Japanese media on Thursday. She revealed that there was a discussion of the importance of ensuring the safety of the Strait of Hormuz and that she explained in detail what Japan can and cannot do within its legal constraints.

By refraining from mentioning at all any bilateral differences, she seemed to want to avoid giving the impression that there was any friction between her and Trump. And by not holding a joint press conference, both leaders perhaps sought to prevent the media from probing any discord between the U.S. and Japan.

So what should Takaichi do after this U.S.-Japan summit?

First, she should work energetically with other countries to facilitate an early termination of the Iran war. With the negative impact on gas prices and the strong American public opposition to the war, Trump should welcome such an effort because he wants a good off-ramp well before the November mid-term elections so that he can proclaim victory and mission accomplished.

More challenging will be convincing Iran to end the conflict. Not only does Iran want to avenge the killing of its top leaders and the death and destruction caused by Israel and the United States, it also wants solid international guarantees that it will not be attacked again and that its sovereignty will be protected. Among the G-7 countries, Japan maintains the best relations with Iran. Therefore, Takaichi should use this asset to promote serious diplomacy to explore viable ways to end this war.

Second, Takaichi should engage in proactive diplomacy to stabilize and improve relations with China. Although improving Japan’s own defense capabilities and deepening its ties with like-minded countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific are important to counter China and to hedge against the uncertainty of the U.S. security commitment, they are no substitute for direct diplomacy with China to stabilize the regional security environment. An emphasis on military deterrence to the neglect of diplomacy will only fuel an arms race that will favor China given the asymmetry in material capabilities and China’s geographic advantages.

As a first step, the Japanese government should publicly clarify its basic stance regarding the Taiwan issue rather than simply repeating that there has been no change in policy. In addition to reaffirming the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan-China normalization communique, Japan should state that it does not support the independence of Taiwan and that it supports any resolution of the Taiwan issue that is peaceful and achieved without coercion and accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

This is necessary to reassure Beijing that Tokyo is not surreptitiously seeking the independence of Taiwan or the permanent separation of Taiwan from China.

In addition, with an eye on the next Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit scheduled in China in November 2026, Tokyo should expeditiously initiate discussions with Beijing on a broad range of issues. Rather than sticking to its current passive approach of simply leaving the door open for dialogue, Takaichi should dispatch to Beijing an influential political leader who is trusted by China to restart bilateral discussions. The agenda could include maintaining and strengthening a “rules-based” order, restraining the weaponization of economic interdependence, promoting stability and security of critical supply chains, cooperating more to address climate change, and enhancing confidence-building and crisis prevention measures.

Takaichi has touted that “Japan is back.” By engaging the above two diplomatic challenges, she can establish herself as one of the world’s most important leaders and upgrade Japan’s international status and influence.