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The New Dynamics of U.S.-Japan Armaments Cooperation
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Framing the Negotiation
“Good intentions, not always observed in the breach.”

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A Dozen Stipulations

1. Take the 10,000 ft. view. Don't assume anyone else will.
2. As goes U.S.-Japan Armaments Cooperation, so goes a great alliance. Considering that we are addressing the security futures of two of the world's great Pacific powers, the prospect of this negotiation is a sobering thought.
3. U.S.-Japan Armaments Cooperation amounts to a negotiation with very high stakes, one that will set many trajectories -- technical, political, doctrinal, strategic, alliance -- for the United States and Japan, for American extended deterrence and power projection, and for effective missile defense.
4. Japan is motivated. North Korea's missile tests in 1998 and again on July 4th galvanized Japan just as Sputnik focused the United States.
5. Even more enervating is the rise of China. Furthermore, the challenges of Iran and the global war on terror loom in the background.

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6. U.S.-Japan Armaments Cooperation will require extensive preparation, due diligence, and consideration of internal and external factors well beyond technical acquisition issues.
7. Traditional expectations and measures of effectiveness -- i.e., statements of work; work share agreements; budgets framed and expended; hardware developed and delivered -- are insufficient and deceptive.
8. To succeed, U.S.-Japan Armaments Cooperation will require an unnatural act: collaboration between and synthesis of politics, policy, operations, strategy, intelligence, technology, and acquisition. This amounts to a very difficult integration challenge.
9. U.S. negotiators will have to get the U.S. story straight from the outset, which will derive from a variety of often uncoordinated American defense policies and strategies. Allies expect to hear this story, and are reading and listening very carefully. In this regard, don't wait for perfect information. Get the policy and strategy information you need. Integrate Armaments Cooperation into those policies and strategies.
10. The range of potential outcomes for the U.S. and for the U.S.-Japan alliance -- both positive and negative -- is dramatically broad.
11. We are on the cusp of a general recognition of the strategic importance of extended air and missile defense, driven by ballistic and cruise missile proliferation and escalation. This will influence every aspect of R&D and acquisition cooperation with Japan.
12. This is not your father's JASDF, JDA, or Japan, all of which will bring new capabilities, requirements, and expectations to the negotiating table. Japan is changing fast, with new requirements, expectations, and strategic approaches.

General Observations on R&D and Acquisition Cooperation with Japan

The USG is in the midst of an ongoing, increasingly complex and difficult negotiation: due diligence, clear objectives, explicit requests, and anticipating and controlling outcomes on the part of the USG -- and American industry partners -- are essential to success.

Agree on goals and objectives up front. Don't wait for perfect information. We do not have to know "everything" in order to proceed. Expect and be prepared for change.

Plan for internal U.S. engagement with two goals: USG leadership alignment at the highest possible levels; and downward direction provided to the rest of the government: don't force freelancing or enable dissent.

This is a multi-player game internally and externally. Japan is not the only international actor involved, and the approach to Japan cannot be conceived or executed in isolation. (Yes, this includes China.)

Involve Japan and other allies from the earliest possible point in planning for R&D and acquisition cooperation. Other allies have an interest in many of the same acquisition programs, and nevertheless will be interested in outcomes involving Japan.

Be sure to ask for what you want from Japan and other prospective international negotiating partners. This sounds self-evident, but is not always done. Be sure to articulate both what you want and what you are not willing to give up.

Remember that you will chase your Japanese counterparts until they catch you.

The negotiation includes essential internal and external components:

Internal (“Traditional”)

- Alliance relations
- Industrial base
- Technology base
- Bureaucratic relations

External (“Non-Traditional”)

- The rise of China and Iran
- North Korea as a Japanese stalking horse for China
- Connectivity and integration as well as interoperability
- Evolving extended air defense goals, objectives, and doctrines
- Geo-strategic competitions involving the United States and Japan
- Alliance roles and missions, in particular redressing the split in air defense connectivity
- Changing Japanese defense policy
- Early warning and C4ISR
- National missile defense considerations and implications, at least for Japan and more than likely for the United States

Take into account essential operational and strategic factors relevant to Japan and to the rest of the Asia-Pacific.

Technical issues and technology considerations are extraordinarily consequential to all parties. This will require that negotiators forge close partnerships with technical experts and technology leaders. Leverage the available extraordinary U.S. influence and connections with the Japanese civilian science and technology community.

Projecting into the future is fundamental. This negotiation will affect and shape -- and be shaped by -- the future bilateral alliance with Japan and the future security environment in which that

alliance and U.S. forces must operate. Take into account intelligence assessments and long term projections that include “non-traditional” exogenous factors.

The key task is to enable successful and integrated USG leadership through careful and authoritative internal U.S. coordination and collaboration.

Specific Recommendations:

Centralized leadership is a tide that lifts all boats. OSD’s role is paramount.

Identify U.S. stakeholders and U.S. decisionmakers. Include them in planning and the negotiating process from the beginning. The importance of achieving American consensus cannot be overestimated, and is 99% of the effort.

Establish authoritative U.S. leadership commitment from the outset.

Understand and incorporate in negotiation objectives and strategies the operational and strategic implications of transferring American technology.

Coordinate the U.S. interagency position in advance of bilateral and/or multilateral overtures.

Get Congress involved – not because Congress might be *against* R&D and acquisition cooperation with Japan, but because Congress has to be *for* it. On the one hand, Congress will pay for advanced U.S. defense capability, but must understand and be persuaded of its value. Likewise, Congress will accept the negotiated bargain -- what we will give, and what we will get in return -- if it is consulted early, often, and effectively.

Perhaps it goes without saying, but it should not be left unsaid: Don’t limit consideration of programmatic cooperation to Japan. There are other international partners to be considered. Their interests will affect U.S. and Japanese considerations and objectives. Some lessons learned in the process of negotiating with Japan will apply to other negotiating partners, if not across the board. Sunk costs in preparing for negotiations with Japan (such as achieving American consensus that is 99% of the effort) will defray effort and expense in other negotiations.

Cross-Cutting and Synthesized Due Diligence and Essential Knowledge (N.B.: All U.S. stakeholders and players need to know this.)

- The future technical state of the art of individual and combined U.S. defense technologies and systems contemplated for cooperative R&D and acquisition.
- Strategic, technical, political, and national defense industrial base implications of technology transfer.
- The future security environment, strategically and at the operational level of war, on a global and regional basis.
- U.S. Air Force strategies, plans and policies vis-à-vis technologies and systems.
- Differences of view, perspective, and objectives in the U.S. Include OSD, Air Force, Regional Combatant Commanders, numbered Air Force Commanders, Congress, and industry (systems and production).
- Japanese stakeholders.
- Variegated Japanese expectations and negotiating goals.
- Japanese decisionmakers
- Other international stakeholders.
- Other international expectations.
- Other international decisionmakers

Develop, coordinate, and conduct a public information operations campaign.

Consider the record of Theater Missile Defense with Japan as a possible template. Assess TMD lessons, successes, and failures, and the future political salience of repeating this approach. Consider FS-X as a politically expensive lesson.

Incorporate the lessons learned, implications, and precedents set of the recent UK MOD visit to Washington, during which he insisted on technical transparency, SIPRNET access, and sharing in the Joint Strike Fighter program.

Objectively gauge Japanese propensity for cooperation, in the fullest sense, from the differing perspectives of each of the Japanese stakeholders and decisionmakers. The willingness and ability to do so is very conflicted in some quarters.

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A Five Step Process:

1. Assess who will be interested in sales and developmental cooperation: the Japanese and others, and what they want.
2. Decide what DoD needs/wants technically, financially, and politically from the Japanese and others. Don't limit the set of requirements to symmetric exchange.
3. Decide what we will not give away to Japan and others. Discriminate as necessary.
4. Assess what the Japanese and others can offer in assistance.
5. Determine the overlap between 1, 2, 3, and 4 to establish U.S. objectives and the negotiating space.

History Lesson:

History does not repeat, but it does rhyme. The Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 provides a number of useful historical lessons regarding negotiations with Japan:

- The Washington Naval Conference set the strategic trajectory for naval competition in the Pacific in the inter-war years. Japan was ambitious, ambivalent, competitive, anxious, defensive, and resentful of its treatment by the Great Powers after World War I.
- Generally, American and Japanese negotiators were on very different pages throughout the conference. Failure to discern the extent and significance of this dichotomy was the manifestation of and led to continued strategic divergence.
- American negotiators profited greatly throughout the process from very effective intelligence support.