Monday Asia Policy Events, July 14, 2025

DISINFORMATION & MISINFORMATION: CURRENT HAPPENINGS IN JAPAN, THE U.S. AND BEYOND. 7/14, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), 5:30-7:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan. Speakers: Matthew Blomberg Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Journalism, Temple University Japan; John W. Cheng Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Communication, Aoyamagaukin University. 

CAN A GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON HEALTH TAXES FINANCE DEVELOPMENT? 7/14, 1:30-2:30pm (BST), 8:30-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CDG). Speakers: Jeremias Paul Jr, Coordinator, Tobacco Control Economics Unit, WHO; N.K. Singh, Former Chairman, Fifteenth Finance Commission of India; Member, Task Force on Fiscal Policy for Health; Moderator: Pete Baker, Deputy Director, Global Health Policy Program and Policy Fellow, CGD.

THE TARIFF DEAL: RECIPROCITY, TRADE BALANCE, AND INDUSTRY. 7/14, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). Speakers: Wendy Cutler, Vice President and Managing Director of the DC Office, Asia Society Policy Institute; Tami Overby, Partner of Government Relations, DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group; Sarah Ahn, Economic Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea; Moderator: Scott Snyder, President and CEO, KEI. 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. 7/14, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Society for International Development, United States Chapter. Speakers: Michael Gubser, Professor of History, James Madison University; Samuel A. Worthington, Author, Prisoners of Hope; Moderator: Anne Simmons-Benton, Co-Head of the U.S. Delegation to the W20 and Principal, Deep Water Point, LLC. 

REIMAGINING EU RESEARCH AND INNOVATION POLICY FOR GLOBAL IMPACT. 7/14, 1:00-2:30pm (CET), 7:00-8:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Centre for European Policy Studies. Speakers: Andrea Renda, Director of Research, Centre for European Policy Studies; Stefaan Verhulst, Co-Founder, GovLab and DataTank; Research Professor, New York University; Lisa Goerlitz, Head, Brussels Office and EU Advocacy, Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevoelkerung (DSW); Sylvia Schwaag Serger, President, Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA); Professor, Lund University; Gunilla Carlsson, Deputy Executive Director, UNAIDS; Former Minister for International Development Cooperation, Sweden; Antoine Mercier, Science and Technology Counsellor, Permanent Representation of France to the EU; Michiel Scheffer, Principal Adviser; President, EIC Board, DG RTD, European Commission; Rosalind Kenny Birch, Second Secretary for Research and Innovation, UK Mission to the EU. 

REPORT LAUNCH: RUSSIA’S FUTURE RULERS. 7/14, 2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Anton Barbashin, Co-founder & Editorial Director, Riddle Russia; Evelyn Farkas, Executive Director, McCain Institute; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, US Department of Defense; Mikhail Zygar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Brian Whitmore, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Assistant Professor of Practice, University of Texas-Arlington.

Japan's Upper House Elections I

Parties Campaign on Three Policy Differences


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 7, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s Upper House election season opened on July 3 with the vote to take place on July 20. This election is overwhelmingly about two issues: support of families suffering from price inflation and international relations, specifically with the United States. In addition, the management of political funds by the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will be front and center for many voters.

Protection against price inflation has largely taken the form of a debate over the consumption tax. Voters are divided over possible measures to reduce price inflation – so the parties have focused on this issue. In an NHK poll in May, 38 percent of respondants favored a consumption tax cut, while just two percent fewer, 36 percent, supported the current consumption tax rate. Eighteen percent wanted to abolish the consumption tax altogether.

Several opposition parties would reduce or eliminate the tax. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) proposes a zero percent consumption tax on food, which is their top priority. The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, insists that the government can eliminate this part of the consumption tax without an impact on government finances that would compel the issuance of new government bonds.

In a debate featuring party leaders at the Japan National Press Club (JNPC) on July 2, Prime Minister Ishiba (the president of the LDP) asked Noda what financial resources would offset the consumption tax cut. Noda pointed to two areas: the surplus in the governmental funds that are reserved for special policy purposes and the foreign exchange fund special account. Noda also said that other, unspecified tax measures could be revised.

The CDPJ has estimated that eliminating the consumption tax on food would reduce tax revenues by five trillion yen a year. Noda said in February that his party had found a 7.8 trillion-yen surplus in governmental funds. He also argued that much more of the government’s profits in foreign exchange could be included in the government’s general account. And he asserted that the special purpose tax on wage increase would increase the government’s revenues by 0.7 trillion yen. In the CDPJ’s view, all these resources would make a consumption tax cut on food feasible.

Taking a different approach, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) calls for halving consumption tax rate (from ten percent to five percent) on all goods on a time-limited basis. The cut would continue until the growth in workers’ wages exceeds consumer price inflation. But the party has not identified as specific budgetary resource for this tax reduction as what the CDPJ listed.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) favors another route: reducing the consumption tax rate on all goods to five percent before taking it to zero. But the party has not announced when the consumption tax will be repealed. Reiwa Shinsengumi, a small party with liberal policies, says that the government can offset these rate cuts by raising other tax rates and issuing government bonds.

The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) does not look to the consumption tax rate to protect against the effects of inflation but rather focuses on reducing premium for social insurance.

In lieu of any changes to tax rates, the LDP and Komeito propose to distribute twenty thousand yen to everyone and an additional twenty thousand yen for each child or a low-income family. The parties dismiss consumption tax rate reductions as unviable. To that point, in the debate at the JNPC, the chief representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, asked Noda about what would happen when the government resumes the current consumption tax rate, which in a sense becomes a tax increase. Noda did not provide a clear answer.

Turning to international relations, the opposition parties are critical of Ishiba’s management of foreign affairs. Just a few days before the start of election campaign, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his frustration with the bilateral tariff negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. “Dear Mr. Japan, here’s the story: You’re going to pay a 25 percent on your cars,” said Trump. He also complained about the small amount of Japan’s imports of American rice, particularly given the rice shortage in the Japanese market.

In a mixed message yesterday, July 7, Trump sent a letter to Ishiba, saying that a 25 percent tariff on all Japanese goods would apply on August 1 unless the countries reach an agreement before then. Trump had previously set a deadline of July 9 for the conclusion of tariff negotiations, so his letter extends the negotiating timeline. Interestingly, the deadline is ten days after the election.

In the JNPC debate, Noda asked Ishiba how he planned to resolve these negotiations. Ishiba did not specify a way forward but stressed that Japan’s unique position as the biggest national investor and biggest job creator in the U.S. “The success of Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel means that they can deliver good products with their technology and U.S. Steel’s labor force. I think our position with the U.S. is more about investment than tariffs,” Ishiba said. When Noda recommended another summit talk with Trump as soon as possible, Ishiba simply repeated that he would protect the national interests of Japan.

The Trump administration has demanded that Japan increase its defense budget to cover the costs of expanding its military and of hosting the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. At the JNPC debate, the Chairwoman of the Japan Communist Party, Tomoko Tamura, observed that a swollen military budget would not be compatible with social security policies. When Ishiba rejected Tamura’s argument for failing to recognize Japan’s security situation, Tamura accused Ishiba of ignoring suffering families.

On another foreign policy note, the debate covered Trump’s recent reference to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump compared those events to the recent U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities as tactics that ended a war. (In the case of Iran, a ceasefire would count as an ending.) Ishiba refrained from criticizing Trump. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, rejected the comparison.

The greatest single reason for the LDP’s major defeat in the Lower House election last October was the party’s mismanagement of political funds. That weakness remains. Ishiba failed to reach a consensus with the opposition parties on the regulation of donations from companies and organizations during the ordinary session of the Diet. The issue surely will weigh in the voters’ decision later this month.

The opposition parties have different views on the question of political donations. The Japan Innovation Party urges a total ban on corporate and organizational donations, while the CDPJ would allow donations from some organizations. The DPP fundamentally opposes any ban on donations. As seen in their mistake of fielding multiple candidates in single-seat districts such as Nara, Shiga or Fukui, the fragmentation of the opposition parties may help the LDP.

Monday Asia Policy Events, July 7, 2025

IS THE DOLLAR IN DANGER? 7/7, Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy. Speakers: Kenneth Rogoff, Author, Our Dollar, Your Problem; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy. 

STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 2025. 7/7, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Energy Security & Climate Change Program, CSIS. Speakers: Nick Wayth, CEO, Energy Institute; Daniel Yergin, Vice Chairman, S&P Global; Angie Gildea, ENR Regional Co-Leader for Americas, KPMG in the U.S.; Joseph Majkut, Director, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. 

RULE OF LAW IN CHINA, 10 YEARS AFTER THE 709 CRACKDOWN. 7/7, 2:00–3:00 pm (EDT), ONLINE. Sponsor: Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS. Speakers: Henrietta Levin, Senior Fellow and Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS; Nicholas Bequelin, Research Scholar in Law and Senior Fellow, Yale Law School; Jonathan Czin, Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings; Donald C. Clarke, David Weaver Research Professor Emeritus of Law, GW Law School; Yaqiu (Rachel) Wang, Chinese Human Rights Researcher and Advocate. 

ADM DENNIS BLAIR - US NATIONAL SECURITY AND WORLD AFFAIRS. 7/7, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: ADM Dennis Blair, former Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command. 

Lobbying Trump's Tariffs

Tariff-related lobbying surged in the first quarter of 2025

By Leonardo Pini, OpenSecrets, July 1, 2025

Throughout the 2024 campaign, Donald Trump touted the financial windfall to be reaped if the United States were to impose a series of revenue-raising tariffs. Since returning to office, the president has followed through on that promise — but has rescinded or reduced some tariffs and faced multiple court challenges threatening to derail his economic agenda.

As companies, investors and trading partners grapple to keep up with the constantly shifting tariff landscape, one industry has seen a big boost to its bottom line: the lobbying sector, which experienced a surge in tariff-related work in the first quarter of 2025.

In the first three months of this year, lobbyists represented 215 clients on tariff issues, according to lobbying disclosure reports studied by OpenSecrets. In all of 2024, lobbyists handled tariff work for just 120 clients. And it’s not just the number of clients signed — lobbyists stepped up their work on those contracts, filing 1,707 reports on tariff work in the first quarter of 2025. That puts them on track to surpass last year’s total of 5,679. 

If they keep up that pace, they would surpass the number of reports filed in 2018 and come closer to the 2019 total, when Trump implemented tariffs in his first term. 

Most active lobbyists

• One of the industries that has had a difficult time navigating the strategy behind Trump’s trade war has been pharmaceuticals. In recent weeks, Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on medicines as part of a broader strategy to manufacture more drugs domestically. As a result, amongst the companies that have increased their lobbying spending the most from Q1 2024 to Q1 2025 we can find major organizations like the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacture of America, Ely Lilly and Apotex. PhRMA increased its spending from $9.8 million to almost $13 million. Ely Lilly boosted its spending from $1.9 million to $3.5 million. Apotex’s expenses surged from $140,000 to $810,000, as the company spent more in Q1 2025 than all of 2024.
• The three companies have lobbied on significantly different issues. Apotex has lobbied to exempt pharmaceutical products from becoming part of the broader trade war launched by the Trump administration. Eli Lilly has lobbied mostly on intellectual property, access to markets through trade negotiations and general issues related to tariffs and trade talks with Japan, the European Union, China, India, the United Kingdom and Brazil. Some of the issues PhRMA has been focusing on regard intellectual property as well tariffs policy related to the pharmaceutical sector and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which gives the president powers to take actions against unfair trade practices. 
• One of the companies more active on lobbying on tariffs has been Hawaii Gas, which had not reported any lobbying activity in previous years. The company lobbied on issues related to the imports of propane from Canada. Propane and energy products are protected by the USMCA (U.S.-Mexico-Canada) trade agreement. It spent $40,000 in Q1 2025 on that and more general issues related to tariffs on Canada. 
• Nike Inc. and Adidas AG, amongst the biggest apparel companies in the world, are amongst the companies that offshore their production the most, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, set to be hit hard by Trump’s tariffs. Both companies have boosted their lobbying expenditures: Nike went from $410,000 in Q1 2024 to $630,000 in Q1 2025, while Adidas went from $10,000 to $27,000. According to the Budget Lab at Yale University, tariffs could spike clothing and textiles price lines by 17 percent. Nike lobbied mostly on policies that could result in adversary foreign tariffs and goods imported from China. Adidas filed only one report in 2025 regarding tariffs. 
• General Motors also reported a huge spike in lobbying expenditures in the first quarter, with trade being one of the top priorities. The automotive giant has surged its lobbying expenses from $4.8 million in Q1 2024 to $8.2 million in Q1 2025, a 69 percent increase. Amongst the most pressing issues for the company are non-tariff trade barriers, USCMA and the international auto supply chain. The company has also said that tariffs will cost it up to $5 billion. 
• Apple has been a target for Trump for some time, as he tries to compel the tech giant to bring its manufacturing to the United States, saying recently that he has “a little problem with Tim Cook.” Trade-related issues has been one of the main focuses for the company, filing three reports regarding trade in the first quarter of 2025. Reports touch on different issues such as U.S. competitiveness in global markets and reintroduction of the American Innovation and Choice Act and/or the Open App Markets Act. The company,  headquartered in Cupertino, California, has increased its lobbying efforts from $2.1 million in Q1 2024  to $2.5 million in Q1 2025. 
• Paper Excellence, a North-American pulp and paper company, has increased its lobbying expenses on tariffs by 237 percent between Q1 2024 and Q1 2025. The company went from $80,000 in the first quarter of last year to $270,000 in the first quarter of this year. It filed different reports on tariffs: one regarding the miscellaneous tariff bill, one regarding general discussions on the impact of tariffs and one regarding section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
• Two aluminum companies — Century Aluminum and Aluminum Association — also reported a spike in lobbying on tariffs. The latter went from $80,000 in Q1 2024 to $230,000 in Q1 2025, lobbying mostly on aluminum trade and tariffs issues. Century Aluminum went from $119,000 to $229,000. It lobbied on section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the president powers to adjust imports of certain goods if there’s a concern for national security. Century Aluminum also lobbied to support the effort of the administration to increase tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from China. In June 2025, Trump announced an increase of tariffs on those products from 25 percent to 50 percent. 

Why does it matter?

U.S. and international companies are trying to keep up with the administration’s shifting tariff policies, knowing any changes would impact supply chains, production lines, the cost of putting together a product or offering a service, and therefore the final cost consumers will pay. 

According to the Budget Lab at Yale University “the price level from all 2025 tariffs rises by 2.3% in the short-run, the equivalent of an average per household consumer loss of $3,800 in 2024$. Annual losses for households at the bottom of the income distribution are $1,700.”

And it’s not just big companies and their consumers that are going to pay the price of Trump’s decisions. Small businesses are also affected by the scale of these measures and the on-again, off-again policies. 

No Gains for Ishiba in the 12-Day War

But not a “survival-threatening situation"

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun. You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 30, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

The military conflict between Israel and Iran, in which the United States became directly involved, has been a real source of anxiety for Japan. Not only did Japan worry about the impact on its economy if Iran moved to block the Strait of Hormuz, but it also had to keep its distance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The conflict, which the U.S. President Donald Trump has called the 12-day war, reminded Japan about the cost of its alliance with the U.S.
 
Israel launched military attacks on nuclear sites in Iran on June 13 and killed Iranian military leaders. Iran immediately struck back on cities in Israel, including Tel Aviv, causing some deaths. After days of deliberation, Trump launched a military operation on June 21, bombing three nuclear facilities in Iran with a weapon called the “bunker buster.” On June 24, Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, but it has been an uneasy time for both countries.
 
The Ishiba administration criticized Israel for its attack on Iran early in June. “The use of military means amid the ongoing diplomatic efforts, including U.S.-Iran talks aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Iran’s nuclear issue, is completely unacceptable and deeply regrettable,” said the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeshi Iwaya, in a statement on June 13.
 
Japan changed its view, however, after the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. “Amidst the extremely difficult circumstances surrounding Iran’s nuclear issue, the United States has been seriously pursuing dialogue, and Japan understands that the U.S. action demonstrates its determination to de-escalate the situation while preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,” said Iwaya in another statement on June 23.
 
While Japan regards Israel’s attacks on Iran as a violation of international law, it nevertheless “understood” the U.S. attacks that supported Israel.  Anticipating a push-back from within Japan about a double standard of diplomacy, Ishiba said in a press conference that “it is difficult for us to make a fixed assessment in terms of international law.”
 
Ishiba meanwhile stressed that Japan depended on the Middle East for over 90 percent of its oil imports. According to data from the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in 2021, 86.7 percent of Japan’s energy came from fossil fuels, of which 37.7 percent was oil. Middle Eastern crude oil accounted for 92.5 percent of oil supplies in Japan for that year. Oil from the Middle East thus is essential for Japan.
 
The most serious concern in Japan was the possibility that Iran would block the Strait of Hormuz, through which most Middle East oil tankers pass. When former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan in 2015, his administration said that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would constitute a ” triggering Japan’s collective self-defense right.
 
If Iran were to block the strait, if the U.S. were to ask Japan to send minesweepers, and if Japan were to do so, Iran could claim that Japan had entered the war. In a discussion on June 23 of this risk, the Chief of the Policy Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party (and formerly the Minister of Defense in the Abe Cabinet), Itsunori Onodera, concluded that the situation in the strait did not yet threaten Japan’s survival for the purpose of Article 9.   
 
Also on June 23, the Israel-Iran conflict caused a rise in gasoline prices in Japan for the first time in nine weeks. The opposition parties showed unusual unity in pushing for gasoline tax reductions at the last moment of the ordinary session of the Diet. If the prices remain high in the coming weeks, it may have a negative political impact on the Ishiba administration, with the Upper House election scheduled for late July.
 
Recognizing the possibility that the conflict could affect Japan’s security, Ishiba was reluctant to become involved in the politics among the Western powers. He cancelled the leaders’ meeting of NATO in the Hague, Netherlands, as other Asian partners from South Korea, Australia, New Zealand also withdrew. Although NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte praised Trump’s decision to strike Iran, Japan was not ready to stand together with the U.S. President who had been demanding that Japan significantly increase its defense budget.
 
Trump unexpectedly drew a parallel between the U.S. strikes on Iran and the atomic bombing of Japan in August 1945. “I don’t want to use an example of Hiroshima, I don’t want to use an example of Nagasaki, but that was essentially the same thing. That ended that war,” said Trump at his meeting with Rutte.
 
The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, decried Trump’s remarks. “I do not approve of his statement, which would justify dropping atomic bombs. Our stance on nuclear weapons is that it is an absolute evil,” Saito told Ishiba. Ishiba said that he felt the same way.  Developments in the Middle East have only underscored Ishiba’s political weakness.  Ishiba has been unable to gain any political advantage from Trump’s agenda for peace through strength.