—and Korea Is Watching
Originally Published on The Peninsula, September 26, 2025
By Daniel Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University, and APP member.
As he heads out the revolving door of Japanese politics, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has two important stops on his agenda. The first will be in Busan, South Korea, for a meeting with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung next week. The two leaders have vowed to solidify the momentum in closer relations and to make these meetings a regular feature of those ties.
Three days later, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will pick a new party leader, with the winner expected to become Japan’s prime minister. Immediately after that hurdle has been cleared, Ishiba is reportedly planning to deliver a long-expected major address, likely in Tokyo, on his version of the lessons of World War II and his vow not to repeat “the devastation of war.”
The outgoing Japanese leader represents the more liberal wing of the LDP and had hoped to cement ties with neighboring Korea and ease tensions with China while seeking more space to pursue an independent foreign policy. But his government was far too weak to take any bold steps. A longtime foe of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Ishiba may now be worried about the candidates for succession from the right, led by former Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Sanae Takaichi.
A rare female figure in Japanese politics, Takaichi has embraced the anti-immigrant and hyper-patriotic rhetoric of the small but surprisingly successful Sanseito, which won fourteen seats in the last election for the upper house of the National Diet on a “Japan First” platform that consciously echoed the ideology and agenda of Donald Trump’s MAGA movement.
The prospect of a victory by Takaichi, who is considered a strong contender along with the more moderate Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi, the son of a former prime minister, also rattles close observers of Japan in Korea.
“Takaichi is a disaster for Korea,” said a former Korean ambassador to Japan, who spoke to this writer on background. “We are closely watching the succession process in Japanese politics,” added former Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo. “It is true that we have concerns over the election of a hawkish PM who might derail the restoration process of Korea-Japan relations.”
Ambassador Shin, who remains active in promoting Korea-Japan ties, gives some credit to President Lee for continuing to build on the previous administration’s outreach. “Now the ball is in Japan’s court,” the former diplomat said. Takaichi, if elected, “would change her revisionist attitude toward the past history as President Lee Jae Myung did after his election,” he forecast.
The Battle within the LDP
The vote within the LDP comes little more than a year after Ishiba won an improbable victory in a similar contest following the resignation of then Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. He inherited a party and a government that was widely discredited due to fundraising scandals and rising cost of living. Along with poor LDP election performance across Japan and other domestic issues, Ishiba faced the challenge of the Trump administration and harsh tariffs imposed on Japan.
Ishiba tried to hang onto power, including accepting a disadvantageous deal with the United States on tariffs and investment. But those defeats and signs of growing discontent ultimately forced his resignation.
The lineup of contenders this time is similar to the vote a year ago, though with only five candidates. The initial vote takes place among almost a million party members, given the equivalent of 295 votes, and 295 members of the parliament. If no one has a majority, there is a runoff with the legislative members and 47 votes from prefectural chapters. In that second round, the still-powerful party leaders—all of them former prime ministers—would have more sway.
Among the candidates, Takaichi is joined on the right by former Minister for Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi. On the left, there is the current Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi. In the center are two well-known figures—former Minister for Foreign Affairs Toshimitsu Motegi and Agriculture Minister Koizumi, the latter of whom leads in many polls. Whomever becomes party leader must still form a de facto coalition government in order to have a working majority—even informally—which requires forming a pact with the Komeito and at least one of the other opposition parties.
In the initial debates among the candidates, foreign policy has been at best a secondary issue. There has been disproportionately large attention paid to alleged problems with foreign workers and tourists, as well as immigration. But the main focus areas are curbing inflation, restoring the social security system, reducing taxes, and political reform.
The only foreign policy issue to get much attention has been the Trump administration’s tariffs. To the extent that foreign policy is a concern, the consensus among observers in Seoul and Tokyo is that the best choices are the two former foreign ministers, Hayashi and Motegi, both of whom have good reputations on the foreign policy front.
“The best choice for Japan’s diplomacy is undoubtedly Hayashi, who has steadily acted as a moderate as foreign minister,” says a veteran Japanese foreign policy reporter at a major daily newspaper. “He has a good record of dialogue with Beijing as well as with Washington.” In Seoul, “Hayashi and Motegi are favorable choices for us,” says Ambassador Shin. Hayashi is considered a long shot, but he could emerge if there is a stalemate between Takaichi and Koizumi, who faltered the last time around when he was considered an early favorite.
Conservative front-runner Takaichi has tried to soften her image but remains anathema to many inside and outside the party as too extreme and likely to scare away many voters. Possible coalition partners like the Komeito have already made clear that they will not join a government headed by her.
Who is Koizumi?
Koizumi, at age forty-four, is increasingly the odds-on favorite to become Japan’s next prime minister. The last time he ran, a year ago, he displayed the inexperience and lack of confidence that seemed to confirm the view that he is too young for the job. But this time around, he looks more polished and presents himself as the person who can both unify the LDP and broaden its appeal again, especially to younger voters. He is also considered more acceptable to the opposition parties that would have to cooperate to make him prime minister and pass vital legislation.
But there remain considerable questions about his foreign policy views, particularly his approach toward Korea and China. He has been a regular visitor to the Yasukuni Shrine, though only as a politician and cabinet minister, following in the footsteps of his father. He has avoided the question of whether he would visit as prime minister.
“Koizumi has two faces, conservative and realistic,” says the former Korean ambassador to Japan, who spoke on background. “Still, I am not that much worried about his position regarding Korea-Japan relations.” The former envoy points out that Koizumi’s parliamentary district in the Kanagawa area is home to a large population of Korean-Japanese residents.
Koizumi notably embraced the importance of Korea-Japan relations in a press conference announcing his candidacy, apparently eager to dispel the idea that he would turn in a more right-wing direction.
“South Korea is an important neighboring country with which we must cooperate as a partner in addressing various global challenges. The importance of South Korea-Japan relations and trilateral cooperation with the U.S. is growing,” Koizumi recently declared. He pledged continuity with the path taken by the previous two Japanese administrations.
Regardless of who wins the LDP leadership, the path ahead in Japan is likely to be fraught with ongoing political instability until the party wins a new election and regains its majority.
“For the time being, Japanese politics is in chaos and flux, limiting Japan’s international role,” concludes Ambassador Shin. “That is quite detrimental to our interests too.”
Monday, September 29, 2025
Sunday, September 28, 2025
Asia Policy Events, Monday September 29, 2025
WORLD WAR II AT 80: THE UNENDING QUEST FOR REDRESS. 9/29, 6:30pm (JST), 5:30am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies. Speaker: Timothy Webster, Lawyer, Professor, Translator. 5
BOOK TALK: THE NATIONAL INTEREST: POLITICS AFTER GLOBALIZATION. 9/29, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: author Philip Cunliffe, Associate Professor of International Relations, Department of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London; Dr. Zachary Paikin, Deputy Director, Better Order Project, Research Fellow, Grand Strategy Program, Quincy Institute. PURCHASE BOOK
WHAT ROBERT F. KENNEDY’S LIBERAL PATRIOTISM COULD TEACH POLITICAL LEADERS TODAY. 9/29, 11:00am-12:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Progressive Policy Institute (PPI). Speakers: Robert Doar, President, AEI; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Director, American Identity Project, PPI; Will Marshall, President, PPI; Ritchie Torres, US House of Representatives (D-NY).
BREAKING TRADITION: PRESIDENT TRUMP’S APPROACH TO POLICY DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION. 9/29, 12:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society. Speaker: Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Former U.S. Secretary of Commerce; Former Board Chair, Japan Society. Members only.
SHIFTING DYNAMICS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PYONGYANG'S OBSERVATIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES. 9/29, 2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea. Speakers: Yaakov Katz, Israeli-American author and journalist, co-founder of MEAD; Siegfried Hecker, former director, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Professor Emeritus, Stanford University.
INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR WHOM? 9/29, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: U.S.–Asia Law Institute. Speaker: Jean-Marc Coicaud, Distinguished Professor of Law and Global Affairs, Rutgers University, author The Law and Politics of International Legitimacy. PURCHASE BOOK
THE IDEAS THAT BUILT AMERICA—AND WHERE THEY STAND TODAY. 9/29, 5:00-6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: R Street Institute. Speakers: Sabrina Schaeffer, Vice President, R Street Institute; Lindsay M. Chervinsky, PhD, Presidential Historian/Executive Director, George Washington Presidential Library at Mount Vernon.
BEYOND TARIFFS: WHAT NEXT FOR THE GLOBAL TRADE REALIGNMENT? 9/29, 5:00-7:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Association of Women in International Trade (WIIT); George Washington University (GWU). Speakers: Christine McDaniel, Senior Economist, Macroeconomics, Trade & Investment Global Practice, World Bank Group; Daniel Ciarcia, Account Manager/Carbon Consultant, EcoEngineers; Bennett Caplan, President, Abridge; Jenny A. Kai, Senior Manager, Government and Public Affairs, Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA).
Tuesday, September 23, 2025
The LDP Presidential Campaign Begins
The LDP Enters the Policy Discussion Phase of its Presidential Election
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 22, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) kicked off its presidential election campaign on September 22. Five lawmakers officially submitted their candidacies to the party on the 22nd with only a 15 minute window to file. The deadline for entries has now passed. All five were losers in the last election a year ago.
Having lost the majority in both Houses of the Diet under the leadership of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the presidential election should be about how to regain power through reforming the party. Yet the candidates are not talking much about reform. They are instead focusing on their economic policies for households or maneuvers to attract support from the opposition parties.
One of the biggest reasons for the defeats in the 2024 Lower House election and the 2025 Upper House election was the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. It revealed LDP’s mismanagement of political funds without transparency. The opposition parties called for stricter regulation of donations from companies and organizations, which have been the financial lifeline for the LDP. After receiving protests from LDP lawmakers, Ishiba did not reach a consensus with the opposition on the issue. Ishiba announced his resignation as the LDP president on September 7.
The LDP set the presidential election for October 4 and opened the starting gate for campaigns on September 22. Five people have entered the race. They are: former Minister on Economic Security Takayuki Kobayashi, former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, former Minister on Economic Security Sanae Takaichi, and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi. Each has his or her own platform.
Kobayashi is running on three key issues. First, he supports a temporary income tax cut with a fixed rate. The tax cut would provide greater benefits to high-income taxpayers than to low-income ones. Kobayashi would offset the cut with surplus tax revenue in the current year. Second, reflecting his hawkish perspective, Kobayashi supports an increase in the defense budget to more than 2 percent of GDP. Finally, he advocates greater regulation of foreign intervention in communications in Japan.
Announcing his candidacy immediately after Ishiba’s announcement, Motegi promises that he will pursue economic growth policies that will increase the annual income of each worker by 10 percent within three years. While other candidates prioritize policy talks with the opposition parties, Motegi aims to assemble a coalition to secure a majority in the Diet.
Hayashi would continue the policies of the Ishiba administration in the hope of attracting the votes of Ishiba and his allies. Setting a target of one percent growth in real wages each year, Hayashi would establish a Japanese version of “universal credit,” a social security payment which the United Kingdom has introduced. In addition, to reform the party, he would create a digital platform for real-time communications with the public. He would also amend the party constitution.
In her campaign speech at the LDP headquarters, Takaichi emphasized her conservative agenda. This includes greater regulation of foreigners in Japan, limiting the line of succession to the imperial throne to male offspring in the male line, and amendments to Japan’s Constitution. Unusually, however, she would pursue economic policies that include positions held by the opposition parties. These include a refundable tax credit system, a gasoline tax cut, and an increase in the income threshold for tax liability.
Finally, Koizumi has actually distanced himself from his platform a year ago. Party “reform” is no longer at the center of his campaign. He has also withdrawn his support for a different surname system and the deregulation of worker dismissals. Instead, Koizumi promises a one-million-yen increase in the annual average wage by FY2030 and domestic investment up to 135 trillion yen. These economic policies were already part of the Ishiba administration’s agenda.
Remarkably, none of the five candidates has offered a plan that would settle the dispute over regulation of (or prohibitions on) donations from companies and organizations. The opposition parties have proposed new regulations on and even the abolition of this kind of fundraising. If the LDP insists on this traditional form of fundraising, the party will retain its negative image as an old-line party.
In the polls by news organizations, Takaichi has the greatest popularity among general voters. However, among LDP supporters, Koizumi has the greatest support, and only LDP members will vote in the election. There is no certainty that the party election results will be consistent with the popularity of the candidates among the public voters.
Five is the largest number of candidates in the history of LDP presidential elections except for the 2024 election, which had nine. Since a candidate can win only with a majority vote, it is almost certain that the election will go to a run-off. Negotiations over policies among the candidates may determine the winner; there is no way to predict which of the five will emerge victoriously.
Sunday, September 21, 2025
LDP Rematch
Consolation Match for the Five LDP Presidency Candidates
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 15, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
A week after Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation, the campaign for the next president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) began. It has turned into a race with five entrants – all of whom lost in the last election a year ago. The race is likely to be about which candidate can “change” the ailing party’s culture through political funding reform and can manage Diet affairs without a majority in either chamber.
Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, resigned last September, in the face of public criticism of the kickback fund scandal by some factions in the LDP. Ishiba succeeded Kishida in the expectation that he would reform a party that relied heavily on donations from companies and business organizations. Ishiba was caught in the middle of a party struggle over whether to ban those donations.
Ishiba had promised last December that he would have a legislative solution to reform political donations by the end of March, but he did not deliver. Instead, he continued to discuss reforms with the opposition parties, some of which demanded the total abolition of donations from companies and organizations.
In the Lower House election last October, the LDP lost its majority. Responsibility for the loss fell largely on Kishida since the election took place shortly after Ishiba assumed the PM position. Ishiba could not, however, avoid responsibility when the LDP lost its majority in the Upper House election last July. “I could not meet the expectation for change,” Ishiba said in his resignation press conference.
The LDP called a presidential election on October 4. Candidates must file entry forms on September 22, when the party will officially open the election. Five candidates are reportedly willing to run for the president.
Former Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi was the first to step forward. In his press conference to announce his candidacy, Motegi emphasized his economic policy that would increase take-home pay for many Japanese. This policy resonates with the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). Motegi also mentioned the possibility of building a leading coalition with the DPP or the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) that would hold a majority in the Diet.
Motegi is running with the support of former colleagues in his now defunct faction, many of whom were leading the anti-Ishiba movement in the LDP after the Upper House election. He also met one-on-one with former prime minister Taro Aso, who openly opposed Ishiba. Polls have shown, however, that many Japanese did not believe that Ishiba should have resigned. This polling data may force Motegi to explain his differences with Ishiba. Motegi will have to develop a plan for party reform.
Other candidates try to catch up Motegi. Former Minister on Economic Security, Takayuki Kobayashi, announced his candidacy on September 16. As a candidate in the age of 50, representing young generation, Kobayashi upheld policies for young generation, including income tax cut. His team is headed by former Minister of Defense, Yasukazu Hamada, who is elected from Chiba, the same prefecture as Kobayashi.
Two ministers in Ishiba Cabinet showed apparent interest in the election on the same day. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi, revealed that he had told his candidacy to his supporters in his hometown, Yokosuka. Although official announcement will be later this week, it is surprising that Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, will lead Koizumi’s team, instead of running for the president.
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshimasa Hayashi, also told his intention to run for the president in his regular press conference. As a core member of Ishiba Cabinet, Hayashi insisted on succeeding policies of Ishiba administration. Supporters for Hayashi consist of lawmakers with former Kishiba faction, supposedly with backing of Kishida himself. He is expected to have another press conference to publicize his policies.
Former Minister on Economic Security, Sanae Takaichi, is expected to officially announce her bid for the president later this week. She mainly receives supports from the conservative lawmakers who were frustrated with Ishiba administration. Reiterating a phrase of “rebuild backbone of the party,” Takaichi hopes to restore the cause of conservatives, which gained momentum in the time of former prime minister Shinzo Abe.
Takaichi and Koizumi currently dominate. In the election last November, Takaichi finished second and Koizumi third. Both enjoyed broad public support in and did not rely on a specific faction. Takaichi has a firm base of support among conservatives. Koizumi has the support of former premier Yoshihide Suga and younger party members.
But neither one is likely to win in the first round. To win in the first round, a candidate must garner at least 296 votes: a majority of all 590 votes: 295 for lawmakers and 295 for local party members. In any subsequent run-off election local party members have only 47 votes. The successful candidate must win at least 171 votes out of 342.
If the run-off pits Takaichi against Koizumi, conservative votes, including those who have supported Kobayashi, will go for Takaichi. Koizumi does not have a similar natural group of supporters. Instead, he must appeal to Ishida’s supporters. This is a tall order because Koizumi had urged Ishiba to step down. With this history, support from some of Ishiba’s allies may be hard to get. Koizumi does have the advantage of a close relationship with the leader of Ishin, Hirofumi Yoshimura. Takaichi expects cooperation from conservative parties, such as Sanseito.
Former Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi was the first to step forward. In his press conference to announce his candidacy, Motegi emphasized his economic policy that would increase take-home pay for many Japanese. This policy resonates with the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). Motegi also mentioned the possibility of building a leading coalition with the DPP or the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) that would hold a majority in the Diet.
Motegi is running with the support of former colleagues in his now defunct faction, many of whom were leading the anti-Ishiba movement in the LDP after the Upper House election. He also met one-on-one with former prime minister Taro Aso, who openly opposed Ishiba. Polls have shown, however, that many Japanese did not believe that Ishiba should have resigned. This polling data may force Motegi to explain his differences with Ishiba. Motegi will have to develop a plan for party reform.
Other candidates try to catch up Motegi. Former Minister on Economic Security, Takayuki Kobayashi, announced his candidacy on September 16. As a candidate in the age of 50, representing young generation, Kobayashi upheld policies for young generation, including income tax cut. His team is headed by former Minister of Defense, Yasukazu Hamada, who is elected from Chiba, the same prefecture as Kobayashi.
Two ministers in Ishiba Cabinet showed apparent interest in the election on the same day. Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi, revealed that he had told his candidacy to his supporters in his hometown, Yokosuka. Although official announcement will be later this week, it is surprising that Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, will lead Koizumi’s team, instead of running for the president.
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Yoshimasa Hayashi, also told his intention to run for the president in his regular press conference. As a core member of Ishiba Cabinet, Hayashi insisted on succeeding policies of Ishiba administration. Supporters for Hayashi consist of lawmakers with former Kishiba faction, supposedly with backing of Kishida himself. He is expected to have another press conference to publicize his policies.
Former Minister on Economic Security, Sanae Takaichi, is expected to officially announce her bid for the president later this week. She mainly receives supports from the conservative lawmakers who were frustrated with Ishiba administration. Reiterating a phrase of “rebuild backbone of the party,” Takaichi hopes to restore the cause of conservatives, which gained momentum in the time of former prime minister Shinzo Abe.
Takaichi and Koizumi currently dominate. In the election last November, Takaichi finished second and Koizumi third. Both enjoyed broad public support in and did not rely on a specific faction. Takaichi has a firm base of support among conservatives. Koizumi has the support of former premier Yoshihide Suga and younger party members.
But neither one is likely to win in the first round. To win in the first round, a candidate must garner at least 296 votes: a majority of all 590 votes: 295 for lawmakers and 295 for local party members. In any subsequent run-off election local party members have only 47 votes. The successful candidate must win at least 171 votes out of 342.
If the run-off pits Takaichi against Koizumi, conservative votes, including those who have supported Kobayashi, will go for Takaichi. Koizumi does not have a similar natural group of supporters. Instead, he must appeal to Ishida’s supporters. This is a tall order because Koizumi had urged Ishiba to step down. With this history, support from some of Ishiba’s allies may be hard to get. Koizumi does have the advantage of a close relationship with the leader of Ishin, Hirofumi Yoshimura. Takaichi expects cooperation from conservative parties, such as Sanseito.
Motegi and Hayashi both rely on the power of former factions. Motegi cannot count on support from Ishiba, and Hayashi expects Ishiba’s support since he was the deputy in the prime minister’s office. But the presidential election last year proved that factions, including the Aso faction, will not suffice as voting units. The LDP factions represented outmoded politics.
The opposition parties have accused the LDP of creating a political vacancy in the election process. Encouraged by public opinion polls showing that the replacement of Ishiba will not raise the LDP’s credibility, the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, degraded this LDP presidential election as “a consolation match” of the previous election a year ago.
Asia Policy Events Monday September 22, 2025
BOOK TALK: GHOST NATION: THE STORY OF TAIWAN AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL. 9/22, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), 5:30-7:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: ICAS, Temple University Japan Campus. Speaker: author Chris Horto, Taipei-based Journalist; Moderators: Andy Sharp, Opinion Editor, Nikkei Asia; Robert Dujarric, ICAS Co-director. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4nLd4HW
BEYOND GDP: A VIRTUAL UNGA80 SIDE EVENT. 9/22, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). Speakers: Enrico Giovannini, Professor, University of Rome; Scientific Director, Italian Alliance for Sustainable Development; Naila Kabeer, Emeritus Professor, Department of International Development and Faculty of the International Inequalities Institute, London School of Economics; Csaba Kőrösi, 77th President, UN General Assembly; Co-chair, UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals; Attiya Waris, Faculty of Law, University of Nairobi and House of Fiscal Wisdom, Kenya; Livia Bizikova, Lead, Monitoring and Evaluation, IISD.
AMERICANS EVENTUALLY REJECTED THE GWOT. WILL ISRAELIS REJECT THEIR WAR ON GAZA? 9/22, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy. Speakers: Aslı Ü. Bâli, Howard M. Holtzmann Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Non-resident fellow, Quincy; Peter Beinart, Professor of Journalism and Political Science, Newmark School of Journalism, City University of New York; Ori Goldberg, Independent Commentator and Analyst; Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Middle East Program, Quincy.WP INTELLIGENCE AT THE CONCORDIA ANNUAL SUMMIT. 9/22, 9:00am-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: WP Intelligence, Washington Post. Speakers Include: Luiza Savage, WP Intelligence Editorial Director; Josh Rogin, Lead Global Security Analyst; Jason Dean, Lead AI & Tech Analyst.
Monday, September 15, 2025
Asia Policy Events, Monday September 15, 2025
AGGRESSION IN EUROPE. 9/15, 11:30-12:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: General (Ret.) Philip Breedlove, Former Commander of U.S. European Command; Former 17th Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations; Admiral (Ret.) James Foggo, Former Commander of the United States Naval Forces Europe-Africa; Former Commander of Allied Joint Force Command Naples; Moderator: Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Program Director and Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS; Jim Townsend, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS.
TAIWAN'S CHINA-FREE DRONE PRODUCTION: SUCCESSES AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES. 9/15, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Taiwan Institute. Speakers: Matthew Fulco, Journalist, Aviation Week; Lotta Danielsson, Vice President, US-Taiwan Business Council; Dr. Hong-Lun Tiunn, Deputy Director, National Security Program, Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET).
SECURING AMERICA’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE: A CONVERSATION WITH USPTO ACTING DIRECTOR COKE MORGAN STEWART. 9/15, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Coke Morgan Stewart, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce, Intellectual Property, Acting Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office; Adam Mossoff, Chair, Forum for Intellectual Property, Senior Fellow.
RETHINKING THE PAST OF CONFLICT, IMAGINING THE FUTURE OF PEACE IN EAST ASIA. 9/15, 4:00-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Pennsylvania State University Institute for Korean Studies. Speakers: Aiko Utsumi, Professor Emeritus, Keisen University; Takashi Fujitani, University of Toronto; Dongeun Shin, Kangwon National University; Min-Chul Kim, Kyung Hee University; Jae-Jung Suh, International Christian University; Ran Zwigenberg, Pennsylvania State University. 6:00–6:40pm Roundtable Discussion: Dong-Choon Kim (Sungkonghoe University); Lisa Yoneyama University of Toronto,*online); Jan Thompson (ADBC Memorial Society, *online); Hong Kal, (York University, Canada); Inkyu Kang (Penn State); Dae‑yeol Yea (Sunchon National University,*online); Hyun-kuk Sung (PeaceNetwork); Shin Chang; (The Academy of Korean Studies,*online). https://events.la.psu.edu/event/rethinking-the-past/ REGISTRATION.
AFTER THE PANDEMIC: REVISING A TEXTBOOK AND RETHINKING HISTORY. 9/15, 7:00-8:00pm (EDT), 9/16, 8:00-9:30am (JST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speaker: Dr. Andrew Gordon, Lee and Juliet Folger Fund Professor of History, Harvard University. 9
TAIWAN'S CHINA-FREE DRONE PRODUCTION: SUCCESSES AND CONTINUED CHALLENGES. 9/15, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Taiwan Institute. Speakers: Matthew Fulco, Journalist, Aviation Week; Lotta Danielsson, Vice President, US-Taiwan Business Council; Dr. Hong-Lun Tiunn, Deputy Director, National Security Program, Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET).
SECURING AMERICA’S TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE: A CONVERSATION WITH USPTO ACTING DIRECTOR COKE MORGAN STEWART. 9/15, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Coke Morgan Stewart, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce, Intellectual Property, Acting Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office; Adam Mossoff, Chair, Forum for Intellectual Property, Senior Fellow.
RETHINKING THE PAST OF CONFLICT, IMAGINING THE FUTURE OF PEACE IN EAST ASIA. 9/15, 4:00-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Pennsylvania State University Institute for Korean Studies. Speakers: Aiko Utsumi, Professor Emeritus, Keisen University; Takashi Fujitani, University of Toronto; Dongeun Shin, Kangwon National University; Min-Chul Kim, Kyung Hee University; Jae-Jung Suh, International Christian University; Ran Zwigenberg, Pennsylvania State University. 6:00–6:40pm Roundtable Discussion: Dong-Choon Kim (Sungkonghoe University); Lisa Yoneyama University of Toronto,*online); Jan Thompson (ADBC Memorial Society, *online); Hong Kal, (York University, Canada); Inkyu Kang (Penn State); Dae‑yeol Yea (Sunchon National University,*online); Hyun-kuk Sung (PeaceNetwork); Shin Chang; (The Academy of Korean Studies,*online). https://events.la.psu.edu/event/rethinking-the-past/ REGISTRATION.
AFTER THE PANDEMIC: REVISING A TEXTBOOK AND RETHINKING HISTORY. 9/15, 7:00-8:00pm (EDT), 9/16, 8:00-9:30am (JST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speaker: Dr. Andrew Gordon, Lee and Juliet Folger Fund Professor of History, Harvard University. 9
Friday, September 12, 2025
Inevitable transition
Ishiba Announces He Is Stepping Down
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 8, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Acknowledging his responsibility for the serious defeat in the Upper House elections in July, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation on September 7. Although he sought a way to stay in office after the election, backed by public opinion that he did not have to leave, the anti-Ishiba movement in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) overwhelmed Ishiba’s continuity plan. The LDP presidential election, which is likely to name the next prime minister, will be held on October 4.
Ishiba announced his resignation at an abrupt press conference on Sunday evening. “I’ve been saying that I would not insist on my position, I would make a decision at a proper time, and I am responsible for the result of the election. Now is the proper time to open my position to a successor, because we could conclude tariff negotiations with the United States,” Ishiba said.
With the defeat in the Upper House elections on July 20, the leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito fell into minority positions in both Chambers of the Diet. Ishiba sought advice on how to continue the government from three former prime ministers, Taro Aso, Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, three days after the election. Although Ishiba denied that the meetings covered his possible resignation, it was reported that the three former premiers did not unequivocally support Ishiba staying in office.
Achievements in tariff negotiations with the U.S. and the expansion of rice production gave the Ishiba Cabinet a bump in its approval rating in August. In the polls, people considered the LDP’s defeat to be more a function of the LDP slush fund scandal than of Ishiba’s mishandling of the election campaign. Nevertheless, anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP called for Ishiba’s resignation and an early presidential election to replace him.
The LDP decided to conduct a count on September 8 of how many lawmakers and local branches would demand an early election. Ishiba made up his mind to step down a day before this showdown. “If we proceed to the process for an early presidential election, it will cause a division of our party. That was not what I want,” Ishiba explained about his decision. The LDP cancelled the count.
A day before the announcement, Ishiba had met with Suga and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi. After 30 minutes, Suga left, and Koizumi had a one-on-one meeting with Ishiba for 90 minutes. It was reported that Suga and Koizumi urged Ishiba to resign to avoid a division of the party. Now isolated, Ishiba decided to resign.
The argument of Suga and Koizumi that Ishiba would avoid disruption of the LDP by resigning did not in fact make good sense because the LDP has already been divided. Anti-Ishiba groups, notably the former Abe faction, have been frustrated with Ishiba’s leadership from the beginning. There has been a rivalry between Ishiba and former prime minister Shinzo Abe ever since Ishiba had rejected Abe’s offer to be his minister in charge of security legislation in 2014. This position oversaw the radical reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.
Ishiba’s and Abe’s antagonism stemmed from a political war in the 1970s between Kakuei Tanaka, Ishiba’s political mentor, and Takeo Fukuda, a founder of the Seiwa Policy Group which was the official name of the former Abe faction. Looking back further, the LDP originally was the result of a merger in 1955 of the conservative Democratic Party of Japan and the relatively dovish Liberal Party. From the beginning, no leader has been found in the LDP who could reconcile the fundamental difference between those two parties: the historical revisionists pushing for an immediate constitutional amendment and the moderates advocating domestic decentralization.
As prime minister, Ishiba was unusually adept at handling competing policies. Although he could not deliver an official statement on August 15 to recognize the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Ishiba included, in his address at the memorial ceremony, the word “remorse” in reference to Japan’s invasion of neighboring countries. Abe, in contrast, refrained from expressing “remorse” in his annual addresses.
On another issue, however, campaign contributions from companies and organizations, Ishiba was unable to abolish them after protests from anti-Ishiba powers in the LDP. Ishiba regretted that he could not deliver the kind of political reform sought by the public.
After Ishiba’s resignation, the LDP decided to hold a presidential election on October 4 to elect a successor. The election will be held in “full spec version,” in which lawmakers and general party members have equivalent votes. In the full-spec version, each of 295 Diet members of LDP has one vote, and hundreds of thousands of votes by general LDP members are proportionally divided into 295 votes.
There is a speculation that the two leading contenders are Koizumi and former Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi. Both have yet to announce their candidacies. Former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, who has allied himself with Aso’s faction. A young conservative, Takayuki Kobayashi, is another possible entrant in the race. Electioneering begins on September 22.
One significant difference between the October 4 election and previous LDP presidential elections is that the winner will not necessarily be elected prime minister in the Diet. The LDP and its junior coalition partner Komeito do not have a majority vote in either Chamber. That is, the opposition parties can elect their own prime minister if they can agree to back a single candidate.
But the opposition parties are too fragmented to do so. One possible consensus candidate is the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan Yoshihiko Noda. Yet some opposition lawmakers may vote for an LDP candidate rather than for an opposition candidate from another party. For there to be smooth negotiations with the opposition parties to name a prime minister or to pass a budget bill, the next LDP president will be required to have an ability to talk convincingly and work closely with the opposition parties.
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 8, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Acknowledging his responsibility for the serious defeat in the Upper House elections in July, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation on September 7. Although he sought a way to stay in office after the election, backed by public opinion that he did not have to leave, the anti-Ishiba movement in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) overwhelmed Ishiba’s continuity plan. The LDP presidential election, which is likely to name the next prime minister, will be held on October 4.
Ishiba announced his resignation at an abrupt press conference on Sunday evening. “I’ve been saying that I would not insist on my position, I would make a decision at a proper time, and I am responsible for the result of the election. Now is the proper time to open my position to a successor, because we could conclude tariff negotiations with the United States,” Ishiba said.
With the defeat in the Upper House elections on July 20, the leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito fell into minority positions in both Chambers of the Diet. Ishiba sought advice on how to continue the government from three former prime ministers, Taro Aso, Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, three days after the election. Although Ishiba denied that the meetings covered his possible resignation, it was reported that the three former premiers did not unequivocally support Ishiba staying in office.
Achievements in tariff negotiations with the U.S. and the expansion of rice production gave the Ishiba Cabinet a bump in its approval rating in August. In the polls, people considered the LDP’s defeat to be more a function of the LDP slush fund scandal than of Ishiba’s mishandling of the election campaign. Nevertheless, anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP called for Ishiba’s resignation and an early presidential election to replace him.
The LDP decided to conduct a count on September 8 of how many lawmakers and local branches would demand an early election. Ishiba made up his mind to step down a day before this showdown. “If we proceed to the process for an early presidential election, it will cause a division of our party. That was not what I want,” Ishiba explained about his decision. The LDP cancelled the count.
A day before the announcement, Ishiba had met with Suga and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi. After 30 minutes, Suga left, and Koizumi had a one-on-one meeting with Ishiba for 90 minutes. It was reported that Suga and Koizumi urged Ishiba to resign to avoid a division of the party. Now isolated, Ishiba decided to resign.
The argument of Suga and Koizumi that Ishiba would avoid disruption of the LDP by resigning did not in fact make good sense because the LDP has already been divided. Anti-Ishiba groups, notably the former Abe faction, have been frustrated with Ishiba’s leadership from the beginning. There has been a rivalry between Ishiba and former prime minister Shinzo Abe ever since Ishiba had rejected Abe’s offer to be his minister in charge of security legislation in 2014. This position oversaw the radical reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.
Ishiba’s and Abe’s antagonism stemmed from a political war in the 1970s between Kakuei Tanaka, Ishiba’s political mentor, and Takeo Fukuda, a founder of the Seiwa Policy Group which was the official name of the former Abe faction. Looking back further, the LDP originally was the result of a merger in 1955 of the conservative Democratic Party of Japan and the relatively dovish Liberal Party. From the beginning, no leader has been found in the LDP who could reconcile the fundamental difference between those two parties: the historical revisionists pushing for an immediate constitutional amendment and the moderates advocating domestic decentralization.
As prime minister, Ishiba was unusually adept at handling competing policies. Although he could not deliver an official statement on August 15 to recognize the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Ishiba included, in his address at the memorial ceremony, the word “remorse” in reference to Japan’s invasion of neighboring countries. Abe, in contrast, refrained from expressing “remorse” in his annual addresses.
On another issue, however, campaign contributions from companies and organizations, Ishiba was unable to abolish them after protests from anti-Ishiba powers in the LDP. Ishiba regretted that he could not deliver the kind of political reform sought by the public.
After Ishiba’s resignation, the LDP decided to hold a presidential election on October 4 to elect a successor. The election will be held in “full spec version,” in which lawmakers and general party members have equivalent votes. In the full-spec version, each of 295 Diet members of LDP has one vote, and hundreds of thousands of votes by general LDP members are proportionally divided into 295 votes.
There is a speculation that the two leading contenders are Koizumi and former Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi. Both have yet to announce their candidacies. Former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, who has allied himself with Aso’s faction. A young conservative, Takayuki Kobayashi, is another possible entrant in the race. Electioneering begins on September 22.
One significant difference between the October 4 election and previous LDP presidential elections is that the winner will not necessarily be elected prime minister in the Diet. The LDP and its junior coalition partner Komeito do not have a majority vote in either Chamber. That is, the opposition parties can elect their own prime minister if they can agree to back a single candidate.
But the opposition parties are too fragmented to do so. One possible consensus candidate is the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan Yoshihiko Noda. Yet some opposition lawmakers may vote for an LDP candidate rather than for an opposition candidate from another party. For there to be smooth negotiations with the opposition parties to name a prime minister or to pass a budget bill, the next LDP president will be required to have an ability to talk convincingly and work closely with the opposition parties.
Sunday, September 7, 2025
Asia Policy Events, Monday, September 8, 2025
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AMERICA'S PROPULSION ADVANTAGE AND WHY IT'S IMPORTANT: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE. 9/8, 10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speakers: Steve Russell, Vice President & General Manager, Edison Works at GE Aerospace; Lt Gen David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.), Dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
THE ENDURING LEGACIES OF WORLD WAR II IN EAST ASIA: REFLECTIONS 80 YEARS LATER. 9/8, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Korea Institute - Harvard University, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations - Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Asia Center, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. Speakers: Thomas Berger, Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University; Mark Caprio, Professor Emeritus, Rikkyo University, Tokyo; Kim Koo Visiting Professor of Korean Studies, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University; Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government and Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.
TRUMP VS. HISTORY. 9/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: New Republic. Speakers: David Blight, Sterling Professor, American History, Yale University; James Grossman, Executive Director, American Historical Association; Leslie M. Harris, Professor of History and Black Studies, Northwestern University; Amna Khalid, Professor of History, Carleton College.
RIGHT-WING HISTORICAL MYTHS: A CHALLENGE FOR SOCIETY, ACADEMIA AND POLITICS. 9/8, 7:00-9:00pm (AEST), 1:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Speakers: Frank Bösch, Historian and Director, Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam; Constanze Itzel, Director, House of European History, Brussels; Katja Meier, Member, Saxon State Parliament; Former Saxon State Minister of Justice and for Democracy, Europe and Equality, Alliance 90/The Greens; Volker Weiß, Historian and Journalist; Moderator: Christine Watty, Editorial Director and Presenter, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, Berlin.
BOOK TALK: NEW BOOKS ON JAPAN: EXHIBITIONIST JAPAN: THE SPECTACLE OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT. 9/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author Angus Lockyer, Lecturer, Rhode Island School of Design; Jordan Sand, Professor of History, Georgetown University; Moderator: Joseph Seeley, Associate Professor of History, University of Virginia. PURCHASE BOOK
THE ENDURING LEGACIES OF WORLD WAR II IN EAST ASIA: REFLECTIONS 80 YEARS LATER. 9/8, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Korea Institute - Harvard University, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations - Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Asia Center, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. Speakers: Thomas Berger, Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University; Mark Caprio, Professor Emeritus, Rikkyo University, Tokyo; Kim Koo Visiting Professor of Korean Studies, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University; Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government and Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.
TRUMP VS. HISTORY. 9/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: New Republic. Speakers: David Blight, Sterling Professor, American History, Yale University; James Grossman, Executive Director, American Historical Association; Leslie M. Harris, Professor of History and Black Studies, Northwestern University; Amna Khalid, Professor of History, Carleton College.
RIGHT-WING HISTORICAL MYTHS: A CHALLENGE FOR SOCIETY, ACADEMIA AND POLITICS. 9/8, 7:00-9:00pm (AEST), 1:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Speakers: Frank Bösch, Historian and Director, Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam; Constanze Itzel, Director, House of European History, Brussels; Katja Meier, Member, Saxon State Parliament; Former Saxon State Minister of Justice and for Democracy, Europe and Equality, Alliance 90/The Greens; Volker Weiß, Historian and Journalist; Moderator: Christine Watty, Editorial Director and Presenter, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, Berlin.
BOOK TALK: NEW BOOKS ON JAPAN: EXHIBITIONIST JAPAN: THE SPECTACLE OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT. 9/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author Angus Lockyer, Lecturer, Rhode Island School of Design; Jordan Sand, Professor of History, Georgetown University; Moderator: Joseph Seeley, Associate Professor of History, University of Virginia. PURCHASE BOOK
Saturday, September 6, 2025
Ishiba Isolated
Going it alone, with the public
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 3, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
In a Joint Plenary Meeting (JPM) on September 2, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wrapped up its assessment of their disastrous July 20 Upper House elections. The party attributed the defeat to the slush fund scandal, and it did not explicitly refer to the responsibility of the party president and prime minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Ishiba announced his willingness to continue as the prime minister in the meeting and apologized for the loss of seats in the election. However, four LDP leaders, including Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, offered their resignations to Ishiba. Ishiba now appears to be isolated from the LDP leadership.
The political struggle in the LDP over replacing Ishiba has continued even after the mid-August commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Asia-Pacific’s War’s end. Anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP have been trying to gather votes for an early presidential election, and LDP leaders have been trying to block that effort.
Following up on a decision of the JPM last month, on August 8, the LDP plans to hear from its lawmakers and local branches on whether the party should hold a presidential election before the end of Ishiba’s term, which expires in September 2027. The LDP constitution provides that an early election will take place when a majority of LDP lawmakers, which currently is 295, plus a majority of 47 local branches request one. Now, the majority consists of 172 votes or more.
The LDP Presidential Election Committee has decided that the requests for an early election will not be anonymous. The decision will make it difficult for party members to gather enough votes to request such an election -- that is, to demand Ishiba’s resignation – because they are afraid of retribution from Ishiba if the vote falls short.
In midst of this party struggle, another JPM was held on September 2. A special committee reviewing the Upper House election submitted a report to the JPM. It concluded that the LDP’s defeat was caused primarily by the secret fund scandal. The report also observed that voters had not accepted the LDP’s measures on price inflation and that a gaffe by an LDP member damaged the image of the party. The report did not place responsibility on Ishiba. The report concluded that the party needs to “restart from dissolution,” a phrase which has often been used in crises of the party in the past.
In the JPM on September 2, Ishiba announced that he would stay on as the LDP president and prime minister. “I could not meet the people’s demand for change,” said Ishiba, recognizing his role in the defeat in the Upper House election. He emphasized his willingness to advance his agenda, including tariff negotiations with the United States, agricultural policy, slowing price inflation, and disaster prevention. Recognizing his responsibility for the lost seats and not clinging to his position as prime minister, Ishiba said that he would make “a decision” on his presidency in a proper time.
His senior staff members took another way – four of them revealed their intention to resign. Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama announced in the JPM that he would step down to take responsibility for the electoral defeat. Three other leaders, Itsunori Onodera, the chief of the policy council, Shunichi Suzuki, the chair of the general council, and Seiji Kihara, the chair of the election committee also submitted letters of resignation. “You too?” Ishiba reportedly murmured when he received them. He now must decide whether to accept them.
The LDP has entered the official process to consider whether to hold an early presidential election. LDP lawmakers and local branches who favor an early election must submit those requests by September 8. If the party receives 172 or more such requests, an early presidential election will be held. A heavyweight in the LDP, Taro Aso, announced that he would demand such an election.
According to Yomiuri Shimbun’s survey of the lawmakers and local branches, 128 will vote for an early election. Only 33 have formally taken the position that an election is unnecessary. The remaining 181 lawmakers or branches have not yet decided or are unwilling to communicate their decisions.
Polls show that Ishiba retains a material measure of popular support. In a poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun in late August, 50 percent of respondents thought Ishiba did not have to resign, while 42 percent thought he should. When asked about the reason for the loss in the Upper House election, 81 percent placed responsibility on the LDP lawmakers who were involved in the political funds scandal. Fifty percent of all respondents thought Ishiba’s responsibility was great, but this percentage is much lower than the percentage that attributes the loss to the scandal.
Even more favorable to Ishiba is a gradual increase in his approval rating. In a poll taken by the Mainichi Shimbun, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet was 33 percent, a four percentage point increase from July. According to the poll, Ishiba is the most suitable person as prime minister with the support of 21 percent of the respondents, followed by Sanae Takaichi with 14 percent and Shinjiro Koizumi with nine percent.
As anti-Ishiba movements spread in the LDP, the difference between anti-Ishiba powers in the party and public opinion widens. If the LDP replaces the president, there is no assurance that the party will be able to regain the power to lead an administration based on a minority government. The LDP lawmakers and local branches face a choice to oust Ishiba to attract public attention or rebuild the party under his leadership.
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 3, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
In a Joint Plenary Meeting (JPM) on September 2, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wrapped up its assessment of their disastrous July 20 Upper House elections. The party attributed the defeat to the slush fund scandal, and it did not explicitly refer to the responsibility of the party president and prime minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Ishiba announced his willingness to continue as the prime minister in the meeting and apologized for the loss of seats in the election. However, four LDP leaders, including Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, offered their resignations to Ishiba. Ishiba now appears to be isolated from the LDP leadership.
The political struggle in the LDP over replacing Ishiba has continued even after the mid-August commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Asia-Pacific’s War’s end. Anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP have been trying to gather votes for an early presidential election, and LDP leaders have been trying to block that effort.
Following up on a decision of the JPM last month, on August 8, the LDP plans to hear from its lawmakers and local branches on whether the party should hold a presidential election before the end of Ishiba’s term, which expires in September 2027. The LDP constitution provides that an early election will take place when a majority of LDP lawmakers, which currently is 295, plus a majority of 47 local branches request one. Now, the majority consists of 172 votes or more.
The LDP Presidential Election Committee has decided that the requests for an early election will not be anonymous. The decision will make it difficult for party members to gather enough votes to request such an election -- that is, to demand Ishiba’s resignation – because they are afraid of retribution from Ishiba if the vote falls short.
In midst of this party struggle, another JPM was held on September 2. A special committee reviewing the Upper House election submitted a report to the JPM. It concluded that the LDP’s defeat was caused primarily by the secret fund scandal. The report also observed that voters had not accepted the LDP’s measures on price inflation and that a gaffe by an LDP member damaged the image of the party. The report did not place responsibility on Ishiba. The report concluded that the party needs to “restart from dissolution,” a phrase which has often been used in crises of the party in the past.
In the JPM on September 2, Ishiba announced that he would stay on as the LDP president and prime minister. “I could not meet the people’s demand for change,” said Ishiba, recognizing his role in the defeat in the Upper House election. He emphasized his willingness to advance his agenda, including tariff negotiations with the United States, agricultural policy, slowing price inflation, and disaster prevention. Recognizing his responsibility for the lost seats and not clinging to his position as prime minister, Ishiba said that he would make “a decision” on his presidency in a proper time.
His senior staff members took another way – four of them revealed their intention to resign. Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama announced in the JPM that he would step down to take responsibility for the electoral defeat. Three other leaders, Itsunori Onodera, the chief of the policy council, Shunichi Suzuki, the chair of the general council, and Seiji Kihara, the chair of the election committee also submitted letters of resignation. “You too?” Ishiba reportedly murmured when he received them. He now must decide whether to accept them.
The LDP has entered the official process to consider whether to hold an early presidential election. LDP lawmakers and local branches who favor an early election must submit those requests by September 8. If the party receives 172 or more such requests, an early presidential election will be held. A heavyweight in the LDP, Taro Aso, announced that he would demand such an election.
According to Yomiuri Shimbun’s survey of the lawmakers and local branches, 128 will vote for an early election. Only 33 have formally taken the position that an election is unnecessary. The remaining 181 lawmakers or branches have not yet decided or are unwilling to communicate their decisions.
Polls show that Ishiba retains a material measure of popular support. In a poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun in late August, 50 percent of respondents thought Ishiba did not have to resign, while 42 percent thought he should. When asked about the reason for the loss in the Upper House election, 81 percent placed responsibility on the LDP lawmakers who were involved in the political funds scandal. Fifty percent of all respondents thought Ishiba’s responsibility was great, but this percentage is much lower than the percentage that attributes the loss to the scandal.
Even more favorable to Ishiba is a gradual increase in his approval rating. In a poll taken by the Mainichi Shimbun, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet was 33 percent, a four percentage point increase from July. According to the poll, Ishiba is the most suitable person as prime minister with the support of 21 percent of the respondents, followed by Sanae Takaichi with 14 percent and Shinjiro Koizumi with nine percent.
As anti-Ishiba movements spread in the LDP, the difference between anti-Ishiba powers in the party and public opinion widens. If the LDP replaces the president, there is no assurance that the party will be able to regain the power to lead an administration based on a minority government. The LDP lawmakers and local branches face a choice to oust Ishiba to attract public attention or rebuild the party under his leadership.
Wednesday, September 3, 2025
The Decline of the U.S.-Japan Alliance?
An Asia Policy Point Seminar
THE DECLINE OF THE
US-JAPAN ALLIANCE?
September 10, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT)
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC
IN PERSON ONLY
Space Limited
Speaker
Ms. Sayo Saruta
President
New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) Japan
Under Trump, the fundamental guarantee of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty –"that the U.S. will defend Japan in an emergency”—has become unstable.
REGISTER
asiapolicyhq@jiaponline.org
Monday, September 1, 2025
September 1, 1945 - Hong Kong
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| Keiji MAKIMURA, 29 August 1945 |
South China Morning Post, September 1, 1945
Henry Ching, Post editor for 33 years until 1958, wrote this editorial on September 1, 1945, when the paper reappeared for the first time after the Japanese occupation.
How long dead? Three years, eight months and six days. Forty-four months lost from our lives - a thousand and more dreary days and nights of waiting and hoping, starving, praying and enduring. Not really dead, only buried alive, conscious of great tumult far off, wherein we could have been participating - wish-dreaming with all the phantasmagoria of delirium. Now for us, the forgotten folk, life begins again. We return to the world like Phra the Phoenician. Some are not with us, will not awaken again. Requiescat! And we who, by the grace of God, survive, emerge from entombment leaner, prematurely aged and spiritually very tired, to justify our existence anew, to try to overtake the march of time, to fill the great gap in our knowledge of our fellow men and of humanity's affairs. History has moved far on, left us stumbling an age behind.
How much elated? The bewilderment of that tragic Christmas Day when our world came to an end returns to us. Can this be it? Can this peace be deliverance? Aye, this is Peace - this is The Day, in faith whereto throughout those interminable months we refused to die. So mild a day, so tame an ending! In the comfortable countries they have already given their thanks and abandoned themselves in celebration. We too had thought to rejoice mightily, in overnight relief: thought also to be avenged for hardship and tyranny, for persecution and slappings - prepared to take again the risks of bombardment, of looting, of starvation, even of vindictive massacre, if only to prevent the vulture horde from escaping with their surfeit. Frustrated to the end; tantalized by uncertainties, rumours and delays, to us the truce brought little more than a fuller realization of our weariness.
How much chastened? The gaping ruins, the walking skeletons, the accumulation of filth, the degradation to be seen on all sides - these are the superficies of a devastation of pride. We have been guilty of failure; we have rediscovered poverty. We have sampled want. We know just how unfitted we are to wrest a livelihood from a primitive economy, without the aid of privilege; we know how it feels to be beggars and helpless. We comprehend how the submerged other half lived and what it is that makes criminals. We appreciate the value of friends, and we have learned why some of us had none. Few can now recall the old recriminations, and many would prefer that they would be forgotten. They are part, however, of the sins of the past and of the warnings for the future. Tolstoi in his 'Peace and War' says that wars are not brought about by politicians, nor even by policy. He agrees that war is the explosion of accumulated conditions, and that those conditions are created by selfishness, by wrong thinking. None of us must cry 'Peccavi.'
How much regenerated? With the end of a difficult war a more difficult task begins - to construct the new world order, to secure the general acceptance of the truth that war will only cease when the causes of war have been destroyed. Are we equal to it? Hong Kong the proud, the beautiful, out-raged, dragged in the mire, to be a foul trollop - Hong Kong is but one of many victims. Her rehabilitation is a task peculiarly ours. It will need much patient effort, for so many of our local institutions have been destroyed, and so many habits have been changed. Success will be great or small in proportion to the sanity that has been left to us, and in ratio to our consciousness of our obligations.
As we return to our own, our rugged familiar Catskills greet us wanly, yet encouragingly. They too have suffered; and because we have bled with them we should know at last what these green hills mean to us. We owe them more faithfully our love and our loyalty, so that this our Hong Kong may flourish again, more beautiful, more prosperous, more progressive - and purer of soul.
Sunday, August 24, 2025
Monday Asia Policy Events, August 25, 2025
WHAT'S NEXT AFTER JACKSON HOLE? 8/25, 4:00pm (CDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: econVue. Speakers: Michael Lewis, Founder, Free Market Inc.; Kathleen Graham, an expert in human capital; Mark Roeder, author and thought leader on the impact of technology on human behaviour; Michele Wucker, author and analyst in world economy and crisis anticipation.
STATESMEN'S FORUM: HIS EXCELLENCY LEE JAE MYUNG, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. 8/25, 6:15-6:55pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: His Excellency Lee Jae Myung, President of the Republic of Korea; Dr. John J. Hamre, President and CEO, and Langone Chair in American Leadership, CSIS; Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS.
RIDING UNRULY WAVES: THE PHILIPPINES’ MILITARY MODERNISATION EFFORT. 8/25, 9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Crisis Group. Speakers: Lindsey W. Ford, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation America, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for South Asia at the National Security Council from 2024-2025; Rommel Jude Ong, Rear Admiral, Philippine Navy (Ret.), Professor of Praxis, Ateneo School of Government; Georgi Engelbrecht, Crisis Group Senior Analyst, Philippines.
Thursday, August 14, 2025
Trump-Lee Summit
Security Agenda for Trump-Lee Summit May Renew Abandonment Concerns
First Published August 13, 2025 in The Peninsula Blog of the Korean Economic Institute.
By Daniel C. Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and APP member.
The upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is shaping up to be a crucial moment in the more than seventy-year-long alliance.
The two leaders inked a vague agreement on trade and investment late last month, which appears to have opened the door to good relations, and President Lee has eagerly sought this meeting to strengthen his legitimacy and demonstrate his diplomatic skills.
But the summit also has the potential to imperil the alliance. While some economic issues remain—not least the U.S. tariffs on automobiles and semiconductors—the meeting is more likely to focus on a range of contentious security issues, including U.S. demands for greater South Korean contributions to defense costs and pressures for South Korea to commit to join military contingencies in Taiwan and subordinate its policies to an aggressive U.S. stance toward China.
All of these issues are now joined under two broad policy umbrellas the Trump administration calls “alliance modernization” and “strategic flexibility.”
Both concepts embody the idea of shifting the alliance away from its sole focus on deterring North Korea toward a broader regional approach that prioritizes confrontation with China, including the use of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in a Taiwan contingency. China is the number one strategic threat to the United States, and allies and partners must “do more,” according to an interim strategic guidance document the U.S. Department of Defense issued in July.
“Strategic flexibility” means that in the event of a clash with China, U.S. military forces based in South Korea will be withdrawn and deployed elsewhere. It demands that South Korea take on the preponderant burden of defense against potential North Korean aggression.
USFK Commander Xavier Brunson recently stated that the “USFK must be able to move to other locations and perform other missions at any time” and that South Korea must “play a great role in responding to North Korea, and USFK demonstrate flexibility to perform other missions.”
General Brunson acknowledged South Korea’s desire to connect any moves in this direction with the completion of a plan to reform the current system of operational control (OPCON), which places South Korea’s military under U.S. command during wartime. OPCON transfer to South Korea has been a long-standing goal for South Korea, particularly under progressive administrations. If the United States shifts its focus, then “the transition of wartime operational control in which South Korea leads the defense of the Korean Peninsula, must also be expedited,” argued the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun.
But Brunson pushed back against accelerating this process, telling reporters that “taking shortcuts to expedite the transfer of wartime operational control could jeopardize the readiness of the Korean Peninsula’s military.”
This has not stopped the Trump administration from preparing to push for South Korea’s acquiescence to their demands. An early draft of a U.S.-South Korea agreement sets a goal for the upcoming talks to compel South Korea to “issue a political statement supporting flexibility for USFK force posture to better deter China while continuing to deter [North Korea],” according to the Washington Post. This is to be paired with pressures to boost South Korea’s defense spending to 3.8 percent of GDP—up from 2.6 percent last year—and to vastly increase its support for the cost of basing U.S. forces.
Defense planners linked to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have pushed more specific plans to drastically cut the number of U.S. troops based in South Korea from the current level of 28,500 to 10,000. This would be done by effectively removing all ground troops from South Korea, leaving only air units that can easily be deployed elsewhere.
The United States has maintained the right to deploy its forces anywhere, and reductions in troop levels are hardly unprecedented. But in return, the United States accepted the South Korean stance that “it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”
More profoundly, the United States’ plans undermine the basic pledge to defend South Korea in a war—a commitment that underlies the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. The presence of U.S. ground forces is the famously labeled “tripwire” to guarantee the U.S. commitment.
“The continued presence of US troops at existing levels on the Korean Peninsula is more important than documents discussing ‘strategic flexibility’ or ‘modernized alliance,’” Senior Fellow at the Mansfield Foundation Bruce Klingner told this writer. “Maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea is a tangible manifestation of American commitment to the defense of its treaty partner. As such, they continue to be an integral part of Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command. In a conflict with North Korea, the American public and Congress would not allow a U.S. president to abandon them, particularly after casualties.”
The Trump administration faces resistance not only from South Korea but also from Congress, where support for the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula and opposition to downsizing the current troop levels remain strong, even among Republicans. The National Defense Authorization Act, which was passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, prohibits a reduction in the U.S. military posture or a change in wartime OPCON until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that “such action is in the national interest.” It also directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Indo-Pacific Command, and USFK to carry out an independent assessment of any such changes.
The North Korea Connection
The push to refocus the U.S. regional presence away from North Korea and toward China could potentially be linked to another sensitive issue shaping the upcoming Trump-Lee summit—relations with North Korea.
Rumors and hints of a resumption of talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have surfaced again in recent weeks. The Lee administration is supportive of such dialogue, as such moves are consistent with its desire to ease tensions with North Korea and revive serious engagement. But such talks are likely to only take place if Trump is heading seriously toward the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and acceptance of Kim’s demand that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.
“At some point, the ROK is going to pay a price for U.S.-DPRK dialogue if the U.S. under Trump decides to accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state,” former senior Department of State official and Korea expert Evans Revere told KEI.
“The deeply progressive government in Seoul cannot possibly give the U.S. what it wants — agreement that the ROK will support the U.S. militarily in a China- or Taiwan-related contingency and agreement to allow the U.S. to use Korea-based forces against China,” argues Revere, who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “And the U.S. does not wish to give the ROK what it wants — an open-ended commitment that Korea-based U.S. forces will be solely dedicated to the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression.”
Summit Disasters of the Past
The possibility that the upcoming summit could lead to a serious clash is well understood in Seoul, based on past experience and the much-publicized Oval Office encounters between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other world leaders. In the case of South Korea, the 1993 meeting between presidents Bill Clinton and Kim Young-sam and the 2001 summit between presidents George W. Bush and Kim Dae-jung are representative examples of what could happen if things go wrong.
“In both cases, the meeting went badly because of North Korea,” recalls former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard, who was a key participant in both summits. “In my mind they went badly because the Koreans failed to prepare carefully and understand where our president was.”
There are lessons for Lee Jae Myung, Hubbard told this writer in an interview. North Korea is not the problem now, as both Trump and Lee want to engage with North Korea. “The issue this time will be security relations, host nation support, and I don’t think anyone really knows where Trump is going to come down on troop levels in Korea. Lee Jae Myung is a progressive who wants to reach out to China but I think he is afraid Trump is going to make demands on troop reductions that will undercut him in Korea.”
Trump’s belief that there is no rationale to keep U.S. forces in South Korea is long-standing and unchanged. It is not hard to imagine a moment in the upcoming summit when Trump will once again raise this issue.
“I never took the strategic flexibility dispute seriously,” says Ambassador Hubbard, “but the danger is we push them too hard on Taiwan, on the relations with China, and at the same time raise questions about our strategic commitment.”
That could put the United States on a slippery slope toward abandoning its ally—something no South Korean leader would want to happen.
PREVIEW OF THE TRUMP-LEE SUMMIT. 8/18, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Korea Chair, CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS; William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair Emeritus, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS; Timothy Martin, Korea Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal. https://www.csis.org/events/impossible-state-live-podcast-preview-trump-lee-summit
TRILATERALISM THROUGH TRANSITION: PROSPECTS OF STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP. 8/18, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Eun A Jo, Assistant Professor of Government, William and Mary; Shihoko Goto, Senior Fellow, Mansfield Foundation. https://keia.org/event/trilateralism-through-transition-prospects-of-strengthening-u-s-south-korea-japan-partnership/
First Published August 13, 2025 in The Peninsula Blog of the Korean Economic Institute.
By Daniel C. Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and APP member.
The upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is shaping up to be a crucial moment in the more than seventy-year-long alliance.
The two leaders inked a vague agreement on trade and investment late last month, which appears to have opened the door to good relations, and President Lee has eagerly sought this meeting to strengthen his legitimacy and demonstrate his diplomatic skills.
But the summit also has the potential to imperil the alliance. While some economic issues remain—not least the U.S. tariffs on automobiles and semiconductors—the meeting is more likely to focus on a range of contentious security issues, including U.S. demands for greater South Korean contributions to defense costs and pressures for South Korea to commit to join military contingencies in Taiwan and subordinate its policies to an aggressive U.S. stance toward China.
All of these issues are now joined under two broad policy umbrellas the Trump administration calls “alliance modernization” and “strategic flexibility.”
Both concepts embody the idea of shifting the alliance away from its sole focus on deterring North Korea toward a broader regional approach that prioritizes confrontation with China, including the use of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in a Taiwan contingency. China is the number one strategic threat to the United States, and allies and partners must “do more,” according to an interim strategic guidance document the U.S. Department of Defense issued in July.
“Strategic flexibility” means that in the event of a clash with China, U.S. military forces based in South Korea will be withdrawn and deployed elsewhere. It demands that South Korea take on the preponderant burden of defense against potential North Korean aggression.
USFK Commander Xavier Brunson recently stated that the “USFK must be able to move to other locations and perform other missions at any time” and that South Korea must “play a great role in responding to North Korea, and USFK demonstrate flexibility to perform other missions.”
General Brunson acknowledged South Korea’s desire to connect any moves in this direction with the completion of a plan to reform the current system of operational control (OPCON), which places South Korea’s military under U.S. command during wartime. OPCON transfer to South Korea has been a long-standing goal for South Korea, particularly under progressive administrations. If the United States shifts its focus, then “the transition of wartime operational control in which South Korea leads the defense of the Korean Peninsula, must also be expedited,” argued the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun.
But Brunson pushed back against accelerating this process, telling reporters that “taking shortcuts to expedite the transfer of wartime operational control could jeopardize the readiness of the Korean Peninsula’s military.”
This has not stopped the Trump administration from preparing to push for South Korea’s acquiescence to their demands. An early draft of a U.S.-South Korea agreement sets a goal for the upcoming talks to compel South Korea to “issue a political statement supporting flexibility for USFK force posture to better deter China while continuing to deter [North Korea],” according to the Washington Post. This is to be paired with pressures to boost South Korea’s defense spending to 3.8 percent of GDP—up from 2.6 percent last year—and to vastly increase its support for the cost of basing U.S. forces.
Defense planners linked to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have pushed more specific plans to drastically cut the number of U.S. troops based in South Korea from the current level of 28,500 to 10,000. This would be done by effectively removing all ground troops from South Korea, leaving only air units that can easily be deployed elsewhere.
The United States has maintained the right to deploy its forces anywhere, and reductions in troop levels are hardly unprecedented. But in return, the United States accepted the South Korean stance that “it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”
More profoundly, the United States’ plans undermine the basic pledge to defend South Korea in a war—a commitment that underlies the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. The presence of U.S. ground forces is the famously labeled “tripwire” to guarantee the U.S. commitment.
“The continued presence of US troops at existing levels on the Korean Peninsula is more important than documents discussing ‘strategic flexibility’ or ‘modernized alliance,’” Senior Fellow at the Mansfield Foundation Bruce Klingner told this writer. “Maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea is a tangible manifestation of American commitment to the defense of its treaty partner. As such, they continue to be an integral part of Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command. In a conflict with North Korea, the American public and Congress would not allow a U.S. president to abandon them, particularly after casualties.”
The Trump administration faces resistance not only from South Korea but also from Congress, where support for the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula and opposition to downsizing the current troop levels remain strong, even among Republicans. The National Defense Authorization Act, which was passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, prohibits a reduction in the U.S. military posture or a change in wartime OPCON until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that “such action is in the national interest.” It also directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Indo-Pacific Command, and USFK to carry out an independent assessment of any such changes.
The North Korea Connection
The push to refocus the U.S. regional presence away from North Korea and toward China could potentially be linked to another sensitive issue shaping the upcoming Trump-Lee summit—relations with North Korea.
Rumors and hints of a resumption of talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have surfaced again in recent weeks. The Lee administration is supportive of such dialogue, as such moves are consistent with its desire to ease tensions with North Korea and revive serious engagement. But such talks are likely to only take place if Trump is heading seriously toward the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and acceptance of Kim’s demand that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.
“At some point, the ROK is going to pay a price for U.S.-DPRK dialogue if the U.S. under Trump decides to accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state,” former senior Department of State official and Korea expert Evans Revere told KEI.
“The deeply progressive government in Seoul cannot possibly give the U.S. what it wants — agreement that the ROK will support the U.S. militarily in a China- or Taiwan-related contingency and agreement to allow the U.S. to use Korea-based forces against China,” argues Revere, who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “And the U.S. does not wish to give the ROK what it wants — an open-ended commitment that Korea-based U.S. forces will be solely dedicated to the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression.”
Summit Disasters of the Past
The possibility that the upcoming summit could lead to a serious clash is well understood in Seoul, based on past experience and the much-publicized Oval Office encounters between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other world leaders. In the case of South Korea, the 1993 meeting between presidents Bill Clinton and Kim Young-sam and the 2001 summit between presidents George W. Bush and Kim Dae-jung are representative examples of what could happen if things go wrong.
“In both cases, the meeting went badly because of North Korea,” recalls former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard, who was a key participant in both summits. “In my mind they went badly because the Koreans failed to prepare carefully and understand where our president was.”
There are lessons for Lee Jae Myung, Hubbard told this writer in an interview. North Korea is not the problem now, as both Trump and Lee want to engage with North Korea. “The issue this time will be security relations, host nation support, and I don’t think anyone really knows where Trump is going to come down on troop levels in Korea. Lee Jae Myung is a progressive who wants to reach out to China but I think he is afraid Trump is going to make demands on troop reductions that will undercut him in Korea.”
Trump’s belief that there is no rationale to keep U.S. forces in South Korea is long-standing and unchanged. It is not hard to imagine a moment in the upcoming summit when Trump will once again raise this issue.
“I never took the strategic flexibility dispute seriously,” says Ambassador Hubbard, “but the danger is we push them too hard on Taiwan, on the relations with China, and at the same time raise questions about our strategic commitment.”
That could put the United States on a slippery slope toward abandoning its ally—something no South Korean leader would want to happen.
###
TRILATERALISM THROUGH TRANSITION: PROSPECTS OF STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP. 8/18, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Eun A Jo, Assistant Professor of Government, William and Mary; Shihoko Goto, Senior Fellow, Mansfield Foundation. https://keia.org/event/trilateralism-through-transition-prospects-of-strengthening-u-s-south-korea-japan-partnership/
Lessons of War
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By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
August 11, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
This month the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki commemorated the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings in 1945. While the sufferers of the atomic bombs, or hibakusha, aspire to eternal peace without the devastation of nuclear weapons, the gap between their hopes and the reality of world politics has widened. Hibakusha face a challenging task in handing their movement over to next generation, as the sufferers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki pass away.
In Hiroshima, in the Declaration of Peace at the Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6, the Mayor, Kazumi Matsui, introduced a story of an unnamed man who was injured by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. “Building a peaceful world without nuclear weapons will demand our never-give-up spirit. We have to talk and keep talking to people who hold opposing views,” Matsui said, quoting words of the hibakusha.
That unnamed man is thought to be Sunao Tsuboi who shook hands and had a short conversation with then U.S. President Barack Obama on his visit to Hiroshima in May 2016. “Never give up” is the phrase Tsuboi likes to use in his conversations. He once told me that he came to pursue peace and to hate war. Instead of continuing the resentment he held against America after the end of the war, he realized that retaliation would produce nothing. This principle is commonly held by the hibakusha.
Mayor Matsui also warned against a growing perception that “nuclear weapons are essential for national defense,” a view that he and many other believe heightens the risk of the use of these weapons.
In Nagasaki, Mayor, Shiro Suzu urged in his Nagasaki Peace Declaration on August 9 for the world to take the path to a peaceful future through dialogue with different people. Suzuki pressed world leaders to end disputes that are based on a principle of “force is met with force.”
One event at which the world community seemed to meet the hopes of the hibakusha was the award of the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize to the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization, or Nihon Hidankyo. The Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized that “Nihon Hidankyo has carried out extensive educational work on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Hence the motto ‘No more Hibakusha.’”
However, the reality of world politics has recently visited more disappointments on the hibakusha. Recognizing that it can use its nuclear weapons stockpile to blackmail Ukraine, Russia has continued its war. Commenters have noticed that the invasion by a country with nuclear weapons of another that abandoned nuclear weapons undermines the international non-proliferation regime. Ukraine gave up its status of the world’s third largest nuclear power with the Budapest Memorandum in 1994.
A growing concern among the hibakusha is the fact that the nuclear powers are increasing their involvement in international conflicts. Despite efforts to find a peace deal in the Gaza Strip, Israel – widely thought to have nuclear weapons capability – has continued to destroy cities in the region to eliminate a terrorist organization, Hamas. India and Pakistan, both of which are recognized as nuclear powers, exchanged military strikes in May over a terrorist attack in Kashmir.
The hibakusha were astonished that the U.S. conducted air strikes in June on three of Iran’s nuclear sites. Aggravating the situation for the hibakusha was U.S. President Donald Trump’s justification for the attacks on Iran as a means of ending the conflict between Iran and Israel. Trump likened the U.S. attack on Iran to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, characterizing the strikes on Iran as “essentially the same thing.” “Nothing has changed 80 years after the war,” said one of the hibakusha.
The survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are also frustrated with the diplomacy of the government of Japan on nuclear non-proliferation. In their peace declarations, Matsui and Suzuki strongly recommended that the government join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, issued by the United Nations in 2017. The Japanese government has routinely rejected that request because Japan is under nuclear umbrella of the U.S.
In his speeches at the ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Prime Minister Ishiba stressed Japan’s efforts toward “the world without nuclear weapons” not through the 2017 UN treaty, but the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. Ishiba also quoted the Hiroshima Action Plan, a plan first proposed by his predecessor Fumio Kishida in a speech to NPT Review Conference in 2022. The plan would preclude the use of nuclear weapons and enhance the transparency of a country’s nuclear development.
When we look at the reality of the hibakusha, they are decreasing year after year. Hibakusha who have kept their copies of the Atomic Bomb Survivor’s Handbook, issued by Japanese government, fell below 100,000 in 2024. It means we have fewer and fewer people who can talk about the direct experience of the devastation brought by atomic bombs. How the narratives of Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be passed down to future generations is an important – and unresolved – question.
In his peace declaration, Matsui urged young people to think less about themselves and more about each other. “Clearly, nations, too, must look beyond narrow self-interest to consider the circumstances of other nations,” Matsui said. This tenet is grounded in the preamble to the Constitution of Japan, which states that “no nation is responsible for itself alone.” While Hiroshima’s hope for peace is as fresh as ever, the reality of the world, including that in Japan, looks as if the great tragedy of the atomic bombings has been forgotten.
###
BOOK TALK: RAIN OF RUIN BY RICHARD OVERY. 10/7, 6:30-8:30pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Imperial War Museums. Speaker: author Richard Overy, one of Britain’s most distinguished historians. https://www.iwm.org.uk/events/iwm-in-conversation-richard-overy-rain-of-ruin. Fee. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/45hyoOU
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THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN: ORCHESTRATING THE END OF THE WAR. 9/2, 11:00am-Noon, HYBRID. Sponsor: National WWII Museum. Speaker: Colonel Mike Bell, PhD, Executive Director of the Museum’s Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/events-programs/events/137098-surrender-japan-orchestrating-end-war
2025 CONFERENCE TO HONOR 80TH ANNIVERSARY OF END OF WORLD WAR II. 8/30-9/2. IN PERSON ONLY, Hilton Garden Inn, Arlington, VA. Sponsor: American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Society. Various presentations on the American POW experience with Imperial Japan. https://www.adbcmemorialsociety.org/
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80TH ANNIVERSARY END OF WAR SYMPOSIUM. 8/8-9. Sponsor: National WWII Museum-New Orleans. Speakers: Guenter Bischof; Michael Neiberg; John McManus; Craig Symonds; James Scott; John Curatola; Jonathan House; Richard Frank; Jim Zobel; Noriko Kawamura. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/events-programs/events/135816-80th-anniversary-end-war-symposium VIDEO
THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO: THE HOTTEST FLASHPOINTS TODAY. 8/1. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Speakers: M.G. Sheftall, Professor, Modern Japanese Cultural History and Communication, Faculty of Informatics, Shizuoka University; Alexis Dudden, Professor, Department of History, University of Connecticut and Visiting Professor of Japanese Studies, National University of Singapore; Koichi Nakano, Professor, Political Science, Sophia University. https://www.fccj.or.jp/news-and-multimedia/press-conference-contested-history-world-war-two-hottest-flashpoints-today-mg VIDEO
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